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ABSTRACT
The Jaguar motor company in the 1980s under the leadership of John Egan attained an 
iconic status as a modem, revitalised company, being hailed as one of the great 
success stories of the decade. This view portrayed Jaguar as having resolved the 
quality and industrial relations problems that had developed during the period of the 
BL stewardship from 1968 to 1980, and which in consequence achieved record levels 
of sales volumes, and profits, before declining again after 1986.
This thesis presents a revisionist view of the problems suffered by Jaguar during the 
1980s, and the reasons why the company under the Egan management failed to 
resolve these. Building on the previous work of Lewchuk and Whisler it examines 
Jaguar’s deficiencies in management, industrial relations, engineering, production, 
product quality, and marketing. Moreover, it reveals how these deficiencies were 
masked by a clever public relations programme by Jaguar which concealed both its 
failure to address many of its inherited problems, and the reasons for its decline after 
the launch of the new saloon car in 1986.
There have been no academic works that have focused on Jaguar, and little has been 
written about Jaguar’s quality problems, and the part played by its inadequate 
engineering function, under Egan. This thesis, therefore, might be seen as filling an 
obvious gap in the historiography of the British motor industry in general, and Jaguar 
in particular. The research to a large extent has been an exercise in oral history. 
However, the information obtained from interviews with an elite group of former 
executives of Ford or Jaguar, and other informed individuals, has been triangulated 
with published and unpublished primary sources such as Jaguar’s Reports and 
Accounts, press releases, newspaper reports and articles, and official statistics.
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INTRODUCTION
History is not what actually happened hut what the surviving evidence says 
happened. I f the evidence can be hidden and the secrets kept, then history will 
record an inaccurate version.
- Tom Bower. “The Perfect English Spy” (Biography of Sir Dick White).
The Jaguar motor company in the 1980s under the leadership of John Egan attained an 
iconic status as a modem, revitalised company, being hailed as one of the great success 
stories of the decade. This is a view that portrays Jaguar as having resolved the quality 
and industrial relations problems that had developed during the period of the BL 
stewardship from 1968 to 1980 and, in consequence, achieved records levels of sales 
volumes, and profits. When Jaguar experienced considerable difficulties from 1986 
onwards, its explanation of this being due to the strength of Sterling, particularly against 
the US Dollar, and lower demand for luxury cars in the US market, was widely accepted 
without question. This is the conventional, or popular, view of the 1980s' Jaguar story, 
and which continues to be reiterated in various recent enthusiasts' books about Jaguar. 
However, there were a number of problems with Jaguar, which, although indicated in the 
1990s after the Ford takeover, were never actually looked at in detail, and never really 
understood.
This thesis presents a revisionist view of the problems suffered by Jaguar 
dining the 1980s, highlighting in particular the company's deficiencies in engineering, 
and its quality problems, and the reasons why the Egan management failed to resolve 
these. It is this view that is presented as the addition to the body of existing knowledge 
required of any doctoral thesis. This thesis also throws light on the company's 
relationship with the City, and in addressing such issues as corporate governance, in an 
era before this topic became of major concern in the 1990s, it touches on aspects that 
have not been discussed in the literature.
In researching this thesis, due regard was paid to the various factors 
influencing or determining the success of the company during this period, but it was 
apparent from the start that a factorial approach in itself would provide but a superficial 
and unsatisfactory explanation. Indeed, the causes of Jaguar's failure in the late 1980s
1
were obviously more fundamental and deep-rooted than were portrayed at the time, and 
since, and require explanation in terms of a broader conceptual framework than that 
provided by factorial analysis. This was apparent from the various studies produced by 
Whisler, particularly regarding British Leyland (which with its various predecessor 
companies such as BMH, and BMC, is referred to throughout this thesis as BL), and his 
focus on the semi-specialist sports cars that were merged into BL.1 The exclusion of 
Jaguar from his doctoral thesis, and his first book, published in 1995, is not clearly 
explained by Whisler, and was something that was questioned by Foreman-Peck in his 
review of that work.2 In this review, Foreman-Peck suggests that if Jaguar, and other 
companies, had not been merged into “one huge, mismanaged business that went 
bankrupt”, then it might have been able to innovate successfully. Whisler did not seek to 
address such issues in his 1999 book, a work which contained hardly any mentions of 
Jaguar. This thesis, therefore, seeks to fill this gap in Whisler’s various studies.
Much of this thesis concerns John Egan. Given that he was the executive head 
of Jaguar for the whole of the 1980s, it could not be otherwise. In examining his role, this 
thesis summarizes, and provides an analysis of, what an elite group of people have said 
about him and the way in which he ran the company. Here, the oral evidence presented in 
this thesis is remarkably consistent, revealing that there were major shortcomings as far 
as Egan’s management of the company was concerned. In particular, his failure as a 
manager to recognize his own limitations denied Jaguar an effective recognition of the 
problems, and hence its ability to resolve them. Also, throughout this thesis reference is 
made to “the Egan management”, a term which is used to refer collectively to the senior 
management team at Jaguar, not just Egan alone. Many of the problems at Jaguar were 
due to the deficiencies of various members of this team, but, even so, the responsibility 
for their actions rested ultimately with Egan, as the Chairman and Chief Executive of the 
company. The buck always stops with top management in any company, and in this case
1 Whisler, Timothy R. Niche Products in the British Motor Industry: A History o f MG and Triumph 
Sports Cars, 1945-1981. Unpublished PhD thesis. London, London School of Economics, 1991; Whisler, 
Timothy R. At the End o f the Road. The Rise and Fall o f Austin-Healey, MG, and Triumph Sports Cars. 
(Greenwich and London, 1995); Whisler, Timothy R. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. A Case 
Study in Industrial Decline. (Oxford, 1999).
2 Foreman-Peck, James. “Review of At the End of the Road. The Rise and Fall of Austin-Healey, MG, and 
Triumph Sports Cars by Timothy R. Whisler". The Journal o f Economic History. Volume 56, Number 4 
(December 1996). pp939-940.
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Egan was the top management. Such issues are discussed at length in Section 4.3. 
However, whilst much of the blame for Jaguar's problems may be attributed to the way in 
which Egan ran the company, there can be little doubt that he exhibited many 
praiseworthy personal qualities which gave great benefit to Jaguar, at least initially. In 
particular there can be no doubt that the survival of Jaguar in the early 1980s owed 
everything to his personal enthusiasm and drive, enthusing others such as the US dealers, 
and saving the company from the very real threat of closure and then going on to 
mastermind its privatization. In doing so, Egan faced considerable difficulties in terms of 
a lack of resources and other constraints, and whilst the importance given to, and the 
impact of, Jaguar's public relations campaign has been heavily criticized, it is debatable, 
given the limited financial resources available, whether he could have realistically 
pursued any other marketing strategy. This is discussed in Chapter Five.
Under founder William Lyons' autocratic rule, from 1922 to 1972, Jaguar had 
operated, and been managed, little differently from other British-owned motor companies 
of the time, being subject to the same national cultural legacy, the constraints and 
deficiencies of which were reinforced by the enervating impact of the bureaucratic 
control and neglect of BL’s ownership in the 1970s. In his highly revisionist text, Whisler 
argued that such constraints impeded the introduction of mass production and modem 
corporate organisations in Britain3, an argument which may be applied to Jaguar, 
implying that change in Jaguar required changing the nature of the corporate ethos, and 
giving rise to a change versus continuity debate. However, as is argued in Section 1.2, the 
Egan management failed to bring about a cultural adjustment within Jaguar despite the 
fact that the company had, by 1980, become subjected to financial and market crises and 
new decision-makers. A primary aim of this thesis, therefore, is to ascertain the reasons 
for such failure, and the part it played in the sudden deterioration in Jaguar's fortunes 
after 1986.
Moreover, it will become apparent that the change versus continuity debate 
was clouded by the impact of a clever public relations programme by Jaguar which 
concealed both its failure to address many of its inherited problems, and the reasons for 
its decline after the launch of the new saloon car, the XJ40, in 1986. A further aim of this
3 Whisler, The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. pp406-408.
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thesis, therefore, has been to explore Jaguar’s notable success in masking from the public 
the extent of its various problems and deficiencies, these being initially camouflaged by 
its largely currency-aided recovery, and then by the downturn in the US market for 
luxury cars and the strengthening of Sterling against the US Dollar. Certainly, Jaguar’s 
remarkable public relations campaign was highly effective in promoting the image of a 
revitalised organisation which had broken out of its legacy of poor industrial relations, 
low productivity, and inadequate product quality, but which then fell victim to 
circumstances not of its own making. Here, this thesis examines the extent to which this 
image had a basis in reality, or might be dismissed as being illusion. Allied to this is the 
issue of the extent to which Jaguar’s management, as a result of its initial success, 
deluded itself that it had overcome the problem of the cultural issues that was the legacy 
of both BL and the Lyons era. Furthermore, the thesis considers whether, given the 
evidence presented, Jaguar’s failure in the 1980s resulted from lost opportunities.
Finally, given the lack of academic publications relating to Jaguar it is 
intended that this thesis fill a gap in the historiography of the British car industry in 
general, and Jaguar in particular, and with the large amount of informed personal 
recollection that was obtained whilst conducting this research, it is offered as a piece of 
oral history, with the transcripts of the various interviews being presented as an 
Appendix.
However, there is a major caveat in regard to the archive material for this 
thesis. The refusal of Ford to permit access to the Jaguar corporate archives relating to the 
1980s limited considerably the amount of primary material that could be consulted, 
although the oral testimony from an elite group, triangulated with other sources, has 
compensated for this to a significant extent. Even so, there would not necessarily have 
been great insights afforded by the Jaguar corporate archives, for as Tosh and Lang point 
out, “the primary sources available to the historian are an incomplete record, not only
because so much has perished but also because a great deal that happened lefr no
material trace whatsoever”.4 This would appear to have been the case with regard to 
Jaguar. Such problematic issues are discussed in Section 2.1. A consequence of Ford’s
4 Tosh, John with Lang, Sean. The Pursuit o f History. Aims, methods and new directions in 
the study o f modem history. Fourth Edition. (Harlow, 2006). pi 78.
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lack of co-operation in regard to the Jaguar archives is that many topics covered in this 
thesis cannot be covered as comprehensively, or robustly, as might otherwise be possible, 
or might be desirable. For example, the availability of statistics regarding production lost 
through industrial disputes, and any internal commentary on such disputes, might have 
provided significant insights into, and enabled some quantification of, the success, or 
otherwise, of Jaguar’s industrial relations policies, and enabled comparison with other 
companies in the industry.
In summary, this thesis seeks to address the following issues:
1. What was the nature of the Jaguar company under Egan’s management? Does the 
conventional view of it as a revitalised modem company, which encountered 
difficulties due to factors beyond its control, have a basis in fact, or is this illusion 
created by Jaguar’s remarkable public relations effort?
2. What were the problems impacting on Jaguar’s performance in the 1980s under 
the Egan management, and were these the principal causes of Jaguar’s 
considerable difficulties in the second half of that decade? Was the failure to 
recognise and resolve the various problems a result of management delusion, 
exacerbated by its initial success in turning round the company?
3. Did Jaguar’s failure in the 1980s reflect lost opportunities?
In pursuing these issues, the thesis has the following structure:
The first chapter outlines the conundrum posed by the conventional Jaguar 
story in the 1980s, touching on some of the macro-economic variables affecting the 
company at this time. It then, as essential background to the Jaguar case study presented 
in this thesis, reviews briefly the explanations offered for the decline of the British 
economy, and the demise of the indigenous British motor industry.
Chapter Two focuses on a discussion of the methodology of the research 
undertaken for this thesis, and a review of the literature examined, and the sources used. 
As is revealed, there has been very little published academic work on the subject of 
Jaguar during the 1980s, most of the academic writing relating to the post-war motor
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industry being devoted to exploring the reasons for the demise of BL. Much of the 
material for this research was obtained from published primary sources such as Jaguar's 
Reports and Accounts, and newspaper reports and articles. However, given the refusal of 
Ford to allow access to Jaguar's archives of the period, the thesis also relies heavily on 
interviews with former executives of Ford or Jaguar, or other informed individuals. The 
reliability of these as source materials is also discussed.
In order to provide a context for this study, the history of Jaguar from its 
founding in 1922 to the appointment of Egan in 1980 is discussed in Chapter Three. A 
central theme of this chapter is an examination of the various factors that led to the 
development of the corporate ethos and ingrained attitudes that prevailed when Egan 
assumed control of the company.
Chapter Four considers the broader aspects of management during the Egan 
era, examining the extent to which Egan's management style and actions mirrored those 
of the traditional British-owned motor industry, rather than heralding a new dawn at 
Jaguar. In particular, the chapter considers whether Egan's management resulted in the 
reinforcement of prevailing attitudes and institutional structures rather than effectively 
challenging them. It also discusses the issue of corporate governance as practiced by 
Jaguar in an era when this issue was becoming of increasing concern to the City 
audience.
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven look at specific individual functions within 
Jaguar, questioning whether pervasive weaknesses were to be found in each area, and, if 
so, the extent to which the consequent deficiencies had a debilitating impact on Jaguar. 
As is demonstrated, only in a few instances, such as the distribution system, were such 
deficiencies corrected. Thus, Chapter Five investigates Jaguar’s interface with its 
marketplace, exploring the reasons for changes in demand for Jaguar vehicles in the 
1980s, and challenges Jaguar's reputation at that time as a marketing-led organisation.
Chapter Six examines the nature of Jaguar's manufacturing capabilities, and 
considers the extent to which Jaguar had moved away from outmoded working practices 
and poor labour relations that were its cultural legacy from the Lyons era, and from BL. It 
examines the impact of Egan's failure to bring about cultural adjustment within Jaguar, 
and questions the veracity of Jaguar's claims of being a rejuvenated manufacturing
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operation, with an enthusiastic workforce, free from strikes and disputes, that could 
deliver a quality product in good time.
Chapter Seven explores the reliability and quality issues that faced Jaguar, 
their causes, and their consequent impact on the company, and argues that these resulted 
largely from pervasive weaknesses in the engineering function which were not addressed 
because, like Edwardes in relation to BL, Egan believed that Jaguar's prevailing 
engineering and management cultures were sound.
Chapters Eight and Nine review the financial aspects of Jaguar's performance 
in the 1980s, and the company’s relationship with the City following its privatisation in 
1984. Chapter Eight provides a financial quantification of some of the problems that 
impacted on Jaguar's performance, enabling the testing of the validity of the premise that 
Jaguar's assertion that the downturn in its profitability from 1987 onwards resulted purely 
from the weakening of the US Dollar and an overall softening of the imported luxury car 
sector in the USA. Indeed, it is revealed that the downturn in Jaguar's profits from 1987 
onwards resulted from a variety of different factors, the vital one being that of the 
considerable increase in warranty costs. Chapter Nine, in examining Jaguar's 
performance as a publicly-quoted company, argues that Jaguar's management failed to 
take advantage of the opportunities afforded it by its position as a publicly quoted 
company, and suggests that Jaguar's financial planning was inadequate, being 
constrained by the cultural legacy of profit retention and depreciation as the main sources 
of investment funds. It also discusses the extent to which institutional investors reacted to 
dissatisfaction to the performance of Jaguar in terms of Hirschman’s mechanisms of 
“Exit” and “Voice”, especially in regard to issues such as corporate governance.
Finally, the Conclusion presents the main findings of the research, addressing 
the issues stated above, and the major limitations of the analysis and, given these, 
suggests areas for further research.
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CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND, AND EXPLANATIONS FOR BRITISH 
ECONOMIC AND MOTOR INDUSTRY DECLINE.
1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the background and context for the study of Jaguar in the 1980s. In 
the thesis Introduction it was stated that the conventional or popular view of the Jaguar 
story during this decade was that of a highly successful company. This view is elaborated 
on in Section 1.2, together with some of the issues that emerged after the Ford takeover 
that pointed to this view being inappropriate or incorrect.
As mentioned also in the thesis Introduction, this research has been 
particularly concerned with examining the fundamental and deep-rooted causes of 
Jaguar’s difficulties that became apparent after 1986, and which in turn owed much to the 
decline of the British economy, and the decline of the British motor industry.
Given that the indigenous British motor industry was an important part of 
British economic activity from the end of World War Two onwards, explanations for its 
decline must be set in the context of the decline of the British economy during the 
twentieth century. Section 1.3 outlines some of the explanations offered for British 
economic decline, and Section 1.4 presents explanations for the decline of the indigenous 
British motor industry. This enables the Jaguar story to be placed in the context of the 
indigenous motor industry overall, the development of a distinct corporate culture, and 
ingrained attitudes regarding labour relations and working practices at Jaguar during the 
Lyons’ era, and their reinforcement under the BL stewardship of the company being more 
fully examined in Chapter Three. A chronology of the key events in the Jaguar story as 
related in this thesis is presented in Table 1.1.
8
Table 1.1: Chronology of Kev Events
1922 Swallow Sidecar business founded in Blackpool by William Lyons and William 
Walmsley.
1927 Production of first motor car.
Nov 1928 Company relocates to Coventry.
Oct 1933 MSS Cars Limited” registered as a private limited company.
Jan 1933 Shares listed on London Stock Exchange. Walmsley leaves die business.
Feb 1945 Company's name changed from “SS Cars Limited” to “Jaguar Cars Ltd”.
1959 Annual deliveries exceed 20,000 cars for first time.
July 1966 Jaguar merges with British Motor Corporation to form British Motor Holdings (BMH).
May 1968 Merger o f BMH with Ley land to form British Leyland Motor Corporation (later BL).
Sept 1968 Launch of the XJ6 Series 1.
1970 Annual deliveries exceed 30,000 cars for first time.
1971 Annual deliveries peak at 32,589 cars (not to be exceeded until 1984)
1972 Sir William Lyons retires from the business, following which Jaguar is more closely 
integrated into BL. “Jaguar Cars Ltd” ceases to exist as a separate company.
Sept 1973 Launch of XJ6 Series 11.
Sept 1975 Launch of XJ-S Grand Tourer.
Nov 1977 Michael Edwardes becomes Chairman of BL.
March 1979 Launch of XJ6 Series III.
1979 Annual sales fall 45%, to 14,861 cars - a 20-year low.
Sept 1979 Edwardes re-establishes Jaguar as a separate company within BL.
April 1980 John Egan joins Jaguar as Chief Executive.
May 1981 US Dollar (at £1=$2.1) begins period of significant strengthening against Sterling.
1982 Annual sales exceed 20,000 cars for first time since 1978. US sales at a record 10,349 
cars, exceeding UK sales for first time. Company returns to profit.
Aug 1984 Company's shares listed on the London Stock Exchange at 165p per share, raising 
£297mil!ion.
end 1984 Jaguar begins currency hedging operations.
March 1985 High point of US$ against £, with rate of £1=$1.064. Thereafter $ gradually weakens 
against Sterling.
Nov 1985 Jaguar shares in American Depository Receipt form listed on the New York NASDAQ 
exchange.
1985 Pre-tax profits peak at £121.3milIion.
Oct 1986 Launch of XJ40 in UK and Europe.
Feb 1987 Share price at pre-October Crash peak of627p, valuing the company at £l,147million.
May 1987 Launch of XJ40 in USA, Australia, and Far East.
19 Oct 1987 Stock market “Crash”.
Nov 1987 Share price reaches post-Crash low of270p (577p immediately pre-Crash).
1988 Annual sales peak at 49,494 cars retail, 50,603 cars wholesale, but pre-tax profit falls 
51% to £47.5million.
May 1988 Whitney Engineering Centre opened.
May 1988 US$ weakens to £1 =$1.89.
Spring 1989 Jaguar enters into co-operation discussions with General Motors.
13 Sept 1989 First half results reveal operating loss of £2.8million.
19 Sept 1989 Ford announces it is to buy 15% stake in Jaguar in the stock market. Shares rise to 467p 
on news, valuing Jaguar at £854million.
31 Oct 1989 Government announces it will waive the Golden Share, allowing Ford to make an 
immediate bid for Jaguar.
2 Nov 1989 Jaguar agrees Ford's offer of £l,600mil!ion (850p per share).
1 Jan 1990 Ford assumes control of Jaguar.
April 1990 John Egan leaves Jaguar.
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1.2 Jaguar PLC: From Thatcherite Icon to Thatcherite Pariah
In the boom era of the 1980s nothing was portrayed as epitomizing more the revival of 
British manufacturing industry as a result of what Lorenz, and others, termed “Mrs 
Thatcher’s Industrial Revolution”1 than the changed fortunes of Jaguar. Indeed, the 
Jaguar company at this time was held forth as the role model for the benefits accruing to 
British industry from Thatcherite macroeconomic policies, which were aimed at 
heralding a new period of laissez-faire.2 Jaguar’s success was held to be “a microcosm of 
the Thatcherite dream”3, which demonstrated, as far as the government was concerned, 
what could be achieved when a business was released from the shackles of the inefficient 
bureaucratic state-run sector into the hands of enlightened entrepreneurial management. 
Certainly, the Jaguar example did much to reinforce the Thatcherite political doctrine, 
with the company’s return to the private sector in 1984 paving the way for other 
privatisations.4
Without doubt, by the end of the 1970s, the once-proud Jaguar company, 
after nearly a decade of being subjugated to the monolithic BL, had lost its identity, its 
reputation, and its raison d ’etre, and was in danger of being closed.5 This was hardly an 
idle threat given that BL had closed the Triumph and MG sports car operations in 1979. 
In 1980, a year in which Jaguar made a pre-tax loss of £47.3million, and with volume 
sales in the important US and UK markets at less than half the 1975 levels, John Egan, 
who was to be described as personifying “the successful Thatcherite executive”6, was 
appointed to run the business with the remit, according to John Edwards, Egan’s Finance 
Director, of returning it to profitability, or else supervising its closure.7
Under Egan’s leadership, Jaguar volume sales recovered significantly from 
their 1980 nadir, and would more than double by 1985, enabling pre-tax profits to exceed 
£120million in both 1985 and 1986. The most important factor in Jaguar’s recovery in the
1 Lorenz, Andrew. A Fighting Chance. The revival and future o f British manufacturing industry. (London, 
1989). ppl-25.
2 Hall, Peter A. “The State and Economic Decline” in Elbaum, Bernard and Lazonick, William The Decline 
o f the British Economy. (Oxford, 1986). p290.
3 The Times, 8 May 1989.
4 Lorenz, op.cit. pp252-8.
5 Lorenz, op.cit. p253; Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989). p63.
6 Lorenz, op.cit. p252.
7 John Edwards. Interview with the author, November 2002. Appendix pSO.
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early 1980s was its sales performance in the US market, despite this economy being in 
recession at that time. As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the US economy in the period 1975 
to 1983 was highly volatile. In 1973 the international oil crisis, resulting from a 
quadrupling o f  oil prices by OPEC, and the 1973-74 stock market crash, resulted in a 
recession which lasted until March 1975. There followed a period o f  rising 
unemployment that coincided with rising inflation, and which saw variable growth rates 
o f GDP. A second oil crisis, resulting from the Iranian Revolution o f  1979 and which 
sharply increased the price o f  oil around the world, produced the recession o f  1981-82. 
This resulted in the imposition o f  tight monetary policy in the US to control inflation.
Figure 1.1: Quarter on Quarter % Change in US GDP, 1975 to 1992
o
-10
Source: Bloomberg
The period o f  fairly strong growth after 1983 resulted in inflation beginning 
to increase, with the Federal Reserve raising interest rates from 1986 to 1989. This 
weakened growth somewhat, but a combination o f  the 1990 oil price shock, debt 
accumulation o f  the previous decade, and growing consumer pessimism plus a weakened 
economy resulted in the recession o f  19 9 0 -9 1.
These factors obviously impacted on car sales in the US, but did not reflect 
directly the peaks and troughs o f  the pattern o f  changes in GDP. The changes in total US
ll
car sales and in the sales o f  European luxury cars (BMW, Jaguar, Mercedes) are shown in 
Figure 1.2. Here it can be seen that total car sales experienced a sharp decline following  
the 1973 oil crisis, and although there was a short-lived recovery after 1983, factors such 
as increased interest rates, and increased levels o f  debt, mentioned above, resulted in total 
sales continuing to decline. However, as can also be seen, sales o f  the luxury car segment 
in the period to 1987 remained buoyant, despite the overall increase in demand for more 
fuel efficient cars. The factors resulting in Jaguar’s strong performance in this period are 
discussed in Sub-Section 5.6.4 below. Whilst the downturn in sales o f  European luxury 
cars that commenced in 1987 might be ascribed in part to the effects o f  recessionary 
pressures and the 1987 stockmarket “Crash”, this is too simplistic an explanation given 
the arrival o f  the Japanese into the US luxury car market in 1988-89, discussed in Sub- 
Section 5.6.5 below. Indeed, if  the luxury sector as defined in Figure 1.2 was extended to 
include Lexus and Infiniti then the Figures for 1990 and 1991 would show strong growth.
Figure 1.2: Year on Year % Changes in US Retail New Car Sales - Overall 
Market and Luxury Segment, 1976 to 1992
20
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Source: Automotive News. Various Issues.
Note: Luxury Car Segment consists of BMW, Jaguar, and Mercedes sales only.
Whilst success in the US market was vital to Jaguar’s recovery, it was the 
strengthening o f  the US Dollar in the first half o f  the decade, shown in Figure 1.3, that
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was the key factor in boosting Jaguar’s profits in this period. This is discussed in Sub- 
Section 8.3.3 below.
Figure 1.3: US Dollar/Sterling Exchange Rates, Quarter End, 1980 to 1989.
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Source: Datastream.
The UK, Jaguar’s domestic, and second most important market, experienced 
a GDP growth pattern similar to that o f  the USA, but with less severe peaks and troughs, 
as shown in Figure 1.4. The recession o f  1980-82 was longer lasting than o f  that in the 
US at this time, and also resulted from the second oil crisis mentioned above. Following 
the end o f  this recession, it would take thirteen quarters for GDP to recover to its level at 
the start o f  19808, and growth rates in GDP thereafter until the 1990 recession began 
showed greater volatility than those in the US. Flere, Lorenz notes that in the period from 
May 1979 to June 1987 employment in manufacturing in the UK fell from 7.1 million 
people to 5.1 million, and manufacturing output did not return to its 1979 level until July 
1987.9
8 Bank of England Quarterly Inflation Report, February 2009. p20.
9 Lorenz, op.cit. p3.
13
Figure 1.4: Quarter on Quarter % Change in UK GDP, 1975 to 1992.
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The pattern o f  car registrations in the UK, shown in Figure l .5, reflected 
more the economic cycle than was the case in the USA, and UK luxury car sales 
(consisting o f  BMW, Jaguar and Mercedes in Figure 1.5) reflected more the pattern o f  
overall demand than was the case in the USA. However, the pattern o f  demand for luxury 
cars was far more resilient than that o f  the overall market, possibly because o f  the number 
of luxury cars bought by corporate customers for the use o f  their executives. Hence, the 
“Crash” o f  1987 appeared to have no impact on the registrations o f  luxury cars, demand 
not going into decline until the recession impacted in 1990. In the USA, in contrast, 
nearly all cars were bought as private purchases by individuals, and, as noted above, the 
1987 “Crash” would have resulted in some weakening o f  demand, although denied by 
Dale in regard to Jaguar.10 The marque that suffered most in the US from the “Crash” was 
Porsche", whose sales figures are not included in Figure 1.2 above.
10 Mike Dale. Interview with the author, June 2007. Appendix p42.
11 Joe Herson. E-mail of 8 July 2008 to Mike Dale, and forwarded to the author. Appendix p i6 n 17.
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Figure 1.5: Year on Year % Changes in UK Car Registrations - Total Market,
and Luxury Car Segment, 1976 to 1992.
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Source: SMMT Automotive Data Services Records.
Note: Luxury Car Segment consists of BMW, Jaguar, and Mercedes sales only. Figures prior to 1978 
were not available from the SMMT.
Jaguar’s success in the early 1980s made it a prime candidate for 
privatisation, and in 1984 the company was floated on the London Stock Exchange with 
an initial valuation o f  £297million. The received wisdom o f  the mid and late 1980s, 
promoted by Jaguar itself, and embraced by customers, media, the City, and other 
interested parties alike, was that under Egan the company, “released from the red tape o f  
state ownership, released from the tyranny o f  union militancy, became a highly motivated 
business underpinned by a workforce committed through high earnings and lucrative 
share ownership”.12 Indeed, Lorenz was later to observe that Jaguar’s revival “had 
acquired Churchillian connotations”13, it being seen as having been transformed into an 
internationally competitive enterprise that was “a metaphor for British manufacturing”.14
Whipp et aL in their 1989 paper15, commented that the turnaround in Jaguar’s 
performance at this time was “by any standards remarkable”. They dismissed the view
12 The Times, 8 May 1989.
13 Lorenz, op.cit. p254.
14 Ibid p257.
15 Whipp, Richard, Rosenfield, Robert, and Pettigrew, Andrew. “Culture and Competitiveness: Evidence 
from Two Mature UK Industries” in Journal o f Management Studies. Volume 26, Number 6. November 
1989. pp561-585.
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that Jaguar*s financial improvement resulted largely from an advantageous movement of 
exchange rates16, and denied that the “cult of quality** developed in Jaguar was “a PR 
device**.17 In their view the metamorphosis of Jaguar was the result of Egan*s success in 
bringing about a range of cultural changes within the company. Here, culture is seen as 
being “the collection of beliefs, values and assumptions held by members of an 
organization**18, a similar definition to that stated by Church who wrote that corporate 
culture is “a concept which refers to the collective sharing of patterns or norms and 
assumptions concerning the organization (or parts of it) to which members (managers and 
workers) belong**.19 An important attribute of culture is the concept of institutions which 
are systems of norms which govern social behaviour, and which give rise to various 
social structures within an organization. Whipp et al note that organizations are often 
found to be multi-cultural or to contain more than one culture.20 In other words, they are 
seldom homogeneous in this respect, being composed of a number of institutional 
structures. The importance of corporate culture may be seen as lying “in its effects on the 
behaviour of groups and of individuals and therefore on the functioning of the 
organization”.21
The effect on Jaguar of the cultural adjustments instigated by Egan, according 
to Whipp et al, included:
• the raising of standards of, and a major overhaul of, quality and reliability, 
enabling Jaguar “to re-establish and expand its market position continuously**.22
• the successful completion of the XJ40 project.23
• the development of a comprehensive communications structure which 
successfully got the message of quality and productivity across to the workforce.24
16 Ibid. p570.
17 Ibid. p572.
18 Ibid. p565.
19 Church, Roy. “Deconstructing Nuffield: The Evolution of Managerial Culture in the British Motor 
Industry” in The Economic History Review, New Series, Volume 49, No 3 (August 1996). p565.
20 Whipp et al. op.cit. pS66.
21 Church, op.cit. p565.
22 Whipp et al. op.cit. p570.
23 Ibid. p573.
24 Idem.
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• a major shift in engineering thinking and behaviour, a “conceptual change” here 
resulting in vehicle engineers no longer assuming that they “supply a car for the 
marketeers to sell” but rather asking the marketeers “What type of product do you 
want to sell?”.25
In the view of Whipp et al and others26, Jaguar had overcome many of the 
labour relations and bad work practices long associated with BL, and which had given the 
British motor industry such a bad reputation. As a result, Jaguar was able to achieve 
significant improvements in productivity. Other important, much publicised, but largely 
supposed, developments, in addition to the improvements in quality, were the 
modernisation of outmoded production facilities, and the restructuring and rejuvenation 
of Jaguar’s distribution network. In particular, Jaguar was seen as having been 
transformed from a production-driven to a marketing-led company. Egan became 
included in Thatcher’s “good list”, and in 1986 received a more tangible reward in the 
form of a knighthood.
However, this highly positive view of Jaguar in the Egan era is based on the 
performance of Jaguar up to 1986, and appears to be the product of an uncritical 
acceptance of Jaguar’s own version of events. Although published in 1989, Whipp et a/’s 
paper illustrates its arguments with data only from the period 1981 to 1985, and thus 
excludes the problems suffered by Jaguar after this time, and which reveal many of the 
aspects of that paper’s analysis of Jaguar to be incorrect, as will be demonstrated in this 
thesis.
Indeed, Jaguar started getting into difficulty from 1987 onwards, for which it 
blamed the strength of Sterling, particularly against the US Dollar, and lower demand for 
luxury cars in the US market in the wake of the 1987 Stock Market “Crash” (discussed in 
Section 9.4 below). Consequently, Jaguar, “could no longer be held up as an example of
25 Idem.
26 For example: Dellheim, Charles. “The Historian and Corporate Culture” in The Public Historian, 
Volume 8, Number 2 (Spring 1986). pp9-22; Goodman, John. “Industrial relations and restructuring in 
manufacturing: Three case studies in the United Kingdom” in International Labour Review, Volume 128, 
Number 5 (1989). pp601-620. Salama, Alzira. “The use of an organisation's biography as a research 
method” in Management Education caul Development, Volume 23, Issue 3 (Autumn 1992). pp225-233.
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what free enterprise could achieve once it was freed from the shackles of nationalisation. 
It began to need money, and the only way that could be achieved was for the government 
to let the Golden Share go by the board and let the other interested companies come in 
and take it over”.27 Indeed, according to Edwards, Thatcher had become disillusioned 
with Jaguar by 1989, seeing it as “teetering on the edge, therefore let's get rid of it”.28 
Given this scenario, it had become inevitable that Jaguar, no longer enjoying government 
support, would be acquired by one of the major global motor manufacturers.
Whilst the fortunes of Jaguar during the 1980s might, on the basis of the 
above, be explained in terms of conventional micro- and macro-economic analysis, a 
problem in so doing arises from the fret that the popular view of it as a revitalised, 
modem company that suffered from macroeconomic forces that were beyond its control 
can be demonstrated to be based on incorrect or incomplete evidence and premises. 
Indeed, as mentioned in the thesis Introduction, the raison d'etre of this study has been to 
provide such demonstration. As Whisler has pointed out, there were factors such as 
production costs, distribution structures, and product design and characteristics, including 
quality, that were more important than currency values in determining British export 
sales.29 Certainly, the well-publicised industrial disputes that Jaguar faced in 1989, and 
the problems with quality and manufacturing revealed following the Ford takeover, 
demonstrated the fallacy of the 1980s received wisdom appertaining to Jaguar. As The
Sunday Times was later to observe: “Egan had done virtually nothing to improve
Jaguar’s manufacturing capability. Working practices in Browns Lane [Jaguar’s assembly 
plant in Coventry] and in its sister plants were untouched by the Thatcherite revolution.”30 
What had become very apparent was that the changes that had taken place were 
superficial, as management and labour continued to adhere to their traditional behaviour. 
Egan had failed to implement the reforms necessary to overcome the ingrained attitudes 
that had been a feature of post-World War Two British industry in general, and the
27 Hamish Orr-Ewing. Interview with the author. November 2002. Appendix pi 13.
28 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p55.
29 Whisler, Timothy R. The British Motor Industry 1945- I 994. A Case Study in Industrial Decline. 
(Oxford, 1999). p282.
30 The Sunday Times. 27 October 1991.
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British-owned motor industry in particular, and could justifiably be accused of what 
Elbaum and Lazonick termed “entrepreneurial failure”.31
1.3 Explanations for the Decline of the British Economy
Hall described the performance of the British economy since the 1880s relative to its 
industrial competitors as being one of continuous deterioration, Britain’s industries being 
characterised by “low levels of investment, a reluctance to innovate or expand, and 
outmoded forms of work organization at both the managerial and shopfloor levels”.32 
Such aspects have been included among the numerous neoclassical economics 
explanations offered for Britain’s productivity performance but, as Hall noted, they are 
merely the “proximate causes” of economic decline, their presence in Britain itself being 
a factor requiring explanation.33 Support for this view was provided by Caves who argued 
that, “sweeping economic explanations of poor productivity performance can be 
discounted” since accounts citing factors such as poor management, troubled industrial 
relations, and a rigid class structure “lack generality, unity, and historical depth”.34 
Consequently, Caves maintained that there was a requirement for an explanation 
comprehensively rooted in the characteristics of the British economy and society and 
which may be found in the continuity of British institutions and the values embodied by 
them.35 Indeed, according to Caves and Krause, Britain’s productivity problem resulted 
from the constraints of “cultural conservatism” which had led to “entrepreneurial 
failure”.36 Elbaum and Lazonick also noted the predisposition of neoclassical economics 
to disengage from processes of socioeconomic development because of the difficulties 
presented in regard to quantification and the development of theoretical frameworks that 
are regarded as being essential for scientific rigour.37 Even so, they observe that there had
31 Elbaum, Bernard and Lazonick, William. “An Institutional Perspective on British Decline” in Elbaum, 
Bernard and Lazonick, William (eds) op.cit. p2.
32 Hail, Peter “The State and Economic Decline” in Caves, Richard E, and Krause, Lawrence (eds) 
Britain’s Economic Performance (Washington DC, 1980) p266
33 Idem.
34 Caves, Richard E “Productivity Differences Among Industries” in Caves and Krause, op.cit. p391.
35 Ibid. pl40.
36 Caves, Richard E, and Krause, Lawrence “Introduction and Summary” in Caves and Krause, op.cit. p i9.
37 Elbaum and Lazonick. op.cit. p i .
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been “an increasingly widespread recognition among economic analysts that relative 
decline must have complex sources within the British social fabric”.38
In their earliest study, Williams et al reject micro and macro economic 
explanations of British industrial decline, and also reject pervasive national attitudes and 
institutions as the cause of a “British disease” but fail to provide any justification for such 
a stance, dismissing institutional analysis out of hand as making “an unjustifiable leap to 
an underlying social cause”.39 Furthermore, whilst they dismiss factorial explanations 
which cite issues such as immobility of labour and lack of appropriate skills as being a 
list of symptoms, not an explanation for industrial decline, they then go on to embrace the 
factorial approach in their several works, consistently blaming management for 
implementing inappropriate production and product strategies.40 Subsequent to Williams 
et aTs 1983 study in which they rejected the institutionalist approach, Elbaum and 
Lazonick produced their influential work on the subject41, but this did not appear to have 
induced Williams et al to revisit their views in the light of Elbaum and Lazonick's 
arguments.
Elbaum and Lazonick maintain that the decline of the British economy in the 
twentieth century resulted from rigidities in the social and economic institutions that had 
developed in the nineteenth century.42 They argue that the overall impact of these, whilst 
difficult to quantify with any degree of precision, was undoubtedly considerable, being, 
amongst other things, interlinked with the failure of British industry to equal the 
productivity improvements achieved by its international competitors through availing 
itself of mass production techniques. It is of note that the productivity failure argument is 
a view promulgated more recently, for example, by Broadberry and Crafts, particularly in
39 Ibid plS.
39 Williams, Karel; Williams, John; Thomas, Dennis. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? (London,
40 l9P }  p,7*Williams, Karel; Williams, John; Thomas, Dennis. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? (London, 
1983); Williams, Karel; Williams, John; Haslam, Colin. The Breakdown o f Austin Rover: a case study 
in the failure o f business strategy and industrial policy. (Leamington Spa, 1987); Williams, Karel; 
Haslam, Colin; Williams, John; Johal, Sukhdev; with Adcroft, Andy. Cars. Analysis, History, Cases. 
(Providence, 1994).
41 Elbaum and Lazonick. op.cit.
42 Idem.
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regard to the engineering industry43, although this is an assertion disputed by Booth.44 
Elbaum and Lazonick reject the “cultural conservatism” explanation for the failure to 
improve productivity, arguing that, in terms of its cultural endowment, twentieth century 
Britain was no worse off than Japan or continental European nations that had been pre­
capitalist, tradition-bound societies at the time that Britain was experiencing its industrial 
revolution. This did not prevent them from being able to undertake successful economic 
development in the twentieth century, and should not therefore have held back Britain. 
Indeed, Elbaum and Lazonick reject all culturally based explanations of British decline, 
arguing that these “shed no light on why Britain was less successful than later 
industrializers in remoulding customary attitudes that encumbered economic 
performance”.45 Rather, they maintain that Britain was impeded from adopting modem 
technological and organizational innovations as a result of the constraints that were the 
legacy of Britain's long mid-Victorian boom that marked the culmination of the world's 
first industrial revolution.44
The salient point here is that Britain's industrial revolution had resulted in 
industries that were composed of a number of small, often family-owned, firms that held 
small market shares. In this atomistic economic organization, shopfloor workers had been 
allowed considerable autonomy over the work process, such positions of control being 
further consolidated in the final quarter of the nineteenth century as a consequence of the 
increasing impact of competitive capitalism, and in the first half of the twentieth century, 
by the growth of trade union power, the rise of the Labour Party, and the emergency 
conditions of two world wars. As Elbaum and Lazonick note, management conceded 
much to shopfloor workers “rather than jeopardise their individual fortunes through 
industrial conflict while there were profits to be made”47, and, lacking the means to alter 
existing constraints, in effect taking them as “given”, thereby losing the “right to
43 Broadberry, Stephen and Crafts, Nicholas. “UK productivity performance from 1950 to 1979: a 
restatement of die Broadberry-Crafts view” in Economic History Review, Volume 56, Number 4 
(November 2003). pp718-735
44 Booth, Alan. “The manufacturing failure hypothesis and the performance of British industry during the 
long boom” in Economic History Review, Volume 56, Number 1 (February 2003). ppl-33.
45 Elbaum and Lazonick. op.cit. p2.
46 Ibid. pp2-3.
47 Ibid p4.
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manage” particularly in regard to the utilization of technology.48 Moreover, British 
industrialists were averse to losing family control of their firms (a view eschewed by 
Foreman-Peck et al in respect to the motor industry49)* and even when horizontal mergers 
occurred the directors of the firms involved refused to relinquish authority, resulting in 
the widespread use of the holding company structure. In any case, few managers had the 
skills required to develop modem corporate organizations, and the British educational 
system, with an emphasis on a classical education, failed to provide industry with 
suitably trained technical and managerial recruits. Demand for such graduates, anyway, 
was not strong, with highly competitive businesses unwilling, or unable, to afford them. 
Here, Whisler notes that Nuffield believed that a formal education offered no 'great 
value' to his organization, a view that was held to various degrees throughout the British 
motor industry for most of the twentieth century.30 Consequently, there developed in the 
workplace ingrained attitudes and value systems which, as Elbaum and Lazonick 
observe, “obstructed individualistic as well as collective efforts at economic 
renovation”.51
It was the existence of such attitudes and norms that were held to have 
resulted in British growth rates lagging behind those of newly industrializing countries, 
with serious competitive losses in international markets being incurred in the period from 
1899 to 1913.52 Unimpeded by the sort of entrenched institutional structures existing in 
Britain, the newly industrialised economies were able to remould their customary 
attitudes and implement fairly easily the mass production methods and corporate forms of 
managerial co-ordination that were to be the vital factors in their economic success. To 
meet this international challenge, British firms needed to emulate this adoption of modem 
production and organizational methods. However, uncertain of the investment returns, 
and unwilling to face conflict with the unions over, for example, pay and manning levels, 
British management turned away from the idea of introducing costly new mass 
production methods. Moreover, the corporate structure was such as to prevent the control
*  Ibid. pS.
49 Foreman-Peck, James, Bowden, Sue, and McKinlay, Alan. The British Motor Industry. (Manchester, 
1995). p45.
90 Whisler. op.cit. pi 60.
51 Elbaum and Lazonick op.cit. p2.
i2Ibid.& .
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and co-ordination required for the effective vertical integration of production and 
distribution, as well as the efficient use of resources within the firm. Although Foreman- 
Peck et al do not appear to accept that there was a “widespread British failure to develop 
professional management organisations9*53, they do note that the veneration of the non­
professional manager was a common feature of British manufacturing as a whole.54
Management and shopfloor institutional structures are the most frequently 
asserted constraints on the transformation of Britain’s productive system, but other 
institutional structures were as much entrenched and also resulted in significant 
constraints here. These included structures in “industrial relations, enterprise and market 
organization, education, finance, international trade, and state-enterprise relations”.55 
Given the pervasive nature of these constraints on the British social system overall, it is 
hardly surprising that they impacted also on the new industries that developed in Britain 
in the twentieth century. As will be described in the next section, the development, and 
decline, of the British motor industry during this time closely resembled the pattern of 
development of British industry in general.
1.4 Explanations for the Decline of the Indigenous British Motor Industry 
Motor vehicle manufacturing in the 1950s and 1960s was one of the leading British 
manufacturing industries, and was the country"  ^second leading exporter, accounting for 
19% of UK total exports in I960.56 However, during the 1970s the British-owned motor 
manufacturing sector demonstrated what Whisler, echoing the sentiments of many other 
writers, described as being “one of the most spectacular industrial declines of the post 
war period”.57 Unsurprisingly, academic studies of the British-owned motor industry from 
the mid-1970s onwards have tended to focus on explanations for the decline, 
concentrating on BL, the only indigenously-owned volume car maker. Most of these 
studies tend to agree that the sector suffered low productivity, poor industrial relations, 
inordinate trades union control over effort levels, inefficient work practices, under­
investment, inadequate corporate strategies, and lacklustre marketing. However, as
53 Foreman-Peck et al. op.cit. p45.
54 Ibid p!86.
55 Elbaum and Lazonick. op.cit. p2.
56 Whisler. op.cit. p4.
57 Ibid. pi.
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Williams et al argued, and noted above, such factorial accounts merely provide a list of 
symptoms, not an explanation for decline. In addition, the danger in the factorial 
approach, as Foreman-Peck et al point out, is that “description can masquerade as 
explanation”.58 Moreover, there has been little agreement as to the primacy of causation, 
and the chain of events leading to the sector’s decline. Generally, scholars have blamed 
either management, or labour, or both, for foiling to adjust to the conditions of greater 
market competition, and to adopt modem production methods.
Williams et al, despite their arguments against seeking factorial explanations, 
mentioned above, blame the decline on management and external market limitations, 
claiming in their final work that management had struggled ineffectually to surmount 
such limitations.59 This is a view somewhat at odds with the assertion made in their 
previous work that such market limitations “could only have been sufficiently modified 
by political action”.60 However, the soundness of Williams et a/’s arguments here has to 
be called into question given the bias exhibited in their several studies. Undeniably, they 
consistently defend labour’s role, and at the same time consistently blame management 
for the decline of the sector, arguing that after 1968 BL’s management “was not the 
saviour but the destroyer of the company”.61 They are equally dismissive of the 
frameworks provided by orthodox economics and, unsurprisingly given their scathing 
comments on BL’s management, by management discourse, particularly as represented 
by business school academics. Neither of these frameworks, undefined by Williams et al, 
is held by them to provide an adequate understanding of motor manufacturing.62 
However, the shortcomings of management per se is far too simplistic, if not superficial, 
an explanation, for, as Foreman-Peck et al argue, “management is always responsible in 
one sense” and, therefore, any objective appraisal of the industry’s decline must question 
whether any management “could have been expected to address the particular challenges 
of the industry”.63 Whilst Foreman-Peck et al place the onus on management to overcome
58 Foreman-Peck et al. op.cit. p89.
59 Williams et al. Cars. Analysis, History, Cases. plO.
60 Williams et al. The Breakdown o f Austin Rover, p i 2.
61 Williams et al. Cars. Analysis, History, Cases, pi 36.
62 Ibid p3.
63 Foreman-Peck et al. op.cit. p90.
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poor industrial relations, they do accept that the constraints in this area may have 
rendered management’s task impossible.64
Church agrees that weaknesses in corporate structures and management were 
important, but sees this as only one of three interacting factors, the other two being 
industrial relations problems, and the constraints placed on business decision-making by 
government policies.69 A number of commentators, such as Rhys66 and Adeney67, have 
argued that government demand management policies, particularly the ‘stop-go’ 
measures of the 1950s and 1960s, had serious negative effects on the industry. In this 
view, ‘stop-go’ demand management is seen to have increased uncertainty and made 
strategic and market planning more difficult, constantly forcing management to adjust 
output and manning levels, thereby exacerbating industrial relations problems. Dunnett, 
the leading advocate of this view, argued that most of the industry’s problems were not 
causes of its decline but symptoms of government macroeconomic policies.68 Wilks, 
however, embracing a wider, institutional, perspective by examining the govemment- 
industry interface, concluded that this relationship in regard to the motor industry was 
marked by “an elite insularity and an associated underdevelopment of institutional 
linkages”69, and consequently the government lacked awareness of the issues facing the 
sector, and operated irresponsibly in respect to it.70
Wilks, in attributing the sector’s decline to intransigent attitudes obstructing 
adjustment to environmental changes, echoes the approach adopted by Lewchuk, 
although both embraced different perspectives, with Lewchuk focusing on production 
systems. Here, Lewchuk argued that neither labour nor management were to blame for 
the collapse of BL since both were merely pursuing their own selfish agendas, and that 
the problems arose from attitudinal constraints regarding the attempt to move to US-style 
production methods.71 Lewchuk’s views fit within the broader framework of Elbaum and
64 Ibid. plS4.
69 Church, Roy. The rise and decline o f the British motor industry. (Cambridge, 1994). p 129.
66 Rhys, D G. The Motor Industry. An Economic Survey. (London, 1972).
67 Adeney, Martin. The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History o f Britain’s  Car Industry. (London, 1988).
68 Dunnett, Peter. The Decline o f the British Motor Industry. The Effects o f Government Policy, 1945- 1979. 
(London, 1980).
69 Wilks, Stephen. “Institutional insularity: government and the British motor industry since 1945” in 
Chick, Martin (ed). Governments, Industries and Markets (Aldershot, 1990). pi 57.
70 Ibid. pl66.
71 Lewchuk “The Motor Vehicle Industry” in Elbaum and Lazonick. op.cit. ppl35-6.
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Lazonick’s work, and whilst he has found supporters such as Church and Whisler72, his 
work has been criticised by Williams et al who dismiss it as “just another instance of one 
dimensional thinking”.73 Williams et al, consistent with their rejection of the institutional 
approach in their earlier study74, refuse to acknowledge that Lewchuk’s work has wider 
application in aiding analysis regarding the demise of the sector. But such wider 
application is apparent from the following brief discussion of the origins and 
development of institutional structures and constraints in the British-owned motor 
industry.
Given its origins in the British skilled craft-based engineering and coach 
building industries, it is perhaps not too surprising that the infant British motor industry 
of the late nineteenth century resembled the atomistic economic organization of those 
industries, with shopfloor workers being allowed considerable autonomy over the work 
process. This was further encouraged by the employment of piece rates, utilised in the 
engineering industry since the 1880s75, a system which empowered labour, particularly in 
regard to effort levels, and which led to the establishment of various institutional 
structures that reflected the sector’s origins, as well as the wider economic environment. 
Lewchuk argues that this tradition of independence of the shopfloor, with management 
having but limited control over the labour effort, was formalised in the strengthening of 
the shop steward system as a result of the favourable conditions enjoyed by labour during 
the abnormal circumstances of the two world wars.76
Lewchuk refers to this approach to production, which he defined as being 
characterized by “weak managerial control over labour, low wages, low capital-labour 
ratios, low levels of machine integration along flow principles, and piecework payment 
systems”77, as the “British system”, a term regarded as inappropriate by Foreman-Peck et 
al who reveal that it was a system not confined to Britain, with piece rates being 
employed by the Siemens company in Germany in the 1880s.78 The advantage of this 
system was that it permitted acceptable profits to be realized despite the low labour
72 Church, op.cit. p i20; Whisler. op.cit p35.
73 Williams et at. Cars. Analysis, History, Cases, p i49.
74 Williams et al. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? p i 7.
75 Foreman-Peck etal. op.cit. p30.
76 Lewchuk. op.cit. pl40.
77 Ibid. pl36.
78 Foreman-Peck et al. op.cit. p31.
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productivity resulting from labour-intensive production methods. As Lewchuk pointed 
out, provided that capital-labour ratios were low enough, low throughput on capital 
equipment could be offset by the payment of low wages.79 Furthermore, as Foreman-Peck 
et al have observed, labour-intensive production methods have the added advantage of 
enlisting worker ingenuity in maintaining production and in ensuring quality.80 This 
system, according to Whisler, was well suited to producing low volume, high labour 
content, niche products such as Jaguar, Land Rover, and MG sports cars, but its 
institutional structures proved to be considerable impediments when such organizations 
sought to introduce mass production methods and modem corporate organisations.81 In 
contrast, the US “Fordist system”, through a combination of “rigid managerial control, 
flow production technology, and relatively high wages paid on fixed day rates”82, 
produced high levels of labour productivity.
Whisler asserts that the implementation of Fordist techniques, particularly the 
replacement of piece-rate payments with measured day work, at BL in 1971/72 emanated 
from management's recognition that traditional methods of production were hindering the 
company's performance. Although the resultant changes revealed the inflexibility of 
shopfloor attitudes, management failed to address these to correspond with the radical 
strategic change. Indeed, management's concessions to the shop stewards in order to 
obtain their agreement to the change served only to reinforce existing attitudes and 
beliefs. The failure to modify existing, or to develop new, supervisory and planning 
techniques demonstrated the rigidity of managerial attitudes, particularly at the junior 
management level where there were not the production planning and supervisory skills 
necessary to replace the shop stewards who had performed these tasks under piece­
work.83 In effect, BL overlaid Fordist production methods and measured day work 
payment on a corporate culture shaped by labour-intensive production methods and piece 
work payments. Unsurprisingly, in the new system management reverted to previous 
measures such as increasing manning levels to obtain increased production levels, 
thereby failing to achieve targeted productivity levels and lower unit costs, and defeating
79 Lewchuk. op.cit. p i40.
80 Foreman-Peck et al. op.cit. pi 73.
81 Whisler. op.cit. ppl84-5.
82 Lewchuk. op.cit. pi 36.
83 Whisler. op.cit. pp218-228.
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the object of introducing Fordist methods in the first place.84 As Whisler observed, the 
new production methods were incompatible with traditional practices and attitudes, and 
was a major factor in BL’s collapse in 1974.83
However, there were other constraining factors that had developed and which 
would play a major role in the sector’s demise. Whisler’s doctorial thesis, one of the few 
micro-economic studies of the industry, examined MG and Triumph sports car 
manufacturing.86 In it, and in his two subsequent books87, Whisler, building on the work 
of Elbaum and Lazonick and of Lewchuk, argues consistently that an examination of 
individual functions reveals that the British-owned motor manufacturing firms in the 
1970s especially suffered from pervasive weaknesses. This was particularly the case in 
engineering, product-design characteristics, product quality, and distribution. The failure 
to address these resulted in various deficiencies, the debilitating effects of which, 
according to Whisler, “have largely been over-looked in previous academic studies, 
which have concentrated primarily upon manufacturing, investment, and corporate 
strategies”.88
One particular resultant weakness can be seen in the merger movement of the 
1950s and 1960s, which did not result in integrated organizations but in loosely federated 
holding companies, the structure of the sector remaining de facto atomistic until after the 
BMC-Leyland merger in 1968. The tradition of personal control established by the 
founders of the various motor firms had resulted in ingrained attitudes regarding 
management control and organization, and consequent weaknesses in a number of 
different, but inter-related, functions. One vital area was engineering, which, as is 
described in Chapter Seven of this thesis, can be held responsible for many of the quality 
problems of BL cars, and of Jaguar in particular, and contributed to the decline of both 
firms. As Whisler argues, the changed corporate and market environments of the 1960s 
and 1970s revealed the inherent weaknesses of British motor engineering. Here, an
84 Ibid p225.
85/Aid. p219.
86 Whisler, Timothy R., Niche Products in the British Motor Industry: A History o f MG and Triumph 
Sports Cars, 1945-1981. Unpublished PhD thesis. London, London School of Economics, 1991.
87 Whisler, Timothy R. At the Etui o f the Road. The Rise and Fall o f Austin-Healey, MG, and Triumph 
Sports Cars. (Greenwich and London, 1995); Whisler, Timothy R. The British Motor Industry 1945- 
1994. A Case Study in Industrial Decline. (Oxford, 1999).
88 Whisler. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. p2.
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engineering elite of 'practical men’ exercised a dominance over the technical matters of 
their firms which was every bit as powerful as the dominance over corporate issues 
exercised by the personal manager.89
Control of the organization by a dominant figure, who had worked his way up 
the hierarchy rather than being a formally trained manager, long continued in BMC/BL. 
Whisler relates that Leonard Lord, who was the first head of BMC, exercised 
considerable control over the subsidiaries, despite the significant independence enjoyed 
by their individual managements, and Donald Stokes, the first head of BL, perpetuated 
the tradition of personal control by assuming the positions of both Chairman and 
Managing Director, and had some twenty-one managers and directors reporting directly 
to him.90 This perpetuation of the traditional personal management system by Stokes may 
be seen as both reflecting and reinforcing the existing management culture. A major 
problem was that the personal domination of all aspects of strategic and operational 
matters, with decisions being based on experience, conviction, and intuition, rather than 
on structured information and control systems, resulted in a management at all levels that 
lacked the organizational skills to construct and maintain a multidivisional organization.91 
The successful imposition by Stokes of a multidivisional structure required radical 
readjustments to the firm’s corporate culture, but this was not attempted. Consequently, 
instead of establishing a managerial hierarchy, a duplicate parallel system emerged, with 
central staff usurping the decision-making responsibilities of plant and company 
managers, producing an organizational paralysis “as strategic and operational matters 
became intertwined and subjected to personal, divisional, and company rivalries”.92 This 
was to have a marked impact on Jaguar, as is shown in Chapter Three of this thesis.
It would, however, not be until BL came under the direction of Michael 
Edwardes in 1977 that the ingrained shopfloor attitudes, values, and beliefs would be 
challenged. Furthermore, the financial support provided by the government in the 1970s 
had obviated the need for radical reform, merely ensuring the deeper entrenchment of 
existing institutions. Edwardes’s reform, however, was a radical redirection that required
89 Ibid. pp 156-7.
90 Whisler. Niche Products in the British Motor Industry. pp22, 44.
91 Whisler. British Motor Industry 1945-1994. p89.
92 Idem.
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an exogenous force for its accomplishment, which was realised through the use of 
government-backed confrontation and consolidation. Even so, these reforms did not go 
far enough, for, as Whisler points out, Edwardes had misread the extent of the changes 
required, and, assuming that the prevailing management and engineering institutions, and 
their cultural values and logics of action, were sound, concentrated, therefore, on the 
shopfloor institutions.93 The reform of managerial and engineering institutions had to wait 
until Graham Day assumed control of BL. These reforms were forced, albeit more gently 
than had been the case with the shopfloor reforms under Edwardes’s management, 
precipitating BL into a new corporate direction through the collaboration with Honda94, 
thus providing another example of an exogenous force being necessary to bring about 
radical change in corporate culture. It is of note that BL’s “engineers, middle managers, 
and manufacturing supervisors resisted change as rigidly as labour had”95, thus 
demonstrating that inflexible and ingrained attitudes had been pervasive throughout the 
firm.
1.5 Summary and Conclusions
The considerable, and remarkable, success achieved by Jaguar in the first half of the 
1980s was matched by an equally remarkable downturn later in the decade. Whilst at the 
time much of this was explained in terms of macroeconomic factors, such as currency 
exchange rates, and microeconomic factors, such as Jaguar’s rejuvenation and 
restructuring of its distribution network, this thesis suggests that the explanation is much 
more complex, and far more deep-rooted.
Certainly, at the time John Egan became responsible for the Jaguar business 
in 1980, the firm suffered the constraints of ingrained attitudes and beliefs which were 
the legacy of Jaguar’s BL stewardship and of Lyons’ autocratic rule, reflecting features 
prevalent throughout post-World War Two British industry in general, and the British- 
owned motor industry in particular. The failure of Egan to bring about a radical change in 
Jaguar’s corporate culture was masked by a public relations campaign that was highly 
effective in promoting the image of a revitalised organisation that had broken out of its
93/todpp4l0-n.
94Jbidp411.
93 Idem.
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legacy of institutional constraints. However, the debilitating effects of this failure became 
apparent in the light of Jaguar’s deteriorating position after 1986 and its subsequent 
acquisition by Ford. What became obvious was that Egan had not only failed to 
implement the recognised necessary reforms to overcome constraints resulting from 
ingrained shopfloor attitudes, but had failed to recognise that managerial and engineering 
attitudes and values were equally inflexible and pervasive and would constrain strategic 
change. To this extent, the Jaguar management may justly be accused of self-delusion, 
and the Egan era described as merely representing a continuance of an existing corporate 
culture. In exploring this theme, this thesis examines a range of functions in Jaguar, and 
considers the extent to which they suffered pervasive weaknesses, and the contribution 
made by each to Jaguar’s overall problems.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Ideally this thesis would have been based largely on material to be found in the Jaguar 
archives, plus data from a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, such as books, 
newspapers, and parliamentary papers, supplemented by information obtained from 
personal interviews with former executives of Ford or Jaguar, and other informed 
individuals, thus enabling reinterpretation of, and filling in of gaps and weaknesses in, the 
documents. This approach, termed triangulation, discussed in Sub-Section 2.2.1 below, is 
fairly standard in case study-based research such as that presented in this thesis. For 
example, in addition to the use of documentary evidence, Willman and Winch's 1980s 
study of the development of the BL Metro and labour relations at BL has a significant 
input from forty-nine interviews conducted with “BL managers, stewards and full-time 
officials”.1 Similarly, Whipp and Clark in their case study of the Rover SD1 project drew 
heavily on a large number of in-depth interviews with respondents “ranging from the 
senior management through to the track workers involved, as well as car industry 
experts”.2 However, in both these studies, respondents were identified by job function, 
rather than by name. Finally, it can be noted that Holden's book on Vauxhall Motors 
included a significant amount of information obtained from fifteen taped interviews with 
identified former Vauxhall employees to supplement documentary evidence.3
The expectation of being allowed access to the Jaguar archives was thought to 
be realistic since there had been positive reactions from individual executives at Ford, the 
then owners of Jaguar, to requests from the author for access to corporate records that 
related to a different ownership and management of the company, and which, in any case, 
were over twenty years old. Indeed, Lord Trotman, the former head of Ford worldwide,
1 Willman, Paul and Winch, Graham. Innovation and Management Control. Labour 
Relations at BL Cars. (Cambridge, 1985). ppl92-3.
2 Whipp, Richard and Clark, Peter. Innovation and the Auto Industry. (London, 1986). pi 6.
3 Holden, Len. Vauxhall Motors and the Luton Economy, 1900-2002. (Woodbridge, 2003).
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who retained an office and staff at the Ford world headquarters at Dearborn after his 
retirement, informed the author in February 2003 that Ford had always been sympathetic 
to requests from academic researchers for access to corporate records. However, after a 
lengthy procrastination involving several departments within Ford, Jaguar's Company 
Secretarial department informed the author in June 2006 that Ford had imposed a fifty 
year moratorium on access to Jaguar corporate records.4 Unfortunately, since Lord 
Trotman had died in April 2005 the author could no longer take up the proffered offer of 
help from this source in regard to overcoming such obstacles. Roger Putnam, President of 
the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) and former Chairman of Ford 
of Britain, opined to the author in November 2006 that the reasons for Ford's denial of 
access was that it had become “over-sensitive” about the financial losses incurred by 
Jaguar, and given that Ford intended to divest Jaguar, it probably did not wish to see any 
investigation of the company. Interestingly, Jim Randle, Jaguar's former Engineering 
Director had much earlier warned the author that, “things had taken place at Jaguar of 
which few people were aware and that Ford would be unwilling to allow these to come 
into the open"5, but refused to elucidate further, or to be interviewed for this study.
As a result of Ford's stance, this research was denied access to what had 
initially been thought of as the most important source of material on Jaguar. However, as 
the study progressed, it became apparent that the depth and quality of the information 
provided through interviews, whilst subject to the usual caveats, discussed in Sub- 
Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 below, was an equally important primary source, compensating 
to a large degree for the absence of material from internal corporate records. As a result, 
the study became increasingly an exercise in oral history, the major aspects of which are 
discussed in Sub-Section 2.2.2. In any case, it became questionable as to what internal 
records might actually exist from the Egan era, and what might be the quality of the 
information contained therein. Indeed, Thompson warns of the dangers of accepting too 
readily the contents of such documents, since they represent “the social perception of 
facts"6, and must be evaluated in this light.
4 e-mail to the author from Sue Pearson, Jaguar Assistant Company Secretary, 23 June 2006.
3 Jim Randle. Telephone conversation with the author. January 2003.
6 Thompson, Paul. The Voice o f the Past. Oral History. Third Edition. (Oxford, 2000). pi 24
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In this respect, Church, in commenting on the transcripts of interviews by 
Andrews and Brunner as part of the research for the writing of Lord Nuffield’s official 
biography, opined that those transcripts revealed “a texture of managerial behaviour 
which, even when they exist, board minutes and memoranda rarely convey”.7 In regard to 
Jaguar, Turner noted that the Board minutes of BMH, formed in 1966 when Jaguar and 
BMC merged, were “curt to a degree”.8 Writing of more recent times, Daniels relates 
how Jaguar’s engineering department had a periodic clear-out of its files, with what there 
is now available being due to personal copies taken home and kept by some of Jaguar’s 
senior engineers, and to which Daniels had been given access.9
It is problematic as to what information contained in such documents as the 
minutes of the Model Progress Meetings, or other internal committee meetings, was 
repeated in Board or Executive Committee Minutes, or what internal reports and 
memoranda might have survived. It is even more problematic as to the usefulness to the 
researcher of any data contained in surviving Jaguar documents, given the apparent 
information deficiencies at the company, which may well reflect the institutional legacy 
referred to in Section 1.4 above, with experience, conviction, and intuition being more 
important than structured information. This was apparent from the interviews with John 
Grant, Mike Beasley, and John Edwards. Grant, Deputy Chairman of Jaguar Cars in the 
two years immediately following the acquisition by Ford, related that Ford had found that 
Jaguar had little market intelligence data, and little analysis capability10, while Beasley, 
Egan’s Manufacturing Director, confessed that he had not been aware fully of the quality 
issues because of a lack of data.11 Edwards, Egan’s Finance Director, revealed that they 
were not aware of Jaguar’s deficiencies in engineering until the quality problems with the 
XJ40 became known following its US launch.12 Further evidence of Jaguar’s poor 
information recording is provided by Thorley who notes that Jaguar’s factory records did 
not differentiate between the XJ40 2.9 litre and 3.2 litre Standard/Daimler, so that the
7 Church, Roy. “Deconstructing Nuffield: The Evolution of Managerial Culture in the British Motor 
Industry” in The Economic History Review, New Series, Volume 49, No 3 (August 1996). p564.
8 Turner, Graham. The Leyland Papers. Second Edition. (London, 1973). Preface, px
9 Daniels, Jeff. Jaguar. The Engineering Story. (Yeovil, 2004). pp6-7.
10 John Grant. Interview with the author. January 1993. Appendix pp94-95.
11 Mike Beasley. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix p7.
12 John Edwards. Interview with the author. November 2002. Appendix p53.
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overall production totals relate to both models.13 However, it would appear that Jaguar 
was not unique in its failure to maintain accurate records. BMW, for example, in 
response to a request from the author stated that although they could provide total BMW 
sales per year they were unable to supply 1980s sales per annum figures for the BMW 7 
Series, but were able to supply the 1980s production per annum figures which they 
believed to be “more or less the same amount” as the cars sold in each year.14 BMW sales 
figures in certain of its main markets, however, were obtained through third-party sources 
such as the SMMT and Automotive News.
This present chapter explains the methodology of the research undertaken for 
this thesis, discusses the aptness, validity, and reliability of the primary and secondary 
sources used, and of the use of oral sources as a major research resource in this study. 
Comparisons and contrasts with, or critiques of, the literature in regard to specific 
functional areas, or theoretical frameworks, are made in various other chapters of this 
thesis, but in this chapter a prime objective is to provide a selective overview and critique 
of motor industry, or motor industry-related, literature that has been relevant to this study, 
focusing in particular on the methodological aspects to be found in existing literature, in 
order to gain an understanding of the extent to which such previous writing sheds light on 
the research questions posed in this thesis.
2.2 Methodology
This study originated from a conversation in 1992 between the author and John Grant, 
who at that time had only recently left Jaguar to join Lucas PLC as its Finance Director, 
regarding the nature of the problems at Jaguar which were being aired gradually by Ford 
at that time. Indeed, it had become increasingly obvious by the early 1990s that, despite 
Jaguar’s earlier claims to the contrary, many of the institutional and organizational issues 
that had faced the company at the start of the Egan era, and which were the legacy of 
both BL and the Lyons era, had not been resolved by the Egan management. A particular 
object of this research was to determine, therefore, whether the explanation for the 
downturn in Jaguar’s fortunes at the end of the 1980s lay in a prevalent cultural sclerosis,
13 Thoriey, Nigel. Jaguar XJ40. Buying, enjoying modifying. (Yeovil, 2002). p i54.
14 e-mails to the author from BMW Business and Finance Communication. 26 September 2008;
29 September 2008.
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rather than external factors such as currency exchange. Although some preliminary work 
was undertaken in 1993-94, the research had to be held in abeyance until 2002 when it 
was resumed as an academic study.
In relation to the methodology employed in this study, there are a number of 
aspects that are of note. These are the multimethod approach to data collection 
(triangulation), the characteristics of oral history, the interview techniques employed, the 
ethical issues involved, and the nature of the elite group of interviewees that contributed 
to the research. These aspects are discussed in the following sub-sections.
2.2.1 Triangulation
Although the term triangulation derives from land surveying, it has been adopted as a 
term covering a particular approach in academic research. Bryman notes that with regard 
to the latter usage, the most common meaning of the term refers to instances in which 
two or more research methods are utilised, the multimethod approach, so that the findings 
of one research method are bolstered by additional sources of information, although he 
also points out that a more appropriate use of the term is when researchers seek to check 
the validity of their findings by cross-checking them with information from other 
sources.13
As was stated in Section 2.1 above, from the outset, information about Jaguar, 
and its context within the British motor industry, was sought from published sources. 
These included Jaguar’s Annual Reports and Accounts, other literature produced by 
Jaguar, press, academic and trade journals, and a considerable number of notes, and 
company handouts, from private and public meetings with the Jaguar management, 
retained by the author from the 1980s when he was an investment analyst advising the 
City audience on the merits, or otherwise, of investing in motor industry shares. 
Academic, and other journals, were searched by means of JSTOR, ProQuest, Business 
Source Premier, and ABI/INFORM, while the Financial Times and other newspapers 
were searched using NewsBook. In addition, The Economist and Automotive News were 
physically searched for information about Jaguar during the 1980s and early 1990s, the
15 Bryman, Alan E. Triangulation, http://www.referenceworld.ccmi/sage/socilascience/triangulation.pdf.
Accessed 22 December 2008
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former using its indexes, the latter, which does not produce an index, by perusing every 
edition.
It was intended that the triangulation approach would be adopted, with 
material obtained from these sources being supplemented by, and cross-checked against, 
information obtained from personal interviews with former Jaguar executives, or other 
informed individuals. However, with the refusal of Ford to permit access to the Jaguar 
archives of the period in question, these personal interviews became central to the study, 
and triangulation assumed an even greater importance in terms of the information thus 
obtained. In this regard, triangulation was necessary on two levels: between the interview 
information and the documentary sources, and between the individual interviews. 
Triangulation also offered the opportunity to ascertain the extent of personal bias by 
interviewees, a subject discussed in the next sub-section.
2.2.2 Oral History
Thompson, a pioneer of oral history, in seeking to define the term accepts that given by 
the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. This defines oral history as “tape-recorded 
historical information drawn from the speaker's personal knowledge; the use or 
interpretation of this as an academic subject".16
With access to the Jaguar corporate archives being denied to the author, the 
methodology of the research consequently became focused on oral history, although as 
mentioned in the previous sub-section the interview programme had always been 
regarded as an important part of the study. It is pertinent, therefore, to discuss the issues 
resulting from the use of such sources. While information gained by this method is little 
different from that obtained, for example, by Parliamentary Committees, whose findings 
and records of evidence received are often cited by historians, the use of the interview is 
a technique, as Tosh and Lang point out, that has not always found favour with those 
historians whose modus operandi is rooted in the “principle that contemporaneity is the 
prime requirement of historical sources”.17 Consequently, such scholars are disdainful of 
the element of retrospection often contained in oral testimonies. Indeed, oral evidence,
16 Thompson, op.cit. Preface pxi.
17 Tosh, John with Lang, Sean. The Pursuit o f History. Aims, methods and new directions in 
the study o f modem history. Fourth Edition. (Harlow, 2006). p312.
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like that of many other sources of historical material, suffers bias of varying kinds, 
testimony being distorted by interviewees’ subsequent experiences, by exposure to other 
sources, particularly the media, and by selective perception or recall being influenced by 
nostalgia or by a sense of grievance, or by poor memory. Examples of such bias 
undoubtedly exist in all the interviews undertaken for this research, discussed below, care 
having been taken by the author to be aware of such bias, and to triangulate to look for 
consistency within interviews and between interviewees, and to seek confirmation in 
other sources. However, as Thompson rightly notes, the interview, unlike the one-way 
communication of the written memoir, does offer the advantages of permitting cross­
questioning and of obtaining elucidation.18
Bias can also result from the interview process itself, for, as Tosh and Lang 
argue, “in an interview each party is affected by the other”, with the end-product 
conditioned by the interviewer’s social position vis-&-vis the informant19, and, according 
to Thompson, by the interviewer’s own knowledge of the subject matter, informants 
being more forthcoming with knowledgeable interviewers.20 However, it is likely that 
such bias was mitigated to some extent by the fact that the interviewees for this research 
constituted an elite group, discussed in the following section, who were confident in 
expressing their views, and in the interview situation a majority of them appearing 
anxious to both “go on the record” and to “set the record straight”, even to the extent of 
being remarkably self-deprecating.
2.2.3 The Nature of the Elite Group contributing to the Research
Stephens defines an elite group as being composed of those in a position of power and 
raised social stature compared to the public at large.21 Undoubtedly, the positions 
occupied, or previously occupied, by all the interviewees contributing to this research 
defines the group as being elite. The seventeen men interviewed, listed in the Appendix, 
had all enjoyed distinguished careers, and most had been directors or senior managers of
18 Thompson, op.tit. p i21.
19 Tosh and Lang. op. tit. p318.
20 Thompson, op.tit. p223.
21 Stephens, Neil. MCollecting Data from Elites and Ultra Elites: Telephone and Face-to- 
Face Interviews with Macroeconomists” in Qualitative Research. Volume 7, Number 2.
May 2007. p205.
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Jaguar or Ford during the time period covered by this study, or in the few years 
immediately following Jaguar's takeover by Ford, or had otherwise been closely 
connected with Jaguar. Seven had been directors or employees of Jaguar in the Egan era, 
four had worked for Ford and had become involved with Jaguar following the Ford 
takeover, three were retailers of Jaguar cars, and three were outsiders involved with 
Jaguar in relation to finance, journalism, and component supply. Unsurprisingly, given 
their backgrounds, all the interviewees, with one exception (Magan), were articulate and 
free speaking individuals, with considerable experience of public speaking, making 
presentations, and giving interviews, for example, to the media. Their recollections and 
views, therefore, whilst subject to the same limitations as all oral testimony, discussed in 
the previous section, can be regarded as being of some import. Indeed, in respect to a 
number of issues, such as the quality problems at Jaguar, these interviews are the only 
available first-hand account of the situation at Jaguar, and are likely to remain so until 
access to Jaguar's corporate records is finally permitted. Of the targeted potential 
interviewees, only one, Jim Randle, the former Engineering Director of Jaguar, refused to 
be interviewed.
Whilst this universe might have been extended further, it was felt that this 
was hardly warranted given the depth and breadth of the material obtained from those 
interviewed. In a number of cases, memory lapses or a request from the author for 
additional information resulted in interviews being supplemented by further contact by 
telephone and e-mail, and John Edwards, at his invitation, was interviewed a second time.
Unsuiprisingly, some interviewees were more forthcoming than others in 
terms of both quantity and quality of information. In part this was a question of 
motivation, with interviewees such as Edwards, Grant, Orr-Ewing, and Michael Dale 
very obviously being attracted to the notion of bequeathing a more accurate version of 
Egan's Jaguar than already existed in the public domain, and being anxious to tell their 
own story. Trotman, Scheele, Beasley, and Blythe, whilst undoubtedly pleased to be able 
to talk about their contribution to the Jaguar story, appeared to be acting more from a 
genuine desire to be helpful. Memory was also an important factor here, with Magan, for 
example, suffering significant memory lapses, although it is problematic whether these 
were real or feigned. On the other hand, Grant, who was interviewed only shortly after he
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had left Jaguar, Scheele, and Michael Dale appeared to have considerable, and fairly 
accurate, recall of facts and figures, as was apparent when these were triangulated with 
documentary sources.
Although there were a number of different perspectives offered by various 
interviewees, there was a remarkable degree of consistency in regard to a number of 
issues, and a considerable willingness to admit to their own failings. In particular, the 
XJ40 quality issue and its adverse impact on Jaguar, never previously in the public 
domain, was held unanimously to be a problem that resulted largely from engineering 
deficiencies, and the one time much lauded Quality Circles were not regarded as having 
been successful by those with whom the subject was raised. There was some obvious bias 
resulting from different respondents’ views of Egan and his managing of Jaguar. 
Ainsworth, Orr-Ewing, and Michael Dale were extremely negative about Egan, and 
Blythe and Putnam were obviously positive, but there was general agreement about the 
triumph of style over substance during the Egan era, and the failure to address many 
deficient areas. In some instances opinion resulted from a feeling of grievance, as with 
Michael Dale, who blamed Egan, albeit with admitted hindsight, for many of Jaguar’s 
problems and the bankruptcy of certain US automotive dealers, and in the case of Orr- 
Ewing against who Egan organised a successful coup d ’etat, resulting in Egan becoming 
the company’s Chairman. Nostalgia also played a part, as was obvious in a number of 
comments made by both Putnam and Trotman. However, it was not always as clear-cut as 
this. Edwards, for example, was full of admiration for Egan’s early achievements at 
Jaguar, seeing him as having saved the company, but was heavily critical of Egan’s later 
performance. It was also noticeable that Grant, Blythe, and Trotman, being Ford 
executives who had been involved with the acquisition of Jaguar, were quite defensive of 
Ford’s action here, unlike Scheele who only became involved with Jaguar some two 
years after the acquisition.
Finally, there is the issue of the amount of direct knowledge of situations and 
events which each interviewee had. Obviously, some interviewees related events of 
which they had no direct experience, but, for example, had learned of them through 
colleagues, and care has had to be exercised in regard to the degree of reliability that can 
be attributed to such “third party” evidence. Edwards opined that the Ford people such as
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Grant could only relate what they discovered when Ford actually took over Jaguar, and 
could not speak about what was there, for example, in 1984/85. However, what is 
obvious from the interviews with Grant and Scheele was that they had a greater depth and 
breadth of knowledge of Jaguar, and its problems, over the entire Egan era, than many 
who were there at the time, and, not having been part of the highly compartmentalised 
Egan management team, consequently produced some of the most balanced and wide- 
ranging accounts.
2.2.4 Interview Techniques used in the Research
The interviews undertaken for this study were semi-structured qualitative interviews, 
whereby open-ended questions were used to guide and facilitate the interview process. 
This technique was adopted for a number of reasons, but its applicability was obvious 
from the start, given the nature of the group being interviewed. By definition, the 
interviewees had expert knowledge of the topics being discussed and, as pointed out by 
Stephens in regard to elite interviewing, consequently needed to be allowed freedom of 
expression to impart information, and opinions, in terms meaningful to themselves.22 The 
author had an agenda of a list of topics to be discussed at each interview, varying 
according to the individual’s role in the Jaguar story and, seeking interview triangulation, 
according to information obtained from previous interviews. The use of such an agenda 
generally ensured that the targeted areas were covered, but at the same time allowed the 
interviewees to introduce issues they considered to be important. In the majority of 
interviews the responses to questions or prompts were lengthy, detailed, and wide- 
ranging, yielding a considerable amount of useful information. Wynn-Williams has 
pointed out that, “By implication, the elite interview obviates the use of a structured 
approach because the interviewee is the expert and to restrict them to answering prepared 
questions would negate the benefits of interviewing them in the first place”.23 Thompson 
warns against the use of “box-ticking 'questionnaires’ whose rigidly structured logical 
patterns so inhibit the memory that the ‘respondent’....is reduced to monosyllabic or very
22 Stephens, op.cit. p205.
23 Wynn-Williams, Michael S., A Role fo r International Vertical Joint Ventures Within An 
Automobile Industry Paradigm. Unpublished PhD thesis. Cardiff University, October 2007. p36.
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short answers”.24 Indeed, more generally, Thompson observes in regard to oral history 
that “the less their testimony is shaped by the interviewer’s questions, the better”.25
Finally, mention must be made of the importance for the interview, and hence 
the amount of information forthcoming, of the rapport between researcher and 
interviewee. As related in Sub-Section 2.2.2, Thompson points out the importance of the 
researcher having thorough knowledge and understanding, and experience, of the subject 
under discussion.26 This is particularly important in elite interviews where respondents 
expect questioning and discussion to be at a fairly sophisticated level. Stephens opines 
that wide differences in culture, experience, and age between researcher and respondent 
can act as barriers to a successful interview, and make it difficult for the researcher to be 
taken seriously.27 In the case of this particular research, such barriers were not apparent, 
the author being of a similar age and social background to many of the interviewees. The 
interview process was enhanced also by the fact that the author was personally known to 
a number of the interviewees from his experience as a City motor industry analyst, and in 
a number of cases interviewees provided introductions to other potential interviewees, 
thus facilitating the interview process.
Each interview was tape recorded, with the full permission for which being 
obtained from each interviewee before the tape recorder was switched on, and also for the 
information thus acquired to be used in the writing of this thesis. Such recordings 
preserved the original content of each interview, and each was fully transcribed by the 
author, the process involved enabling the recovery of information that might have been 
highlighted at the time of the interview. Whenever possible, opinions expressed, and 
facts, were triangulated with more than one interviewee, and against published material, 
and vice versa. In a number of instances the author was able to follow up various issues, 
or pose further questions, by telephone or e-mail with different respondents. The 
transcripts of the interviews, edited for grammar, syntax, and comprehension, and with 
certain sensitive information (largely of a personal nature) deleted mainly at the request 
of respondents, after interview, are produced in the Appendix to this thesis.
24 Thompson, op.tit. p225.
25 Ibid. p227.
26 Ibid. pp2Al-3.
27 Stephens, op. tit. p207.
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2.2.5 Ethical Issues
Thompson has drawn attention to the ethical considerations in relation to interviewees28, 
and throughout the interview process due regard was paid by the author to ethical issues. 
In requesting an interview the purpose of the research was stated, and reasons given for 
wanting a contribution from that particular person. At the meeting, this was reiterated, 
and the interviewee was asked his permission for the interview to be recorded, with the 
author undertaking to switch off the tape machine if at any time the interviewee wanted 
to “go off the record” and provide information for background only. However, this 
occurred only on a few occasions. Likewise, some interviewees, realising that they had 
perhaps been indiscreet with regard to certain former colleagues, later asked that certain 
comments be not used, and accordingly these were not included in the transcription by 
the author. Only after consent for recording the interview had been granted was the tape 
machine switched on, with the machine being in full view of the interviewee at all times, 
the exception, of course, being the two telephone interviews with respondents in the 
United States. Thus, the two main ethical issues of informed consent by the respondent, 
and confidentiality, were respected by the author. In regard to the first issue, Thompson 
opines that license to quote the respondent is implied by a consent to be interviewed29, 
and it may be likewise argued that consent to have the interviewed taped reinforces such 
license. The confidentiality aspect relates to the information imparted, and to the identity 
of the respondents.
Despite the refusal of Ford to allow access to the Jaguar archives, commercial 
confidentiality could not be regarded as an issue given that the information sought at the 
time of most of the interviews related to some twenty years earlier, and this was 
appreciated by all the later interviewees. The exceptions were the two earliest 
respondents (Grant and Blythe), interviewed shortly after the events which are the subject 
of this thesis had taken place. Each respondent was informed prior to the interview that 
their contributions would be attributed to them, and none requested that their 
contributions be non-attributable. Even so, to demonstrate the veracity of the author’s 
statements regarding consent and confidentiality, certain of the later interviewees were
28 Thompson, op.tit. pp252-257.
29 Ibid. p2S3.
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asked to confirm these in writing, and copies of such confirmation have been placed in 
the Appendix.
2.3 Literature Review
The indigenous UK motor industry has spawned a huge number of books, unsurprisingly 
given its importance to the national economy, its rapid demise in the 1970s, and the 
interest it holds for motor enthusiasts in terms of the industry overall, or in regard to 
specific companies or marques. Such books may be broadly categorised in terms of those 
being of interest mainly to an academic audience, or of interest mainly to a more general 
audience, or of interest mainly to a specialist enthusiasts' audience. There are books in 
each of these three categories that have at least some relevance or usefulness to this 
study, and this present section provides a selective review, and critical examination, of 
those that have been found to have been of greatest relevance, focusing in particular on 
the methodological approach, where relevant, of each, and the existence, and nature, of 
any bias. At this point, however, it should be noted that, apart from Whisler, scholars 
have not given a great deal of consideration to the quality aspect of British cars, which, as 
will be indicated in Chapter Seven below, was the major factor determining Jaguar's 
fortunes in the second half of the 1980s, nor have they investigated the costs and causes 
of poor quality and reliability. Moreover, there have been no academic works that have 
focused exclusively on Jaguar, and whilst certain learned articles have used Jaguar as a 
case study, along with other companies30, they, like the Whipp et al paper discussed in 
Section 1.2 above, were written mainly at a time when Jaguar was widely perceived as a 
success story, and merely repeated various, discrete, aspects of the Jaguar story as 
presented by the company. The usefulness of such articles as source material, therefore, is 
somewhat limited, and where something has been added it has been duly referenced in 
this thesis.
30 For example: Dellheim, Charles. “The Historian and Corporate Culture” in The Public Historian, 
Volume 8, Number 2 (Spring 1986). pp9-22; Goodman. John. “Industrial relations and restructuring in 
manufacturing: Three case studies in the United Kingdom” in International Labour Review, Volume 128, 
Number 5 (1989). pp601-620. Salama, Alzira. “The use of an organisation's biography as a research 
method” in Management Education and Development, Volume 23, Issue 3 (Autumn 1992). pp225-233.
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2.3.1 Books relating to the British Motor Industry.
The earliest academic works of interest to this study are those by Turner31 and by Rhys.32 
Both offer a limited amount of useful material on Jaguar prior to 1970, as well as on the 
development of the British-owned motor sector. Although failing to identify sources, 
Turner’s largely narrative work, which was primarily focused on the Leyland-BMH 
merger in 1968, may be regarded as highly authoritative since he had been allowed 
virtually unrestricted access to BL’s corporate records, and to a number of the BL 
personnel concerned.33 In contrast, Rhys’s book is far more analytical, and wide-ranging, 
as might be expected given the addition of the rubric “An Economic Survey” to its title, 
but whilst it is undoubtedly a work of considerable authority, being much cited 
elsewhere, with, for example, some forty-seven references to it in Forman-Peck et aV s 
1995 book34, it suffers from being somewhat economical in the identification of sources. 
Nonetheless, it is particularly useful in identifying and evaluating the factors which had 
influenced the historic development of the British motor industry as a whole.
Much of what has been written in the past thirty years about the UK motor 
industry has focused on discussing, and attempting to provide explanations for, the 
demise of the British-owned motor industry, and BL in particular. Two notable 
exceptions are the case study-related works by Willman and Winch33, and Whipp and 
Clark.36 Both are based largely on primary material, using archival records such as Board 
minutes of BL and its antecedent companies, as well as drawing heavily on material 
obtained through in-depth interviews. In both studies, archival material was used to 
confirm or challenge oral testimony. Whipp and Clark’s book is a fairly exhaustive study 
of BL engineering capabilities through an investigation of the SD1 project, and although 
not written from an institutionalist perspective it does draw attention to the failings of 
orthodox approaches to industrial change, and to the understanding that can be gained 
from studies at the institutional level, especially in regard to addressing the multiple
31 Turner, op.cit.
32 Rhys, D G. The Motor Industry. An Economic Survey. (London, 1972).
33 Turner, op.cit. Preface, ppix-x.
34 Foreman-Peck, James, Bowden, Sue, and McKinlay, Alan. The British Motor Industry. 
(Manchester, 1995).
33 Willman ami Winch, op.cit.
36 Whipp and Clark, op.cit.
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structures within an enterprise.37 Particularly interesting and useful is the book’s brief 
history of The Rover Company, which provides clear evidence for the evolution of a 
strong cultural ethos within the company, in regard to both management and shop floor 
workers, especially as a result of the plurality of sub-cultures within these two groups.38 
Willman and Winch’s book on the development of the BL Metro and labour relations 
within BL, written contemporaneously to that of Whipp and Clark, usefully identifies 
many of the pervasive weaknesses in BL, and their deep roots. In particular, Willman and 
Winch demonstrate the importance of industrial relations at BL, and of their reform, in 
marked contrast to Williams el al who argue that industrial relations were a relatively 
unimportant factor in BL’s performance.39
Michael Edwardes’ autobiographical account of his five-year stewardship of 
BL40, published in 1983, the year after he left BL, was to be the precursor of a number of 
books about BL, each of which was to draw at least some material from it. As with all 
autobiographies, its contents are inherently subjective and need, therefore, to be treated 
with a considerable degree of circumspection in regard to its use as a record of events. 
Obviously, Edwardes has been selective in what he has included, and admits in the 
Preface that certain material of a private or sensitive nature has been purposefully 
omitted. It is perhaps for this reason that Edwardes makes very little comment about 
quality problems at BL, other than to acknowledge the existence of quality defects41, and 
that many quality problems resulted from BL’s shortage of 1,500 engineers.42 Edwardes 
showed no such inhibitions in regard to Jaguar, his scathing comments about the quality 
and reliability of the cars at the time Egan was appointed to run the company being made 
at a time when these quality problems had been well acknowledged, and, apparently, 
resolved.
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Edwardes’ book is an exercise in 
self-justification, aimed at answering the considerable criticism previously levied at him 
by the media, and by politicians, but it does provide useful insights, from the perspective
37 Ibid. ppl3-14.
n Ibid. pp71-4.
39 Williams, Karel; Williams, John; Thomas, Dennis. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? (London, 
1983). pp252,254-55.
40 Edwardes, Michael. Back from the Brink. An Apocalyptic Experience. (London, 1983).
41 Ibid. p64.
42 Ibid. p65.
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of management, into the problems facing BL and the reasons for Edwardes' consequent 
somewhat draconian actions in respect to reducing employee numbers, and replacing 
managers. Moreover, in highlighting the “ingrained attitudes" that were “widespread 
throughout the company”43 it complements the work of Willman and Winch, and of 
Whipp and Clark, in demonstrating the strength of BL's cultural ethos. Additionally, and 
of direct relevance to this study, Edwardes identifies a number of pervasive weaknesses 
at Jaguar in regard to its shopfloor, engineering, and management structures.44 These, 
however, were left to the Egan management to challenge, but which, as will be 
demonstrated in this thesis, it failed to do.
Also in 1983 was published the first of Williams et a/’s three books which 
focus in part, or exclusively, on the problems at BL.45 Despite their claim to academic 
rigour, these are works that generally lack credibility, for the reasons that will now be 
discussed. Even so, they do contribute to the debate surrounding the demise of the 
British-owned motor sector, if only in terms of their deliberately provocative and 
negativistic stance on many of the issues. Unfortunately, a number of their statements and 
arguments do not bear close scrutiny, and although only some of the defects have been 
noted by other academics, their work undoubtedly has stimulated debate, and further 
research. To take but two examples, their assertion that the managers BL recruited from 
Ford in the 1970s had little understanding of finance or of car manufacturing46 is 
demonstrated by Whisler to lack validity47, and Bowden et al have called into question 
their claims about the decision-making capabilities of, and the information available to, 
BL's senior managers.48 Problematic issues such as these are discussed in the body of this 
thesis, but it is useful at this point to discuss some of the more general problems inherent
43 Ibid. pi 7.
44 Ibid. pl75.
45 Williams, Karel; Williams, John; Thomas, Dennis. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?
(London, 1983); Williams, Karel; Williams, John; Haslam, Colin. The Breakdown o f Austin Rover: a 
case study in the failure o f business strategy and industrial policy. (Leamington Spa, 1987); Williams, 
Karel; Haslam, Colin; Williams, John; Johal, Sukhdev; with Adcroft, Andy. Cars. Analysis, History, 
Cases. (Providence, 1994).
46 Williams et al. Cars, p i51.
47 Whisler, Timothy R. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. A Case Study in Industrial Decline.
(Oxford, 1999). pl07.
48 Bowden, Sue, Foreman-Peck, James, and Richardson, Tom. “The Post-war Productivity Failure: Insights 
from Oxford (Cowley)”. Middlesex University Business School Discussion Paper No 85. June, 2000. p8 
andn33.
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in Williams et aVs several books in order to demonstrate why such otherwise apparently 
major pieces of work have to be treated with a great deal of circumspection.
A major criticism that may be levelled is that all three books are strong on 
opinion, and extremely weak on the use of primary sources, relying heavily on printed 
material such as company Annual Reports and Accounts, which they refer to as “archive 
research”49, and published statistics, as well as analysis of published work. Indeed, the 
motor industry parts of their first book, Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? 
(published in 1983), draw quite heavily on the Report of the Central Policy Review Staff 
(hereafter CPRS).30 In their second book, The Breakdown o f Austin Rover (published in 
1987), they proudly proclaim that their analysis had not benefited from access to internal 
company documents and was written “from published sources by a team of outsiders”51, 
justifying this methodology on the grounds of their analysis being concerned with 
“abstract considerations” rather than individual personalities. But, their claim of not 
wishing “to personalise the issues”52 might carry greater conviction if so much of their 
work was not devoted to attacking Edwardes personally, with them writing, for example, 
of management miscalculation being “predetermined by Sir Michael Edwardes personal 
style”53, and basing a great deal of their analysis on material from his autobiography.
Moreover, Williams et a/’s work offers no new evidence to support their 
arguments, the authors having disdained consulting archival or personal sources, unlike 
the writers of other works discussed in this present section. Indeed, the emphasis of 
Williams et al on the analysis and interpretation of published statistical and financial 
data, and failing to triangulate their findings by reference to qualitative archival data, 
suggests an unduly superficial approach, lacking in academic rigour. Finally in regard to 
sources used by Williams et al, their apparent unquestioning use of data from BL’s 
Annual Reports and Accounts makes their consequent analysis somewhat suspect given, 
as discussed in Section 2.4.2 below, the extent to which companies at this time were able 
to manipulate data and conceal information in such documents.
49 Williams et al. Cars. p5.
50 Central Policy Review Staff, (hereafter CPRS). The Future o f the British Car Industry. (London, 1975).
51 Williams et al. Breakdown o f Austin Rover. p3.
52 Ibid. p2.
53 Ibid. p33.
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Williams et a/’s negativistic approach is also manifest in their dismissal of the 
various analytical and theoretical frameworks used to explain BL’s demise, as was noted 
in Section 1.5 above. Unfortunately, whilst Williams et al may well be justified in 
rejecting some of these approaches, their refusal to accept any of them, and their failure 
to expound sound reasons for so doing, does not make for a convincing argument. 
Particular scorn is reserved by them for the contributions made by applied economics, 
which they accuse of producing deficient explanations as a result of its preoccupation 
with “the symptomatology of poor manufacturing performance”54, and management 
science, accusing “the business-school professors” of merely using old techniques and 
themes “in an increasingly loose and rhetorical way”55. They are similarly dismissive or 
disparaging of the various arguments and studies relating to the subject of the motor 
industry, and its writers, or ignore a number of important texts altogether. Thus, the work 
of Rhys is ignored, having been first dismissed as being part of the outmoded 
“descriptive empirical” legacy of applied economics56, Wormack et a/’s book57 is 
denigrated as “evangelical Japanolatory” and its conclusions as being “manifestly 
absurd”51, Lewchuk’s work in regard to British production methods is disdained for being 
“one dimensional thinking” resting on “historical misunderstanding”59, and the CPRS 
findings are rejected as being “invalid and unfair” on the grounds of them being based on 
data supplied by BL.60
Finally, Williams et al may be fairly criticised for their inherent bias against 
BL’s management, who they consistently blame for ineptitude and miscalculation, and 
for their consistent defence of labour’s role. Hence, their use of headings such as “The 
workforce as scapegoats”61, and their rejection of the adverse impact of strikes, and bad 
work practices, on BL’s fortunes after 1968, seeing the importance of the role of these 
factors as having been exaggerated because of “management alibis and media
54 Williams et at. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? p i 7.
55 Williams et al. Cars. p4.
56 Ibid. p3.
57 Womack, James P, Jones, Daniel T, & Roos, Daniel. The Machine That Changed The World (New 
York, 1990).
58 Williams et al. Cars. p4.
39 Ibid. pl49.
60 Williams et al. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? p255.
61 Ibid. p251.
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stereotypes”.62 This was despite evidence from the CPRS that the strike record was much 
worse than that of BL’s overseas competitors63, and that the pace of work in UK car 
plants was slower than in European plants.64 Whilst Williams et al acknowledge that BL 
did have a quality and reliability problem, they argue that its importance had been 
exaggerated since the basic problem was one of “external market limitations” which were 
“more fundamental than the poor quality of the company’s product”65, and which were 
not recognised by management, leading to the conclusion that BL was “killed by massive 
managerial miscalculation”.66 However, as other writers were to demonstrate 
subsequently, the issues were far from being as unambiguous as Williams et al sought to 
portray.
Two histories of the British motor industry were published in 1988, both 
written by journalists who were highly knowledgeable of the subject matter, and were 
aimed at the popular audience. Both offer good overviews of the development of the 
industry, and although they offer insights and information that have been useful in the 
research for this thesis, both suffer from being narrative, and fairly superficial, accounts. 
That produced by Wood67 is the more academic in its style, with good referencing and a 
useful bibliography, although it does not attempt to explain the problems of the industry 
in relation to an analytical framework. The information and perspectives obtained from 
interviews with senior motor industry executives are particularly interesting and useful, 
although Wood does not always treat these with the appropriate degree of caution. For 
example, Wood unquestioningly accepts Egan’s description of the dinner for US dealers 
in 1981, in which Egan portrays himself as playing the main role.68 This is a version that 
is strongly contested by Dale69 who had already published an account of the event that 
differed somewhat from that depicted by Egan.70 Whilst representing a worthwhile
62 Ibid. p255.
63 CPRS. pp98-9.
64 Ibid. p83.
65 Williams et al. Breakdown o f Austin Rover. p72.
66 Williams et al. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? p253.
67 Wood, Jonathan. Wheels o f Misfortune: The Rise and Fall o f the British Motor Industry. (London, 1988).
68 Ibid. pp232-3.
69 Michael Dale, e-mail to the author. 7 August 2007. Appendix p44n52.
70 Dale, Michael. “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the US”. Fortune. 28 April 1986.pl 11.
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contribution to the literature, Wood’s book is hardly a balanced account, being written 
from a management perspective, and neglecting shopfloor standpoints.
This is not a deficiency apparent in Adeney’s book.71 Indeed, Adeney has 
produced a far more balanced account of the history of the British car industry, exploring 
the subject from both the management and worker perspectives. Moreover, Adeney 
provides far more examples than does Wood which may be used to demonstrate the 
prevalence of ingrained attitudes in both BL and Jaguar. Indeed, the prevalent 
inflexibility of BL’s engineering function, and the consequent adverse impact on BL’s 
fortunes, particularly as a result of a damaging disregard of ease of manufacture and 
product quality, is revealed in Adeney’s accounts of the personal domination of Issigonis, 
BL's chief designer.72 Even so, such revelations would later be ignored by Williams et al 
who viewed BL’s engineering function as first rate, and designated Issigonis a “design 
star”.73 However, the rigidities of the engineering function’s modus operandi that Jaguar 
inherited from both the Lyons era, and from BL, would be a major factor in Jaguar’s 
demise in the late 1980s, as is detailed in Chapter Seven below.
Church’s 1994 account74 of the British motor industry during the one hundred 
years since its foundation offers a fairly comprehensive review of the literature of the 
subject and, apart from tracing the development of the industry, assesses the sufficiency 
of the various explanations that had been offered to explain its decline since the mid- 
1960s. He notes that these tended to emphasize “adverse government policies, obstructive 
and militant labour, or organizational and managerial weaknesses”75 and concludes that 
although no single explanation by itself could adequately account for the demise of the 
industry, each was important in contributing to an understanding of the complexity of the 
topic. Of particular relevance to this thesis is that it is the first account of its kind to 
examine the contribution of Lewchuk’s institutional approach, and whilst noting criticism 
of Lewchuk’s work as being too deterministic, Church concludes that it is a model that 
affords some valuable insights into the industry’s post-war history.76 Although offering
71 Adeney, Martin. The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History o f Britain's Car Industry. (London, 1988).
72 Ibid. pp239-40.
73 Williams etal. Cars, p i37.
74 Church, Roy. The rise and decline o f the British motor industry. (Cambridge, 1994).
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no new primary source material Church's work is particularly useful, being essentially a 
survey and analysis of the literature which, unlike that of Williams et al, is well-balanced 
and objective, and which, therefore, by means of clarifying the various issues does serve 
to move the debate forward.
Foreman-Peck et aVs 1995 account77 is framed in the applied economics 
tradition so disparaged by Williams et al. Like Rhys's book of twenty-five years earlier it 
is concerned with identifying and evaluating the factors which had influenced the 
development of the British motor industry as a whole, but up-dating the analysis to 
include the decline of the British-owned sector, and the subsequent attempts to restore its 
fortunes. However, there is little mention of the quality issues that adversely impacted 
British cars, or of the problems resulting from design and engineering. Moreover, there is 
no attempt to root these various factors in a framework of theory. Nonetheless, the book 
is a useful conspectus, enhanced by the use of archival material and personal interviews.
Whisler’s book7*, the most recent on the subject of the British motor industry 
overall, is a revisionist work, founded on detailed archival research, that seeks to 
reinterpret orthodox views on evidence, and events regarding the demise of the 
indigenous British motor industry. It is more limited in its scope than those of Rhys or 
Foreman-Peck et al, confining its coverage to the post-war years to 1994, but this more 
restricted time horizon is more than compensated for by the depth of coverage, based on 
detailed archival research, particularly of the companies concerned, interviews with some 
of the industry's leading personalities, and on existing literature, including his own 
previous work79 which developed out of his PhD thesis.80 Apart from the thoroughness of 
the research, Whisler’s 1999 book is notable for its new approach to the subject, utilizing 
the theoretical framework of the institutional rigidity hypothesis of Elbaum and Lazonick 
to explain the development and decline of the indigenous British motor industry. In so 
doing, however, Whisler tends to confine his analysis to BL and its main post-war 
constituent companies such as BMC, with only occasional comparisons being made with
77 Foreman-Peck et al. op.cit.
78 Whisler. op.cit.
79 Whisler, Timothy R. At the End o f the Road The Rise and Fall o f Austin-Healey, MG, and Triumph 
Sports Cars. (Greenwich and London, 1995).
80 Whisler, Timothy R., Niche Products in the British Motor Industry: A History o f MG and Triumph 
Sports Cars, 1945-1981. Unpublished PhD thesis. London, London School of Economics, 1991.
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the foreign-owned UK motor companies such as Ford. Also, there is little mention of the 
more specialist parts of BL such as Jaguar. As stated in the Introduction, this thesis seeks 
in part to determine whether Whisler’s findings apply equally to the experience of Jaguar 
in the 1980s. Whisler also was the first academic to give prominence to the adverse 
impact of the poor reliability and quality of British cars, as mentioned earlier, and the 
first writer to demonstrate the illusory nature of BL’s reputation for engineering 
excellence. These themes, and others, are explored further in this thesis in relation to 
Jaguar.
2.3.2. Books Relating to Jaguar
Most of the books discussed in the previous section make at least some mention of 
Jaguar, but do not ascribe any great importance to the company. It may be supposed, with 
some justification, that the reason for this lack of scholarly attention lay in Jaguar’s minor 
significance in terms of the industry overall. Indeed, despite the considerable publicity 
Jaguar generated in the 1980s as a result of its corporate revival, privatization, and 
acquisition by Ford, it played little part in the fortunes of the British motor industry 
overall, accounting for less than 2% of total UK car production volume in the 1970s.81
However, there is a voluminous literature dedicated to Jaguar, for the most 
part focusing on the development, history, and technical aspects of particular models 
produced by the company, with all the consequent bias that might be expected of works 
written by a small number of enthusiast, and prolific, motor journalists for an audience of 
motor enthusiasts. Indeed, the British Library catalogue shows that on the subject of 
Jaguar sixteen books have been written by Nigel Thorley, thirteen by Philip Porter, 
sixteen by Andrew Whyte, and nine by Paul Skilleter. In addition, a number of other 
writers have each produced a smaller number of books, or single titles, relating to Jaguar. 
Generally, the corporate histories produced by these writers suffer an obvious bias 
resulting from a significant input from Jaguar’s PR department, and whilst providing 
interesting overviews and perspectives, all suffer from being mainly narrative, and fairly 
superficial, accounts which often fail to identify precise sources. However, whilst the 
writers’ enthusiasm for the marque, and its history, has resulted in accounts of corporate
81 SMMT. The Motor Industry o f Great Britain. Various Issues.
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Jaguar often amounting to little more than hagiographies, and thereby lacking credibility 
as sources, there are a number that have offered at least some material of use in this 
thesis.
The first “definitive history of Jaguar”, with an introduction by Sir William 
Lyons, the founder of Jaguar, was produced by Whyte in 1980, with a second edition 
appearing in 1985 to mark the fifty-years anniversary of the launch of the first car to 
carry the name “Jaguar”, and at a time when the newly privatized Jaguar company was at 
a high point82 The heavy bias towards Jaguar displayed in the book probably owes much 
to the fact that Whyte worked in public relations at Jaguar for some twenty years. This 
book was the first to focus equally on the history of Jaguar and the personalities involved 
as well as the cars themselves, and was based heavily on interviews with Jaguar 
executives and material from the Jaguar archives. Whilst it studiously avoids negative 
aspects of Jaguar's history such as industrial relations problems, it does include some 
useful perspectives, especially in regard to the development of a corporate ethos similar 
to that in other British motor companies, and quantitative data regarding deliveries of 
different models.
Thorley’s account of Jaguar's history83 is another heavily biased work, the 
production of which is stated to have been suggested by the Jaguar Daimler Heritage 
Trust to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the opening of Jaguar's Browns Lane factory. 
Whilst offering some useful insights regarding Jaguar's fortunes under Egan, and later, it 
is less detailed than Whyte's 1985 book, but does provide some material not covered in 
that earlier book and, like Whyte's work, avoids negative aspects such as industrial 
relations issues, omitting any mention of the problems experienced in this respect by the 
Egan management. Indeed, one of the major failings of the book is that Thorley seems to 
have accepted without question the releases and briefings of Jaguar's PR department. 
Thus, Thorley labels Egan as “Mr Jaguar”, portrays the problems of the late 1980s as 
being due to the aftermath of the Stock Market crash, and adverse currency exchange, 
and limits mention of the XJ40’s quality problems to one sentence.84 It is of note that in
82 Whyte, Andrew. Jaguar. The definitive history o f a great British car. Second Edition. 
(Wellingborough, 1985).
83 Thorley, Nigel. Jaguar in Coventry. Building the Legend. (Derby, 2002).
84 Ibid. pi 57.
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his book devoted to the XJ4085, produced in the same year, Thorley again makes little 
mention of the model's quality problems.
Porter’s “Illustrated History”86 is a work that focuses on the cars themselves, 
but with a text which, in contrast to most books of its type, makes a serious attempt to 
achieve a balanced, albeit limited, account of corporate Jaguar, and provides some 
interesting insights which few other writers have pursued. For example, Porter notes that 
after 1987 the press were starting to tarnish Jaguar’s “new image” and questions whether 
“the vital reliability was as good as it was vaunted to be”.87 Unlike many other books in 
this genre, Porter briefly considers Ford’s post-acquisition judgment on Jaguar, noting, 
for example, “too late, Ford realised it had bought a company with work practices that 
would have looked out of date in the 1970s”.88
Dymock’s “The Jaguar File”89 is useful as a reference book, cataloguing 
every model, including racing cars, produced by Jaguar up to 1998, and is particularly 
informative regarding the XJ220 model. However, it suffers from certain uninformed 
comment regarding corporate Jaguar. For example, Dymock portrays Egan as having 
Jaguar take part in racing “in order to sell the company”90, something Egan, and Edwards, 
vehemently deny.91
Thoms and Donnelly approach the Jaguar story from within the context of the 
motor car industry situated in Coventry since the 1890s, their book92 providing useful 
comparisons between the various vehicle manufacturers located in the area. Although the 
book contains many factual errors, some perhaps merely typographical, and inaccurate 
statements, suggesting a lack of attention to detail by the writers, the referencing is 
extremely good. Unfortunately, the references show that the writers have relied to a very 
great extent on media coverage for their research material. Given that the media would 
have been pursuing its own selfish agenda, as discussed in the next section, and that
85 Thorley, Nigel. Jaguar XJ40. Buying, enjoying, modifying. (Yeovil, 2002).
86 Porter, Philip. Jaguar. The Complete Illustrated History. Third Edition. (Yeovil, 1995).
^  Ibid. pi 14.
88 Ibid. pi 22.
89 Dymock, Eric. The Jaguar File. (Sutton Veiny, 1998).
90 Ibid. p316.
91 John Egan. Interview with the author. October 2007. Appendix p75; John Edwards Interview.
Appendix p62.
92 Thoms, David, and Donnelly, Tom. The Coventry Motor Industry: Birth to Renaissance?
(Aldershot, 2000).
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many press articles and television broadcasts would often have been based on Jaguar’s 
own press releases and press briefings, much of Thoms and Donnelly’s narrative, whilst 
supplying some useful perspectives, has had to be viewed with considerable caution in 
terms of providing source material for this thesis. Again, much of the account of the Egan 
era up to 1987 is based on a lecture by Ken Edwards, Jaguar’s Company Secretary, at 
Coventry Polytechnic in November 198793, relating, for example, how Jaguar resolved its 
quality problems in the period 1981-82*, so is hardly without bias.
The latest specialist book on Jaguar, written by Jeff Daniels and based firmly 
on primary sources, is the only one to focus on an in-depth account of the history of 
Jaguar’s product engineering function.95 This is a work that has been especially useful to 
this thesis, with the, albeit somewhat limited, archival material recently discovered by 
Daniels confirming a number of the points regarding quality issues that the author had 
obtained previously for this thesis from personal interviews, and demonstrating the 
prevalent structural rigidity of the Jaguar engineering function. Unlike other books 
discussed in this present section, Daniels’s work attempts objectivity, with, for example, 
admiration for the achievement of Egan “in 'talking up’ Jaguar’s reputation through sheer 
force of personality”96 being balanced with statements from the Model Progress Meetings 
in 1986 regarding the extent of the defects of the XJ-S, and the inadequacies of the AJ6 
2.9 litre engine. However, Daniels makes no mention of the quality problems of the 
XJ40, presumably because the records available to him did not extend beyond 1986.
Finally, an important work is that written by Underwood97, which is the only 
book to focus on the management of Jaguar, particularly in the Egan era. Like most 
books on Jaguar, it is a narrative work, but unlike other books reviewed here suffers from 
the absence of both an index and a bibliography. Whilst the title suggests an inherent bias 
towards Egan, portraying him as a heroic figure, it contains sufficient criticisms of him, 
and of Jaguar, to counter any accusation of it being nothing other than hagiography. 
Much of the book is based on interviews with Jaguar personnel, ranging from directors to 
shop stewards, and the consequent lengthy quotations have been particularly useful to
93 Ibid. p219.n46.
94 Ibid. pp206-7.
95 Daniels, op.cit.
96 Ibid. pl30.
97 Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989).
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this thesis, providing additional evidence or support for opinions and facts obtained from 
other sources. It is apparent, however, that Underwood had the full support and co­
operation of Jaguar in his research, being given full access to relevant personnel, as was 
confirmed by Egan98, and the book to some extent might be viewed as a product of the 
Jaguar PR department. Thus, although Underwood relates Egan's antipathy towards 
trades unions, there is no mention of the nature and extent of the industrial relations 
problems faced by Egan at Jaguar, or of the quality problems with the XJ40, Underwood 
accepting unquestioningly Jaguar's explanation of currency fluctuations being a major 
reason for the downturn in Jaguar's fortunes after 1987. This is not altogether surprising 
given that Underwood's research was undertaken at a time when Jaguar was once again 
experiencing problems, and needed to be portrayed in a favourable light, and was 
published in 1989 just after Ford had announced its intention of taking a fifteen per cent 
stake in Jaguar. Consequently, much of the opinion expressed by Underwood has had to 
be treated with a considerable degree of circumspection.
2.4 Other Printed Sources
In addition to published books, there were a number of other printed sources that were 
consulted for this thesis, all of which suffer weaknesses of various kinds, and the purpose 
of this current section is not only to describe their usefulness in terms of the information 
they provide, but also to demonstrate the nature and extent of the bias to which they are 
subject. Three main types of sources were utilised: newspapers and journals; material 
published by or on behalf of Jaguar, including press releases; official publications. These 
are reviewed in the sub-sections that follow.
2.4.1 Newspapers and Journals.
Whilst it has been stated that the object of the press is to “inform, influence, 
mislead or entertain"99, its fundamental aim has to be that of increasing readership 
through the publication of particularly interesting, or sensationalist, articles. Given this, 
and the need to respond to, and represent, vested interests such as companies, politicians,
98 John Egan Interview. Appendix p64.
99 Tosh and Lang, op.cit. p66.
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and trades unions, the considerable element of bias contained in press articles must be 
acknowledged. Over the course of the Egan era, and in the few years immediately 
following the Ford takeover, a considerable number of articles on Jaguar appeared in 
British newspapers and journals, individual articles of relevance being referenced as 
footnotes in this thesis. Certainly, the revival of Jaguar's fortunes in the first half of the 
1980s, promoted both by Jaguar and by a government desperate for examples of 
economic revival, discussed in Section 1.2 above, gave rise to a great deal of press 
coverage, much it of merely regurgitating Jaguar's own press releases, or repeating points 
made in press briefings or personal interviews with the likes of Egan. There was also a 
great deal of press coverage that was prompted by Jaguar's declining fortunes after 1987, 
leading investigative journalists to look for explanations of why a success story had so 
quickly turned sour, and, in what might be regarded as retaliation for Jaguar's perceived 
earlier arrogance, allowing the press to indulge in a great deal of schadenfreude.
Whilst “factual” reports in the British press have proved to be helpful in 
collaborating evidence from other sources, many articles suffered from numerous errors 
of fact and ill-considered opinion, and generally add little to what is already known. 
Where such an article has added something, there is a reference to it in this thesis. 
Nonetheless articles in newspapers and magazines have been useful in indicating what 
had been placed in the public arena regarding Jaguar's problems. Interestingly, no 
journalist appeared to follow Kenneth Fleet's lead in ascribing Jaguar's falling US sales 
to quality problems rather than adverse currency movements.100 This suggests that 
Jaguar's PR effort was very effective in ensuring that commercially damaging news, such 
as quality problems, was contained. In part this was achieved by maintaining good 
relationships with particular journalists who were then given access to exclusive stories if 
they refrained from writing what Jaguar regarded as being damaging or hostile accounts. 
Lorenz, who covered Jaguar for The Sunday Telegraph and then for The Sunday Times, 
explained that it was important to maintain good relationships with companies that he 
was writing about since, “if you got on with companies, but were still prepared to ask the
100 The Times. 8 October 1988.
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odd probing question, you had more chance of finding out earlier if anything was 
happening than if you were on the outside”.101
With regard to the important US market, the research for this thesis has made 
much use of Automotive News, the highly influential weekly trade paper of the US motor 
industry. Here, the author undertook a manual search of all editions extending over 
fifteen years, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Although subject to the same sort of 
bias that was to be found in the British press, this publication is an important source in 
respect to the US market since it contained far more factual reports regarding Jaguar, 
especially in regard to its US sales volumes and its dealer network, and in reporting on, 
and providing comparisons with, Jaguar’s US competitors. Also, it published summaries 
of the annual J D Power Customer Satisfaction Surveys which provided an indication of 
the extent of the reliability and quality problems experienced by US car owners. This was 
particularly useful since J D Power was unable to provide the author with access to the 
original reports or summaries since they had no publicly accessible archives.102 
Automotive News also published more in-depth, and more candid, interviews with Egan 
and other Jaguar executives than did the British press, and which have been useful in 
providing statements relating to what Jaguar promoted at the time as being its 
achievements and prospects. Undoubtedly, Jaguar made great efforts to have reports of its 
US revival, and various favourable news, featured in Automotive News since it was a 
publication that was aimed primarily at motor dealers, and which therefore represented an 
important marketing channel. However, the importance of the dealer audience also led to 
a certain degree of caution, or bias, by Automotive News in regard to what it published. 
Thus, whilst the quality problems of the XJ40 were apparent from the J D Power surveys 
reported, Automotive News did not publish any articles dedicated to these problems and 
the consequent impact on sales.
101 Andrew Lorenz. Interview with the author. August 2007. Appendix pi 02.
102 e-mail to the author from J D Power Corporate Communications. November 2006.
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2.4.2 Material published bv. or on behalf of. Jaguar
Of the Jaguar published documents, the most important were its Annual Report and 
Accounts, and the Offer for Sale document which was published ahead of Jaguar's listing 
on the London Stock Exchange in 1984 by Hill Samuel, BL's merchant bank, and which 
contained significant factual information about the Jaguar business. Notwithstanding the 
usefulness of such information, these are documents that have to be treated with a 
significant amount of caution for the reasons that will be made clear in this section.
As a limited liability company, Jaguar had a legal requirement to place in the 
public arena certain information about its activities. The Companies Acts of 1981 and 
1985 required that every limited liability company issued an Annual Report and 
Accounts, which had to be filed with the Registrar of Companies. This had to contain a 
directors’ report, a profit and loss account, a balance sheet, and an auditors report. The 
London Stock Exchange listing, which it obtained in August 1984, demanded further 
information disclosure, including, in addition to the Annual Report and Accounts, the 
requirement for the publication of a half-yearly, or Interim, Report at the end of the first 
six months of every financial year. This required only profit-related information, together 
with an explanatory statement on the company's performance during the half year. It was 
also required that a company publish a Preliminary profit announcement prior to the 
publication of the Annual Report and Accounts. This was to ensure that the results for the 
year were made public as soon as possible to prevent insider dealing. The Stock 
Exchange regulations also required that the Annual Report and Accounts provided 
significantly more information that that required by the Companies Acts. Such 
requirements included: a statement by the directors regarding the reasons for any 
significant departures from applicable standard accounting practices (as codified in the 
twenty-five Statements of Accounting Practice issued by the Accounting Standards 
Board); a geographic analysis of net turnover and of the contribution to trading results 
from those trading operations carried on outside the UK and Ireland; a statement of 
interest capitalised during the year.
The Offer for Sale document contained significant factual information about 
the Jaguar business, the accuracy of which was given as being the responsibility of the 
Jaguar Directors, and of BLMC and BL. However, it has to be noted that due to the
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absorption of Jaguar by BL Cars, separate accounting records for Jaguar were not 
maintained from 1972 to 1980, with much of the information provided in the Offer for 
Sale document relating to 1980 being “best estimate”. Subsequent accounting changes at 
BL Cars enabled Jaguar’s costs and revenues for 1981 and 1982 to be compiled from the 
accounting records of BL Cars, and the Offer for Sale document provides greater 
exactitude in respect of these two years. It was not until 1983, however, that separate 
audited accounts were prepared for the Jaguar Group.103
Whilst these documents provide useful information about the performance of 
Jaguar from 1980 onwards, particularly in terms of quantifying its trading performance, 
and in enabling a comparative analysis, there was much that was not disclosed. This is 
not too surprising in the decade before concern over the need for greater transparency in 
financial reporting would result in the 1992 Cadbury Committee “Code of Best 
Practice”104, discussed in Sub-Section 4.3.3 below. Indeed, the rules of disclosure, 
particularly at this time, were such that companies in general had plenty of leeway for 
concealment of information, through deliberate omission or obfuscation, in order to veil 
particular problems, or to deny information that might be of use to competitors. As will 
be demonstrated in Chapter Eight below, Jaguar’s Annual Reports concealed certain 
aspects of cost, particularly in regard to the impact of warranties on profit, and an 
understanding of Jaguar’s actual financial performance has required reference to 
information obtained elsewhere. In regard to revenue, the Accounts define vehicle 
revenue as being from wholesales (that is, sales to dealers and distributors), thus 
matching sales with revenue, but elsewhere discusses sales only in terms of retail sales. 
Even so, in a decade which is renowned for takeovers and creative accounting, giving rise 
to such pronouncements as “Every company in this country is fiddling its profits”105, 
Jaguar’s accounting policies are notable for their relative conservatism.
On the other hand, the Directors Review of Operations sections of Jaguar’s 
Annual Reports, written by its Corporate Communications Department106, were used 
unashamedly as propaganda instruments to foster, and enhance, the illusion that Jaguar
103 Jaguar Offer for Sale document, 1984. pi 9.
104 Pendlebury, Maurice, and Groves, Roger. Company Accounts. Analysis, Interpretation and 
Understanding. (London, 1994). p3.
105 Griffiths, Ian. Creative Accounting. (London, 1986) p i .
106 e-mail to die author from John Edwards. 18 July 2007.
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was a company that had resolved its many problems, particularly in regard to quality. 
Obviously, no company will seek to give prominence to its problem areas, unless it has 
little choice, as has been shown to have been the case in the early days of the Egan 
management with regard to Jaguar’s quality problems. Having declared that it had 
resolved its quality and reliability issues, to have given prominence to a recurrence of 
such problems in its Annual Reports would have been commercially damaging for 
Jaguar. Even so, there is little doubt that Jaguar used its Annual Reports to bolster its 
image and its reputation, both by omission, and through focusing on what it wished to be 
seen as positive aspects, such as its Quality Circles, discussed further in Section 6.9 
below. Given that Quality Circles, and similar initiatives by Jaguar, have been 
acknowledged subsequently to have not produced anything like the positive results that 
were attributed to them, it has to be questioned as to what extent Jaguar believed its own 
statements about them; that is, whether the Jaguar management suffered self-delusion in 
this regard.
It is also notable, and unhelpful to the analyst, that the Directors Reviews of 
Operations, unlike the presentation of the Accounts themselves, suffer a lack of 
consistency in the information presented, and that certain information does not 
correspond with that presented in the Accounts. For example, in the Directors Reviews, 
purchasing costs are given only in the 1985, 1986, and 1987 Reports, and vehicle sales 
are discussed in terms of retail sales, which do not necessarily correspond with 
wholesales mentioned in the Accounts proper. It is of note that there was no legal 
requirement regarding exactly what information was to be presented in the Directors’ 
Reviews, and the Report and Accounts for 1989 onwards do not show the same amount 
of detail in the Directors Review of Operations as do the glossy documents produced for 
the shareholding public in respect of the period 1984 to 1988. Although Jaguar was a 
public company in 1989, by the time the results for that year were filed with Companies 
House, Jaguar was wholly-owned by Ford which reverted to providing only that 
information that was required by law.
Supplementing the sometimes sketchy information provided in the Annual 
Reports and Accounts are the contemporary printed notes produced by Jaguar for 
distribution to Press and City audiences during regular briefings to them, and the
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consequent investment circulars produced by City analysts. Jaguar’s briefing notes here 
had similar aims to their Annual Reports and Accounts, and consequently, as with other 
company-produced documents, have limited credibility as source documents. Similarly, 
whilst investment circulars have a usefulness in terms of providing factual information 
about Jaguar, its markets, and its competitors, their main purpose was to provide a basis, 
or an argument, for investors to trade in Jaguar shares, and many suffer from being 
merely a regurgitation of company financial results releases. Stockbrokers also often 
produced lengthy reviews on companies or industrial sectors usually ahead of, and to 
support, corporate activity such as Rights Issues, or acquisitions, and whilst containing 
useful factual information, the often highly positive opinions expressed in such 
documents merit considerable circumspection.107
2.4.3 Official Publications
The reports of Parliamentary Committees and governmental agencies have proved to be 
especially fruitful in terms of providing factual information about the development and 
operation of the British motor industry, and the issues impacting it. But all such reports 
are subject to various degrees of bias. Indeed, a considerable degree of circumspection 
has been required in regard to the opinions stated in them, and to the responses of 
witnesses to criticism, since many such Committees, by their very nature, are politically 
motivated, acting as vehicles for vested interests, or otherwise are fixed on pursuing their 
own selfish agendas. Although written evidence was often submitted by witnesses in 
advance, the main method of obtaining information is by direct questioning of witnesses 
in open session. Thus, the quality of information obtained will to a large degree depend 
on the quality of the questions asked, and the way in which the sessions are conducted, 
with leading or barbed questions often being employed to elicit responses that conform to 
committee members’ pre-conceived views. On the other hand, witnesses who seek to 
promote a particular view, or are highly defensive of their views and actions, tend to 
make statements that are disingenuous, obftiscatory, or simply untrue.
For example, when appearing before the Trade and Industry Committee in 
May 1984, Ray Horrocks, Group Chief Executive Cars of BL, was subjected to some
107 Golding, Tony. The City: inside the great expectation machine. (London, 2003). p59
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fairly hostile questioning over the planned flotation of Jaguar108, the Committee's 
negative stance on the issue being evident from its later statement that “no matter how 
successful the sale of Jaguar, its disposal is not in the long term best interest of BL”.109 
Again, Horrocks informed the Select Committee that it was the BL Board who had taken 
the decision to privatise Jaguar110, a statement which was contradicted by Hamish Orr- 
Ewing, Jaguar’s Chairman at the time of privatisation, who opined that privatisation was 
forced on BL by the government111, a view supported by Edwards, Jaguar’s Finance 
Director.112 As a final example here, Egan’s evidence to the Trade and Industry Select 
Committee in November 1989 is of note.113 In his evidence, Egan informed the 
Committee, without prompting, that the negotiations with General Motors had been 
conducted “in very good spirit”114, which was not Edwards’ recollection. Indeed, Edwards 
described the meetings with General Motors as “nasty” and “aggressive”.115 Also, Egan 
informed the Committee that, “we were always conscious of our fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders, at no time did we feel we wanted to do something that was against the 
interests of our shareholders”116, but a different view was expressed by Edwards who 
opined that the deal that Egan had wanted to do with General Motors in 1989 would have 
been “a disaster for the [Jaguar] shareholders”.117
There have been a number of Parliamentary Committee reports consulted in 
this research, all of which are listed in the Bibliography. The two most useful, however, 
have been the Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee on the Motor Vehicle 
Industry, together with the minutes of evidence (hereafter Fourteenth Report)118, and the
108 “Trade and Industry Select Committee. BL pic. Third Report, together with the proceedings of the 
Committee relating to the Report and the Minutes of Evidence”, (hereafter Third Report). Parliamentary 
Papers. 1983-84. vol XL (HC 490). Q47-96.
109 “Trade and Industry Select Committee. BL pic. Fourth Special Report. 30 July 1984” Parliamentary 
Papers. 1983-84. vol XLVI (HC 607). Para 3.
110 Third Report Q74.
111 Hamish Orr-Ewing. Interview with the author. November 2002. Appendix pi 13.
112 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p52.
113 “Trade and Industry Select Committee: Special Shares and the Department of Trade and Industry. 
Minutes of Evidence 13 December 1989 ( Printed with HC 617-i 1988/89)”. (Hereafter Special Shares 
Committee). Parliamentary Papers. 1989-90. vol XIV. (HC 90-i). Ql-101.
114 Ibid. Q35.
115 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p54.
116 Special Shares Committee. Q42.
117 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p56.
1,8 “Motor Vehicle Industry. Fourteenth Report, with Evidence taken before the Trade and Industry Sub- 
Committee, and Appendices”. Parliamentary Papers. 1974-75. vol XXV (617).
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minutes of evidence from the Trade and Industry Select Committee report on Special 
Shares (hereafter Special Shares Committee).119 The investigation resulting in the 
Fourteenth Report emanated from the prospect of government investment in BL, with the 
Committee interviewing over two hundred witnesses, ranging from senior executives of 
motor companies to trades union officials, as well as receiving written evidence. 
Notwithstanding the caveats stated above about the bias associated with such 
investigations and reports, the Fourteenth Report provides a comprehensive review of the 
British motor industry in 1975, providing useful insights, facts, and opinions, about 
aspects such as manufacturing, distribution, industrial relations, quality issues, and the 
structure of the industry in general. The Special Shares Committee investigation, on the 
other hand, was far narrower, being concerned with the special shares (“Golden Share”) 
held by the government in formerly government-owned, and subsequently privatized, 
companies, which prevented such companies being taken over without government 
acquiescence. It is particularly interesting to the research for this thesis since it contains 
lengthy evidence from Egan, taken on 8 November 1989, shortly after the Jaguar Board 
had agreed the Ford takeover, in respect to the events that led up to that takeover. As has 
been shown earlier, there were a number of statements made by Egan to the Committee 
which were later shown to be somewhat disingenuous. Nonetheless, it is a document that 
provides a valuable, and unique, if somewhat limited, account of the final chapter in 
Jaguar’s history as an independent company.
Contemporaneously with the Fourteenth Report investigation, the CPRS, an 
independent government think-tank, undertook its own investigation, at the behest of 
government ministers, into the whole British motor car industry, not just BL, the report 
being published on 16 December 1975. Assisted by the management consultants 
McKinsey and Company, the CPRS visited various manufacturing plants, interviewed 
numerous people within the industry, or connected with it, and had access to numerous 
unpublished papers, although to avoid duplication the study drew on the factual 
information published in the Fourteenth Report.120 Unfortunately, the CPRS report does 
not identify its interviewees or many of the companies cited when making comparisons.
119 Special Shares Committee.
120 CPRS. ppl-4.
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This not only limits the report's usefulness as a source for this thesis, but also makes it 
difficult to accept the Williams et al criticism, cited in Sub-Section 2.3.1 above, of the 
report’s findings being “invalid and unfair” on the grounds of them being based on data 
supplied by BL. Also, the report is incomplete since certain information, for example, 
relating to product quality, has been deleted for “reasons of commercial 
confidentiality”.121 Notwithstanding this, the CPRS report is far more analytical, critical, 
and outspoken than the much longer Fourteenth Report, to which it is thus 
complementary, providing information, well illustrated with tables and charts, on the 
structure of the industry, the manufacturing process, and comparisons between British car 
manufacturers over a wide range of factors such as distribution systems and labour 
relations. Apart from factual information on the industry, the report provides useful 
examples of the existence of institutional rigidities in the industry, citing the major 
problems resulting from “entrenched attitudes on both sides of industry”.122
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
The methodology employed in this research is similar to that found in other case-study 
orientated academic studies, with material being obtained from a variety of primary and 
secondary sources. It was unfortunate that access to Jaguar’s internal corporate records 
was refused, thereby denying the use of these in challenging or supporting information 
obtained from other sources. However, it would appear that the depth and quality of the 
information provided by the available sources, particularly from oral testimony, has been 
such as to render the absence of such archival material as being not that significant in 
relation to the arguments and conclusions of this thesis. Naturally this requires further 
investigation, but is a task that has to await the opening of Jaguar’s corporate records to 
researchers. It remains to be seen whether this may not be for another twenty or so years, 
in accordance with the stated Ford pronouncement, or whether Tata Motors, Jaguar’s new 
owner, will be prepared to end the existing moratorium, assuming, of course, that the 
Jaguar archives have been transferred to them.
121 Ibid. p68.
122 Ibid. pi 20.
66
In addressing the sources utilised in this research, attention has been drawn in 
this present chapter to the bias evident in the various sources, the object being to 
demonstrate recognition of the existence of such bias, and the need to test the reliability 
of the testimony through the process of triangulation. Even when there is very obvious 
bias, such as is to be found in what have been described above as being hagiographies, 
this in itself has been revealing of the usefulness of the source material in relation to its 
reliability, and the need to confirm or challenge such information by reference to other 
sources. This has been undertaken throughout this thesis, particularly in regard to oral 
testimony.
Oral testimony has been especially important to this study and, as has been 
pointed out, the interviews recorded in this thesis are the only available first-hand account 
of the situation at Jaguar, particularly regarding the institutional sclerosis suffered by the 
engineering function and the quality problems, and are likely to remain so until access to 
Jaguar's corporate records is finally permitted. Bias undoubtedly is evidenced in all the 
interviews undertaken in this research, as detailed by this chapter, and due account has 
been taken of this.
Finally, this present chapter, in reviewing the relevant literature, has shown 
that whilst there are a considerable number of books written about Jaguar, most have 
been written for an audience of motor enthusiasts, and have focused on the cars 
themselves, rather than the company and its management, other than en passant. Such 
works tend to be aimed at reinforcing enthusiasts' existing extremely positive beliefs 
about the Jaguar marque, and eschew discussion of Jaguar’s major failings in quality and 
reliability, even when such failings are recognised by the occasional one-sentence 
mention. There have been no academic works that have focused exclusively on Jaguar, 
although a small number of scholarly articles have used Jaguar, along with other 
companies, as a case study. Whisler, who has been the only academic to have given 
prominence to the adverse impact of poor reliability and quality of British cars, and the 
myth of British engineering excellence, ignores Jaguar when expounding these themes. 
This thesis, therefore, fills an obvious gap in the historiography of the British motor 
industry in general, and Jaguar in particular.
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The problem of bias in source material will be demonstrated further in the 
next chapter which, in examining the development of the Jaguar company in the period 
before Egan assumed control, has relied heavily on secondary sources.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CORPORATE CULTURE AT JAGUAR 
- THE LYONS ERA, AND THE BL STEWARDSHIP
3.1 Introduction
Although a comparatively late entrant to the British motor industry, Jaguar's origins and 
subsequent development had much in common with those of other British motor 
manufacturers. Foreman-Peck et al point out that many of Britain's motor manufacturers 
had started out as cycle manufacturers, and had moved into motor vehicle manufacturing, 
or, in the case of Triumph, into motorcycle manufacturing.1 Consequently, as was 
indicated in Chapter One, with its origins in the skilled craft-based engineering and coach 
building industries, it was not surprising that the infant British motor industry resembled 
the atomistic economic organization of those industries.
It may be argued, as do Adeney2 and Foreman-Peck et aP in varying degrees, 
that World War Two represented a watershed for the motor industry in general in that the 
post-war changes in important aspects such as demand patterns, industrial relations, 
government involvement, and the pace of technological advance represented a 
discontinuity, rather than being part of a continuous process of evolution. This resulted in 
a radical shift in shop floor culture and attitudes which became entrenched in the 
indigenous industry. Such change led to the sector’s demise in the 1970s, since 
“management and labour were unable and unwilling to adapt their corporate strategies, 
institutions, and beliefs to the changing demands of the post-war environment”.4
Whilst such post-war problems applied equally to all firms in the industry, it 
does not follow that the outcome should have been similar for them all for, as Whisler 
notes, in the thirty years following World War Two, the industry’s management had
1 Foreman-Peck, James, Bowden, Sue, and McKinlay, Alan. The British Motor Industry. (Manchester,
1995). pi 1.
2 Adeney, Martin. The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History o f Britain’s Car Industry.
(London, 1988). pi 79.
3 Foreman-Peck et al, op.cit. p92.
4 Whisler, Timothy R. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. A Case Stucfy in Industrial Decline. 
(Oxford, 1999). p401.
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plenty of opportunities to institute cultural change.3 This leads to the question of whether 
such opportunities existed at Jaguar and, if so, then why were they not exploited. At the 
time of Jaguar’s second stock market flotation in 1984 it was fashionable to blame BL for 
the problems that had nearly driven Jaguar into extinction at the end of the 1970s. 
Certainly, mismanagement and underinvestment by BL exacerbated the problems at 
Jaguar, but there is little doubt that many of these were already ingrained, being a legacy 
of the Lyons’ era, as will be revealed in the following sections.
This present chapter thus explores the history of Jaguar from its founding in 
1922 to the appointment of Egan in 1980, examining the various factors that led to the 
development of the institutional structures that were entrenched within the corporate 
culture when Egan assumed control of the company. In particular it looks at the problems 
resulting from the under-investment during the Lyons era, the impact of Lyons’ 
autocratic management style, and the resultant management inflexibility, and its effect on 
labour relations. Furthermore, it examines the issue of poor quality and reliability which 
was a problem that Lyons never resolved, and which was the fundamental cause of 
Jaguar’s deteriorating situation in the late 1980s.
3.2 From Sidecars to Aircraft Components 1922-1945
Founded in 1922 in Blackpool as a partnership between William Lyons and William 
Walmsley, the business that was to evolve into Jaguar began as “The Swallow Sidecar 
Company”, manufacturing and selling luxury sidecars for motorcycles. In common with 
other early motor-industry, or motor-related, businesses it was an activity that was 
heavily dependent on craft skills, each Swallow sidecar being hand built around a wood 
frame by skilled trimmers, upholsterers, tinsmiths, and other such craftsmen6, on chassis 
supplied by outside manufacturers. The production method employed was recognisably 
that of Lewchuk’s low-productivity, labour-intensive “British system”, described in 
Section 1.4 above, with shop floor workers being paid by the piece rate system, and who 
consequently enjoyed considerable autonomy over the work process. Thus, from the 
firm’s origins there was in place a shop floor institutional structure that reflected
5 Ibid. p33.
6 Whyte, Andrew. Jaguar. The definitive history o f a great British car. Second Edition. (Wellingborough,
1985). pp24,37.
traditional behaviour and expectations in place in British industry generally. The firm's 
first employees brought with them a set of values and beliefs from their previous firms, 
and these continued to evolve and would become progressively more self-reinforcing in 
the 1920s and 1930s as the result of the growth and continuity that marked the company's 
progress in this period.
The success of the sidecar business was evident from the fact that production 
reached 100 units a week in 19277, and that the business continued throughout the 1930s 
and into World War Two when, over the course of the conflict, it produced over 10,000 
sidecars for army use. After the war, however, the sidecar operation was sold to the 
Helliwell Group.8 In essence the raison d ’etre of the firm was that of coach building, that 
is, the manufacture and fitting of hand-built vehicle bodies and trim onto chassis supplied 
by other companies, and was recognised as such by the two partners when, in 1926, the 
company's name was changed to “The Swallow Sidecar and Coach Building Company".9 
Having started making new hoods and side curtains for motor cars it was only a short step 
to the building of motor cars themselves. So, in 1927 the company started constructing 
Swallow bodies onto Austin 7 chassis, the car thus produced being called the Austin- 
Swallow, and sold initially through some of the sidecar distributors that the company had 
started appointing following Swallow's appearance at the 1923 Motorcycle Show in 
London.10 As King has noted, there was an “immense public demand" for the more 
stylish body designs of the type produced by Swallow, and other specialist body builders, 
than the “normal staid, solid touring cars of the motor manufacturers”.11 The success of 
the Austin-Swallow led to some large orders, notably one for 500 cars from Henlys, the 
large motor distributor in the south of England, to be delivered at the rate of twenty cars 
per week. However, the production constraint of two cars per week, and the need for a 
greater number of skilled craftsmen, resulted in the company relocating to Foleshill in 
Coventry in November 1928.
Following the move to Coventry, other models were introduced, built on 
chassis and engines bought from Alvis, Fiat, Swift, Wolseley, and Standard, with total
7 Ibid. p42.
8 Thorley, Nigel. Jaguar in Coventry. Building the Legend. (Derby, 2002). pp41,47.
9 Whyte, op.cit. p37.
'°tbid. p29.
11 King, Peter. The Motor Men. Pioneers o f the British Car Industry. (London, 1989). pi 63.
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production, including the Austin-Swallow, increasing from 12 to 40 cars per week by the 
end of 192912, although Whyte suggests that production of 40 cars per week was not a 
regular occurrence at that time.13 Such low volumes enabled the “British system” to 
continue to be implemented by the company at Coventry, the cars being hand-built by 
skilled craftsmen who crafted bonnets and wings on trestles, and grafted steel and alloy 
panels onto an ash ftame mounted on a jig, such processes continuing to be utilised by 
the company until 1937.14 However, as Thorley observes, the negative reaction of new 
workers taken on in Coventry towards the company's piece rate system gave rise to its 
first industrial relations dispute.15 The principle and practice of piece rate payments had 
been well-established in the British engineering and motor industries by this time16, and 
the fact that Jaguar experienced hostility in this regard indicates that the problem lay with 
Jaguar's own basis for determining payment rather than with piece rate payments per se. 
However, the piece rate system was finally accepted within a fairly short space of time, 
possibly because the employees lacked an alternative course of action, particularly given 
the high unemployment rates in Coventry at the time.17 But this incident demonstrated the 
inflexibility of the management, with the partners refusing to agree to the new workers' 
demands, a stance that perhaps was directed and reinforced by the fact that at this very 
early stage in the company's history the partners did not have individual fortunes at risk 
as a result of industrial conflict. However, some other shopfloor employees at this time 
proved more inflexible, with a dispute in the company’s sawmill over union membership 
resulting in the first withdrawal of labour, and the replacement of those workers 
involved.1*
In 1931 the company, in another natural progression, moved into car 
production under its own brand name, an objective that had been given impetus by the 
experience that the chassis utilised to date had inhibited body design. Key to this 
development was the relationship that was built with the Standard Motor Company which 
agreed to supply engines and completed chassis, the chassis frame having been designed
12 Thorley. op.cit. p22.
13 Whyte, op.cit. p i92.
14 Thorley. op.cit. p34.
15 Ibid. p22.
16 Foreman-Peck et al. op.cit. pp30,62.
17 Thorley. op.cit. p21.
"Ibid. p22.
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by Swallow and manufactured by Rubery Owen, and which formed the basis for a new  
car, designated the SS. The two basic models, the SSI and the SS2, and their thirteen 
variants were extremely successful, as can be seen from Figure 3.1. However, in what 
might be seen as a forewarning for the Jaguar o f  the 1980s, the original SSI suffered
Figure 3.1: SS Cars Total Deliveries, August 1931 to July 1940
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Note: Deliveries of Swallow bodied cars amounted to 578 units (43% of the total) in 1932, and 155 units 
(9% of the total) in 1933. Thereafter only SS models were produced. Factory records for the Swallow 
models before this period do not exist; however, it is estimated that a total of some 2,500 Austin- 
Swallow cars were produced between 1923 and I934.19
considerable defects as quality had been lost in the drive for production volumes, 
problems that were resolved for subsequent models, particularly the SS2, introduced in 
1932. Even more successful were the SS Jaguar models, First launched in 1935 with a 
new engine supplied on an exclusive basis by Standard.20 There is some debate regarding 
the contribution made by Lyons to the design and styling o f  the SS Jaguar, the similarities 
with the Triumph Dolomite, which appeared a little later, being quite marked. Here it is 
o f note that Bill Thornton, Triumph’s ch ief body engineer, who had worked on the
19 Ibid. p i92.
20 Ibid. pp33, 39.
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Dolomite design, joined SS Cars in early 1935 and worked on the creation of the SS 
Jaguars.21 It would not have been unusual if use had been made of Triumph’s designs for 
as William Heynes, who in 1935 was recruited from Humber as chief engineer at SS 
Cars, recalled, at SS Cars, “English and continental cars would be brought in and driven 
for assessment, and if there was anything good on them, we would copy it”. Heynes 
added that Lyons “was no engineer -  he just knew a good car when he saw one”.22
The launch of the new models, particularly the SS Jaguar, enabled the 
company to maintain its relative position in the UK motor industry during this period, its 
production appearing to account for a fairly constant 0.7%-0.8% of total UK annual 
motor car production, until 1938/39 when the resolution of the production problems with 
the SS Jaguar, described below, resulted in this figure exceeding 1%.M Unfortunately it is 
not possible to determine more precise figures due to different year ends (July for Jaguar, 
December for overall production figures published by the SMMT) and because of the 
necessity of using Jaguar delivery figures as an approximation for production statistics.
Undoubtedly, price had a big part to play in the success of the SS Jaguar, 
with, for example, the 1.5-litre saloon being priced at £298 in 1938/3924, compared to 
£388 for the 1.5-litre Triumph Dolomite.25 Interestingly, at this time it was not only 
against other specialist car manufacturers that the company sought to be price- 
competitive, with the top of the range SS Jaguar 3.51itre saloon being priced at £445, 
compared with £615 for the top of the range Vauxhall GL saloon.26 Putnam opined that, 
“If you go back to the pre-war Jaguars, they promised so much, they looked so stunning, 
but they weren’t particularly good. But they were cheap. Bill Lyons set out to be the 
cheap Bentley, or Lagonda.”27 Indeed, Adeney points out that at this time Rolls-Royce 
“compared the appropriate Jaguar [3.51itre saloon] at £450 with the £950 Bentley”.28
By the late 1930s, SS Cars had an established position amongst the UK’s
21 Robson, Graham and Langworth, Richard. Triumph Cars. The Complete Story. Second 
Edition. (Croydon, 1988). pi 00.
22 William Heynes, quoted in King, op.cit. p i31.
23 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. The Motor Industry o f Great Britain. (London, 1971). pi 2; 
Whyte op.cit. p210.
24 Whyte, op.cit. p213.
25 Robson and Langworth. op.cit. p i06.
26 Holden, Len. Vauxhall Motors and the Luton Economy, 1900-2002. (Woodbridge, 2003). p40.
27 Roger Putnam. Interview with the author. November 2006. Appendix pi 24.
28 Adeney. op.cit. p!40.
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specialist car manufacturers, a characteristic of whom was that manufacture relied “more 
on craftsmanship and less on expensive machinery than in the case of volume production, 
so that the labour force also is a larger proportion of the total”.29 It would appear, 
however, that the company’s improved market position was due as much to the financial 
problems suffered by a number of its rivals as it was to its own volume increases. For 
example, Lea-Francis went in and out of receivership in the 1930s, Humber was taken 
over by Rootes in 1931, Lanchester’s bank forced it to merge with Daimler in 1931, 
Lagonda called in the receivers in 1935, and increasing financial difficulties resulted in 
Swift going out of business in 1938, and Riley calling in the receivers in 1938, as did 
Triumph in 1939. The relative positions of the various UK motor manufacturers in 1938 
are shown in Table 3.1 below. As can be seen, the specialist car producers accounted for 
9.9% of total UK car and taxi production in that year, although within the “Big Six” there 
were certain models, such as the Humber Pullman (Rootes Group), and the Big Six series 
(Vauxhall Motors), that directly competed with those of the specialist manufacturers.
Because the higher volumes required could not be met by SS Cars using 
existing methods, a degree of mechanisation was introduced into the manufacturing 
process, described in Section 3.5 below. Although this seems to have caused some 
resentment among shop floor workers30, it is not recorded whether this led to industrial 
action, suggesting that shop floor attitudes continued to be flexible enough to 
accommodate such a change. Also, a major new industrial process, involving 
constructing bodywork from steel panels, was introduced in 1937. This system, detailed 
in Section 3.5 below, offered considerable advantages, but also resulted in significant 
problems, and lost production, with deliveries down some 38%, as may be seen in Figure 
3.1, and net profits reduced by some 35% to £22,218 in the twelve months ending 31st 
July 1938.31
During this period also, some major corporate changes took place, with the 
firm first being registered in 1933 as a private limited company under the name “SS Cars 
Ltd”, and then, in January 1935, having its shares listed on the London Stock Exchange.
29 Political and Economic Planning. Motor Vehicles: A Report on the Industry. 
(London, 1950). p31.
30 Thorley. op.cit. p34.
31 Whyte, op.cit. p i07.
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Table 3.1: British Motor Car Production by Company, 
Year to end September 1938.
Estimated %
Company of Total UK
Production
The Big Six (Volume Producers)
Nuffield.......................................................................  26.6
Ford.............................................................................  17.8
Austin..........................................................................  17.0
Vauxhall......................................................................  10.1
Rootes..........................................................................  9.6
Standard.......................................................................  9.0
Total Big Six 90.1
Specialist Car Producers
Rover...........................................................................  3.2
Singer........................................................................... 2.6
BSA (Daimler, Lanchester)....................................  1.2
SS Cars (Jaguar)...........................................................  1.1
Armstrong-Siddeley.....................................................  0.6
Jowett........................................................................... 0.4
Rolls-Royce and Bentley..............................................  0.3
Alvis............................................................................  0.3
Other............................................................................  0.2
Total Specialist Car Producers 9.9
Total 100.0
Source: Adapted from Political aod Economic Planning.
Motor Vehicles, Table 14, p26.
At this juncture, William Walmsley retired from the business, selling his half of the 
shares in the public offering, leaving Lyons in sole control as Chairman and Managing 
Director. Lyons retained his 50% of the business, and later bought additional shares, 
thereby establishing a majority shareholding which, in 1966, at the time of the merger 
with BMC, amounted to some 54% of Jaguar's voting shares.32 The personal control 
Lyons henceforth was to exercise over the company would mirror that of the founders of 
other motor firms, such as Austin and Morris (Lord Nuffield), Heynes describing board
32 Ibid. pl61.
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meetings under Lyons as “a joke. He just said what he wanted to do, and everybody 
agreed with him”.33 Lyons’ ability to exercise dictatorial control undoubtedly reinforced 
his own beliefs regarding management control and organization, and resulted in 
weaknesses in a number of different, but interrelated, functions, which, according to 
Underwood “nearly brought about the extinction of Jaguar Cars in the late 1970s”.34 
Certainly, as Underwood further observed, by 1972, when he retired, Lyons had “failed 
to introduce basic modernisation, management systems, or new technology”.35 Espousing 
this view, Putnam described the problems impacting on Jaguar in the 1980s as being 
“innate”.36 These aspects are discussed in Sections 3.4 to 3.6 below. However, probably 
due to Lyons’ tight control over costs, and possibly because of care being taken to restrict 
output, the business remained profitable, as may be seen from Table 3.2, in an era when 
many other specialist car companies were experiencing severe financial difficulties, as 
mentioned above.
Table 3.2: SS Cars Net Profit 1935 to 1938.
Year to 31 July: Net Profit £
1935 24,209
1936 27,367
1937 34,292
1938 22,218
Source: Whyte pp !05 ,107
Foreman-Peck revealed that Rover, having achieved a loss of £279,000 in 
1931-2, was turned round to a net profit of £165,000 in 1935-6 through planning for 
relatively low volume production at a time when the demand for cars was expanding 
rapidly.37
By the start of World War Two the company was employing a workforce of
33 William Heynes quoted in King, op.cit. pi 31.
34 Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989). pi 7.
35 Ibid. p31.
36 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i24.
37 Foreman-Peck, James. “Exit, Voice and Loyalty as Responses to Decline: The Rover Company in the
Inter-War Years”. Business History, Volume 23, Number 2 (July 1981). pp202-3.
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some l,5003t, due to the increased level of output, and the need for a wider variety of 
skills as a result of the new production system, with production approaching some 200 
cars a week.39 But the war meant that car production had to be halted, the focus now 
being on producing war material such as parts for fighter and bomber aircraft, sidecars 
and trailers, and on repairing and modifying Whitley bombers. These activities were 
profitable for the company, and undoubtedly helped fund the immediate post war 
investment required to return to car production. The war enabled the company to benefit 
from extra, government-funded, space and equipment, including a large machine shop 
that, according to Underwood, resulted largely from a contract to build the new 
Manchester bomber.40 The war also resulted, in February 1945, in the change of the 
company’s name to “Jaguar Cars Ltd”, the initials “SS” by this time having somewhat 
sinister connotations.
Other important developments related to engines. The machine tools for 
processing engines were bought from Standard which had informed Lyons that, after the 
war, they would have no further interest in supplying engines. However, the development 
of a company-designed engine, the XK, was well advanced by the war’s end, and the 
company would henceforth have autonomy in engine manufacture. One other war-time 
development concerned industrial relations, war-time employment regulations, such as 
those imposed under the Emergency Powers Act of July 1940, giving rise to a rigid 
shopfloor institutional structure, and inflexible attitudes, matching the inflexible 
management attitudes that already existed. This resulted in a mismatch of cultures within 
Jaguar that would obstruct change and impose significant constraints on its future 
evolution and growth, as discussed further in Section 3.6 below.
3.3 The Emergence and Growth of Corporate Jaguar. 1945 to 1968 
Jaguar resumed production of the saloon range in 1945, but under the “Jaguar”, as 
opposed to the “SS”, marque. However, with government dictats focusing steel allocation 
on motor companies that exported a large proportion of their output, it was necessary for 
Jaguar to develop overseas markets in order to maintain supplies of steel. As may be seen
3* Whyte, op.cit. p i06. 
w Ibid. p il l .
40 Underwood, op.cit. p26.
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from Figures 3.2 and 3.3 (page 112), Jaguar was successful in this, with exports reaching 
a peak in 1951/52 o f  89% o f  total deliveries after Lyons had visited various parts o f  the 
world to appoint distributors. Henceforth, exports would be an important element in 
Jaguar’s future growth, from 1950 onwards, seldom accounting for less than 40% o f  total 
deliveries, as can be seen in Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5 (page 136). In contrast, in the pre­
war years the highest volume o f  total exports in any year, achieved in 1938/39, amounted 
to 252 cars, accounting for 4.9% o f  total deliveries in that period.41
Figure 3.2: Jaguar Cars Home and Export Deliveries, Export Percentage, 
and Percentage Change in Total Deliveries, 1945 to 1959
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Indeed, according to Thorley, in the twenty years to 1967 Jaguar would 
export “over 52% o f  their entire production, the highest percentage in the British motor 
industry”42, and by 1956 Jaguar had become the U K ’s greatest dollar earner.43 In addition 
to direct exports, taxation laws affecting exports to Belgium resulted in Jaguar setting up 
an assembly line in Brussels in 1948, an arrangement which lasted until 1950/51.44
41 Whyte, op.cit. p241.
42 Thorley. op.cit. pi 14.
43 Ibid. p74.
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Jaguar's success in the immediate post-war period resulted in it improving its 
position relative to other specialist car producers, as may be seen in Table 3.3 below, 
accounting for 1.6% of total UK car production in 1947, compared to 1.1% in 1938 
(shown in Table 3.1 above). During the 1950s Jaguar would enhance its position as a 
specialist producer, aided by the withdrawal of Jowett from car production in 1954, and 
the demise of Singer in 1956, and the gradually lower annual outputs from Armstrong- 
Siddeley until it ceased car production altogether in 1960. By the end of the decade 
Jaguar would account for some 1.75% of total annual UK car production.43
Although the initial impetus to growth was high market demand, and 
restricted supply, in the immediate post-war environment, Jaguar's continued success in 
the 1950s and 1960s was both product-led and export-led, bolstered by its successful 
involvement in motor racing, particularly the Le Mans 24-hour race which it first won in 
1951. Over this period Jaguar produced a succession of successful new models, the first 
two, the XK120 and the Mark V saloon, being launched in October 1948. Despite the 
continual replacement of older models, the range gradually expanded, comprising seven 
models in 195946, and twelve models in 196447, the latter including the iconic E-type 
sports car, and the Mark X, the widest production saloon ever produced in the UK. The 
growth in volume, shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, however, was achieved despite on-going 
problems regarding quality, continual industrial disputes (discussed in Section 3.6 
below), the relocation in 1952 of all operations to Browns Lane (a government-owned 
factory that Jaguar would eventually buy for £1.25million in 1959), and the production 
hiatus resulting from a major fire at Browns Lane in February 1957.
This growth in sales during the 1950s caused its own problems for it became 
obvious that Browns Lane offered insufficient space to produce enough cars to meet 
anticipated demand. The eventual solution was to purchase in 1960, for £3^million48, the 
ailing Daimler Company, mainly for the space offered at its Radford factory, located 
some two miles from Browns Lane. Apart from the fact that Radford doubled Jaguar’s
44 Ibid. p57.
43 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. The Motor Industry o f Great Britain. (London, 1992). p50;
Whyte op.cit. p210.
46 Thorley. op.cit. p84.
41 Ibid. pi 06.
48 Underwood, op.cit. p32.
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Table 3.3: British Motor Car Production by Company, 
Year to end September 1947
Estimated %
Company of Total UK
Production
The Big Six (Volume Producers)
Nuffield.......................................................................  20.9
Ford.............................................................................  15.4
Austin..........................................................................  19.2
Vauxhall......................................................................  11.2
Rootes..........................................................................  10.9
Standard.......................................................................  13.2
Total Big Six 90.8
Specialist Car Producers
Rover...........................................................................  2.7
Singer........................................................................... 2.1
BSA (Daimler, Lanchester)..........................................  0.6
Jaguar.................................................................... 1.6
Armstrong-Siddeley.....................................................  0.8
Rolls-Royce and Bentley...............................................  0.3
Alvis............................................................................  0.3
Other............................................................................  0.8
Total Specialist Car Producers 9.2
Total 100.0
Source: Adapted from Political aud Economic Planning. 
M o to r  V e h ic le s . Table 14, p26.
factory space, the acquisition brought Jaguar another two car models, and moved it into 
the production of limousines, coaches and double-decker buses, public service vehicles, 
and military armoured cars. Unlike many mergers, or acquisitions, in the motor industry 
at this time, which, as mentioned in Section 1.5 above, tended to give rise to loosely 
federated holding companies, the two companies were fully integrated, resulting in 
redundancies at Daimler, and the discontinuing of certain Daimler activities.49 All car 
assembly was now undertaken at Browns Lane, while Radford focused on machining,
49 Thorley. op.cit. pp 92-95.
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Figure 3.3: Jaguar Cars Home and Export Deliveries, Export Percentage,
and Percentage Change in Total Deliveries, 1959 to 1968.
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Note: Figures do not include cars assembled locally in such countries as Ireland and South Africa.
engine production, and bus production. Although the acquisition o f  Daimler resulted in 
some immediate volume increase, as shown in Figure 3.3, annual car production o f  the 
enlarged company remained at a fairly constant level during the 1960s, despite the 
growth in total UK car production, Jaguar’s position relative to total UK car production at 
best remaining at, or slightly below, 1950s levels.
In 19 6 1 Jaguar bought Guy Motors from the receivers for £800,000, thus 
adding to its range o f  Daimler buses, and “gaining a significant place in the commercial 
vehicle industry and giving the market leader, Leyland, a great deal o f  competition”.50 
The acquisition resulted in bus production being centralised at Radford, while the Guy 
factory at Wolverhampton was dedicated to commercial vehicles. Finally, in 1963, Jaguar 
acquired Coventry Climax, primarily for its engineering team and facilities, whose main 
activity was the production o f  fork-lift trucks, but which also produced racing car
50 “Motor Vehicle Industry. Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, with Evidence taken 
before the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee, and Appendices”. (Hereafter Expenditure Committee 
XIV Report). Parliamentary Papers. 1974-75. vol XXV. Para 36.
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engines. The fact that this deal was paid for by an exchange of shares51, thereby diluting 
Lyons’ personal holding in Jaguar, indicates the importance he placed on this particular 
acquisition.
The growth in the sales of Jaguar cars, the impact of the acquisitions, and 
tight control of costs enabled the company to achieve after tax profits exceeding 
£lmillion in every year from 1958/59 onwards, as can be seen from Figure 3.4, despite 
continual, and sometimes severe, disruption to production from industrial disputes and 
periodic downturns in demand. Thorley notes that the lower deliveries in 1967, 
necessitating three-day working at Browns Lane, resulted from a major downturn in UK 
demand and from Jaguar’s aging model range at that time.52 Whilst Jaguar’s profit record 
at this time might be regarded as being indicative of a financially successful company, it 
appeared that the situation was that of focusing on the short term at the expense of the 
longer term. As was the case with many British firms at this time53, Lyons funded 
investment out of retained earnings only, and, as the House of Commons Trade and 
Industry Sub Committee in 1975 (“1975 Committee”) opined, whilst “The Jaguar
company had progressed steadily small profits (about £3million) meant slow
expansion”.54 The 1975 Committee noted also that the method of financing Jaguar’s 
expansion had been dictated by Lyons’ desire to keep control.55
In 1966 Jaguar merged with the much larger British Motor Corporation 
(BMC), the largest UK producer of volume cars, including Austin and Morris, to form 
British Motor Holdings (BMH). Various explanations of Lyons motives for the deal have 
been put forward, including his concern regarding future supplies of bodies, BMC having 
recently taken over Pressed Steel, Jaguar’s own body supplier56, but Lyons himself does 
not seem to have proffered a particular reason for the merger. The 1975 Committee 
concluded that, ‘The merger was defensive; BMC needed a stronger large car and 
commercial vehicle range, while Jaguar needed capital to finance research and
51 Underwood, op.cit. p33.
52 Thorley. op.cit pi 15.
53 Whisler, op.cit. p53.
54 Expenditure Committee XIV Report. Para 36.
55 Idem.
56 Thorley. op.cit. pi 10.
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Figure 3.4: Jaguar Profit after Tax, 1959 to 1967
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development in new vehicles and engines”.57 However, it was a merger that had been 
typical o f  many in the motor industry, Lyons’ insistence that he retained his autonomy 
and control resulting in a deal that was little more than a “paperwork exercise with little 
change at Jaguar”.58
Two years later, in 1968, BMH merged with Leyland, owner o f  Standard- 
Triumph and Rover, to form the British Leyland Motor Corporation (later British 
Leyland). This was a merger that was to have serious consequences for Jaguar, as 
discussed in Section 3.7 below.
3.4 The Impact o f  the Lyons Autocracy
Jaguar was William Lyons’ creation, and for some forty years he exercised dictatorial 
control over it. During this time it was impossible to separate the man from the enterprise 
at any point. Consequently, Jaguar’s corporate ethos for much o f  its existence until the
57 Expenditure Committee XIV Report Para 36.
58 Thorley. op.cit. ppl 15-116.
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Ford take-over was shaped by him. Certainly, management institutions at all levels in the 
business evolved in response to the ideology and codes of conduct dictated by Lyons, and 
which were adopted by other Jaguar managers. Pre-World War Two shop floor workers’ 
institutions evolved in a similar direction. In the post-war environment, Lyons simply did 
not transform his pre-war notions and methods in response to the changes in shopfloor 
beliefs, values, and attitudes that had developed during the period of the war. This is 
discussed in Section 3.6 below. Since Lyons subsequently has been held responsible for 
many of the deficiencies, such as in management, production, and engineering, suffered 
by Jaguar in the post-war period, and which were perceived as being causal factors in 
Jaguar’s slide into near-bankruptcy in 198059, and its problems in the late 1980s, it is 
pertinent to consider the aspects of Lyons’ personality that resulted in such outcomes.
Undoubtedly Lyons’ attitudes were rooted in the Victorian virtues of hard 
work and thrift60, although Lyons’ often extreme examples of frugality led to his attaining 
such epithets as “skinflint”.61 Certainly, SS Cars during the 1930s paid its employees less 
than other local businesses in Coventry, and Lyons constantly exhorted them to work 
harder62, whilst he, in turn, worked a sixteen-hour day.63 In marked contrast, Vauxhall 
Motors during the 1930s paid its employees significantly more than did other Luton 
businesses.64 Egan was to remark about the Lyons era in general that, “There was a 
general meanness in terms of payment to people and in terms of investment”.65 It was the 
low level of investment that was most damaging for Jaguar in the longer term for Lyons’ 
philosophy of “make do” led to him forsaking modem manufacturing equipment and 
techniques in favour of cheaper alternatives. Thus, greater mechanisation of 
manufacturing at Browns Lane in the late 1950s to accommodate the higher levels of 
sales, both achieved and anticipated, was accomplished by means of an assembly line that 
was bought second-hand from the Standard Motor Company66, and body finishing and 
painting equipment that was bought second-hand from Mulliner’s works in
59 Underwood, op.cit. p207.
60 Thorley. op.cit. p66; Adeney, op.cit. pi 36.
61 Bob Ainsworth. Interview with the author. October 2003. Appendix p i .
62 Thorley. op.cit. p31.
63 Underwood, op.cit. pi 8.
64 Holden, op.cit. pi 17.
65 John Egan, quoted in Underwood, op.cit. p207.
66 John Egan, Interview with the Author. October 2007. Appendix p64; Roger Putnam Interview.
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Birmingham.67 Another example was to be found in the poor quality of the tooling, 
designed and owned by Jaguar, used in the pressing of body panels, leading Geoffrey 
Robinson to remark that, “Bill Lyons wanted a first-class body shell off third-class 
tooling”.6* The consequences of such a philosophy are discussed in Section 3.5 below, 
and in Chapters Six and Seven.
Lyons’ own values and beliefs, shaped by such Victorian virtues as hard work 
and frugality, undoubtedly laid the foundation for what most writers have described as his 
dictatorial, or autocratic, management style.69 Such behaviour, however, was hardly 
unique, with founders or heads of other motor companies, such as Nuffield, Austin, and 
Black (of Standard Motor), being noted for their personal dominance of their respective 
businesses.70 Certainly, Lyons appeared to demand nothing less than total control over his 
business, even to the extent of “negotiating intricate details of piecework with union 
officials”71, and had difficulty in delegating decisions. Consequently, even small 
decisions on his cars could not be taken if he was away, a situation which Adeney notes 
as being the same at the end of Lyons’ tenure as it was at the beginning.72 This was to 
have serious longer term consequences for, with Lyons basing decisions on personal 
experience, intuition, and conviction, there was little need of structured control, cost, and 
other information systems, resulting in an unsophisticated business lacking professional 
managers. For example, both Grant and Beasley recounted, as mentioned in Section 2.1 
above, how an absence of information systems had constrained problem solving in regard 
to quality and reliability and to marketing. Again, Dale related how in the mid-1980s it 
was found that the engineering drawings for the XJ-S did not match the actual car73, and 
Scheele discovered that even in 1992 the manufacturing costs of the Series III were not 
known.74
Appendix pi 23.
67 Collins, Paul, and Stratton, Michael. British car factories from 1896: a complete historical, 
geographical, architectural & technological survey. (Godmanstone, 1993). p220.
68 Geoffrey Robinson quoted in Underwood, op.cit. p51.
69 Adeney, op.cit. ppl36,138; Thorley. op.cit. p i23; Underwood, op.cit. p35.
70 Adeney, op.cit. pp44-5,108; Whisler. op.cit. pp37-41.
71 Adeney. op.cit. p i38.
72 Ibid pl36.
73 Mike [tele. Interview with the author. June 2007. Appendix p35.
74 Nick Scheele. Interview with the author. May 2007. Appendix pi 36.
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Given Lyons’ concern for personal dominance it is not too surprising that 
relations between him and his original partner, Walmsley, became “strained”75, the two 
men arguing “incessantly”.76 However, the part played by Walmsley in the development 
of what became Jaguar in the thirteen years or so that he was a joint partner in the 
business is unknown, his role, in a measure characteristic of an Orwellian totalitarian 
state, having been air-brushed out of the official company history of Jaguar and its 
subsidiaries. As Underwood was to remark, the official history was a publication in 
which “the name William Walmsley does not appear once”.77 Whilst the accounts written 
by Thorley, Underwood, and Whyte correct this distortion of the truth to some extent, 
they relate little of what Walmsley achieved, perhaps for lack of information, other than 
noting his design and craft skills, and the fact that it was he who started the business that 
Lyons later joined. Again, perhaps for lack of information, all three writers ascribe all the 
decisions taken in the business as being those of Lyons alone.
Following the flotation of the company in 1935, Lyons maintained a majority 
shareholding in the business, a situation which enabled him “to continue ruling over it 
like some personal fiefdom”78, and, as has been noted in Section 3.3 above, he was 
certainly averse to losing control, and refused to relinquish authority when Jaguar merged 
with BMC. Although the company went public in 1935, forcing Lyons to appoint 
directors, the Board, on Lyons’ own admission, “rarely met and then only as a formality 
to satisfy legal requirements”.79 It may be reasonably argued that because Lyons rarely 
delegated major decisions his co-directors were ill-equipped to succeed him, as was 
demonstrated by his chosen successor, “Lofty” England (see Section 3.7 below). As 
Dellheim observed, “Jaguar was led by managers who had much experience in following 
orders and little practice in making decisions”.80 Whether or not Lyons had much respect 
for his co-directors is a matter for conjecture but, as Whyte relates, he did not see fit to
75 Thorley. op.cit. p30.
76 Underwood, op.cit. p22.
77 Ibid. p23.
78 Ibid. p24.
79 Sir William Lyons, quoted in Wood, Jonathan. Wheels o f Misfortune: The Rise and Fall o f the British 
Motor Industry. (London, 1988).p80.
80 Dellheim, Charles. “The Historian and Corporate Culture” in The Public Historian, Volume 8, Number 2 
(Spring 1986). pl7.
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consult them in regard to the acquisition of either Daimler or Guy Motors, or about the 
merger with BMC, since “as the majority shareholder such decisions were his alone”.81
Lyons' own Victorian-influenced values and beliefs also determined his 
attitude towards, and his relationship with, his workforce, his approach here gaining him 
a reputation for being a “hard task-master”.82 Increased enterprise size did not seem to 
have impeded his personal dominance of all aspects of strategic and operational 
activities, with frequent tours of the factory, particularly Browns Lane, aimed at keeping 
everyone, workers and managers alike, “on their toes”.83 Thorley relates that workers 
were frightened of Lyons’ wrath if they were found wanting during one of these tours.84 
Such actions may be seen as demonstrating the primacy of management in the light of the 
increased power of the unions on the shop floor, discussed further in Section 3.7 below. 
Although Thorley argues that Lyons tolerated trades unions85, a more widely accepted 
view is that although he believed that trades unions were an impediment to businesses 
making profits86, he was forced to work with them because of post-war industrial 
relations legislation. This is discussed further in Section 3.6 below.
Somewhat paradoxically, Lyons was hailed for his paternalism as a result of 
him setting up an employees’ pension scheme, and having the company pay for such 
things as employees’ annual outings to Blackpool, for Christmas lunches for employees, 
Christmas parties for employees’ children, and a social club.87 However, in providing 
such benefits, Lyons appeared merely to be emulating the likes of Nuffield, and Bartlett 
(Managing Director of Vauxhall Motors, 1929 to 1953). Nuffield had “pioneered many 
employees amenities such as holidays with pay, profit-sharing, sports clubs, and medical 
centres [and] also believed he should pay reasonable wages”88, whilst the paternalistic 
policies pursued by Bartlett included high pay, group bonus, and profit sharing, as well as 
“better welfare, sporting, social and canteen facilities”.89 But whilst the adoption of some
81 Whyte, op.cit. pi 17..
82 Thorley. op.cit. p31; Underwood, op.cit. p35.
83 Thorley. op.cit. p68.
84 Idem.
85 Ibid. p52.
86 Underwood, op.cit. p i9.
87 Thorley. op.cit. pp 31,43, 70.
88 King, op.cit. p71.
89 Holden, op.cit. p i36.
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of these measures by Lyons might be regarded as pure altruism, an alternative, and more 
likely, interpretation might be that, in the face of the threat posed by organised labour, 
Lyons, in common with many other British managers, was merely responding with the 
carrot of traditional benevolent paternalism, as opposed to the stick of victimization and 
harassment of trade union organisers that he had once applied. Whisler argues that British 
management in general viewed paternalism as a means of maintaining control over 
workers, with Rover, for example, sponsoring sports and social clubs, and providing 
workers disability pay.90 But such paternalism does not appear to have resulted in 
diminishing the trade unions' power and influence on employees, Whisler noting that, “It 
was clear in the early 1950s that management's paternalism had failed to ensure peaceful 
industrial relations and impede trade unionism".91 Indeed, the trade unions, according to 
Underwood, saw Lyons as “an old fashioned manager with an appalling attitude towards 
his employees”.92
3.5 Production Issues in the Lvons Era
As was related in Section 3.2 above, the origins of the Jaguar business lay in the craft- 
dependent activity of coach building. Sidecars, and then motor cars, were hand-crafted on 
chassis bought in from outside suppliers, and while volumes remained comparatively low 
faults could be fairly easily identified and rectified before the vehicles left the factory. 
With this method of production operating virtually unchanged from 1922 until 1937 there 
can be little doubt that shop floor attitudes were determined by continuity as customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct remained basically unaltered, thus reinforcing a craft- 
orientated corporate culture. Increased volumes were achieved initially through 
increasing the size of the workforce, although this resulted in the original SSI car 
suffering considerable defects as quality was lost in the drive for production volumes.
But, to meet even higher levels of demand for the SS Jaguar saloon, the existing 
production systems required some degree of mechanisation.
Consequently, two measures, mentioned in Section 3.2 above, were 
introduced to help resolve the problem. First, a new assembly line enabled the bodies to
90 Whisler. op.cit. p i93.
91 Ibid pi 94.
92 Underwood, op.cit. pi 9.
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be mounted on trestles and pulled along by chains while the operatives installed the 
various components. This did not alter the craft-based nature of the workers’ tasks, but 
meant that workers had to maintain pace alongside the cars, and this could lead to quality 
defects. Second, a major new industrial process, whereby all-steel panels replaced wood­
framed bodywork, was introduced. Whilst this required some change in the trades 
employed, with an emphasis now on metalworkers, the cars remained essentially hand­
crafted. But, in what was obviously a design fault, the various steel panels, produced by 
different outside companies, did not fit together properly, a problem that took months to 
resolve, and even then required a lot of hand finishing work before the cars were 
perfect.93 Thorley notes that “lead loading”, the practice of using hand-moulded lead to 
fill in gaps and undulations and achieve the required lines, “became the norm”94, and was 
a practice that continued well on into the 1980s, undertaken, as related by Bennett, even 
by Jaguar’s retailers seeking to rectify faults before delivery to the customer.95 Indeed, it 
would appear that hereafter the continuance of quality problems shaped and reinforced 
shop floor institutions, both labour and shop floor supervisors, and resulted in ingrained 
attitudes in regard to post-assembly rectification work. Even in the 1980s there was an 
acceptance, according to Ainsworth, that “right first time every time wasn’t in the ethos 
at all” and that at Browns Lane cars had to be continually re-worked.96
Quality was to be a recurring problem after the end of World War Two, for a 
variety of largely unspecified reasons. The process of re-conversion of the business to car 
production after nearly six years of armament-related activity in itself undoubtedly 
caused problems, with numerous complaints being received from distributors about the 
quality of workmanship and the presentation of the cars.97 Consequently, in a move that 
would pre-empt Egan’s much heralded Quality Circles by some thirty-five years (see 
Section 6.9 below), in 1946 Lyons set up a Joint Production Committee made up of 
managers and workers to iron out problems and to look at workers’ ideas for improving 
the factory.98 The success, or otherwise, of this initiative, however, is not recorded. It is of
93 Thorley. op.cit. p35.
94 Idem.
95 Martin Bennett. Interview with the author. July 2008. Appendix p i2.
96 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p2.
97 Thorley. op.cit. p53.
98 Ibid. p52.
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note that in setting up this committee Lyons appeared merely to be emulating 
developments elsewhere in the industry, Vauxhall Motors having established its 
Management Advisory Committee in 1941, a body that was to form the “lynchpin of 
management-labour relations at Vauxhall” until the late 1950s when the Committee was 
disbanded." In 1946 also, Lyons started to take cars home for evaluation, reporting back 
on faults as appropriate100, although there is no evidence of any consequent remedial 
action, and it is problematic as to whether Lyons' action here constituted quality control.
The industrial relations problems suffered by Jaguar throughout the post-war 
period, discussed in Section 3.6 below, no doubt also contributed to the poor quality 
problem. Whisler argues that, in relation to the motor industry generally, “the disruptions 
to work routines and parts supplies caused by chronic industrial action reduced build 
standards”.101
In common with similar motor manufacturers, such as Rover, increased sales 
also are likely to have adversely impacted on quality, with quality being sacrificed for 
volume, and the increased number of workers employed to manufacture higher volumes 
also having a dilutive impact on quality.102 By 1956 the Jaguar workforce had increased to 
4,000103, compared to the 1,500 employed immediately prior to World War Two.
The further increases in sales in the 1950s led to the installation of a more 
mechanised assembly line that was bought second-hand from the Standard Motor 
Company, as mentioned in Section 3.4 above. This, however, did not automate the 
assembly process, and many activities, such as the building of doors, were hand-crafted 
alongside the assembly track, a situation that continued well into the 1980s.104 Production, 
however, had been modified slightly by the introduction in 1955 of monocoque designs 
where floor pans, built from different pressings, replaced chassis, resulting in the use of 
mounting jigs instead of trestles on the assembly line. It is of note that Jaguar was well 
behind in the adoption of monocoque construction, the first British car built in this
99 Holden, op.cit. pi 22.
100 Thorley. op.cit. p53.
101 Whisler. op.cit. p358.
102 Ibid. p359.
103 Thorley. op.cit. p73
104 Jake Weidinger. Interview with the author. May 2008. Appendix p i47.
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manner being the Vauxhall H-type, launched in 1938.105
Finally, it has to be noted that the conditions of work and the apparent lack of 
shop floor discipline would have created a culture that would undoubtedly have 
undermined attempts at reform. Photos of the Foleshill assembly area in 1950106 and the 
Browns Lane assembly area in 1964107 show overcrowded and debris-strewn areas, which 
did not demonstrate a great deal of regard for safety, with, for example, overhead lines 
carrying trim above work stations.108 In Egan’s view, manufacturing in the Lyons’ era 
was never “a well thought of discipline”.109
3.6 Industrial Relations in the Lyons Era
As previously noted, the development of the Swallow/SS Cars business before World 
War Two appears to have been fairly undistinguished in regard to production and labour 
relations issues. The industrial relations agenda was undoubtedly determined at an early 
stage by Lyons’ attitude in regard to trades unions. Lyons was well-known for his distaste 
of trades unions and, as mentioned in Section 3.2 above, the first experience of the 
withdrawal of labour, shortly after the company had moved to Coventry, resulted from a 
dispute in the company’s sawmill over union membership. This is an experience that does 
not appear to have been repeated in the pre-war period and, as Adeney observed, Lyons 
“had refused to negotiate with the Sheetmetal Workers Union; like many manufacturers 
he had dismissed union activists, and paid one TGWU steward to stay at home even 
during the war”.110 Unsurprisingly, as Thorley notes, “Before the war and for some time 
afterwards the company was not totally unionised”111, but this was not uncommon in the 
motor industry at this time, unions generally having been unsuccessful in organizing car 
workers in the inter-war period.112
However, World War Two proved to be an exogenous force that produced a 
radical re-routing of the company’s corporate ethos, largely as a result of government
105 Holden, op.cit. p51.
106 Thorley. op.cit. p57.
107 Ibid p i04.
108 Ibid. p i07.
109 John Egan Interview. Appendix p64
110 Adeney. op.cit. p i90.
111 Thorley. op.cit. p52.
112 Adeney. op.cit. pi 70.
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action aimed at maintaining production of essential war materials. Unfortunately, the 
literature covering the motor industry in general, and Jaguar in particular, does not 
provide much discussion of the events and consequences for the motor industry of this 
important era. Adeney, one of the exceptions to this, argued that, for Lyons, wartime 
developments in industrial relations represented “a sea-change which marked a break 
with the past that was almost incomprehensible”.113
The Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration under the 
Emergency Powers Act of July 1940 severely restricted management action in relation to 
employees, and trades unions in particular, and “effectively handed power to the unions 
even in plants where the management had [previously] refused to do business with 
them”.114 Moreover, the Essential Work Order restricted the ability of companies to hire 
and fire. Adeney notes that the effect of such measures and “the climate of working 
together for victory established the unions as never before”.115 The impact on Jaguar was 
profound as Jack Beardsley, who became a works superintendent at Jaguar after the war, 
related: “We didn’t know anything about unions until 1943, but then we had to be 
affiliated. We had troubles then, stoppages”.116 Change was marked by the union 
institutions now becoming an entrenched part of the company’s corporate culture, 
underpinned by the fact that the National Arbitration Act remained in force until 1951.
Henceforth, industrial disputes would be a constant factor influencing the 
company’s modus operandi and direction. Lyons appears to have recognised the need to 
modify his own historically developed values and beliefs, and attempted to redirect the 
shop floor institutions that had evolved in the course of the war through a mixture of 
paternalism and accommodation. In contrast to the situation when the company had first 
moved to Coventry, Lyons, owning a majority of what by this time had become a 
successful and important company, now had a great deal to lose personally and was 
obviously prepared to make concessions to the shop floor workers. Minor disputes at 
Foleshill in 1946 resulted in a mass meeting at which Lyons spoke to the workforce on 
the issues, following which a committee of twenty-five shop stewards was established to
113 Ibid. pi 89.
1.4 Ibid. pi 88.
1.5 Ibid. pl91.
116 Quoted in Adeney. op.cit. p i91.
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deal with matters."7 The success of this initiative is not recorded, but Thorley notes that 
‘‘minor irritations and disputes continued for many years”."8 The nature of these is not 
recorded, but the limited degree to which Lyons’ attitudes had been modified was 
demonstrated by the seven week strike in 1953 by the National Union of Vehicle Builders 
over the victimization of shop stewards."9 That there was a divergence of attitudes during 
the 1950s is illustrated by the refusal of workers to accede to Lyons’ appeal to them in 
1956 to accept lower piece rates at a time when the company was forced, because of an 
economic downturn, to operate short time working120, perhaps demonstrating the failure 
of Lyons’ paternalism, and by a strike in 1959 emanating from an inter-union dispute.121
Even so, it has to be recognised that the nature and extent of disputes at 
Jaguar during the Lyons’ post-war era were only in part a result of the growth of trade 
unionism. As mentioned above, union institutional structures now formed part of Jaguar’s 
corporate culture, but as a result there was institutional overlap, and a consequent 
dysfiinctionality that was to significantly constrain attempts at future operational and 
strategic reforms. The major problem during the 1960s and 1970s impacting on the 
British motor industry in general was the greater number of unofficial strikes caused by a 
myriad of factors.122 Adeney argues that the impact of unionization at this time was “skin- 
deep” and that the issue was that unions, like management, were too weak, not too strong, 
union officials having little influence with their members, despite the part they played in 
negotiating piece rates and manning levels.123 The situation appears to have been little 
different at Jaguar, with numerous disputes occurring in the 1960s, of which the most 
devastating was a five-week unofficial strike by assembly workers in 1965124, and during 
1970 there were few full weeks of production at Jaguar due to constant strikes and 
disputes.125 Whilst the outcome of many of these disputes is not recorded, the continuance
117 Thorley. op.cit. p52.
u* Idem.
1,9 Ibid. p66.
120 Ibid. p75.
121 Ibid. p83.
122 Foreman-Peck et al, op.cit. pi 77.
123 Adeney. op.cit. pp236-7.
124 Thorley. op.cit. p i03.
125 Ibid. p i20.
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of this behaviour suggests that employees perceived that the rewards of their actions 
exceeded the costs.
Geoffrey Robinson appears to have recognised, and started to address, the 
constraints posed by the inflexibility of at least some of Jaguar's encrusted institutions, 
but these were ignored by BL which attempted to destroy the company’s corporate ethos, 
a measure which served only to reinforce prevailing shopfloor attitudes, as is discussed in 
the next section.
3.7 The BL Stewardship, from 1968 to 1980
Lyons remained at Jaguar from the merger with Leyland in 1968 until retiring in 1972. 
During this period his continuing presence ensured some degree of independence and 
protection for Jaguar as the various car companies within BL defended their parochial 
interests against calls for the creation of corporate integration and identity, and vied with 
each other for shares of the corporation’s scarce investment funds126, while “the frequent 
conflict at the top levels [of BL] created an inertia”.127 But whilst Lyons, protective of 
Jaguar’s position as the specialist luxury sports car maker within BL, managed to kill off 
the development of a new Rover sports car128, he was unable to prevent the 
dismemberment of the Jaguar Group, with Guy Motors being transferred to the Leyland 
Truck and Bus Division in 1969.129 Whisler notes that during this time the impact of 
corporate in-fighting within BL resulted in the various companies’ management and 
workers seeking refuge in the status quo.130 Certainly, Jaguar workers saw themselves as 
craftsmen and, therefore, as part of an elite within BL131, the corporate culture at Jaguar 
thus being at variance with that of BL.
However, despite some very positive developments, such as the 1969 launch 
of the XJ6, which was to remain in production in its various versions until 1992, it was a 
period marked by an increasing number of industrial disputes at Jaguar. The dispute of 
1970, noted above, culminated in 1972 in a ten week long strike over the BL-imposed
126 Whisler. op.cit. ppl01-104; Adeney. op.cit. pp278-279.
127 Whisler. op.cit. p i05.
128 Adeney. op.cit. p278.
129 Thorley. op.cit. p i20.
130 Whisler. op.cit. p i05.
131 Underwood, op.cit. p51; Edwardes, Michael. Back from the Brink. An Apocalyptic Experience.
(London, 1983). pi 75.
move from the piece rate payment system to the Measured Day Work (MDW) system. 
Although the introduction of MDW was seen as a reform vital to the introduction of 
“Fordist” production in the BL volume car business, the situation at Jaguar was different, 
and here BL was seeking to impose MDW on a culture shaped by labour-intensive, craft- 
based, processes and piecework payment. Whilst MDW was eventually accepted, the 
change was largely superficial, both management and labour adhering to their traditional 
behaviour. The empowerment of the trade unions provided by the piece-rate system, and 
the long-established management strategy of using labour-intensive techniques, had given 
the union shop stewards control over flow and working practices, and the introduction of 
MDW altered little other than the fact that assembly line workers now had no incentive to 
ensure continual production flow, or keep product quality acceptable. Ainsworth, a 
former shop steward at Jaguar, admitted that, “When we moved to flat rate nobody 
cared”.132 Foreman-Peck et al argue that whilst the piecework system gave workers “a 
material interest in circumventing assembly problems caused by poorly machined 
components”, with MDW “component fit and quality became exclusively a management 
problem”. 133 But the required change was constrained by the factory managers who 
lacked the skills necessary to plan and supervise labour. Underwood notes that MDW 
resulted in the employment of three times the number of supervisors who lacked adequate 
training, and “who failed to win the respect of shop floor workers”.134 The impact of this 
in the Egan era is discussed further in Sub-Section 6.4.3 below.
When Lyons retired in 1972 he was succeeded by his deputy, “Lofty” 
England, who had joined Jaguar in 1946. However, as a result of Lyons’ autocratic style, 
England had no real experience of running the business, and not only lacked management 
skills but seemed incapable of recognising, let alone attempting to rectify, Jaguar’s 
management inadequacies. In particular he appeared to lack the skills required to 
maintain Jaguar’s independence in the light of continual incursions from BL, with BL 
subjecting the company to more controls, and moving accountability away from Jaguar.135 
In October 1972 “Jaguar Cars Ltd” ceased to exist as a separate company, although BL’s
132 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p3.
133 Foreman-Peck et al. pi 73.
134 Underwood, op.cit. p43.
135 Thorley. op.cit. pp!22-3.
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desire for Jaguar to retain its separate identity appears to have been the reason for the 
appointment, in mid-1973, of Geoffrey Robinson, in charge of BL’s Innocenti business in 
Milan, as Managing Director. “Lofty” England retired in January 1974.
The appointment of an outsider, bringing the experience of different 
corporate environments and structures, provided the opportunity for innovative decision­
making. But more importantly, Robinson appeared to have quickly identified some of the 
company’s weaknesses that were unrecognised by the existing management, 
consequently challenging encrusted institutional structures.136 Of particular note, he 
addressed the constraints posed by inherent management weaknesses by appointing 
former Ford senior executives to top management positions in manufacturing and 
purchasing, and establishing a seven-man management board, of which only two of its 
members had been part of the previous management team.137 Robinson appears to have 
recognised that the Jaguar workforce regarded themselves as an elite within the British 
motor industry, producing a unique product that had gained worldwide fame as a result of 
racing successes. Consequently, according to Bower, he actively sought to gain their co­
operation, and modify their traditional attitudes and beliefs, by pandering to their self- 
image, avoiding any type of confrontation with them, and through lavishly entertaining 
the shop stewards.138 This approach appears to have prevented further industrial disputes, 
the only strike during Robinson’s tenure being an unofficial action two weeks after he 
arrived at Jaguar. This, plus the expansion and investment plans that Robinson 
announced, together with his energetic management style, appeared to result in “a 
renewed commitment by workers and management”139, and record car deliveries in 1974, 
as shown in Figure 3.5 (page 136). However, that there had been any modification of 
encrusted shopfloor attitudes was questioned by Dale who, lending support to Bower’s 
view, opined that, “The only way he [Robinson] got work out of the unions was by 
promising them the earth, and the results were astonishingly bad both from a quality and 
a production angle”.140
136 Underwood, op.cit. pp45-46.
137 Whyte, op.cit. p i71.
138 Bower, Tom. The Paymaster. Geoffrey Robinson, Maxwell and New Labour. (London, 2001). pp25-6.
139 Underwood, op.cit. p46.
140 Mike Dale, e-mail to the Author, 5 August 2008. Appendix p4n8.
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Providing farther support for the view that Robinson had not been successful 
in effecting cultural change at Jaguar was the fact that the workforce reverted to its 
traditional behaviour after he resigned in 1975 following the government-commissioned 
Ryder Report which resulted in BL’s car operations being amalgamated into a single 
amorphous business, and Jaguar ceasing to exist as a separate entity. Indeed, as Wood 
succinctly comments, Jaguar was “nearly obliterated in the chaos of the post-Ryder 
years”.141 But, in implementing the Ryder recommendations in regard to Jaguar, BL failed 
to recognise and address the importance of culture. The transfer of all Jaguar’s specialist 
functions such as sales and marketing, and purchasing, to BL, with only the engineering 
department remaining at Browns Lane, significantly altered the company’s corporate 
culture, leading to a radical shift in shopfloor attitudes as employees, and factory 
supervisors, came to believe that they had no future. Such a view was reinforced by 
various measures pursued by BL, including: the Browns Lane and Radford plants being 
split up, with Browns Lane becoming part of BL’s assembly division, and renamed 
“Leyland Cars Large Car Assembly Plant No 2”, and Radford becoming part of BL’s 
power train division, and renamed “Radford Engines and Transmission Plant”; the 
decision to erect a new paint facility at the BL plant at Castle Bromwich, rather than at 
Browns Lane, as had been planned by Robinson; the removal of all Jaguar signage from 
Browns Lane.142 But, most tellingly, BL made no attempt to make good the lack of 
investment of the Lyons’ autocracy, Scheele noting that, “If you look at Jaguar’s 
investments in the Leyland years, there was incredibly little in facilities”.143
The consequent behaviour of the workers served to reinforce prevailing 
shopfloor institutions and led to greater conflict between management, unions, and 
workers than had ever been experienced previously at Jaguar, particularly as a result of 
BL’s constant push to increase productivity.144 Product quality suffered, and “Dealers 
were complaining about the amount of rectification work they had to carry out and 
owners were losing faith in the once prestigious marque”.145 In part this emanated from
141 Wood, op.cit. p206
142 Thorley. op.cit. pi 27; Thoms, David, and Donnelly, Tom. The Coventry Motor Industry: Birth to 
Renaissance? (Aldershot, 2000). pp179-80.
143 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix pi 29.
144 Thorley. op.cit. p i28.
145 Idem.
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poor build quality, but on the new Series III saloon launched in 1979 the problems were 
more deep-rooted, owing much to design faults, discussed in Chapter Seven, and this, 
plus a major strike by Jaguar assembly workers over pay, against an economic 
background o f  the onset o f  a severe recession that was to last until 19 8 1146, resulted in 
sales dropping to a twenty-year low, as can be seen in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Jaguar Cars Home and Export Deliveries, Export Percentage, 
and Percentage Change in Total Deliveries, 1968 to 1980
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3: Downturn in 1972 directly attributable to impact of Piece Rate strike.
Even so, although now in dire straits, and in danger o f  being closed down, 
Jaguar was to be afforded one last chance. In 1977 Michael Edwardes, who had been 
appointed Chairman o f  BL, set in motion a recovery plan for BL. A first m ove involved 
splitting the car side o f  BL into two parts: volume cars, and the three prestige marques o f  
Jaguar, Rover, and Triumph. However, the new company, Jaguar-Rover-Triumph, was to 
last but a couple o f  years, for Edwardes, realising problems with his original concept,
146 Foreman-Peck et al. op.cit. p218.
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and, deciding to re-assert the marque, set up another new company, Jaguar Cars 
Holdings, which would be responsible for Jaguar, Daimler, Browns Lane, and Radford. 
The fortunes of Jaguar under the management of John Egan, brought in to run the new 
company, is the subject of the following chapters of this thesis.
3.8 Summary and Conclusions
Although at the time of Jaguar's second stock exchange flotation in 1984 it was 
fashionable to blame the problems that had faced the company on mismanagement and 
underinvestment by BL, there is little doubt that many of the problems resulted from the 
Lyons’ era. Whilst BL had aggravated many of these problems, Lyons may be justly held 
accountable for failing to address the company’s pervasive weaknesses in the period after 
World War Two, thereby exacerbating industrial relations issues and management 
inadequacies, and for the under-investment which had resulted in Jaguar’s factories, 
equipment, and systems by the late 1970s being outmoded and inefficient.
Prior to World War Two the company’s growth and success owed much to a 
corporate culture composed of shop floor institutions shaped by craft-based, labour- 
intensive processes, and piecework payment systems, and management institutions rooted 
in the traditional Victorian virtues of hard work and thrift. The success of the business, 
and the lack of change-inducing external pressures, reinforced the evolving and 
established institutional structures of management and labour, sustaining the existing 
corporate ethos.
World War Two constituted a watershed that produced a radical modification 
of employee values and attitudes, and a consequent adjustment of Lyons’, and 
management's, approach to running the business. Whilst maintaining his long-held values 
and beliefs, Lyons henceforth would seek to accommodate the demands of an 
increasingly pervasive and inflexible shop floor institutional structure, having the effect 
of reinforcing shopfloor behaviour. However, Lyons assumed that labour would respond 
to paternalism and an accommodating management style, and made little attempt to 
address the informal expectations and behaviour of both labour and lower level 
management that were becoming entrenched in the company and which would obstruct 
change and impose considerable constraints on Jaguar’s future evolution and growth.
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Lyons' “make-do” philosophy and under-investment in capital equipment and 
systems, emanating largely from his Victorian attitude to thrift and his unwillingness to 
dilute his personal shareholding in the company, resulted in production that, whilst 
mechanised, remained rooted in craft-based activities and which imposed constraints on 
higher volume outputs. One consequent problem was that of poor quality, which was to 
become a recurring issue in the post World War Two period, and which was the major 
factor in the company's near demise, first in the late 1970s, and then in the late 1980s.
Robinson had started to address Jaguar's encrusted institutional structures, 
but with limited success, and which in any case was negated by the post-Ryder attempt to 
assimilate Jaguar within BL. Here, Jaguar's traditional behaviour and institutions which 
had been shaped by the “British System", and the elitism inculcated by belief in the 
uniqueness of the product, proved to be incompatible with those entrenched in BL and 
which had been shaped by high volume production methods. The attempt by BL to 
destroy the company’s identity and corporate ethos only reinforced vested interests and 
the historic institutional structure of management and labour, leading to even more firmly 
entrenched attitudes. Egan appears to have seen nothing wrong with the corporate culture 
when he arrived at Jaguar, other than the weaknesses caused by trade union ingrained 
attitudes. Egan's failure to recognise and address the weaknesses in the corporate culture 
as a whole only served to exacerbate the underlying problems of organizational 
dysfunction and inadequate corporate resources, and undermined his attempts to establish 
Jaguar as a world leader in the production of luxury cars. This is discussed in particular in 
the next chapter which looks at the subject of management in general during the Egan 
era.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EGAN YEARS -  OVERVIEW, MANAGEMENT, STRATEGY
4.1 Introduction
As related in Section 1.2 above, John Egan was widely acclaimed during the 1980s and 
afterwards for his success in revitalizing Jaguar, thereby saving it from the threat of 
closure, and going on to privatize the then flourishing company, and successfully 
launching an all-new model, the XJ40. Typical here was the comment of Bruce Blythe, 
one of the Ford executives responsible for its acquisition of Jaguar, when he stated that, 
“John Egan absolutely, almost on a personal basis, saved Jaguar. I think his performance 
was heroic, absolutely heroic”.1 Such sentiment was not dented greatly by the downturn 
in the company’s fortunes from 1987 onwards since there was general acceptance of the 
Jaguar version of the problem resulting from the strength of Sterling and the lower 
demand for luxury cars in the US market, factors over which Jaguar could exert no 
control. However, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters of this thesis, this 
was a view that was based on incorrect or incomplete evidence and premises, with 
Jaguar’s well-honed public relations efforts successfully concealing Jaguar’s failure to 
address many of its inherited problems, and the reasons for its decline after the launch of 
the XJ40.
In the Introduction to this thesis it was stated that a primary aim of this study 
has been to examine the extent to which Jaguar’s reduced fortunes after 1987 resulted 
from the Egan management failing to recognize and address the deep-rooted problems 
inherent in Jaguar’s corporate culture, which, as was demonstrated in Chapter Three, 
developed In the years of the Lyons autocracy. These cultural issues were pervasive, 
impacting all areas of Jaguar, as will be apparent from the following chapters which 
examine particular departments and functions of the company during the Egan era. 
However, management itself suffered considerable dysfunction, and this had a significant 
detrimental impact on the company’s fortunes.
1 Bruce Blythe. Interview with the author. January 1994. Appendix p i9.
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This present chapter provides an overview of the main phases of Jaguar's 
fortunes during the Egan era, and examines the nature and quality of the Egan 
management team, questioning its culpability in regard to the problems encountered by 
Jaguar, and the extent to which it suffered from cultural constraints, topics which are then 
examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters. This chapter also examines Egan's 
much-lauded leadership abilities, particularly in the light of Jaguar's highly effective PR 
campaign, much of which was devoted to promoting Egan himself, and questions the 
extent to which Egan was successful in directing the activities of the management team. 
Furthermore, it considers whether Jaguar practiced good corporate governance in an era 
when there was increasing concern in the City about the degree of good stewardship 
exercised by company directors in general and the levels of disclosure by companies. 
Finally, it examines the failure of the Egan management to undertake strategic planning, 
suggesting that much of this was due to Egan's own obduracy in regard to strategic 
issues, which was only modified as a result of the exogenous force represented by the 
failure of the XJ40, but which, ironically, made the take-over by Ford inevitable.
As will be seen, much of the analysis presented in this chapter is based on 
information obtained from personal interviews. Given the subject matter of this chapter, it 
could not be otherwise. However, in arriving at the views presented here, care has been 
taken to be aware of personal bias, particularly old animosities or personal bitterness, and 
to triangulate wherever possible. What has been reassuring here is the degree of 
unanimity among interviewees in regard to a range of what might be regarded as fairly 
sensitive issues. The author, therefore, has a considerable degree of confidence in the 
soundness of the analysis presented in this chapter.
4.2 Jaguar in the Egan Era -  Renascence: Prosperity: Labefaction
In addressing an audience of City analysts in March 1989 following the announcement of 
Jaguar's extremely disappointing financial results for the year to 31st December 1988, 
Egan announced that the company was now entering the third stage of its evolution, 
identifying the three phases of development as being the following:
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• First Stage, lasting from 1980 to 1982, involving turning around the company and 
creating a viable product. This was the period of Jaguar's renascence.
• Second Stage, from 1983 to 1988, dedicated to creating a viable company. Here, 
according to Egan, it had been recognised that Jaguar needed to sell at least
50.000 units per annum to frilly fund its research and development requirements. 
During this stage, the company had been privatised, it had introduced an all-new 
car (the XJ40), built a research and development facility, had substantially 
modernised its equipment, and built up a worldwide sales network. The target of
50.000 cars had been achieved, but satisfactory profits had not been achieved due 
to adverse currency exchange rates. Even so, this was a period of considerable 
prosperity for Jaguar in terms of sales, and, until 1988, in terms of profits.
• Third Stage, in which the focus was on better managing the business as the 
company entered a period of significant financial difficulty. According to Egan, 
the problems caused by adverse currency exchange movements, “had dragged the 
company into doing the right things". In this stage £50million per annum would 
be taken out of the cost base, of which some £20million/£30million had been 
identified.2
Egan had never previously talked publicly about phases of development of 
the company, or the company’s objectives in each, and this statement, coming at a time 
when the company had just reported a 51% decline in pre-tax profits, as may be seen in 
Table 4.3 below (page 113), was aimed undoubtedly at reassuring investors that the 
management were taking steps to cope with the difficulties resulting from factors beyond 
their control, especially adverse currency exchange rates. This statement is notable for 
two particular aspects. First, it was the first public admission that Jaguar’s management, 
once heralded as a model of successful British management, could “better manage” the 
business. Second, it provides an example of Jaguar’s well-developed disinformation and 
obfuscation skills that are discussed, in particular, in the following three chapters of this
2 City Analysts Results Briefing Meeting, 16 March 1989. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
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thesis. As will be shown, Jaguar's problems were innate, and were exacerbated by the 
failure of the Egan management to undertake necessary cultural adjustments. 
Fortuitously, adverse currency movements provided a convenient smokescreen for the 
downturn in profits, and enabled the nature and extent of its more deep-rooted problems 
to be disguised.
Even so, the era of the Egan management may be conveniently discussed in 
terms of three distinct periods, defined by demonstrable patterns of profitability, and two 
major events that would determine the company’s fate: the launch of the XJ40 in 
1986/1987 that would prove to be the catalyst for the company’s downfall, and the 
takeover bid by the Ford Motor Company in 1989. These five elements in the Jaguar 
story are summarized and discussed chronologically in the sub-sections that follow.
4.2.1 The Reversal of Decline. 1980 to 1983
John Egan joined Jaguar at a low point in its fortunes, the impact of quality problems in 
terms of the poor physical characteristics of the cars, described in Section 7.6 below, and 
the impact of a severe economic recession, having resulted in sales falling to a twenty- 
year low in 1979, shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 above. Moreover, as described in Chapter 
Three, the business was suffering from years of inadequate investment and neglect, it 
lacked a senior management team, with the major business functions such as marketing 
and sales and accounting being undertaken by BL, and had a de-motivated workforce3, 
half of which was on strike over BL-imposed new work practices on the day Egan joined 
the company.4 Egan’s remit, as recounted by Edwards5, was to return the company to 
profitability, or to supervise its closure.
In Section 3.7 above it was described how BL had reduced what was once the 
Jaguar company to little more than an assembly plant, but allowed it to retain its own 
engineering department. The new company set up by Michael Edwardes, and which Egan 
was brought in to head in April 1980, was to undertake the management of the Jaguar and 
Daimler brands, and the Browns Lane and Radford factories. In July 1980, the Castle
3 Thoms, David, and Donnelly, Tom. The Coventry Motor Industry: Birth to Renaissance? Second Edition 
(Aldershot, 2000). p206.
4 Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989). p63.
5 John Edwards. Interview with the author. November 2002 and October 2003. Appendix p50.
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Bromwich plant, which undertook car body assembly and paint, was added to Egan's 
responsibilities. His task was to re-construct a discrete organization, and build a new 
senior management team, there being only a manufacturing and an engineering operation 
in place when he joined.6 But until 1984, Jaguar remained a company wholly-owned by 
BL, and for the first one or two years of Egan’s management little could be done without 
the approval of BL executives. In this regard, Mike Dale, in charge of Sales and 
Marketing for Jaguar-Rover-Triumph Inc (JRT Inc), and then Jaguar Inc., related how in 
1981 they had to obtain the permission of the Head of BL International, to whom JRT 
Inc., BL’s, and hence Jaguar’s, North American distributor, reported at that time, before 
they could re-enter TransAm racing.7 By the middle of 1982 Jaguar had achieved a great 
deal of autonomy from BL, Egan stating that, “The only functions that we get from BL 
are a treasury function on funding, and centralized wage bargaining. Otherwise we do our 
own thing”.8 However, it would not be until 1983 that ownership of JRT Inc, renamed 
Jaguar Inc, would be transferred from BL to Jaguar.9
With his own team in place, Egan set about identifying and tackling the major 
problems impacting on Jaguar, including poor vehicle quality, production, especially the 
problems with the paint process, labour relations, and labour productivity. These aspects 
are detailed in Chapters Six and Seven. Employee numbers were reduced by 19.5% 
between 1980 and 1982, although they increased again in 1983 as car output increased. In 
parallel with this considerable task there was a significant PR programme which 
successfully projected the image of Jaguar as a company with a rejuvenated 
manufacturing operation, that had overcome the dominance of the trade unions, and 
consequent bad work practices, and which had resolved many of the quality issues, and 
thus re-established the image of the Jaguar car as a high quality, reliable product. This is 
examined in Sub-Section 4.3.1 below.
The perception that the quality issue had been resolved was the key element 
in turning around Jaguar’s fortunes, for it was Egan instilling confidence in the JRT Inc’s 
sales team that quality and delivery were no longer problems, that resulted in them in turn
6 John Egan. Interview with the author. October 2007. Appendix p65.
7 Mike Dale Interview with the author. June 2007. Appendix p45.
8 John Egan Interview. Automotive News. 17 May 1982.
9 Automotive Age. October 1985.
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re-motivating the US dealer body, although Egan had considered transferring the US 
distributorship to Lincoln Mercury, as revealed in Section 5.6 below. Here, it is o f  note 
that JRT Inc was an established BL-owned distribution operation that had largely focused 
on MG and Triumph cars, but when these were discontinued was left with only Jaguar to 
sell. This removal o f  the greater part o f  its business, and the quality and delivery 
problems suffered by Jaguar, had de-motivated the sales force and dealers alike.10 Indeed, 
Jaguar in 1980 did not appear to be a worthwhile franchise, its US sales having halved 
between 1976 (which at an annualized 7,384 units were at a near record high) and 1980 
(a year when Jaguar experienced its lowest level o f  US sales since 1954), as can be seen 
from Figure 4.1. The recovery, however, once began was impressive, for whilst the 55% 
increase in US sales in 1981, albeit from the 25-year low suffered in 1980, was 
remarkable, the real breakthrough was achieved in 1982 when Jaguar recorded a 120% 
increase in its US sales, the 10,349 cars sold being a US sales record for Jaguar, and for 
the First time its US sales exceeded those in the UK. Although the US had long been an 
important market for Jaguar, sales there had never previously exceeded 30% o f  total
Figure 4.1: Deliveries to The USA and US Deliveries as % of Total Deliveries,
1970 to 1982.
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worldwide sales." From 1981, however, the pattern of Jaguar's overall sales would be 
determined by US sales, but that also made Jaguar subject to the vagaries of fluctuating 
currency exchange rates to an extent never before experienced.
The extent of Jaguar's recovery is illustrated by the change in the main 
financial and volume measures shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Changes in Main Financial and Volume Measures, 1980 to 1983
Year to 31* December: 1980 1981 1982 1983
Total Retail Sales (units) 15,011 15,562 21,619 29,175
% Change +23% +3.7% +38.9% +35.0%
US Retail Sales (units) 3,029 4,695 10,349 15,815
% Change -19.1% +55.0% +120.4% +52.8%
US Retails as % of Total 20.2% 30.2% 47.8% 54.2%
Total Wholesales (units) 15,469 13,933 21,007 28,467
% Change n/a -9.9% +50.8% +35.5%
US Wholesales (units) 2,518 5,154 9,971 15,260
% Change n/a +104.7% +93.5% +53.0%
US Wholesales as % of Total 16.3% 37.0% 47.5% 53.6%
Production (units ) 13,360 14,677 22,042 28,041
% Change -4.5% +9.8% +50.2% +27.2%
Total No. Employees 
(at year end) 9,725 8,285 7,832 8,606
% Change n/a -14.8% -5.5% +9.8%
Cars produced per 
employee (average 
number for year)
1.4 1.63 2.74 3.41
% Change n/a +16.4% +68.1% +24.5%
Total Revenue (£million) 166.4 195.2 305.6 472.6
% Change n/a +17.3% +56.6% +54.6%
Pre Tax Profit (£million) -473 -31.7 9.6 50.0
% Change n/a +33.0% +1303% +420.8%
Exchange Rate US$=£1 232 2.02 1.75 1.51
% Change n/a -12.9% -13.4% -13.7%
Sources: Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984; Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984;
Datastream; SMMT internal files; Automotive News 100 Year Almanac 1996.
Note: “Wholesales” are those sales made by Jaguar to distributors and dealers, whilst retail sales are those 
made by dealers to the end user. As may be seen, the two sets of figures do not necessarily 
correspond, largely due to timing differences. Jaguar’s reported revenues and profits are derived 
from wholesales.
11 Whyte, Andrew. Jaguar. The definitive history o f a great British car. Second Edition. 
(Wellingborough, 1985). pp241,247.
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The return to profitability in 1982 was particularly noteworthy, as was the 
further advance of profits in 1983. During this time, as may be seen, most of the advance 
in sales came from the USA, where a strong advertising and PR campaign did much to 
overcome the poor quality and reliability image that had become associated with Jaguar 
cars in the late 1970s. With the increased importance of the USA in Jaguar's 
geographical sales mix, the weakness of Sterling became an important factor in the 
company’s profitability.
4.2.2 Halcvon Davs. 1983 to 1987
This period marked the high point of Jaguar’s fortunes under Egan, with sales, and 
profits, reaching new heights, as shown in Table 4.2. Indeed, sales, as measured in terms 
of deliveries, had never previously surpassed the 32,589 units achieved in 1971.12 Key to 
this continual improvement was the US market, which became Jaguar’s main market, 
accounting for more than 50% of total sales over this period, the slight drop in US sales 
in 1987 resulting from supply constraints following the launch of the XJ40 rather than a 
downturn in demand.13 However, and contrary to the view expressed by Whipp et al 
mentioned in Section 1.2 above, the main impetus to increased profits was the 
strengthening of the US Dollar against Sterling, as discussed in Section 8.3.3 below, 
resulting in Jaguar obtaining a greater proportion of its profits from currency movements 
than it did from manufacturing and selling motor vehicles. Indeed, over half Jaguar’s 
peak pre-tax profits, achieved in 1985 and 1986, resulted from movements in the US 
Dollar14, something Jaguar was careful to conceal. In 1985, Jaguar began a currency 
hedging programme which enabled it to protect some of its US Dollar, and other foreign 
currency, revenues when Sterling strengthened again after 1985.15
The period 1983-1987 also witnessed two significant events: the privatization 
of the company in 1984, and the launch of the new saloon, the XJ40, in 1986 (in the UK) 
and 1987 (in the USA), discussed in Section 4.2.3 below.
12 Ibid. p241.
13 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1987. p i7.
14 John Edwards Interview Appendix p52\ Roger Putnam Interview with the author November 2006. 
Appendix pi 18.
15 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p52.
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The success achieved by Jaguar by 1983 gave it a significant financial worth 
which the Thatcher Government seemed anxious to realize in order to reduce BL’s high 
level of debt.16 The revitalized, and now profitable, Jaguar became of acquisitive interest 
to other motor companies such as General Motors and BMW, both of which made 
approaches to the company. These were rebuffed by Egan17, and by a government 
anxious to avoid the political fallout from the sale of a British icon to a foreign 
company.18 Ray Horrocks, the Group Chief Executive of BL Cars, claimed at the time
Table 4.2: Changes in Main Financial and Volume Measures, 1983 to 1987
Year to 31 December: 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total Retail Sales (units) 29,175 33,429 37,732 40,971 46,643
% Change +35.0% +14.6% +12.9% +8.6% +13.8%
US Retail Sales (units) 15,815 18,044 20,528 24,464 22,919
% Change +52.8% +14.1% +13.8% +19.2% -63%
US Retails as % of Total 54.2% 53.9% 54.4% 59.7% 49.1%
Total Wholesales (units) 28,467 32,956 37,952 41,256 49300
% Change +35.5% +15.7% +15.1% +8.7% +193%
US Wholesales (units) 15,260 18,216 20,130 24,901 21,233
% Change +53.0 +193% +10.5% +23.7% -14.7%
US Wholesales as % of Total 53.6% 55.3% 53.0% 60.4% 43.2%
Production (units) 28,041 33,437 38,500 41,437 48,020
% Change +27.2% +19.2% +15.1% +7.6% +15.9%
Total Employees (average 
for year) 8,219 9,516 10,441 11324 12,483
% Change +2.0% +15.8% +9.7% +8.5% +10.2%
Cars produced per 
employee (average 
number for year)
3.41 3.60 3.69 3.66 3.85
% Change +24.5% +5.6% +2.5% -0.8% +5.2%
Total Revenue (£million) 472.6 634.1 746.5 830.4 1,002.1
% Change +54.6% +34.2% +17.7% +11.2% +20.7%
Pre Tax Profit (£million) 50.0 91.5 1213 120.8 97.0
% Change +420.8% +83.0% +32.6% -0.4% -19.7%
Exchange Rate US$=£1 1.51 1.34 130 1.47 1.64
% Change -13.7% -113% -3.0% +13.1% +11.6%
Sources: Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984 to 1987; Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984;
Datastream; SMMT internal files; Automotive News 100 Year Almanac 1996.
16 Underwood, op.cit. p i23.
17 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p52.
18 Underwood, op.cit. p i27.
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that it was the BL board’s decision to divest Jaguar19, but both John Edwards, Jaguar’s 
Finance Director throughout the 1980s, and Hamish Orr-Ewing, Jaguar’s Chairman at the 
time of the privatization, both of whom were closely involved with the flotation, disagree. 
Indeed, both are adamant that it was a government-led decision, but instigated by Egan20, 
who was thought, at least by BL, to be close at the time to Mrs Thatcher, the Prime 
Minister.21
What is fairly certain is that Egan was anxious to break free from the shackles 
of BL, for whom he appeared to have a particular animus22, and to have complete 
independence in running Jaguar.23 Egan’s preferred route to independence was a 
management buy-out, but this was opposed by the BL board.24 In turn, BL’s attempt to 
retain a 25% holding in a privatized Jaguar was blocked by the government, possibly as a 
result of representations by Egan. The successful flotation of the company’s shares on the 
London Stock Exchange in August 1984 raised £297million, all of which benefited BL, 
and indirectly the government. The company, however, was privatized with the 
government retaining a “Golden Share” which limited individual shareholdings in the 
company to 15% in its first five years as a privatized company, thus preventing any 
takeover of Jaguar. But the government’s early release of the “Golden Share” paved the 
way for the Ford take-over, discussed in Sub-Section 4.2.5 below. The implications of 
Jaguar being a quoted company and its relationship with the City is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Nine.
4.2.3 The Defining Moment -  The XJ40 Debacle
In 1986 Jaguar launched the XJ40 saloon, an event which was to determine its future 
existence as an independent motor company, since it was a product that, according to 
Scheele, “nearly brought the company to its knees”.25 Indeed, in the six years to the end
19 “Trade and Industry Select Committee. BL pic. Third Report, together with the proceedings of the 
Committee relating to the Report and the Minutes of Evidence”. Parliamentary Papers. 1983-84. vol 
XL (HC 490). Q74.pl0.
20 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p52; Hamish Orr-Ewing. Interview with the author. November 2002. 
Appendix pi 13.
21 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix p i l l .
22 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix p i08.
23 Underwood, op.cit. pi 22.
24 Ibid. pi 27.
25 Nick Scheele. Interview with the author. May 2007. Appendix pi 30.
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of 1994 Jaguar reported pre-tax losses amounting to a total of £735.2million, even after 
considerable capital had been injected into the company by Ford from 1990 onwards.26 
As discussed in Section 7.7 below, the much-heralded new car suffered from appalling 
quality defects, largely as a result of engineering design faults but exacerbated by 
problems in manufacturing, these being aspects that were not recognized or challenged 
by Egan, largely due to his own shortcomings, which were later to be acknowledged by 
him27, and which are discussed in Sub-Section 4.3.3 below. The problems with the XJ40 
had a severe impact on Jaguar's profitability, resulting both from lower US sales volumes 
and from significantly higher warranty costs.
4.2.4 Reversal of Fortune. 1987 to 1989
In this period, Jaguar's revenues were adversely affected by lower sales, particularly in 
the US, as a result of the XJ40's quality problems and the strengthening of Sterling, while 
profits were diluted as a result of lower revenues and higher costs, discussed in Section
8.4 below. In 1989 Jaguar produced a pre-tax loss of £58.3million, as is shown in Table 
4.3.
But it was not until late 1988, when the potential loss situation in 1989 
became apparent, that Jaguar appreciated the urgency of addressing its cost base, and put 
in train a cost reduction programme aimed at reducing its costs by £50million in 1989, 
and some 5% per annum thereafter. Such was the strength of the illusion created by 
Jaguar, and its ability to mask its problem areas, that Jaguar's explanations of its sales 
and profits downturn at this time being due to the overall decline in US demand for 
luxury cars and the strength of Sterling were accepted, seemingly without question, by 
many media and City commentators.28
26 Jaguar Annual Reports 1989-1994.
27 Andrew Lorenz. Interview with the author. August 2007. Appendix p i04.
28 For example: The Independent 27 August 1988; Financial Times 27 August 1988; Financial Times
7 January 1989; Financial Weekly 12 January 1989; The Engineer 2 February 1989; Barclays de Zoete 
Wedd Investment Circular 23 March 1988; County NatWest Woodmac Investment Circular 17 March 
1989.
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4.2.5 The Ford Takeover
After 1987 it became apparent that Egan would have to overcome his obduracy in regard 
to Jaguar retaining its independence, Egan at that time starting to realize that Jaguar did 
not have the resources, and could not generate sufficient cash, to remain a totally 
independent car company. Even so, he was not prepared to completely change his stance
Table 43: Changes in Main Financial and Volume Measures, 1987 to 1990
Year to 31st December: 1987 1988 1989 1990
Total Retail Sales (units) 46,643 49,494 46,600 42,000
% Change +13.8% +6.1% -5.8% -9.9%
US Retail Sales (units) 22,919 20,727 18,967 18,728
% Change -63% -9.6% -8.5% -13%
US Retails as % of Total 49.1% 41.9% 40.7% 44.6%
Total Wholesales (units) 49,200 50,603 47,668 41,985
% Change +19.3% +2.9% -5.8% -11.9%
US Wholesales (units) 21,233 20,787 n/a n/a
% Change -14.7% -2.1% n/a n/a
US Wholesales as % of Total 43.2% 41.1% n/a n/a
Production (units) 48,020 51,937 48,937 41,883
% Change +15.9% +8.1% -5.8% -14.4%
Total Employees (Average for 
year) 12,483 12,835 12,385 12,259
% Change +10.2% +2.8% -3.5% -1.0%
Cars produced per employee 
(Average number for year) 3.85 4.05 3.89 3.42
% Change +5.2% +5.2% -4.0% -12.1%
Total Revenue (£million) 1,002.1 1,075.5 1,139.7 1,016.1
% Change +20.7% +73% +6.0% -10.8%
Pre Tax Profit (imillion) 97.0 47.5 -583 -66.2
% Change -19.7% -51.0% -222.7% -13.6%
Exchange Rate US$=£1 1.64 1.78 1.64 1.77
% Change +11.6% +8.5% -7.9% +7.9%
Sources: Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1987 to 1990; Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984;
Datastream; SMMT internal files; Automotive News 100 Year Almanac 1996.
in this regard since retaining some degree of independence remained important to him.29 
This view was confirmed by Blythe, who recounted that Egan had been “robust in his 
wanting to be independent and, therefore, when he got continued approaches from Ford 
he simply said he wouldn’t talk about it”30, whilst Orr-Ewing opined that Egan “sincerely
29 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p54.
30 Bruce Blythe Interview. Appendix p21.
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believed that Jaguar would be able to remain indefinitely an independent company”.31 
Thus in 1988 he started looking “at whether there was some kind of relationship with an 
excellent car company that we could control”.32 Egan's ideal was to develop a 
relationship with Toyota, but when that company showed no interest, Egan started talking 
to General Motors because its decentralized management structure would have allowed 
him to retain some degree of independence.33 Edwards relates that the deal would have 
entailed Jaguar having a Rights Issue, with General Motors buying the issue, perhaps 
40% of the enhanced total issued share capital, with the rest remaining in general issue34, 
the money raised being used to develop a new model.35 However, according to Edwards, 
“the General Motors deal would have been a disaster for the [Jaguar] shareholders”36 
because it was essentially giving General Motors the company for 40% of its increased 
value, a move that would not be maximizing shareholder value.37
In 1988 the Ford Motor Company had approached Jaguar with a view to 
acquiring it, but had been rebuffed by Egan38 who appeared to have an especial animosity 
towards Ford, Edwards quoting him as saying “I hate the Ford Motor Company”.39 
However, when Ford discovered that Jaguar was having talks with General Motors in the 
Summer of 1989 they again targeted the company, after Petersen, the Chairman of Ford, 
had publicly declared his interest in acquiring Jaguar in an interview with the Chicago 
Tribune in June 1989.40 Ford had been interested only in an agreed deal41, but the spectre 
of General Motors acquiring Jaguar provided the impetus for Ford to make a hostile bid 
for the company.42 Ford’s purchase of 15% of Jaguar’s shares in the stock market in 
October 1989, and the government’s suspension of the Golden Share, left Egan,
31 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 12.
32 John Egan Interview. Appendix p75.
33 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p54; Bruce Blythe Interview. Appendix p24.
34 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p54.
35 John Egan Interview. Appendix p69.
36 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p56.
37 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p54.
38 Alex Trotman. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix pi 38.
39 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p54.
40 Cited in Financial Weekly. 1 June 1989.
41 Alex Trotman Interview. Appendix p i38.
42 Bruce Blythe Interview. Appendix p24; John Grant. Interview with the author. January 1993. 
Appendix pi 00.
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pressurized also into doing so by his Finance Director43, with no option but to enter into 
acquisition talks with Ford. Undoubtedly, the suspension of the Golden Share sent a 
strong signal to Egan that he no longer enjoyed the government’s support, but also 
demonstrated the power enjoyed by Ford at that time, with both Edwards and Putnam 
opining that a deal had been agreed between Mrs Thatcher and the Chairman of Ford.44 
Certainly, it is inconceivable that Ford would not have consulted with the government 
beforehand given that its attempt in 1986 to take over Austin Rover collapsed under the 
weight of Conservative backbench opposition. Ford had been considerably put out by this 
rebuff, Trotman recounting that, “we were upset, very upset, and let her [Mrs Thatcher] 
know that”, adding that Ford made it clear to Mrs Thatcher that, as the oldest auto 
company in Britain, the largest manufacturer in Britain, the biggest employer, and the 
biggest investor, it did not deserve to be treated with such disdain.43
Indeed, Putnam expanding on this view, stated that:
Ford were powerful enough to pull the Golden Share. There is no doubt they 
leaned on Maggie [Mrs Thatcher], and Ridley [Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, 1989 to 1990], and that was the beginning of the end. 1 was actually in 
John’s office, just the two of us, when John got the call from Ridley that they’d 
pulled the Golden Share. I think you’ll find that the potential closure of 
Dagenham, reduction in Ford investment in the UK, were all wrapped up in this. 
Again, having spent four years as Chairman of Ford of Britain 1 know the way 
those things work.46
John Grant, who played a central role in the events leading up to the 
acquisition, confirmed that the Ford purchase of Jaguar was driven by emotion47, 
although it was held out to be a rational business decision. This enabled Egan to drive a 
hard bargain, Ford paying £1.6billion for Jaguar, of which some £1.1 billion was for 
goodwill.48 With the benefit of hindsight, Scheele was to comment that, “Ford bought 
Jaguar almost sight unseen, and what we bought was a can of worms, with no new
43 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p54.
44 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p55; Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i25.
45 Alex Trotman Interview. Appendix p i43.
46 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i25.
47 John Grant Interview. Appendix p i00.
48 Sunday Times 27 October 1991; Evening Standard 2 December 1991.
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models in the sausage machine. We paid too much for it. A frigging fortune!”49 Egan 
received considerable acclaim in the media for negotiating such a favourable deal for his 
shareholders, but Lorenz believes additionally that the reason he was able to get such a 
high price for the company was that “he didn’t want to do the deal with Ford. He really 
didn’t want to sell the company. He believed the government would support him”.50
4.3 Management in the Egan Era
The success or otherwise of an enterprise is usually attributed to the abilities of its 
management, and it is germane, therefore, to explore the management of Jaguar as 
practiced by Egan, and the issues relating to that. The term “Management” has been 
variously defined, the simplest definition being that of Follett, who described it as being 
“the art of getting things done by people”, and may be conveniently evaluated in terms of 
five functions undertaken by management.51 These are usually considered to be the 
planning, leading, organizing, co-coordinating, and controlling of the activities of the 
organization. Each of these is drawn on as appropriate when exploring the nature and 
effectiveness of management under Egan in the following five main sub-sections, 
reviewing the nature of management under Egan, the continued influence of Lyons, the 
issue of corporate governance, the importance of the PR effort, and strategy and strategic 
issues.
4.3.1 The Nature of Management under Egan
As revealed in Sub-Section 4.2.1 above, one of Egan’s first tasks when he arrived at 
Jaguar was to build a new senior management team. Two functional departments were 
already in place, and the heads of both, Mike Beasley, the Head of Manufacturing, who 
had rejoined Jaguar, from BL, in 197952, and Jim Randle, the Head of Vehicle 
Engineering, having joined Jaguar from Rover in 196553, became part of the Egan team. 
David Fielden, who had spent his entire career with Jaguar Cars was appointed Quality 
Director, and Patrick Audrain, who had joined Jaguar Cars in 1975, was appointed
49 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i37.
50 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix p i04.
51 Boddy, David. Management An Introduction. Third Edition. (Harlow, 2005). pp37-68.
52 Mike Beasley. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix p4.
53 Whyte, op.cit. p i77.
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Purchasing Director.54 Others were recruited externally. John Edwards, who had been 
Egan’s Financial Controller at Massey Ferguson, joined as Head of Finance, and 
recruited from BL were Neil Johnson (as Sales and Marketing Director), and Kenneth 
Edwards (as Personnel Director and Company Secretary). Also recruited from BL at this 
time was David Boole who, as Communications and Public Affairs Director, was to play 
a pivotal role in the company’s affairs over the next decade, as demonstrated in Sub- 
Section 4.3.4 below, although he was not appointed to the Jaguar Cars board until after 
privatization in 1984. According to Roger Putnam, also recruited into Sales and 
Marketing, Neil Johnson was imposed on Egan by BL, Egan having recruited Putnam, 
from Lotus Cars, for the position of Sales and Marketing Director, a job which was then 
taken by Johnson.55 These, along with Graham Whitehead, the Head of North America 
and a long-time BL employee, and Bob Dover, who joined Jaguar from Rover Group in 
1986 as Manufacturing Director when Mike Beasley was promoted to Assistant 
Managing Director, formed the Executive Committee. Despite the importance placed by 
Egan on university education56, of the members of the Executive Committee only Egan 
and Edwards held university degrees, which was not surprising given BL’s 
“unwillingness to employ graduates”57, although some of them had professional 
qualifications.
Recruiting executives externally at this time was undoubtedly not an easy 
task given that Jaguar had a very uncertain future, with, as Edwards put it, “Michael 
Edwardes chopping everything out left, right, and centre”.58 Underwood applauded 
Egan’s skill in “bringing together senior managers from outside the company and 
seasoned executives who had first-hand experience of how Jaguar worked”59, and Egan 
was to describe this team as “very capable”.60 However, few of those interviewed for this 
study seemed to agree with these sentiments, albeit with the benefit of hindsight. Grant,
54 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984. p9.
55 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix pi 17.
56 John Egan Interview. Appendix p67.
57 Foreman-Peck, James, Bowden, Sue, and McKinlay, Alan. The British Motor Industry. 
(Manchester, 1995). pi 86.
58 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p48.
59 Underwood, op.cit. p70.
60 John Egan Interview. Appendix p66.
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who effectively took control of the team shortly after Ford’s acquisition of the company, 
judged the management to be “really poor”, and was shocked to find that:
There was no management system. There was the company, which by automotive 
company standards was a small, one would hope cohesive, centrally located, all in 
the same area, fairly simple company. Two products, all English speaking people, 
all based within a radius of about five miles of one another. It should have been a 
very cohesive management team, but it just wasn’t. It was very divided. There had 
been very poor direction of it. There were all kinds of factions within the 
company, and there was no mechanism for bringing those factions together.61
This view is echoed by others who were directly and indirectly involved with 
the management. Nick Scheele, who took control of Jaguar in 1992, commented that 
“Jaguar had lots of fiefdoms”, with the problems at the engineering/manufacturing 
interface being the result of “the Jim Randle empire against the Mike Beasley empire. 
I’ve heard from lots of people that they were hammer and tongs at each other”.62 Scheele 
also commented on the existence of the “total antipathy between Browns Lane and the 
States” stating that “It was total, it was almost total, warfare”63, a claim that was 
supported by Mike Dale, who described the relationship as “hostile”64, and also by Roger 
Putnam.65
It can be argued that such problems were the product of three inter-related 
factors. These may be seen as being the quality of the team and its individual members 
(that is, the experience, abilities, and professionalism of the team overall, and of its 
individual members), the direction, or leadership, given to the team, and the attitude of 
the team and the team members. These factors are examined in the following three sub­
sections.
4.3.1.1 The Quality of the Management Team
Hamish Orr-Ewing, Jaguar’s non-executive Chairman at the time of privatization, and the 
executive Chairman of Rank Xerox since 1979, had been particularly unimpressed with
61 John Grant Interview. Appendix p85.
62 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i35.
63 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i36.
64 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p32.
65 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix pi 17.
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Egan’s management team, remarking that, “By the standards that I was used to in Xerox 
they were very ordinary people”.66 Dale described the Jaguar management team as 
“inexperienced” and “incompetent”67, citing management inability as his reason for 
opposing the proposed Jaguar takeover of Land Rover in 198768, while Martin Bennett, a 
leading US Jaguar dealer, commented that at the time of the XJ40 launch, “The company 
was an absolute bloody shambles”.69 Blythe believed that one of Egan’s main problems 
was that “he just didn’t have the depth of talent to be able to implement his wishes”.70 
Indeed, certain members of the team were prepared, with hindsight, to admit their 
shortcomings, Edwards citing his own lack of experience as a finance director71, and 
Beasley confessing to management’s naivety, failing to understand “the full magnitude of 
some of the things we were doing”72, and lacking in “process disciplines, know-how, and 
management skills”.73 Dale in retrospect appreciated that, “the company just didn’t have 
the resources, but neither did we, from John [Egan] downwards, understand that we 
didn’t have them because none of us had ever been in a car company before, not a real 
one anyway”.74 Scheele added that the Jaguar management “never kept pace with the 
massive changes that had happened in the 1980s when, really, western manufacturers 
started to wake up to modem quality control methodology”.75
Jim Randle, in retrospect, was seen to have been lacking the skills and 
experience to have undertaken the role of head of vehicle engineering, Edwards 
perceiving him as being “a very clever man, but not much of a practical engineer”.76 Orr- 
Ewing, who as Light Car Planning Manager at Ford in the early 1960s had headed the 
Cortina project team, saw Randle as “a very good conceptual engineer, but not 
particularly good at getting things done”, adding that “1 always felt that the spring was
66 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 14.
67 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p33.
68 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p42.
69 Martin Bennett. Interview with die author. July 2008. Appendix p i4.
70 Bruce Blythe Interview. Appendix p20.
71 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p49.
72 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix plO.
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75 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i32.
76 John Edwards. Telephone conversation with the author. 5 December 2006. Appendix p53 n73.
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only half wound out”.77 Mike Dale, echoing this sentiment, pointed out that much of the 
problem concerning the launch of the XJ40 was that Randle “had no training in 
producing a car for production”.78 Edwards supported this view, noting that, “at that point 
in time [1986] we’d not launched a new car for fifteen/twenty years. So it was a lack of 
experience, and none of us realising it at the time”.79 Inexperience was a particular 
problem for Egan himself for, apart from anything else, he had, as Scheele opined, no 
comparisons, no experience of similar situations.80
Even so, in two particular areas Jaguar’s management proved to be extremely 
competent and achieved considerable success. These were in the spheres of public 
relations, where David Boole undoubtedly achieved a great deal, as discussed in Sub- 
Section 4.3.5 below and in various places in the following chapters, and in distribution 
and dealer relationships, discussed in Sub-Section 5.6.2 and Section 5.7 below, where, 
according to Grant, Jaguar did an outstanding job on improving the quality of its 
distribution network, particularly in the USA.81
But information systems were deficient, John Grant relating:
By the time we [Ford] got there the accounting was actually in reasonably good 
shape. The technical book-keeping was in good shape. The control over costs was 
not, the planning of costs was absolutely not, the ability to control the costs of the 
new model programme was nonexistent. In fact, the ability to control anything on 
the new model programme was virtually nonexistent whether it was cost, or
investment, or timing, or content, or achievement of objectives, or whatever I
think that probably costs had got out of control.82
Scheele, supported this view, noting that although Ford were still producing 
the Series III up to 1992 for the US market, “We [Ford] didn’t really know what the 
Series III manufacturing costs were....It was pretty clear that they were horribly 
expensive”, and added that “the XJ-S was fundamentally an early 1950s design, stretched 
and stretched, it had manufacturing inefficiencies coming out of its ears, but we didn’t
77 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 14.
78 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p34.
79 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p59.
80 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i32.
81 John Grant Interview. Appendix p94.
82 John Grant Interview. Appendix p95.
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know their cost. There were no systems integrations -  none of that started until 1992”.83 
Moreover, Jaguar appeared to have had little understanding of the nature and extent of 
the quality issue, and the consequent warranty problem, Beasley admitting that, “We 
didn’t have the data to know. That’s the worrying thing now, looking back with the 
benefit of wonderful hindsight. We had a warranty system which was designed to pay the 
money, not designed to give you data on what the issues were”.84 The lack of analytical 
ability was fairly widespread in Jaguar, and may be seen as evidence of a lack of 
professionalism, Grant relating that:
They didn’t have an attitude that was receptive to analysing things. When we got 
there, there was a lot of opinion being expressed by management but virtually no 
analysis to back up the opinion. When the analysis was asked for and 
subsequently delivered fifty per cent of the time the opinions were dead wrong.85
Dale recounted how challenges by Bill Hayden, the Ford Vice President who 
was appointed to head Jaguar in 1990, would expose management’s weaknesses:
[David Boole] would make the kind of statement that BL would make. You know, 
‘Well, customer satisfaction is much easier to achieve when you sell lower-priced 
cars’. I remember Bill saying ‘What data do you have to prove that?’, and David 
was stumbling all over the place.86
Lorenz, echoing Blythe’s view stated above, believed that Egan did not have 
the right team87, but, as suggested in Chapter Three, Egan, who for his first four years at 
Jaguar was part of, and subject to, the broader BL organizational structure, appears to 
have seen nothing wrong with Jaguar’s management institutions when he arrived at the 
company. In part this was likely to have been the result of his own shortcomings, for as 
Edwards was to observe “He [Egan] was deficient in engineering and manufacturing 
experience”88, something that Egan post the Ford takeover was to admit to Lorenz, when 
in relation to the problems at Jaguar that had become apparent he confessed that, “It
83 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i36.
84 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p7.
85 John Grant Interview. Appendix p95.
86 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p47.
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wasn't my fault. I knew so little about manufacturing”.89 As a result, ingrained attitudes 
not only persisted in the company, particularly at lower shop floor management levels 
hardly touched by the BL restructuring, but were reinforced by the recruitment of 
managers from BL.
As indicated above, with the exception of Egan, Edwards, and Putnam, all the 
members of the senior management team were long term Jaguar or BL employees, and 
had little reason to modify their behaviour or existing structures. Egan appeared to be 
happy with the senior management team, with the exception of Randle following the 
revelation of the problems with the XJ40. Unlike Iacocca, with whom Egan was 
frequently compared, who had fired thirty-three of his thirty-five senior managers in his 
first three years at Chrysler90, Egan's team remained in place throughout his tenure, the 
exception being Neil Johnson who left in 1986 to rejoin the army.91 However, Edwards 
relates that Egan had sought to replace Randle, but had not been able to do so.92 Ford 
seemed less impressed with Egan's senior management team, half of whom, including 
Randle, had been fired by the time Scheele arrived at Jaguar at the beginning of 1992.
The cultural inflexibility evident in the senior management structure was 
apparent also in other management structures within Jaguar, particularly at the factory 
level, which Ainsworth described as being “dysfunctional”93, resulting in poor discipline, 
deficiencies in manufacturing systems, and the continuance of outmoded work practices.
4.3.1.2 Leadership of the Management Team
As mentioned earlier, leadership is seen as an important function of management, but 
effective leadership requires the ability to co-ordinate, control, and organize the activities 
of the organization. Success here, it may in turn be argued, depends on the leader’s 
knowledge, skills, and experience, and the information made available to him by his team 
and their subordinates. Egan’s charismatic personality also played an important part, as is 
discussed in the following sub-sections.
89 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix p i04.
90 Iacocca, Lee. Iococca. An Autobiography. (New York, 1984). pi 56.
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Egan was appointed on the basis of his track record as a manager of 
businesses in general, as was the case with Edwardes’ appointment at BL, rather than on, 
as was the case with the appointment of Iacocca at Chrysler, a reputation built up in the 
motor industry. However, as noted in the previous section, Egan knew little about 
manufacturing, let alone motor manufacturing, knew nothing about vehicle engineering 
and, according to Orr-Ewing, “was not particularly well-informed on the motor 
industry”.94 Such deficiencies put him at a considerable disadvantage, for consequently, 
according to Blythe, Egan might have been aware of problems, but “was less able to 
figure out how to fix them. I think he could get on the backs of his operating executives 
and say ‘By God Joe you’ve got to fix this; Ian, you can’t let that go on’ as opposed to 
saying ‘Ian, here’s exactly what I want you to do to fix this problem’”.95 Exacerbating 
this situation, according to Lorenz, was that Egan “didn’t know his own limitations”, 
something that Egan later admitted.96 The corollary to this was that Egan appeared not to 
know the limitations of his subordinates, especially Randle, and was not in a position, 
therefore, to take appropriate action. Consequently, he had no option but to trust his 
management team, and felt let down, by Randle in particular, when the extent of the 
problems became known.97
Putnam indicated that there were three problems in regard to engineering. 
First, Randle ran the engineering function as a fiefdom, and “there wasn’t quite the 
process and discipline in place to make sure that engineering were doing what they 
should have been doing”.98 Here, Egan observed that he thought Randle did not listen 
“very carefully to the feedback from all the testing we did on XJ40”99, and Bennett 
reported that Randle “would never discuss the problems with the car”.100 Second, 
according to Putnam, Randle used to talk “gobbledegook engineering”, tying Egan up in 
knots, and Egan just “didn’t know enough about engineering to actually take him 
[Randle] on”.101 An example of this was related by Scheele in regard to the problem of the
94 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 12.
95 Bruce Blythe Interview. Appendix p22.
96 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix p i04.
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XJ40 windscreen wiper mechanism lifting off the windscreen at higher speed, Randle 
attributing this to “ionization” of the windshield, an explanation that Scheele regarded as 
“a load of old codswallop!”102 It was, in fact, a problem that resulted from having a single 
windscreen wiper, and was solved by introducing two wipers. Finally, Egan, according to 
Putnam, was in awe of Randle's reputation with the motoring journalists, and was afraid 
that Randle's credibility was such that his leaving would damage Jaguar's image.103 That 
there was such concern is hardly surprising given Egan's focus on PR, but, as Putnam 
wryly remarked, “Ford got rid of Jim without a whimper”.104
There was a similar problem with the manufacturing operation, Egan 
apparently failing to appreciate the problems of Jaguar's antiquated plant, and the poor 
manufacturing systems and discipline, discussed in Sub-Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 below. 
This was confirmed by Egan's reaction to the “Transition Report” prepared by a team of 
both Ford and Jaguar personnel following the Ford takeover, Grant recounting that:
It was incredibly damning. In the space of sixty days an awful lot of warts were 
uncovered. John Egan had a very hard time accepting that report and was 
eventually persuaded by his people that he had no option. It was factual. He 
thought it was exaggerated, inflated. He couldn't accept it at all. He was forced to 
roll over because he had no one to fight his battle for him; all the Jaguar people 
accepted it.105
Apart from his own lack of experience, much of Egan’s problem with 
engineering and manufacturing stemmed from the fact that he allowed them to operate as 
fiefdoms, as mentioned above, with a number of the problems of the XJ40 being 
attributed by Scheele to the fact that “engineering didn’t talk to manufacturing, and vice 
versa”.106 Dale went further than this, stressing the need for “sales and marketing, 
engineering, manufacturing, and quality and styling all working together”, something 
which was not happening under Egan.107 This is evidence of the deficiencies of the Egan
102 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i32.
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management in that there was little effective co-ordination and control of the company’s 
activities.
Finally, it is debatable as to how aware Egan was of the issues that impacted 
adversely on the company. Certainly, Egan had the tendency, as related by both Dale and 
Bennett, to refuse to accept unpalatable facts, such as the problems in the US with the 
XJ40, until he had no other alternative, but undoubtedly he often had information 
concealed from him, perhaps as a result of managers trying to protect their own positions. 
Randle appears to have suffered from this syndrome, and, Egan came to accept, as 
revealed by Underwood108, how he had not always been given an accurate picture of what 
had been achieved by his (Egan’s) much-vaunted Quality Circles. Dale believes that the 
reasons that Egan had not been fully informed of the XJ40 quality problems when 
launched in the UK were because, “There was an arrogance about the UK Board which 
may have blinded them, but I don’t think there was anyone in the senior management 
who had the data, or the courage, to tell John even if they knew”.109 Egan does not 
dismiss such views, accepting that, “Maybe people were making cooing noises to me. 
Maybe people weren’t used to telling the absolute truth”.110
4.3.1.3 The Problem of Management Arrogance
It is very apparent that a major problem that developed during the Egan era was that the 
Jaguar management, as a whole, and in terms of its individual members, became 
increasingly arrogant, in the sense of being “unduly or overbearingly confident”111, as a 
result of Jaguar’s rapid and spectacular recovery in the period 1980 to 1983. Edwards 
described the ambience of that time thus:
In 1982 we started to make quite a lot of money, and in 1983 we made a sackful 
because the exchange rate was piling in at the same time and we moved US 
volume from 2,500 in 1980 to 15,000. This was heroic stuff. We were very
pragmatic, quite young but we all thought ‘Bloody Hell!’ We started to believe
our own bullshit in the mid-1980s We thought we were the best marketing
people in the world, the best manufacturing people, the best engineers We
108 Underwood, op.cit. p204.
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were getting fame and worldwide recognition beyond our abilities, and beyond 
what we really deserved.112
The success achieved at this time undoubtedly reinforced managerial 
behaviour, and was manifested in an arrogance that was noted by a number of different 
observers. Bennett commented that, “Randle was particularly arrogant when it came to 
that car [the XJ40]”113, and Blythe was critical of David Boole’s attitude when dealing 
with City analysts, describing his demeanour as “almost an arrogance that had built up 
because of the success of the company in the last few years”.114 The problem was that 
arrogance led to complacency, and an unwillingness to consider alternative views, and, 
therefore, to inappropriate, or incorrect, action or inaction. As stated earlier, Grant found 
that the Jaguar management did not have an attitude that was receptive to analysing 
things, and Blythe had found that running throughout the company “was an almost 
unbelievable lack of knowledge of the competitive world”, and, as a result, “Because 
sales had grown from what they were in 1982/83 to what they were in 1988/89 how could 
you then convince them that they were ropey?”115 Bennett recalled that when the US 
dealers attempted to inform Jaguar of the faults with the XJ40, “Jaguar didn’t want to 
listen. It was a mixture of contempt and indifference”.116
Grant gave greater illustration to this problem with the example of the ill- 
fated XJ41 sports car, whose development was cancelled by Ford. Eighteen months after 
taking over Jaguar, Ford had a post-mortem on the XJ41, because:
we were examining the processes of how we developed new products and how do 
we make sure we don’t do the things that Jaguar had done with the XJ41 in terms 
of the factions, in terms of a lot of people in the company knowing it was going in 
the wrong direction, but yet the management continued down that direction, 
apparently blinded. Was information getting fed up to the management, and if it 
was getting fed through then why weren’t the management responding to it?117
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This investigation revealed:
that the information had been fed through to the board of directors, at least to the 
executive group, that they were being told at regular intervals that the objectives 
that were being set could not be met; that there were not resources in place to 
achieve those objectives; that the project was impossible. But the message was 
basically ‘Go away and try harder!’ They were being told by the guy who was 
running the project that he couldn’t deliver it. They were being told that. There 
were no secrets. We saw the reports that had been presented that said it can’t be 
done, that we’re missing all the targets, and here’s the reasons why. And yet they 
carried on blindfold, jettisoning other products, like the long wheel base XJ40, to 
support this product which they were told was a no-hoper.118
One consequence of this, according to Grant, is that Jaguar “were certainly 
representing things to the City about this product that they were being told at the same 
time could not be done”.119
However, Egan also seemed unwilling to listen, especially in regard to the 
problems of the XJ40, as related by both Dale120 and Bennett121, and had developed a 
considerable reputation for arrogance by the time of Jaguar’s privatization, and 
afterwards, being referred to as John “Ego” by the likes of Hayden122 and Bennett123, and 
“the Hitler of the motor industry” by a leading journalist of the time.124 Dale saw “ego” as 
a necessary attribute in leadership, but added the caveat that, “controlling your ego is 
what matters”. Here, Dale saw the essential problem being that, “John couldn’t control 
his ego”.125
But one area where Egan’s personal charisma and leadership qualities did not 
have a great impact and where his ego was constantly dented was in relation to the 
workforce, as was obvious from the start. Certainly, Egan failed to appreciate that the 
entrenched beliefs and attitudes could not be modified by means of personality alone, and 
his failure to modify these did not make for a harmonious relationship with the
118 John Grant Interview. Appendix p98.
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workforce, a topic that is examined in Section 6.7 below. This is something that was quite 
apparent to others, Jake Weidinger, one of Jaguar’s largest US dealers, recalling that:
We used to watch him when he was around on the assembly line and speaking to 
the union people. He’d got a nasty streak about him. His demeanor changed 
completely. He did not like his workforce.126
Both Dale, and Edwards, Egan’s closest lieutenant, agree that there was a
change in Egan’s manner in the mid 1980s. In Dale’s view:
it was John who energized Jaguar in a way no one at BL was capable of doing, 
and he had the courage to take the company away from BL. For a time he was an 
excellent leader but within a couple of years he came to believe in the press 
clippings and thought himself omnipotent.127
Edwards, supporting this view, opined that, “If it hadn’t been for him it
[Jaguar] would have gone under. He personally saved the company”128, a sentiment
echoed by Blythe who, as noted in Section 4.1 above, hailed Egan’s performance at that 
time as being “heroic”. Edwards believed that, “John, in the years between 1980 and 
1984, was absolutely head and shoulders above everybody else. He knew exactly what he 
was doing. Dynamic, energetic, a fantastic leader of men. People thought he walked on 
water because he was that good at that time”.129 However, Edwards then saw the issue as 
evolving into that of “John thought he could do anything. This was really a chap walking 
on water!”130 so that, “by the mid-1980s he started to believe his own bullshit, and that’s 
when, in my view, things went a bit wrong, and he didn’t know what to do”.131 Orr-Ewing 
saw the problem as emanating from a combination of Egan’s arrogance and his ignorance 
of Jaguar’s manufacturing capability, particularly in the era of rapid technological 
progress:
I don’t think Egan had realised how woefully lacking they [Jaguar] were in 
capacity to build that sort of thing [technologically advanced vehicles]. I don’t
126 Jake Weidinger. Interview with the author. May 2008. Appendix pp 147-8.
127 Mike Dale, e-mail to the author. 7th August 2007. Appendix p44n51.
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think he had the analytical capacity to coldly and quietly assess the situation in the 
company which he was in. 1 believe his ego was such as to believe that all that 
was detail, and that with his ability anything could be achieved, which is 
admirable in some respects, but not when you're in a company like Jaguar which 
really was on its knees.132
Such issues are discussed in the sections that follow, but perhaps the final 
word on the subject was provided by Lorenz when he somewhat drolly observed that, 
uJohn Egan was by no means the first or the last egomaniac to run a company down the 
tubes.”133
4.3.2 Egan as Heir to William Lyons
From the time he joined Jaguar in 1980 to when Lyons died in 1985, Egan appeared to 
have developed a close relationship with the founder of the company, and looked to him 
as a role model, adopting much of Lyons' managerial outlooks and behaviour. Edwards 
thought that the relationship between the two men “was spiritual almost” with Lyons 
treating Egan like the son he no longer had.134 Lorenz believed that Egan saw himself as 
being another Sir William Lyons, and that he presented himself as such.135 Porter notes 
that Egan consulted Lyons and “genuinely sought his advice”136, but, of course, this was 
before Jaguar suffered its XJ40-originating problems, Lyons passing away in February 
1985. Whether Lyons’ advice included guidance on how to manage the Jaguar operation 
is not recorded, but it is likely that Egan was influenced by Lyons’ own values and 
attitudes, and adopted at least certain aspects of these.
Egan appears to have set out to emulate Lyons in a number of ways. Thus the 
Quality Circles (see Section 6.9 below) set up by Egan in an attempt to solve quality 
problems, were little different from the Joint Production Committee set up by Lyons, 
discussed in Section 3.5 above. Moreover, Egan started taking cars home at night, 
bringing them back the next day, reporting on their faults, something that Lyons had done
132 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 15.
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when running the company.137 Again, echoing Lyons’ similar paternalistic initiatives, 
described in Section 3.4 above, Egan instituted social events to which employees’ 
families were invited and gave employees the opportunity to participate in the launch of 
the XJ40.138 These were fairly sound, common sense, measures, which had beneficial 
effects, although just as with the Lyons initiatives they did not succeed in routing 
employee institutions away from trades union influence or control. Ainsworth, for 
example, believed that Egan saw Quality Circles as “a way of circumventing the 
unions”.139 Moreover, Quality Circles offered more in terms of PR value than in providing 
help with quality issues. However, Egan’s emulation of Lyons’ walks around the factory 
tended to be resented by the workforce and had a negative effect on them, for, as 
Ainsworth explained, “Egan didn’t know what he was talking about with regard to
cars With Egan it was all PR. He used to walk around the factory, showing himself,
playing at being Chairman”.140
However, there were other aspects that were also to have quite negative 
consequences. Egan, like Lyons, exhibited a highly proprietorial attitude to Jaguar, Orr- 
Ewing opining that Egan believed that, “Jaguar was his property. Absolutely. Totally”.141 
Undoubtedly this was a major reason for Egan organizing a coup d ’etat against the Jaguar 
Chairman shortly after privatization, although there were other issues, particularly that of 
freeing Jaguar from what was seen as being the remaining shackles of BL.142 Thus Egan, 
like Lyons, and in the traditions of BL, described in Section 1.5 above, became both 
Chairman and Chief Executive. Edwards was to agree that such a dual role was frowned 
upon by the City at the time, but was dismissive of any such criticism since “at that time 
we couldn’t do anything wrong, could we?”143 This and other aspects of corporate 
governance relating to the direction of the company are discussed in Sub-Section 4.3.3 
below.
137 Thorley, Nigel. Jaguar in Coventry. Building the Legend. (Derby, 2002) pi 36.
138 Underwood, op.cit. p82.
139 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p3.
140 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p i .
141 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 14.
142 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pl09; John Egan Interview. Appendix p67; George Magan. 
Interview with the Author. January 2004. Appendix p i06.
143 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p58.
130
It is of note that in getting rid of Orr-Ewing as Chairman, Egan appeared to 
be depriving himself of the benefit of the counsel of someone with considerable motor 
industry experience, something which he obviously felt he did not require given that he 
did not recruit anyone of a similar ilk into a senior position in Jaguar, or onto the Jaguar 
main board. Henceforth, there would be nobody within the company who would be able 
to challenge his actions, a scheme that, somewhat incongruously, given his animus 
towards BL, imitated the BL tradition of personal control described by Whisler.144
More significant was Egan’s steadfast refusal to recognize the requirement to 
raise funds through an Equity Rights Issue. Whilst the desire to keep control had dictated 
Lyons’ refusal to undertake Rights Issues, as noted in Section 3.3 above, it is more 
difficult to understand Egan’s reasoning since he held relatively few shares in the 
company, and there was no question of his losing control through his holding being 
diluted. It is questionable, therefore, as to whether Egan was influenced in his attitude 
here by what Lyons had done, or not done, because Jaguar, unlike at the time when 
Lyons ran the company, did need considerable funding. Here, Orr-Ewing provided the 
following analysis:
Up to the late 1960s a motor car was sufficiently straightforward that a small 
company dominated by a very industrious and ingenious man, backed by some 
first class first line reporting, was perfectly capable of holding its own in the 
marketplace. Development costs were not that high. Jaguar was able to generate
enough cash during that period to pay for its own development  Where
Jaguar ran into trouble was when the era of electronics appeared and suddenly a 
new world opened up; engine management systems, ABS braking systems. These 
became hugely expensive to develop, and required skills which simply did not 
exist in that sort of company.145
The question of a Rights Issue had been raised shortly after privatization by 
Ted Bond, the Finance Director of Beecham and a Jaguar non-executive director, as 
recalled by Orr-Ewing:
144 Whisler, Timothy R., Niche Products in the British Motor Industry: A History o f MG and 
Triumph Sports Cars, 1945-1981. Unpublished PhD thesis. London, London School of Economics, 
1991. p45.
145 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix ppl 14-5.
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Ted Bond said ‘Well, we have to bear in mind that at some time in the not too 
distant future we may need a Rights Issue to raise enough funds’. Egan said 
‘We’ll never need a Rights Issue!’ Ted, I remember, said ‘I’ll remind you of that 
one day in the future’.146
When asked about the need for a Rights Issue when interviewed for this 
study, neither Edwards nor Egan saw it as having been a concern, Egan holding to the 
view that whilst Jaguar “needed a huge resource to get this job done”, it could fund its 
development programme from cash flow, and made much of the fact that Jaguar had 
banking facilities of three or four hundred million pounds. Drawing on such facilities, 
however, seemed somewhat contrary to his statement that, “I was very anxious to have a 
very conservative funding strategy so we never had any debt.”147
However, Orr-Ewing doubted that Jaguar would have benefited from a Rights 
Issue, opining that:
Whilst they could have had a Rights Issue and raise a substantial amount, I doubt 
that they had the management ability to use the money. I also doubt whether Egan 
would have had the ability to mastermind that. There was an ego problem here.148
Egan’s refusal to countenance raising funds through equity issues was to have 
dire consequences for Jaguar’s future survival, particularly given the need for ever- 
increasing levels of capital expenditure, and diminishing levels of operating cash flow, 
both of which are discussed in Chapter Eight.
4.3.3 The Issue of Corporate Governance
It may be argued that an important indicator of the integrity of a company’s management 
is that of the extent to which good corporate governance is practiced by its directors. 
Although corporate governance issues in general in the early and mid-1980s were not 
given the prominence that they were to attain in the 1990s, they were of growing concern 
to City fund managers throughout the decade. Indeed, the extent to which good corporate 
governance was practiced by a company’s directors was perceived as being evidence of
146 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 12.
147 John Egan Interview. Appendix p68.
148 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 16.
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good stewardship and management. The collapse of companies such as Polly Peck, 
Maxwell Communications, and the Coloroll Group, led to the deliberations of the 
Cadbury Committee, and the publication of The Code o f Best Practice in December 
1992149 which presented the Committee’s recommendations on the structure and 
responsibilities of boards of directors, and which were largely a reflection of perceived 
best practice. It is of note that very little was published, particularly by academics, on the 
subject of corporate governance before this date, but the debate stimulated by the 
Cadbury Committee, and subsequent committees (Greenbury in 1995, and Hampel in 
1998)15°, jgd to a considerable volume of literature on the subject.
Whilst the term ‘corporate governance’ is more often used in relation to the 
accountability of a company to its shareholders, to provide a degree of protection to 
investors in the company, it also relates to “the way in which directors provide ‘overall 
direction to the enterprise’, and control the ‘executive actions of management’ ”.151 This 
present sub-section discusses these “internal” aspects of corporate governance as they 
applied to Jaguar, while the external aspects, relating to the interface with the City, are 
examined in Chapter Nine.
Lloyd-Jones et al opine that “the governance of a company involves the 
activity of top decision makers in defining and shaping the key elements of 
administration, which includes planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating and 
controlling”152, whilst Dedman suggests that governance is a mechanism that serves to 
protect external investors from “managerial expropriation”. This term, according to 
Dedman, encompasses “a range of dysfunctional managerial behaviours which increase 
the manager’s personal utility but reduce the value of the owner’s investment in the 
firm”. Such behaviour “includes spending company funds on non-value-adding luxuries, 
such as....company yachts, jets etc; making inefficient investment decisions (e.g. to 
pursue ‘pet’ projects); and shirking (e.g. failing to expend time and effort to seek out new
149 Cadbury, Sir Adrian (Chairman). The Report o f the Committee on the Financial Aspects o f Corporate 
Governance. (London, 1992).
150 Greenbury, Sir Richard. Director’s Remuneration. (London, 1995); Hampel Committee. The Final 
Report o f the Committee on Corporate Governance (The Hampel Report). (London, 1998).
151 Lloyd-Jones, Roger, Maltby, Josephine, Lewis, M.J., and Matthews, Mark. “Corporate Governance in a 
Major British Holding Company: BSA in the Interwar Years” in Accounting, Business & Financial 
History, Volume 16, Number 1 (March 2006). p70.
152 Ibid. p83.
133
investment opportunities)”.153 Lending support to this view, Gaved notes that 
“Managerialist models of corporate control predict that managers left to their own 
devices will shirk, entrench their personal positions, and make private gains at the 
expense of shareholders”.154
Corporate governance also concerns the level of disclosure by companies, 
without which there can be little or no accountability to shareholders. Here, Gaved asserts 
that it was widespread concern about insufficient financial disclosure, checks, and 
balances which had led to the collapse of a number of companies and resulted in the 
establishment of the Cadbury Committee.155
The main recommendations of the Cadbury Committee, incorporated in The 
Code o f Best Practice, were that:
• the roles of Chief Executive and Chairman be separated, due to concern about the 
“considerable concentration of power” which arises when the two roles are 
combined
• there be a minimum of three non-executive directors on the board, the idea being 
that the non-executive directors should act as a check and a balance on the 
activities and plans of executive directors and therefore the company. The Code 
stated that non-executive directors “should bring an independent judgement to 
bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, including key appointments, 
and standards of conduct”.156
• there be an audit committee composed of at least three non-executive directors, 
with written terms of reference
As a result of these and other recommendations being adopted by companies 
it was intended that financial control and reporting standards would be raised, and that 
the consequent increased levels of disclosure by companies would encourage effective
153 Dedman, Elisabeth. “The Cadbury Committee recommendations on corporate governance -  a review of 
compliance and performance impacts” in International Journal o f Management Reviews, Volume 4, 
Issue 4 (December 2002). p336.
154 Gaved, Matthew. Ownership and Influence. (London, 1994). pi 1.
155 Gaved, Matthew. Closing the Communications Gap: Disclosure and Institutional Shareholders. 
(London, 1997). p25.
156 Cadbury op.cit. Recommendation 2.1.
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interest on the part of fund managers, it being noted that institutional shareholders had 
been “reluctant to become too involved in company affairs when unhappy, preferring to 
sell shares than to propose change”.157 There was no obligation for companies to adopt 
these recommendations, and whilst the London Stock Exchange from 1993 onwards 
required, as part of its listing rules, listed companies incorporated in the UK to report 
whether or not they had complied with the Code, this was not a requirement to comply 
with the recommendations themselves.
As stated above, the Cadbury recommendations were based on what was 
perceived as being best practice, and it is germane to an understanding of the practice of 
corporate governance by Jaguar to examine to what extent Jaguar complied with best 
practice in an era when there was growing concern about the conduct of listed companies. 
What is apparent is that the arrogance of the Jaguar management that was the subject of 
Sub-Section 4.3.1.3 above extended also to the realm of corporate governance.
When Jaguar was privatized in August 1984 it had a board of directors 
consisting of three executive directors (John Egan, John Edwards, and Graham 
Whitehead) and three non-executive directors (Hamish Orr-Ewing, Ray Horrocks, and 
Ted Bond), with the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive being separated. Thus, the 
composition of the board was in accord with what would be two of the three Cadbury 
recommendations mentioned above. However, in March 1985 John Egan forced the 
resignation of Hamish Orr-Ewing as Chairman, as described in Sub-Section 4.3.2 above, 
and assumed both roles, despite such a dual role being frowned upon by the City at that 
time. At the same time two new executive directors (Kenneth Edwards and Michael 
Beasley) were appointed to the board, causing the Financial Times to note that Jaguar's 
executive directors now outnumbered its non-executive directors.158 In April 1985 both 
Orr-Ewing and Horrocks resigned from the board, leaving Jaguar with only one non­
executive director. Thus two of the three main components of what would be identified 
by Cadbury as being corporate governance best practice were now being ignored by 
Jaguar. Another non-executive director, Sir Austin Pearce, was appointed in February 
1986, as a result, according to the Financial Times of Jaguar being “persuaded by the
157 Dunlop, Alex (ed). Corporate Governance and Control. (London, 1998). p4.
158 Financial Times. 2 March 1985.
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City to add more NEDs to its board”159, although it is problematic as to whether the City 
influence was that of investors or Jaguar’s own City advisors. However, with two non­
executive directors Jaguar continued to ignore perceived best practice. Also it is 
problematic as to whether either of the two non-executive directors in office from 1986 
onwards had much knowledge of the motor industry and could therefore contribute a 
great deal in terms of the issues of strategy, performance, and resources as recommended 
by the Cadbury Code. Although, there was never any mention in its literature or in 
meetings with the City of Jaguar having an audit committee, Jaguar, with only two non­
executive directors, could not ipso facto comply with perceived best practice in this 
regard.
As has been revealed in Sub-Section 2.4.2 above, and is divulged further in 
Sub-Section 5.6.5 below, and in Chapter Eight, particularly Sub-Sections 8.3.3 and 8.4.7, 
Jaguar’s level of disclosure was insufficient, critical aspects of the company’s 
performance being obscured. This severely limited shareholder knowledge and was 
contrary to good corporate governance. However, it must be emphasized that Jaguar at all 
times complied with statutory requirements regarding financial disclosure, despite its 
withholding from shareholders information regarding the benefits accruing from currency 
exchange in the first half of the decade, and the impact on profits of the problems with 
the XJ40, and misrepresenting, as revealed in Sub-Section 4.3.1.3 above, the progress 
with the development of the XJ41 sports car.
4.3.4 The Cult of Personality and the Triumph of Style over Substance 
As was mentioned in Sub-Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.4 above, and is discussed in various 
places in the chapters following, PR was central to the Egan campaign to restore Jaguar’s 
fortunes. Given, as Lorenz appreciated, that the job of PR was “to put the best possible 
gloss on things”160, it was the means by which Jaguar masked its considerable problems 
following the launch of the XJ40. But much of the PR effort was directed at projecting 
the image of John Egan himself, and in this David Boole, the company’s
159 Ibid. 19 February 1986.
160 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix p i03.
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Communications and Public Affairs Director, played a leading role. Indeed, as Putnam 
related:
David, like his mentor before him, Hopkins, who had been Lord Stokes PR [at 
BL], saw his main role as that of promoting John. He believed that a brand like
Jaguar had to have a figurehead like Bill Lyons So, John was what David had
made him: “Mr Jaguar”, inseparable from the brand.161
Orr-Ewing saw Boole as Egan’s “Svengali”162, a sentiment with which Dale 
agreed, opining that, “David Boole made John Egan in the press, there’s no doubt about 
that. David had a wonderful touch with the UK press”.163 Lorenz, a member of that press, 
even likened the relationship to that of Alistair Campbell and Tony Blair a decade or so 
later.164 The projection of Egan to the outside world was such that Edwards was to 
comment, not altogether tongue in cheek, that, “By this time [1983-84] everyone believed 
that John Egan did everything at Jaguar. He made all the cars, he designed them all, he 
sold them all, he made the tea. He did everything!”165 Orr-Ewing, in paying tribute to 
Boole, a man whom he admitted to not liking at all, commented, “The buildup of the 
image of Jaguar by David Boole as a study of rebuilding a company’s public image was 
absolutely masterly”.166 In 1983 Egan was given the accolade of “Midlander of the 
Year”167, and among many other tributes was voted the most popular businessman in the 
UK after Lord Hanson.168 In 1986 Egan received a knighthood in recognition of his 
success at Jaguar.169
Much of this PR success was due to the personality, and drive, of Egan 
himself. Orr-Ewing saw Egan as being “ruthlessly ambitious”, but someone who enjoyed 
tremendous loyalty from the Jaguar staff, being seen as, “a tough customer, and when he 
said something would be done it happened. After years of very woody management, 
Egan arrives on the scene; strong personality, forthright, no nonsense, and did hugely
161 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i27.
162 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 14.
163 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p42.
164 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix p i04.
165 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p52.
166 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 15.
167 Thorley. op.cit. p i37; Whyte, op.cit.p i80.
168 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p53.
169 Thorley. op.cit. p i50.
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raise their morale”.170 Trevor Finn, the Chief Executive of Pendragon, the UK motor 
retailer, at the start of his relationship with Jaguar in 1983 noted, as an external observer, 
that Jaguar's middle management were in awe of Egan.171 But this did not appear to 
extend to the shop floor, Ainsworth commenting in regard to Egan that, “It was all 
superficial with him. He was superb at presentation, but not as far as following up was 
concerned”.172 Undoubtedly, Egan did have a great ability as a salesman, Lorenz noting 
that, “he told a great story. John was a great salesman actually. I think he did a fantastic 
job of selling that story. In the early 1980s he understood what they needed to pull 
themselves out of it. In that kind of business image is really important. That was his 
forte.”173 This personal characteristic was particularly appreciated, and effective, in the 
USA, Putnam noting that, “without any doubt, one of John Egan’s greatest achievements 
when he first took over was actually getting the US dealers’ confidence restored. He gave 
Mike Dale the confidence to go out and get the dealers to place their support”.174 Bennett 
agreed, describing Egan as, “a super, super salesman. And he sold the US dealers on the 
XJ40, and on the things that Jaguar was doing....He could sell an Arab a bucket of 
sand!”175, as did Weidinger, the proprietor of Jaguar’s most successful US dealership, 
who noted that Egan, “had a sparkle in his eye, and a lot of charisma, and he was 
probably the best salesman I’ve ever seen in my life. And he was a great leader”.176
But, as has been noted, Egan became increasingly prone to believe his own 
PR statements, and tended to lose touch with reality. In this sense he represented what 
Maccoby identified as being the unproductive narcissistic leader, such individuals 
becoming obsessed with their own grandiose ideas, emotionally isolated, and distrustful 
of alternative viewpoints.177 Maccoby notes that as narcissistic leaders become more 
successful they become over-sensitive to criticism and become increasingly poor 
listeners, and can become destructive as a result. As has been shown in the previous
170 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix pi 12.
171 Trevor Finn. Interview with the author. July 2008. Appendix p80.
172 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p i .
173 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix p i03.
174 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix pi 19.
175 Martin Bennett Interview. Appendix pi 4.
176 Jake Weidinger Interview. Appendix pi 47.
177 Maccoby, Michael. “Narcissistic Leaders. The Incredible Pros, The Inevitable Cons”. 
Havard Business Review. 78 (1). January-February 2000. pp69-77.
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sections, Egan exhibited many of these traits, and increasingly, according to Edwards, 
Dale, and others, became less effective as a leader, while Egan’s sensitivity to criticism 
may be noted from his reaction to the Ford “Transition Report” mentioned above, and his 
attempt to persuade Lorenz to cease publishing Ford’s criticisms of Jaguar, and himself, 
following the takeover.178
During his tenure at Jaguar Egan seemed to have forgotten that PR is aimed at 
creating perceptions, and eventually reality has to match those perceptions, or credibility 
suffers, perhaps to an extent where sales and profits are damaged, as became the case 
with Jaguar following the launch of the XJ40. However, Egan, with the benefit of 
hindsight, was later to boast of the success of Jaguar’s PR, Trotman recounting that, 
“John Egan said that one of the things they’d done, to his great glee, was to create a lot of 
sizzle without there being a lot of bacon there”, Trotman going on to observe that, “they
were limping along and keeping the thing going with the sizzle but it was an accident
on the way to happen”.179 This is a topic that is explored further in Chapter Five, 
particularly in regard to the myths created by Jaguar’s PR, many of which have not been 
examined in any detail prior to this study.
4.3.5 Strategy and Strategic Issues
As noted earlier, planning is regarded as one of the major functions of management. 
Because Jaguar never formally articulated a long term strategy to a public audience, such 
as the City, there was always some doubt as to what the company’s goals might be. 
Ainsworth, for example, believed that the management’s objective was merely to sell the 
company to the highest bidder after five years when the “Golden Share” expired180, a 
sentiment that was shared by Dymock.181 Such an aim has been vehemently denied by 
both Egan and Edwards.182
Whilst there are many definitions, and interpretations, of the term “strategy”, 
it is usually understood to be concerned with defining the organization’s objectives, 
developing policies and plans to achieve those objectives, and allocating resources
178 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix p i04.
179 Alex Trotman Interview. Appendix p i40
180 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p i .
181 Dymock, Eric. The Jaguar File (Sutton Vemy, 1998). p316.
182 John Egan Interview. Appendix pp75,76; John Edwards Interview. Appendix p62.
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accordingly in pursuit of those objectives.183 Generally, strategy is the concern of the top 
management of a company, particularly its Chairman or Chief Executive, although it 
might be delegated to a specialist Development or Corporate Planning Director, and 
strategy may be formally set out as a strategic plan. Although strategy can extend to 
various time horizons, most strategies are concerned with the longer term, with detailed 
plans and budgets relating to a five year time horizon.
Although it is hardly surprising that the Egan management was little 
concerned with strategy per se in the early years, survival and recovery being the prime 
objectives, the situation had changed by the time of privatization, with strong cash flow at 
that time enabling capital investment, and corporate development, enhanced by the 
possibilities offered by Jaguar taking advantage of its highly priced shares. The potential 
problems facing Jaguar, and the opportunities presented for corporate development were 
recognized by Orr-Ewing, Jaguar’s first Chairman, who set about informally exploring 
the possibilities for acquisitions. Egan was scornful of ideas such as buying an Italian 
luxury boat manufacturer or Land Rover, although given that in the late 1980s Vickers 
was to purchase Cosworth Engineering, a designer and manufacturer of high performance 
automotive engines, and Cantieri Riva, an Italian luxury boat business, to complement its 
Rolls-Royce motor manufacturing activity, perhaps Orr-Ewing’s ideas were not that 
bizarre. Orr-Ewing’s “interference” was used by Egan as the main reason for obtaining 
his removal as Chairman, although, as Orr-Ewing admits, the personal chemistry between 
Egan and himself was not good.184
Egan by this time appeared to have developed an intransigence in regard to 
strategic issues that excluded anything but Jaguar itself, and it is notable that Egan’s 
management team did not include a Corporate Planning or Corporate Development 
Director, unlike many public companies of this era, especially those with annual sales 
exceeding some £500million. Whilst Jaguar had certain long term objectives there did not 
appear to be any formal planning, and Finn, who had been closely involved with the 
redevelopment of Jaguar’s UK distribution network in the 1980s, related that he had not
183 Henry, Anthony. Understanding Strategic Management (Oxford, 2008) pp2-25.
184 Hamish Orr-Ewing Interview. Appendix p i l l .
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seen any evidence at the time of there being a “big strategic plan”.185 Edwards admitted 
that, “We just worked on our instincts....One of our logics was based on trying still to 
make something of an independent Jaguar, which was our gut instinct, maybe a naive 
instinct, since before the 1984 privatization”.186 Thus, the opportunity of taking over Land 
Rover, an acquisition which Putnam believed “would have given us critical mass”187, was 
rejected without a formal appraisal being undertaken.
Egan's long term objective was “to build all the way through the 1980s a 
company which would be the new BMW, the English BMW”188, but little consideration 
appears to have been given to the financial resources, and their sources, required to 
achieve that aim, and a formal plan of how it would be achieved appears never to have 
been set out. Above all, there does not appear to have been given much consideration as 
to what might be the limits to growth for a company with a limited product range, 
targeted at a comparatively small market segment, as was the case with Jaguar. This 
perhaps is something that is not very surprising given Jaguar's lack of market research 
and analysis capability, discussed in Section 5.2 below. In this regard, the size constraints 
of the luxury car market segment, and the benefits of a broader product range is apparent 
from the BMW experience at this time.
Whilst total BMW car sales of486,592 units in 1988 was 147,360 units ahead 
of the 1980 figure, production of its 7 Series, the main BMW competitor to the Jaguar 
saloon, had increased by only 28,108 units by this time. By 1990, BMW total sales had 
increased by a further 27,139 units to 513,731 units, but 7 Series production declined by 
14,675 units to 43,503 units, the overall increase obviously resulting from sales of the 
smaller, and cheaper, 3, 5 and 6 Series models.189 Jaguar, in contrast, was dependent on 
the sales of its saloon models, and had little prospect of being able to achieve product 
diversification in the short or medium term given its limited financial resources. 
Interestingly, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, BMW 7 Series production saw little change in 
the five years to 1984, and declined in 1985 and 1986 ahead of the launch of the new
185 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix. p80.
186 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p62.
187 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i22.
188 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p62.
189 e-mails to the author from BMW Business and Finance Communication Department, Munich 25 
September 2008 (total BMW sales); 29 September 2008 (7 Series production figures).
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7 Series at the end o f  1986, the success o f  the new car being apparent from the greatly 
increased volumes produced from 1987 onwards. Jaguar, on the other hand, was not able 
to respond as rapidly to the increased demand for the XJ40, launched in 1986 onwards, 
due to deficiencies in planning and resource allocation, discussed in the chapters that 
follow.
As noted above, Egan had determined against raising funds through the stock 
market, and was dependent on operational cash flow to fund the necessary resources for 
product development and capital expenditure. Much was dependent, therefore, on the 
successful launch o f  the XJ40. The problems with this model, however, deprived the 
company o f  much needed resources, both financially and in terms o f  manpower, and 
reduced strategic considerations to those described by Putnam as being the “needs must” 
objectives that were prevalent in Egan’s first years at Jaguar. By 1988, Egan, according 
to Putnam, “was running the business on a kind o f  monthly basis. John had a 
Micawberish view  that something would turn up. And, o f  course, Ford turned up”.190
Figure 4.2: Jaguar Saloon Production and BMW 7 Series Production,
1980 to 1990.
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Furthermore, Egan was forced to radically modify his views regarding 
strategic issues due to the problems resulting from the XJ40. As was seen in Sub-Section
4.2.5 above, Egan was prepared to consider a corporate partner for Jaguar, provided this 
allowed Jaguar to keep its independence, and was prepared to have a Rights Issue to 
support such a deal. It was ironic, however, that the negotiations with General Motors, 
designed to ensure independence, forced Ford to bid for Jaguar, and resulted in Jaguar 
losing its much-cherished independence.
Ford was later to show Jaguar its deficiencies in failing to undertake strategic 
planning, Edwards explaining that when Ford came along, “They showed us their 
business plan. They wanted to create a new BMW. We had wanted to create another 
BMW in terms of a 3 Series, a 5 Series etc, but ours was more of a pipe-dream. Theirs 
was a proper plan, and they’ve done it, they’ve done exactly what they said they’d do”.191
4.4 Summary and Conclusions
In Chapter Three it was suggested that Lyons might justly be held accountable for the 
problems resulting from the pervasive weaknesses within Jaguar’s corporate culture. 
Many of these were aggravated by BL, but then were largely ignored by Egan. Indeed, as 
was argued in Chapter Three, Egan appeared to have seen nothing wrong with the 
company’s corporate ethos when he arrived at Jaguar, other than the weaknesses caused 
by trades union intransigence. His failure to recognise and address the weaknesses within 
the organization as a whole only served to exacerbate the underlying problems.
Whilst there has been much comment about poor industrial relations at Jaguar 
under Egan, there has been little written regarding the effectiveness of management itself 
or the weaknesses of Jaguar’s management structures in the Egan era. Undoubtedly, the 
abilities of a number of Egan’s management team were open to question, as may be 
ascertained from the discussion of specific functions in the chapters that follow, and as is 
evidenced by Ford firing half of the team following its acquisition of Jaguar. But also, 
Egan appeared to be deficient in regard to his own management skills, the continuing 
existence of fiefdoms, for example, giving testimony to his inability to control and co­
ordinate the activities of the organization, whilst his obduracy in regard to strategic issues
191 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p48.
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paved the way for the Ford takeover. Egan’s growing arrogance, and that of his team 
members, following the remarkable revitalisation of the company led to an unrecognised, 
and unchecked, complacency which blinded Egan, and his team, to the problems, and the 
consequences, of the disaster represented by the XJ40.
This arrogance was reinforced by the success of the PR campaign and was 
apparent also from the failure to adopt best practice in corporate governance. Indeed, it is 
somewhat incongruous that in a decade when listed companies were progressing towards 
the type of corporate governance system suggested by Cadbury that Jaguar should be 
moving away from it. The success of the PR campaign undoubtedly had a detrimental 
effect on Egan, with him starting to believe more the illusion created about Jaguar, and 
himself, rather than the reality, something which consequently led to a diminution of his 
management and leadership skills, and laid the path to Jaguar’s demise. The extent of 
cultural constraints in the different functional areas of Jaguar, and the impact of each in 
the determination of Jaguar’s performance, is examined in the chapters which follow, 
commencing with markets and marketing.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MARKETS AND MARKETING
5.1 Introduction
In Section 1.2 above it was noted that the received wisdom of the time, and subsequently, 
was that Jaguar’s remarkable recovery and success in the first half of the 1980s was the 
result of it having been transformed from being a production-driven company, to that of 
being marketing-led. As a result of this supposed metamorphosis, Jaguar was able to 
regain, and surpass, the level of sales lost in various markets at the end of the 1970s. It is 
appropriate, therefore, that the first functional area to be examined in greater depth 
should be that of marketing.
Whilst much has been written, both by academic and popular writers, about 
the failures of the British motor industry, mainly BL, in various geographical markets in 
the 1960s and 1970s, discussion here has tended to focus on the symptoms, rather than 
the causes, of such failure, with little depth of analysis being offered. Williams et al in 
their several works1 have emphasised “external market limitations”, and “poor 
distribution” for the failure of BL, but confine their analysis regarding market limitations 
to a discussion of published statistics, which, as was argued in Sub-Section 2.3.1 above, 
is a somewhat inadequate basis for their opinions and conclusions. Likewise, their 
assertions regarding poor distribution are based on official sales volumes figures and, 
forsaking any attempt at triangulation to support such sources, they concluded that BL’s 
low sales volumes in France and Germany could be explained purely in terms of patchy 
or inadequate dealer networks, and restricted product offering.2 This ignored other 
possible variables, such as poor product quality and reliability, relative prices, economic 
cycles, or the existence of French and German nationalism. Indeed, the fact that Jaguar’s
1 Williams, Karel, Williams, John, Thomas, Dennis. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? (London, 
1983); Williams, Karel, Williams, John, Haslam, Colin. The Breakdown o f Austin Rover: a case study in 
the failure o f business strategy and industrial policy. (Leamington Spa, 1987); Williams, Karel,
Haslam, Colin, Williams, John, Johal, Sukhdev, with Adcroft, Andy. Cars. Analysis, History, Cases. 
(Providence, 1994).
2 Williams et al. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? p238.
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US sales collapsed after 1988 despite it having a strong dealer network, discussed in Sub- 
Section 5.6.5 below, demonstrates that good distribution per se, is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for sales success.
If the actual dynamics of various motor car markets have not been sufficiently 
explored by such writers then the existence, performance, and success of the marketing 
function per se within motor manufacturers has received even less attention. For the most 
part there has been little or no attempt to examine the part played by marketing, and, 
indeed, many writers seem to have regarded the word “marketing” merely as a 
euphemism for customer-related activities such as distribution, sales promotion, and 
public relations, as Lorenz was to admit.3 But even then, something as vital as the 
distribution function, as Whisler has noted, “receives cursory attention in the analyses of 
the indigenous industry”.4
By the 1980s, markets for luxury cars had grown in size, and had become far 
more complex and competitive than anything previously experienced. Greater 
technological and safety innovations in automotive design were responses not only to 
more stringent safety and pollution laws but also to the need for greater product 
differentiation.5 Contemporaneously, the entry of more manufacturers into various luxury 
car markets, and the resultant intensified competition, demanded not only the appropriate 
sales, advertising, and public relations responses, based on well-founded marketing 
research and analysis, but also products that matched consumer expectations, both in 
terms of physical attributes, such as safety and fuel economy, and in terms of the image 
that they conveyed, and which, in turn, therefore, might be conferred on the driver. 
Indeed, as Foreman-Peck et al wrote, “customer loyalty clustered round images of 
marques; Ford acquired an image of mechanical reliability, Volvo of safety and so on”.6 
For Jaguar, much emphasis was given to developing a subjective image of the brand
3 Andrew Lorenz. Interview with the author. August 2007. Appendix pi 03.
4 Whisler, Timothy R. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. A Case Study in Industrial Decline. (Oxford, 
1999). p243.
5 Rhys, Garel. “Motor Vehicles” in Johnson, Peter (ed). The Structure o f British Industry. (London, 1988). 
pi 78.
6 Foreman-Peck, James, Bowden, Sue, and McKinlay, Alan. The British Motor Industry. (Manchester, 
1995) pi 35.
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based on its features of “wood, leather, and overall charm”7, and its reliability, as well as 
its success in motor racing.
Towards the end of the 1970s, and during the 1980s, the German luxury 
marques increased their sales and market share of the luxury cars sector in both the US 
and UK, as can be seen in Table 5.2 (page 209) and Figure 5.18 (page 238). Indeed, 
Mercedes increased its US sales from 45,259 units in 1975 to 89,098 units in 1985, thus 
increasing its overall market share from 0.5% to 0.8%, and BMW increased its US sales 
from 19,419 units to 87,832 units, and its overall market share from 0.23% to 0.79%, in 
the same period.8 In 1989 the Japanese entered the US luxury car sector, and in one year 
had overtaken Jaguar in terms of sales volumes, Lexus, with two models, alone achieving 
US sales in 1990 of 63,534 units9, compared to Jaguar’s 18,728 units and BMW’s 63,646 
units.10 Whilst in the early 1980s Jaguar did much to restore, and grow, its sales volumes 
in both the UK and the USA through a well-orchestrated PR campaign, and 
reorganisation of the distribution systems, which dramatically improved the image of the 
company and its products, it was a triumph of style over substance. The reality was that 
the new car, the XJ40, could not live up to the Jaguar quality image that had been so 
carefully nurtured in the five years before its launch in 1986, particularly in the USA, as 
discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.
This present chapter examines and challenges Jaguar’s reputation in the 
1980s as a marketing-led organisation (Section 5.2), exploring the extent to which this 
was an illusion created by the company itself. It then examines Jaguar’s interface with its 
marketplace, mainly in the period 1978 to 1992, in terms of product offering (Section 
5.3), competitive position (Section 5.4), and the relative importance of its various markets 
(Sections 5.6 to 5.8), especially the US market (Section 5.6) which from 1981 onwards 
determined Jaguar’s overall financial performance. In particular, it examines the vital part 
played by Jaguar’s US dealers (Sub-Section 5.6.2), and considers the incidence of, and 
reasons for, Jaguar’s remarkable renascence in the US in particular in the early 1980s 
(Sub-Section 5.6.4), and also the downturn after 1987 (Sub-Section 5.6.5).
7 Bruce Blythe. Interview with the author. January 1994. Appendix p i9.
8 Automotive News, various issues.
9 Dawson, Chester. Lexus: The Relentless Pursuit. (Chichester, 2004). pp139-144.
10 Automotive News, 100 Year Almanac, 1996.
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5.2 The Myth of a Marketing-led Jaguar
Much has been written about Jaguar’s success under Egan being marketing-led. 
Underwood, echoing Egan’s oft-repeated words, in 1989 wrote, “[Jaguar] is no longer a 
manufacturing-led company, it is a marketing-led company in which ‘satisfying 
customers’ is the key to success”.11 Lorenz, also writing in 1989, wrote, “Jaguar was a 
marketing-orientated company. Above anything else, Egan was a great marketing man”.12 
However, when questioned in 2007, Lorenz admitted that he could not really explain 
what he had meant by “marketing”, other than relating it to Jaguar’s success in terms of 
PR.13 This is hardly a criticism of Lorenz for, as Wilmshurst pointed out, “The term 
‘marketing’ is used in different ways by different people”, before going on to define the 
term as referring to “a particular approach to business in relation to customers and their 
needs”.14 Therein lies one of the problems since it is difficult to identify, beneath the 
hype, what aspects of the marketing concept, as understood at the time, were actually 
embraced by the Egan management.
Marketing textbooks of the time placed great emphasis on distinguishing 
between the traditional, and outmoded, production-orientated company and the modem, 
dynamic, marketing-led company, hence the significance of Underwood’s comment 
quoted above. Rodger, one of the leading writers of the time on marketing, distinguished 
between the approach to various organizational functions taken by the production- 
orientated company, and the marketing-orientated company, and examined the activities 
which formed the main activities of the marketing function.15 It is pertinent, therefore, to 
consider Jaguar’s marketing activities in the light of these as a basis for determining the 
veracity of Underwood’s statement, and Jaguar’s claims.
Rodger identified the principal marketing functions as being those of 
marketing information and research, product planning, sales and distribution, and 
advertising and promotion. The marketing information and research function was seen as 
key by writers such as Rodger since shortcomings here could “seriously impair a firm’s
11 Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989). p2.
12 Lorenz, Andrew. A Fighting Chance. The revival and future o f British manufacturing industry.
(London, 1989). p257.
13 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix pi 03.
14 Wilmshurst, John. The Fundamentals and Practice o f Marketing. (London, 1978). p i .
15 Rodger, Leslie W. Marketing in a Competitive Economy. (London, 1971) pp60-l, 70.
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competitive performance”.16 Although Egan often claimed that a number of his 
statements regarding Jaguar's markets were based on the company’s own market 
research, it is clear that market research and analysis, to the extent that it existed, was not 
taken much into account. In Section 5.5 below, it is shown that Jaguar spumed the input 
of its US dealers in regard to product specifications for its US models. Grant related that 
Jaguar “had very little analysis capability”, and that, as previously noted in Sub-Section
4.3.1.1 above, “they didn’t have an attitude that was receptive to analysing things” ,7. 
Support for this view was provided by Finn who recounted that Jaguar tended to “make 
policy decisions around the table” rather than base decisions on research and analysis, but 
noted that Jaguar was very keen to receive the views of its UK retailers18, in apparent 
contrast to the attitude adopted towards its US dealers. Indeed, Finn maintained that the 
idea for the exclusive dealerships in the UK that proved to be such an important factor in 
Jaguar’s sales growth in the mid-1980s onwards originated with Pendragon, based on 
Pendragon’s own extensive market and customer research.79
Jaguar’s own forecasting of demand appears to have had little or no scientific 
basis, so that it was often caught unaware by changes in demand patterns, favourable or 
unfavourable. In September 1989, Jaguar was forced to admit that, “we didn’t anticipate a 
further deterioration in the US market”20, only eight months after forecasting US sales of 
23,000 sales for the year21, a figure that had represented a year on year increase of 11%. 
Dale admitted that Jaguar’s US sales forecasts “at first were guessed” but were later 
based on thirty day forward orders from dealers, so “it didn’t have some great market 
research behind it, but what it did have was a very careful every thirty day view of what 
was really happening in the marketplace”.22 Likewise, there was little attempt to gamer 
and analyse marketplace intelligence, probably one of the reasons for Jaguar’s narrow 
definition of its competitors, as discussed in Section 5.4 below. But this also explains 
why Jaguar was unaware at the time that German dealers in 1985 were re-exporting cars 
to the USA, described in Section 5.8 below. As Grant observed:
16 Ibid p75.
17 John Grant. Interview with the author. January 1993. Appendix p95.
18 Trevor Finn. Interview with the author. July 2008. Appendix p80.
19 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p77.
20 Jaguar Interim Results Meeting. September 1989 (Author's own contemporaneous notes).
21 Financial Times. 7 January 1989.
22 Mike Dale. Interview with the author. June 2007. Appendix p45.
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[Jaguar] were very introverted. There was very little awareness of what the 
competition was up to. When we, Ford, first went to talk to them back in 1988, 
Ford was clearly aware that the Japanese were coming into the luxury segment. 
We knew they were going to do it well and Ford’s view was that Jaguar couldn’t 
tackle it on their own and they needed help....[John Egan] just refused to 
recognise that the Japanese could in any way challenge Jaguar.23
The lack of awareness of the competitive environment was further 
demonstrated in the apparent debate within Jaguar as to what constituted the parameters 
of its markets, and in regard to the identification of its competitors, as will be discussed in 
detail in Section 5.4 below. In Rodger’s terms, such an undeveloped marketing research 
and analysis function was symptomatic of a production-led company where internal 
influences predominate in determining the company’s objectives.24
This obviously impacted on product planning and development which, in a 
marketing-led company, according to Rodger, is based on market research.25 Without 
adequate market research Jaguar could not, ipso facto, claim to be marketing-led in terms 
of product planning. Indeed, both Dale26 and Putnam27 bemoaned the fact that the 
marketing and sales functions were permitted little or no input into product planning and 
development, an issue that may be seen as being illustrative of the arrogance of Jaguar’s 
engineering function, and that the Egan management either saw little that was wrong 
with, or felt unable to challenge, such attitudes and behaviour. Dale added, “The whole 
company was complacent - they simply were not prepared to respond to the marketplace 
in a practical manner”.28 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the engineering department initially 
refused to consider the development of a convertible version of the XJ-S, and it was only 
after the undoubted sales success of the model contracted by Jaguar Inc from the US 
company Hess and Eisenhardt had been demonstrated that Jaguar’s engineering function 
relented and developed a Jaguar-assembled version.29 As was shown in Chapter Four, and 
will be discussed further in Chapter Seven, engineering was allowed to operate virtually
23 John Grant Interview. Appendix pp94-95.
24 Rodger, op cit. p60.
25 Ibid. p61.
26 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p37.
27 Roger Putnam. Interview with the author. November 2006. Appendix p i21.
28 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix pp36-37.
29 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p35.
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independently of other departments within Jaguar. Rodger notes that one of the 
characteristics of the production-led company is that “engineering considerations tend to 
predominate”.30
So, in regard to the first two marketing functions identified by Rodger, it can 
be seen that Jaguar remained very much a production-led company. But, on the other 
hand, in regard to sales, and to advertising and promotion, Jaguar was outstandingly 
successful. In the sales arena the vital aspect was that of distributor and dealer 
representation in the various markets, discussed in detail in Section 5.5 below. According 
to Grant, Jaguar did an outstanding job on their distribution:
They’ve been in the forefront on a number of things that the volume 
manufacturers have now picked up on....Particularly in the States, particularly in 
the UK, and increasingly in the European countries as well, they adopted a radical 
approach to dealer representation and done a hell of a job on it....They ended up
with very good quality dealers and those dealerships in fact had helped Jaguar
survive and compensated to some extent for this awful vehicle quality.31
Even so, as is shown in Section 5.6.2 below, this appears to have been a 
Jaguar Inc initiative, continuing on from the huge reduction in BL franchises in the USA 
during the 1970s, rather than an Egan-inspired Jaguar Group policy, but was one that was 
later taken up by the UK and European operations.
In terms of advertising and promotion, Jaguar placed the greatest emphasis 
on, and achieved its greatest success in, its PR effort, creating an image of Jaguar and its 
products that belied the reality. As was made clear in Chapter Four, this was widely 
attributed to be the creation of David Boole, who as part of the image-building of the 
company promoted Egan as “Mr Jaguar”, the saviour of the company. The image build­
up was gradual but, once established, had a dramatic impact for, as Edwards recalled, 
“We started to get these fantastic articles. Therefore, all the publicity we were getting was 
free. It was all John Egan. He was actually, literally, a one-man band promoting 
everything”.32 The initial target was that of overcoming the well-founded image of 
Jaguar’s poor quality. This campaign, as will be shown in Section 7.6 below, was
30 Rodger, op cit. p61.
31 John Grant Interview. Appendix p94.
32 John Edwards. Interview with the author. November 2002. Appendix p51.
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extremely successful. But whilst the resultant powerful illusion of improved quality 
created by Jaguar revitalized the company, it was only to generate greater problems when 
customers could no longer believe, in the wake of the XJ40 launch, the claims of the 
images that had been created. As noted previously in Sub-Section 4.3.3 above, Egan was 
later to admit that he had created “a lot of sizzle without there being a lot of bacon 
there”.33 Thus, far from being a marketing-led company, Jaguar, despite having made 
significant advances in distribution, had remained a production-led company, and one 
that suffered considerable on-going problems, facts that Jaguar had cleverly masked 
through the application of its well-developed disinformation and obfuscation skills, as 
will be demonstrated further in the sections and chapters that follow.
5.3 Products
In the 1970s and 1980s Jaguar was firmly established in the prestige or luxury segment of 
the motor industry. At this time, the image of the Jaguar car, reinforced by Jaguar’s own 
publicity, was that of a relatively expensive, powerful, high performance, opulent vehicle, 
noted for its unique styling, with an emphasis, according to Dale, on “wood, leather seats, 
thick carpets, and chrome trim”.34 However, by the time Egan joined the company, the 
product rationalisation undertaken by BL during the 1970s had reduced the model range 
from six in 1968 to just two, the XJ6 Saloon car range and the XJ-S Grand Tourer range, 
at a time when the likes of BMW and Mercedes were expanding their model ranges. 
Also, Jaguar offered the DS420 Daimler limousine, a coach-built, purpose-designed car, 
first seen in 1968, which was built to order, but which was insignificant in volume terms, 
with generally less than 200 units per annum being produced throughout the 1980s.35
The saloon was the more important range, as may be seen in Table 5.1 below, 
accounting for nearly 90% of Jaguar’s vehicle sales in 1980, and remaining at 75% or 
more throughout the 1980s. This led many observers at the time to label Jaguar “a one 
product company”. In contrast, the output of the BMW 7 Series, identified by Jaguar as 
the only competing BMW model, represented only 8.9% of total BMW sales in 1980, and
33 Cited by Alex Trotman. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix p i40.
34 Mike Dale quoted in Automotive News. 6 April 1987.
35 Long, Brian. The Marques o f Coventry. A History o f the City’s Motor Industry. 
(Exeter, 1990). p94.
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was a gradually diminishing proportion o f  total sales until 1987 when, following the 
launch o f  the new 7 Series, production increased to a level equating to 12.1% o f  total 
BMW sales, but thereafter declined again, to 8.5% in 1990.36
Table 5.1: Jaguar W holesales analysed by M odel Range, 1980 to 1983
Year end Dec: 1980 1981 1982 1983
W’sales % o f W’sales % o f W’sales % o f W’sales % o f
Model Range: (Units) Total (Units) Total (Units) Total (Units) Total
Series 111 13,851 89.5 12,666 90.9 17,733 84.4 23,413 82.2
XJ-S 1,526 9.9 1,108 8.0 3,131 14.9 4,886 17.2
Limousines 92 0.6 159 1.1 143 0.7 168 0.6
Total W’sales 15,469 100.0 13,933 100.0 21,007 100.0 28,467 100.0
Source: Jaguar Offer for Sale Document, 1984
However, as Figure 5.1 shows, sales o f  the XJ-S in the vital US market 
progressively took a larger proportion o f  the total, partly due to the greater attractiveness
Figure 5.1: Relative Importance of Jaguar Model Ranges in 
US Retail Sales, 1983 to 1990
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□  Series III/XJ40 BXJ-s!
Source: Automotive 'News Various Issues 1984-1991.
36 e-mails from BMW Business and Finance Communication Department, Munich 25 September 2008 
(total BMW sales); 29 September 2008 (7 Series production figures).
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of the XJ-S “spin-offs” that were introduced, and partly due to the problems experienced 
by the XJ40, discussed in Chapter Seven. In 1988, saloons accounted for some 79% of 
Jaguar's total production.
Both the XJ6 and XJ-S ranges benefited from what Whipp and Clark 
designated “robust” designs37, that is, designs lending themselves to incremental changes 
over their life spans. This was a model strategy that was ideal for a low model output, 
high cost manufacturing, producer. Here, basic features of the car such as chassis and 
engine block, the most expensive elements, remain unchanged, but aspects such as body 
panels, interior, and trim were designed to enable modifications. In general terms there 
are two types of alteration -  the “face-lift” which allows a model to be updated quickly, 
and often at low cost, to meet changing market conditions, such as those experienced 
with the advent of safety and exhaust emission control measures, or changing fashions, 
and the “spin-off’ which, through the fitting of a different power unit or body style, 
enables the presentation of a “new” model. The great advantage of “robust” designs, 
particularly for Jaguar, was that they enabled longer production runs, thus reducing the 
per vehicle fixed costs such as initial design and tooling, and lowering the subsequent 
redesign and retooling costs.
The XJ6 saloon had been introduced in 1968 (the Series I), with a “face-lift” 
version, the Series II, which was designed to comply with changing legislation, 
particularly in the USA, being launched in 1973.38 A further “face-lift” model, the Series 
III, with minor restyling undertaken by Pininfarina of Italy, was introduced in 1979.39 
Thus, by 1980, the XJ6 saloon had been in production for twelve years, and according to 
many was beginning to look dated.40 Continual “face-1 ifts”, however, had resulted in a 
range that offered a choice of two engines, the XK (3.4 or 4.2 litre capacity, with manual 
or automatic transmission) or V12 (5.3 litre, with automatic transmission as standard), 
differing levels of refinement, whilst badge-engineering had resulted in the addition of 
the top of the range Daimler Sovereign, an XJ6 with revised badges and trim.41
37 Whipp, Richard and Clark, Peter. Innovation and the Auto Industry. (London, 1986). pp54-7.
38 Whyte, Andrew. Jaguar. The definitive history o f a great British car. (Wellingborough, 1980). p238; 
Thorley, Nigel. Jaguar in Coventry. Building the Legend. (Derby, 2002). ppl 18-119.
39 Thorley. op.cit. pi 30.
40 Underwood, op.cit. p60.
41 Daniels, Jeff. British Leyland: The Truth Behind the Cars (London, 1980) ppl54-163.
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The XJ-S Grand Tourer was a much more recent model, having been 
launched in 1975, although it had been under development since 1968.42 But it was not a 
complete innovation, having been based on the floorplan of the XJ saloons.43 This model 
was offered as a fixed-head coupe with the VI2 engine and automatic transmission. 
There was obviously some confusion within Jaguar as to whether or not the XJ-S could 
be described as a sports car. Whisler has drawn attention to the problem of defining what 
constituted a “sports car”, with the characteristics cited by Motor Business being 
applicable to many high performance saloons.44 It would appear, therefore, that whether 
the label “sports car” could be applied to any particular model was as much a question of 
it being designated as such by its manufacturer as it was of any particular physical 
characteristics. Jaguar's Offer for Sale Document in 1984 referred to the “XJ-S sports car 
range”, but the subsequent Annual Reports were generally careful to refer to the “XJ-S 
range”, or “XJ-S Coupe”, although the wholesales statistics tables in all of the Annual 
Reports continued to label the range as the “XJ-S sports car”. Whether this testified to an 
internal debate on the issue is unclear, but Dale was adamant that in the 1980s Jaguar did 
not sell sports cars.45 Certainly, Jaguar had a different image in the US from the UK. 
According to Bennett, UK customers viewed Jaguar as a “Luxury sports car, or a sports 
saloon” whilst in the US Jaguar's sporting heritage was almost ignored, Americans 
seeing Jaguar purely as a luxury car.46 However, Jaguar appears to have admitted that it 
was not in the sports car business with its statements in 1987 that it intended to re-enter 
the sports car market with the XJ41, or “F-type”, which was under development 
throughout the 1980s, and which would directly compete with Porsche.47
Throughout the 1980s, “face-lifts” continued to be a feature of Jaguar’s 
product strategy, with, for example, the top of the range Jaguar Vanden Plas saloon being 
introduced into the US market,'Jaguar being unable to use the Daimler name in the USA. 
The XJ-S offered more scope for “spin-offs” which included the HE (“High Efficiency”)
42 Harvey, Chris. Great Marques. Jaguar (London, 1982). p75.
43 Thorley. op.cit. pl26; Harvey, op.cit. p75.
44 Whisler, Timothy R. At the End o f the Road. The Rise and Fall ofAustin-Healey, MG, and Triumph 
Sports Cars. (Greenwich and London, 1995). ppl 1-12.
45 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p43.
46 Martin Bennett. Interview with the author. July 2008. Appendix p i2.
47 John Edwards, meeting with the author January 1987 (Author’s own contemporaneous notes);
Automotive News. 26 October 1987.
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version, a cabriolet version, and then a convertible model. The convertible model was 
initially manufactured, in 1986, as a two-seater conversion by Hess and Eisenhardt of 
Cincinnati, who built a total of 2,000 cars under contract to Jaguar Inc48, and from 1988 
onwards by Jaguar itself. In 1983 the XJ-S was also offered in a version with the new 3.6 
litre AJ6 (“Advanced Jaguar” six cylinder) engine, only the third engine to have been 
designed and developed by Jaguar.
Indeed, the new engine was a very necessary innovation since, by the early 
1980s, Jaguar's engine range was looking extremely dated. The XK engine had been 
launched in 194849 and, as Beasley remarked, “as wonderful a job as it did for Jaguar, by 
the mid 1980s was getting tired, and it was certainly well amortised kit that it was made 
on”.50 Jaguar also produced the J60 engine, a variant of the XK, used to power military 
vehicles, although this was a very small part of Jaguar's overall engine production. The
5.3 litre VI2 engine, developed to compete with the V8 engine in the US market, had 
been first launched in 1971 to power the iconic Series 3 E-type sports car, and was then 
used to power the XJ-S when introduced in 1975, although a V12-engined version of the 
XJ saloon had been introduced in 1972.51
Unlike its competitors, Jaguar did not offer a diesel-engined car, although in
1981 it did announce that it would launch a six-cylinder turbo-diesel version of the Series 
III in the US market in 1983 using a bought-in unit from VM of Italy, pending 
development of its own diesel engine.52 This was reaffirmed by Egan in 1982, who 
remarked that this was “a comparatively low-cost risk” solution that freed Jaguar from 
“the enormous financial burden of developing its own diesel”.53 Even so, cost did not 
appear to have been the major issue, for, as Putnam revealed, “The reason that Jaguar 
didn’t have diesels for such a long time was that to the engineering guys it wasn’t sexy”.54 
In the event, the promised diesel-engined Jaguar car did not materialise, and whilst the
1982 and 1983 decline of the US diesel car market55 gave an acceptable pretext for the
48 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p35.
49 Thorley. op.cit. p54.
50 Mike Beasley. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix p6.
51 Thorley. op.cit. p i22.
52 Automotive News. 10 August 1981.
53 Quoted in Automotive News. 17 May 1982.
54 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i22.
55 Automotive News. 8 November 1982; 24 October 1983.
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non-appearance of the car, the actual reason appears to have been that the VM engine was 
“a ‘dog’. It was very ‘agricultural’, and Jaguar just couldn’t put it in its cars”.56
In 1986 Jaguar launched the XJ40 saloon, its first all-new model for 18 years, 
in the UK and Europe. This was available in three models: the Jaguar XJ6, the Jaguar 
Sovereign, and the top of the range Daimler, and with two engine sizes (2.9- and 3.6- 
litre), except the Daimler which offered only the larger engine.57 In 1987 the XJ40 was 
launched in North America, available in two versions, the XJ6 and the top of the range 
Vanden Plas. Of great significance was that the new, more fuel efficient, engine freed 
Jaguar of its Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) burden, CAFE penalties being 
levied by the US government for failure to meet average fuel consumption standards 
which were set on an annual basis and applied to a manufacturer’s total range. In 1986 
Jaguar incurred a CAFE penalty of some $8million.58 At the end of 1989, in response to 
the entry of the Japanese in the US luxury car segment and lower sales, Jaguar launched a 
number of “face-lift” models, with price, for the first time under Egan’s management, 
being a factor. Here, a lower specification XJ6 model at a lower price - $39,700, against 
$44,000 for the previous year’s base price - was introduced, whilst the previous year’s 
XJ6 was re-badged “Jaguar Sovereign”, given additional equipment, and priced at 
$43,000. However, somewhat paradoxically, at the same time a plush top of the range 
model, the Vanden Plas Majestic, was introduced, priced at $53,000.59
5.4 The Competitive Environment
In Section 5.2 above it was suggested that Jaguar’s shortcomings in regard to marketing 
information and research resulted in a lack of awareness of the competitive environment, 
which gave scope for debate within Jaguar as to the parameters of its markets, and the 
identification of its competitors. These aspects are important in regard to such areas as 
product planning, pricing policy, and advertising and promotion, and this present section 
aims to explore the main issues involved for Jaguar.
56 Roger Putnam. Telephone conversation with the author. July 2007. Appendix pl22n!36.
57 Jaguar Information Pack - XJ6 (XJ40) Launch. 1986.
58 Automotive News. 6 April 1987.
59 Automotive News. 18 September 1989.
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Although Jaguar defined its activity as being within the luxury, or prestige, 
market worldwide, there was some debate as to what constituted the parameters of this 
market. Certainly, there was some overlap with the “executive car” market in terms of 
price and specification, and, as already mentioned, it was problematic as to whether 
Jaguar was actually competing in the sports car market.
Price is one parameter that can be used to define a market segment, with most 
observers in 1986 excluding models priced at below $20,000 in the USA from the luxury 
category.60 However, it is undoubtedly germane to consider classifying a prestige car in 
terms of the perceived status conferred by ownership of a particular marque, as well as 
high price. This differed between markets, for, as Bennett pointed out, the Mercedes 
brand was regarded as pure luxury in the US market, but was a brand that also had a 
utilitarian image in Germany.61
With the ending of production for many of the UK specialist marques, such as 
Jowlett and Armstrong Siddeley, noted in Section 3.3 above, and with the demise of MG 
and Triumph sports cars, Jaguar by 1980 had become the only UK manufacturer 
producing specialist cars in reasonable volumes, although still small compared with the 
volumes produced by the likes of Ford and Vauxhall. Also the demise of MG/Triumph 
resulted in the specialist car market segment becoming in effect the luxury car segment, 
with what remained of the sports car manufacturers, mainly Lotus, Aston Martin, and 
Morgan, producing but a few hundred units each per year.62 During the 1980s Jaguar’s 
production volume as a proportion of total UK car production grew from 1.4% in 1980 to 
peak at 4.23% in 1988. This demonstrated the diminished relative importance of the UK 
specialist car sector compared, for example, to 1947 when, as shown in Table 3.3 above, 
the specialist car segment accounted for 9.2% of total UK car production. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, Jaguar’s main competitors were now overseas producers. In the Offer for Sale 
document in 1984, Jaguar’s main competitors in the UK were listed as being Mercedes, 
BMW, and Porsche, although it was pointed out then that only certain, unidentified, 
models were regarded as competing. It was not too surprising, therefore, given the nature 
of the source document concerned, that Jaguar claimed market leadership of this
60 Prudential-Bache Investment Circular. 13 April 1987
61 Martin Bennett Interview. Appendix pi 7.
62 SMMT Automotive Data Services Records.
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narrowly defined segment, which it referred to as “the luxury car market”, as shown in 
Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: UK Luxury Car Market Shares - Jaguar and Acknowledged 
Competitors, 1978 to 1983
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Two other points here are o f  note. First, whilst the “Others” category, which 
accounts for as much as 13% o f  the segment, undoubtedly includes marques such as 
Rolls Royce and Aston Martin, it is unknown if  it includes, for example, top o f  the range 
Saab or Volvo cars. Second, the inclusion o f  Porsche as a competitor at this time may 
have been motivated by Jaguar’s desire to give itself a more glamorous image at the time 
o f  the company’s public listing, but all the interviewees, when asked, excluded Porsche 
from Jaguar’s list o f  direct competitors. This was due not only, in their view , to Jaguar 
not producing sports cars, but also to the fact that the two marques were aimed at two 
different markets, with Porsche being regarded very much as a “Yuppie” car63, whilst 
“much o f  Jaguar’s American clientele was ‘old money’”.64
63 John Edwards. Meeting with the author, October 1987. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
64 Lorenz, op.cit. p255.
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The result o f  Jaguar defining its market segment in terms o f  its own product 
range, rather than in terms o f  more objective criteria, may be ascertained by examining 
Mercedes and BMW competing sales as a proportion o f  their total sales, shown in Figure
5.3.
Figure 5.3: Mercedes and BMW % of UK Retail Sales regarded  
by Jaguar as Competing, 1978 to 1983
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Year to December
□ Mercedes ■ BMW
Source: Jaguar Offer for Sale Document, 1984; SMMT Archives.
As can be seen, less than half o f  Mercedes sales, and less than a quarter o f  
BM W ’s sales were considered by Jaguar to be competing with it in the period 1978 to 
1983. At the time o f  the launch o f  the XJ40 in 1986, Jaguar defined the UK luxury car 
segment as comprising “the Mercedes ‘S’ class, and the 7 Series BMW in addition to 
Jaguar, and low volume producers like Rolls Royce”.65 Given that BMW 7 Series 
production in total in the period 1980 to 1983 represented only 8.5% o f  total worldwide 
sales o f  all BMW models in that period66, it may be ascertained from Figure 5.3 that UK 
customers bought a disproportionate number o f  BM W ’s top o f  the range models.
65 Jaguar Information Pack - XJ6 (XJ40) Launch., 1986.
66 e-mails from BMW Business and Finance Communication Department, Munich 25 September 2008 
(total BMW sales); 29 September 2008 (7 Series production figures).
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The important US luxury car market traditionally had been dominated by the 
domestically-manufactured Cadillac (owned by General Motors), and Lincoln (owned by 
Ford), but in the late 1970s and early 1980s the European marques within this market 
segment (as defined by Jaguar) succeeded in increasing their sales and market share, as 
shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Shares of Jaguar-defined US Luxury Car Market,
1978 to 1983
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
000s 000s % 000s 000s % 000s % 000s %
European* 68 11.7 74 14.5 73 20.3 84 23.5 104 24.8 137 27.0
Cadillac 335 57.6 308 60.4 213 59.3 211 59.1 227 54.2 273 53.8
Lincoln 179 30.7 128 25.1 73 20.4 62 17.4 88 21.0 97 19.2
Total 582 100 510 100 359 100 357 100 419 100 507 100
Source: Jaguar Offer for Sale document, 1984
(’ European group here consisted of Jaguar, BMW, Mercedes, and Porsche)
In its Offer for Sale document Jaguar listed its main US competitors as being 
the two indigenous marques plus Mercedes, BMW, and Porsche, but again only with 
regard to certain, unidentified, models. It can be seen from Figure 5.4 that, as was the 
case with the UK market, US customers bought a disproportionate number of BMW’s top 
of the range models. But Figure 5.4 also indicates that all Mercedes US sales have been 
included, a problem with this being that Jaguar did not compete in the diesel-engined 
market, and some 75% of Mercedes sales in the US in both 1982 and 1983 were of 
diesel-engined cars.67 Similarly, it is difficult to understand why the Porsche figures for 
1982 and 1983 were so much higher than those for previous years. Even so, what appears 
to be the case is that, unlike the data provided for the UK, the US luxury car sector is 
being defined more objectively, not merely in terms of, and in relation to, Jaguar’s own 
models. This more objective definition of the luxury car sector results in a somewhat 
different picture regarding market shares, with the European imports segment being 
dominated by Mercedes, as shown in Figure 5.5.
67 Automotive News. 24 October 1983.
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Figure 5.4: Mercedes, BMW, Porsche % of US Retail Sales regarded  
by Jaguar as Competing, 1978 to 1983
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However, trade publications such as Automotive News adopted a much wider 
definition of the sector and normally also included Audi, Volvo, and Saab in the category 
of “major European luxury-class exporters”.68 Dale, on the other hand, is adamant that 
Jaguar’s only real competitor in the US market was Mercedes, until the arrival of 
Japanese competition in the sector in 1989.69
Consequently, in the US market, for most of the 1980s Jaguar carefully 
positioned itself in terms of price between the Cadillac Seville and the Mercedes 300E. 
The raison d ’etre here was that 25% of Jaguar’s US sales at this time were “conquest” 
sales of existing Cadillac drivers, and Jaguar remained anxious not to frighten such 
custom away with forbidding sticker prices.70 However, status or personal image also 
played a part. Jaguar was not one of the most expensive players in the European luxury 
car sector in the US and, as Edwards explained at the time, “whilst dropping down to a 
domestic marque can cause problems for a customer’s image, a customer can step down 
from a Mercedes to a Jaguar without giving himself an image problem”.71 In April 1987, 
the Series III had a US sticker price of $37,500, compared to $32,000 fully optioned for 
the Cadillac Seville, $44,000 for the Mercedes 300E, and $42,500 for the BMW 735i.72
5.5 Geographical Markets - Overview
Although Jaguar had long exported its cars, as previously detailed in Section 3.3 above, 
its domestic market had traditionally been its largest single market and main focus, with 
UK sales invariably accounting for 40% or more of total sales in the period 1965 to 
1979.73 Consequently, until 1980 the pattern of Jaguar’s sales overall largely reflected its 
UK sales. From 1981, however, the pattern of Jaguar’s overall sales was determined by 
US sales, which had never previously exceeded 30% of the total74, as the Egan 
management increasingly focused on that market. Consequently, Jaguar enjoyed seven 
years of US-led sales growth, as shown in Figure 5.6, with Jaguar’s previous worldwide 
sales record, of 32,589 units achieved in 1971, being exceeded in 1984.
68 For example, Automotive News. 2 February 1987.
69 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p43.
70 John Edwards. Meeting with the author. October 1987.(Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
71 John Edwards. Meeting with the author. October 1987.(Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
72 Automotive News. 6 April 1987.
73 Whyte, op.cit. p241.
74 Ibid. p241, p247.
163
Indeed, the USA was the world’s largest single market for luxury cars, 
representing some three-quarters of the total worldwide market, and over seven times the 
size of that of West Germany, the world’s second largest luxury car market.75 From 1982 
onwards the US overtook the UK as Jaguar’s major market, accounting for over 59% of 
its total sales in 1986, as can be seen in Figure 5.7.
The fact that UK and US sales combined accounted for 70% or more of 
Jaguar’s annual total sales in the period 1982 to 1990 (shown in Figure 5.7) is testimony 
to the opportunistic nature of Jaguar’s sales effort, Egan having stated in 1982 that, “We 
want to build the company on the basis of four legs. We want them all to be pretty similar 
in size -  the UK, the US, Europe, and the Rest of the World”.76 Rather, Jaguar’s success 
in the US market led to a radical change in its marketing strategy, with the increasing 
returns ffom that market sustaining that particular policy, leading to Jaguar’s increasing 
dependence on the US market in this period. This led to two problems in particular. First, 
there was the need to design products to cater specifically for the somewhat different 
requirements of US consumers, something that the encrusted institutional structure of 
Jaguar’s engineering department appeared unwilling to do, or incapable of 
accommodating, as noted by Scheele.77 This inflexibility appeared to have Egan’s tacit 
approval, reflected in his apparent refusal to listen to the US dealers’ advice regarding the 
need for different product specifications in the US models.78 Second, as a result of this 
US-focused marketing strategy Jaguar was unable to develop other markets sufficiently 
rapidly to compensate for any downturn in its major market, as happened after 1987.
In the main, Jaguar’s geographical sales pattern in the early 1980s was a 
product of the poor distribution system that Jaguar inherited from BL for, to sell its cars 
in any national market outside of the UK, Jaguar, like any other motor manufacturer, 
required a supporting network of distributors in each market which would appoint and 
service the dealers. These dealers hold stock, promote the product, act as the point of 
sale, and provide after sales service and technical backup to customers. In the UK, Jaguar 
itself was its own distributor, appointing and managing its dealers, and in Canada and the
75 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984. p3.
76 Automotive News. 17 May 1982.
77 Nick Scheele. Interview with the author. May 2007. Appendix pi 36.
78 Martin Bennett Interview. Appendix p i5.
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Figure 5.6: Total Jaguar Retail Sales, 1975 to 1992,
and Year-on-Year % changes
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Note: Change of year end results in 1976 being a fifteen-month period. The figures for this year shown 
above are annualised (see also Figure 3.5)
Figure 5.7: Jaguar UK and US Retail Sales, 1975 to 1992, 
as % of Total Jaguar Sales
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USA Jaguar’s distributors were w holly-ow ned subsidiaries. In other markets, however, 
Jaguar sales at the tim e o f  privatisation in 1984 were handled by Austin Rover 
distributors w hose main focus o f  activity w as not that o f  selling  Jaguar cars. A prime 
objective for Jaguar fo llow ing  privatisation, therefore, w as to increase its market 
penetration in these territories through appointing its ow n distributors. Even so, as Dale 
argued, there could be problem s in not having w holly-ow ned  distributors because 
independent distributors deny the manufacturer direct contact with the dealers and, given  
that they did not have an investm ent in the production line, they could cancel orders 
without any financial penalty to them selves.79
5.6 The US Market: Saviour and N em esis
5.6.1 Background
As noted in Sub-Section 4.2.1 above, Jaguar’s distributor in the U SA  in the 1970s was 
Jaguar-Rover-Triumph Inc (JRT Inc.), a w holly-ow ned subsidiary o f  BL, which had been 
established primarily to sell MG and Triumph sports cars. Dale related that w hilst JRT 
Inc. “turned the U S into one o f  the few  profitable parts o f  the world for B L ....Jaguar was 
a very small part o f  the business, only about 3 ,000-4 ,000  cars a year, out o f  60 ,000-  
70,000, so it w as neither here nor there. It w as nice. It w as the cream on the pudding as it 
were”.80 H ow ever, by the end o f  the 1970s JRT Inc. had reached a watershed. A s  
previously noted in Sub-Section 4.2.1 above, BL had ended production o f  MG and 
Triumph sports cars, leaving JRT Inc. with only Jaguar cars to distribute. But Jaguar sales  
had fallen rapidly as a result o f  quality and delivery issues, and the recession resulting 
from the m id-1970s energy crisis which had affected the luxury car market. 
Consequently, JRT Inc. had to cope with an increasingly dem oralized dealer body, many 
o f  whom  thought that Jaguar w as going bankrupt.81
Figure 5.8 show s that Jaguar’s US sales halved between 1976 (w hich at an 
annualized 7 ,384  units were at a near record high) and 1980 (a year when Jaguar 
experienced its low est level o f  US sales since 1954).
79 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p33.
80 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p32.
81 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p39.
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Figure 5.8: Jaguar US Retail Sales, 1975 to 1992,
and Year-on-Year % Changes
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Jaguar’s designated peer group experienced mixed fortunes in this period, as 
may be seen from Figure 5.9, Porsche suffering from the impact o f  the energy crisis, 
particularly fuel prices that had more than doubled, whilst, on the other hand, BMW  
benefited as a result o f  its smaller, more fuel-efficient, 3 Series range, and Mercedes 
benefited somewhat from the greater demand for diesel-engined cars.
From 1981 onwards, as may also be seen in Figure 5.8, Jaguar experienced a 
significant renascence, before its fortunes again reversed as a result o f  the dire quality 
problems with the XJ40. The sales growth, according to Dale, was the product of:
the dealership package, which was absolutely key to the whole thing; the £/$ 
relationship; the enthusiasm that John [Egan] had set o ff  which really made us 
believe, and he really was trying to change things from a quality point o f  view; 
mass media advertising, and we had the best ten years o f  advertising that w e’d 
done consistently.82
These factors are discussed in the following sub-sections o f  this chapter.
82 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p42.
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Figure 5.9: Indices of US Retail Sales - Overall US Market
and Selected Luxury Marques, 1975 to 1980
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However, given his later comments, Dale is being somewhat charitable in 
regard to the initial impact o f  Egan on JRT Inc. since its senior management had 
discovered that at an early stage the Egan board had held secret discussions aimed at 
transferring the US distributorship to Lincoln Mercury. This would have resulted in 
Jaguar losing control o f  its distribution in the world’s largest market as well as direct 
contact with its dealers, and would have “given away at least 5% o f  the margin forever, 
plus losing control o f  half the production line volum e”.83 The offer made by Lincoln 
Mercury was to guarantee sales o f  10,000 units in the first year, which was “a big 
temptation to a company desperate for sales and would have been a life saver in the short 
term”.84 Although the JRT Inc. management eventually persuaded Jaguar that having a 
wholly-owned distributor in the US was “the key to turning Jaguar around from both a 
profit and a volume point o f  v iew ”, the incident did nothing for the morale o f  the JRT 
Inc. senior management, or for its future relationships with Jaguar UK for, as Dale made 
clear, “we never trusted the [Jaguar] Board from then on”.85
83 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p33.
84 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p33.
85 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p33.
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5.6.2 The Dealer Network
In the early 1970s there were several independent distributorships in the USA, managing 
a total of some 1,250 dealerships, for the various BL marques. With the decline in BL 
sales these distributors were bought up by BL and rationalised into JRT Inc., with the 
number of dealerships being reduced to 450 by the mid-1970s, most of whom were 
Jaguar dealers.86 By this time, JRT Inc. had become the second most profitable franchise 
in the US in terms of percentage return on sales, and the demise of MG and Triumph 
sports cars at the end of the decade left it only with the troubled Jaguar marque, for which 
there were 269 somewhat demoralised dealers at the start of 1980.87 By this time the 
dealers, “had started to get angry. Most of the dealers were local businessmen who knew 
the people who they sold the cars to, and if the car broke down they’d get people beating 
them up, not literally, but they’d go out to a cocktail party or something and get moaned 
at”.88
Having been reassured by Egan that the Jaguar quality, and, more 
importantly, delivery, problems would be resolved, Dale and his team set about re- 
motivating the dealer body, encouraging the dealers to invest in cooperative advertising, 
and improve customer service levels. Motivating the dealer body was a major reason why 
Jaguar resumed sponsorship of a Trans Am racing team with a rebuilt XJ-S in 1981, BL 
having abandoned racing in 1978.89 In the 1981 season the Jaguar team won three of the 
nine races, and came second overall.90 In early July 1981, on a trip that seems to have 
passed into folklore, and which appears to mark the turning point in Jaguar’s fortunes, 
Dale took some eighty US dealers to visit Browns Lane. Many of these, according to 
Dale, returned to the US, “thoroughly fired up....and became the core of our turnaround 
effort”.91 Although Egan was later to claim the credit92, the success of the visit was 
unquestionably Dale’s accomplishment, with the final evening’s dealer-inspiring after-
86 Mike Dale e-mail to the author. July 2007. Appendix p39, n43.
87 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p38.
88 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p50.
89 Dale, Michael “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the US”. Fortune. 28 April 1986. pi 15.
90 Long, Brim Jaguar XJ-S. The Full Story o f Jaguar’s Grand Tourer. (Dorchester, 2000). pi 33.
91 Dale, Michael “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the US”. Fortune. 28 April 1986. pi 14.
92 Wood, Jonathan. Wheels o f Misfortune: The Rise and Fall cfthe British Motor Industry 
(London, 1988). pp232-3.
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dinner speech being delivered by Dale, not Egan.95 The visit, according to Dale, was, 
however, “a last gasp. Some dealers wouldn’t even com e on the trip”94. Dale also 
recounted that, despite the apparent revitalisation o f  the marque, a number o f  dealers 
remained disillusioned and voluntarily gave up selling Jaguars, som e being encouraged to 
do so by JRT Inc., “so that by 1984 w e’d actually got them down to about 180 dealers 
without spending a cent”.95 Figure 5.10 shows the gradual reduction o f  the US dealer 
body.
Figure 5.10: Jaguar US Franchises, 1979 to 1990
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Reducing the number o f  dealers to a level determined by total US sales o f  
some 20,000 cars per year was a key part o f  the strategy for success formulated by JRT 
Inc. (which as noted in Sub-Section 4.2.1 above, was renamed Jaguar Inc. in 1983 when 
its ownership was transferred from BL to Jaguar), since it had become apparent that the 
Jaguar franchise had to be made attractively profitable to a dealer in order to justify
93 Dale. “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the US”, p i l l ;  Mike Dale e-mail to the author. August 2007. Appendix 
p44n51.
94 Mike Dale e-mail to the author. August 2007. Appendix p44n50.
95 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p39.
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expensive investm ents in im proving prem ises and service capability to the level o f  other 
European luxury cars.96 A s Dale later made clear:
Our dealers couldn’t afford the facilities, management, or equipm ent to com pete. 
W orse, the average m echanic saw  a Jaguar so rarely that regardless o f  how  
diligent his training, he could not be expected to possess the experience and skills  
o f  his counterparts at the com petition. We had no choice but to shrink our dealer 
body to raise its quality.97
In m id -1984 Jaguar announced plans to get rid o f  36 dealers, offering each a 
compensation package. H ow ever, dealers rights were safeguarded by quite stringent 
federal and state laws, and w hilst eleven dealers accepted the com pensation offered, 
tw enty-five dealers took legal action against Jaguar.98 Although m ost o f  the cases were 
settled by negotiation, and Jaguar did eventually reach its target o f  som e 140 dealers, the 
process took eight years to com plete, and cost m illions o f  dollars in legal, and other, 
expenses99 in addition to the £7m illion provided for as an extraordinary item in the 1984 
Jaguar accounts.100 The outcom e, how ever, was dramatic, with average sales per dealer 
rising from eleven cars per year in 1980 to 150 cars per year in 1986, as can be seen in 
Figure 5.11.
In terms o f  the average number o f  cars sold per dealer, Jaguar m oved from 
bottom position in the U S luxury car sector, in the period 1975 to 1980, as shown in 
Figure 5 .12 , to overtake Lincoln and Porsche, and be within striking distance o f  Cadillac 
by 1987, as shown in Figure 5 .13 , by which tim e a Jaguar dealership had becom e a very 
attractive business opportunity. Jaguar and its dealers had now  entered a virtuous circle  
for, as Jaguar’s sales, and prices, increased, and dealer margins were uplifted by Jaguar, 
dealer profits increased substantially, with the average dealer gross profit rising from  
$1,500 per car in 1980 to $6 ,500  per car in 1985.101 A s Edwards remarked, “from being  
cranky old little dealers they started m aking big bucks. I think w e made more Am erican  
Dollar m illionaires in that period than anyone. You know, their earnings w ent from
96 Automotive Age. October 1985.
97 Dale. “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the US”, pi 19.
98 Ibid. pp 119-120.
99 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p40.
100 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts, 1984.
101 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p40.
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Figure 5.11: Jaguar Average Annual Sales per US Franchise,
1974 to 1987
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Source: Automotive News. Various Issues 1975 to 1988.
Figure 5.12: US Luxury Car Segment Average Annual Retail Sales 
per Franchise, 1974 to 1980
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Figure 5.13: US Luxury Car Segment Annual Average Retail Sales 
per Franchise, 1981 to 1987
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Source: Automotive News. Various Issues 1982 to 1988
nothing to a million Dollars”.102 This meant, as Dale emphasised, that Jaguar “had 
enormous muscle with the quality. We were able to mask the quality 
[problem s]....[because] there was this tremendous agreement between ourselves and the 
dealers, and the District Service Managers, for instance, to fix the customer, even if  he’s 
outside warranty”.103
However, a reversal in dealer fortunes resulted from the US launch o f  the 
XJ40 in 1987. Bennett, for example, believes that the quality problems o f  the XJ40 had 
resulted in him losing fifty per cent o f  his Jaguar customers.104 Dealers had borrowed, in 
some cases quite heavily, to invest in new premises and enhanced customer service, Egan 
reporting in 1989 that, “90 o f  Jaguar’s 140 US dealers have upgraded or built new  
facilities”.105 Consequently, the dramatic fall in sales, particularly in 1991, resulted in 
some heavy financial losses by dealers, and, as Dale related, “Quite a number o f  the 
dealers here went bankrupt; quite a large percentage. We lost some really good dealers as
102 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p51.
103 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p40.
104 Martin Bennett Interview. Appendix p i3.
105 John Egan, quoted in Automotive News. 12 September 1988.
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a result o f  the XJ40. There w as a deep feeling o f  anger in the m anagem ent o f  Jaguar Inc. 
towards the UK ” 106, Dale going on to cite the case o f  G ene Fisher, owner o f  a dealership 
in Texas, and President o f  the Jaguar National Dealer Council: “This guy w as a multi­
m illionaire and he ended up as a $160 ,000  a year salesman in a dealership down there [in 
Texas]. So you can see why there was a certain amount o f  anger with the UK. These were 
good friends o f  ours w ho laid their lives on the line”.107
5.6.3 A dvertising and Promotion
As m entioned above, D ale held that m ass m edia advertising w as an important part o f  
Jaguar’s recovery in the U SA  throughout the 1980s -  “the best ten years o f  advertising 
that w e ’d done consistently”.108 A s might be expected, much o f  the advertising w as aimed 
at overcom ing the poor reliability image that had haunted Jaguar in the late 1970s. In 
1982, for exam ple, Jaguar’s advertising copy focused on “sm oothness, sophistication, 
‘superb engineering’, and ‘Jaguar luxury’ as w ell as the warranty protection” 109, the new  
Jaguar 36 ,000-m ile  tw o-year warranty having been introduced for the 1982 m odel year. 
Certainly, as noted in the next section, this was a m essage that, when com bined with the 
revitalised dealer body, had a big impact on potential custom ers and w as a significant 
factor in the sales increase at this time. Much o f  the advertising cost w as shared, 
providing support for local or regional promotional cam paigns by particular dealers, this 
accounting for som e 50% o f  Jaguar Inc’s total advertising spend o f  $3m illion  in 1982.110 
However, advertising spend w as low  relative to M ercedes, which D ale regarded as being 
Jaguar’s main com petitor, with Jaguar relying more on PR in the recovery period. In 
1985, for exam ple, Jaguar spent $1.444m illion  on television  advertising, compared to 
$10.333m illion by M ercedes.111 This amounted to $70 per car sold by Jaguar in the year, 
compared to $118  per car for M ercedes. Unsurprisingly, Jaguar’s advertising spend
106 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p35.
107 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p36.
108 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p43.
109 Automotive News. 26 April 1982.
110 Ibid 4 September 1983.
111 Ibid. 10 March 1986.
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increased significantly, to some $20million over the twelve months from May 1987, to 
support the launch of the XJ40."2
The PR campaign undertaken by Jaguar, apart from the obvious courting of 
the motoring press, aimed at more favourable press comment, had two main elements. 
The re-entry of Jaguar into motor racing, mentioned earlier, certainly gave Jaguar a great 
deal of positive press coverage, but what Dale regarded as the most important ingredient 
in the recovery was the quality tracking programme which commenced at the beginning 
of 1982. Every month a percentage of Jaguar customers were telephoned by the J D 
Power market research company and asked about their ownership experience, and if there 
was a problem the customer was put in touch with a District Service Manager who would 
endeavour to fix the problem.113 Although having a very practical purpose, this 
programme proved to be a major factor in building the company’s credibility.114
5.6.4 Renascence and New Horizons: 1981 to 1987
Jaguar’s recovery was fairly rapid, aided initially by positive publicity following the 
appointment of Egan, a rapid improvement in deliveries, and a relatively strong imported 
luxury car market, compared to an overall US market that was in decline in both 1981 
and 1982, as may be seen from Figure 5.14. Whilst the 55% increase in Jaguar’s sales in 
1981, albeit from the 25-year low suffered in 1980, was impressive, the real breakthrough 
was achieved in 1982 when Jaguar recorded a 120% increase in sales, as was shown in 
Figure 5.8 above, the 10,349 cars sold being a US sales record for Jaguar, and for the first 
time its US sales exceeded those in the UK. As previously mentioned, there were a 
number of factors involved, of which a perception of improved quality, and the very real 
improvement in dealer service were paramount. In 1983 Jaguar appeared in the J D 
Power Customer Satisfaction Index for the first time, lying in thirteenth place out of 
twenty-seven marques.115 In 1984 Jaguar was placed sixth out of thirty-two marques, and 
in 1985 advanced one place again.116 Such success was self-feeding, Jaguar enjoying 
continual growth in US sales from 1981 to 1986, as shown in Figure 5.14.
1,2 Ibid 6 April 1987.
113 Dale, Michael. “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the 1980s”. pi 15.
114 Automotive News. 16 August 1982.
115 Dale. “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the US”, pi 19.
116 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1985. pi 3.
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Figure 5.14: Indices of US Retail Sales - Overall US Market and
Selected Luxury Marques, 1980 to 1986
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Source: Automotive News 100 Year Almanac, 1996
In 1981 Jaguar was able to take advantage o f  the resurgence in its popularity 
in the US, and o f  its no longer being associated with the more down-market Triumph and 
MG products, as well as the strength o f  the US market for imported luxury cars, to 
impose a major price increase o f  18.5% for the Series III 1982 model year vehicle. This 
was a model that was better equipped and was offered with an extended warranty. 
Continued strong growth in demand, and maintenance o f  the pricing differential against 
other luxury marques, permitted regular price increases, as shown in Figure 5.15.
In 1982 there was another significant increase, o f  7.3%. More modest price 
increases followed in the next three years but, in 1986, as the Series III was run out, and 
perhaps to prepare the market for the introduction o f  the XJ40, there were three separate 
price increases put into effect, resulting in an overall 11.6% increase for the year. A 
further price increase o f  4.2% was imposed in April 1987, giving an overall price 
increase o f  nearly 62% for the Series III compared to 1980.
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Figure 5.15: Series III/XJ40 US Retail Prices, and % changes,
1980 to 1989
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Table 5.3 shows US list price comparisons between the Jaguar saloon model 
and its defined competing models, although it has to be noted that given changes in 
specification between years, these models are not always strictly comparable, with all 
manufacturers increasing the level o f  refinement and specification over this time period. 
As can be seen, Jaguar reduced the pricing differential in regard to its two defined 
competitors in the period, but ensured that BMW and Mercedes retained a premium in 
excess o f  20% to the comparable Jaguar model.
Table 5.3: US Price C om parisons between Jaguar XJ6  
and perceived com peting m odels, 1980, 1987, and 1989 m odel years
Date Jaguar
XJ6
BM W  7 Series M ercedes 300E  
(300SE in 1989)
List Price 
$
List Price 
S
Premium to 
XJ6
List Price 
$
Premium to 
XJ6
March 1980 23,200 28,945 25% 30,584 32%
April 1987 37,500 45,487 21% 46,500 24%
May 1989 44,000 54,000 23% 54,400 24%
Source: Automotive News.(I March 1980, 3 April 1987,9 May 1989)
Note: Jaguar prices arc for Series III in 1980 and 1987, and XJ40 in 1989. For BMW and Mercedes, the prices stated
are for the mid-point of the range of prices stated for each model.
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5.6.5 Gfttterdammerung: 1988 to 1992
The XJ40 went on sale in North America in May 1987, heralded as the car that, “will 
enable Jaguar to reach the customer satisfaction and dealer quality levels achieved by 
Mercedes-Benz, the industry’s leader and Jaguar’s big rival”.117 Jaguar’s hopes for the 
new car had been high, Edwards opining that eventual annual US sales of 30,000-35,000 
looked a modest target.118 But initial XJ40 supply constraints meant that 1987 US sales 
volumes declined some 6% overall, despite the 11% increase in XJ-S sales.119 The 
collapse in share prices in October 1987 (the stock market “Crash”, discussed in Section
9.4 below) did not, according to Dale, have “much effect at all”120 on Jaguar sales, unlike 
Porsche whose “dependence on Wall Street yuppiedom”121 resulted in its sales halving in 
the final quarter of 1987.122
The 1987 Crash presaged an economic downturn that was accompanied by a 
greater weakening of the US Dollar, particularly against the European currencies. This 
caused Mercedes and BMW in particular to raise further their US prices, as has been 
shown in Table 5.3, to compensate for the lower Deutschmark revenues. This, in turn, led 
to falling demand for European luxury cars. Two other factors impacted on the sales of 
the European luxury imports at this time. First, the improvements in quality of both 
Cadillac and Lincoln resulted in strong relative sales performances. As noted in Section
5.4 above, the European models commanded a significant premium to the domestic 
offerings, the Series III in 1987, for example being priced some 17% higher than the 
Cadillac Seville.
In the 1988 JD Power Customer Satisfaction Index, Lincoln moved to sixth 
place (from twelfth place in 1987), and Cadillac moved to fourth place, from seventh.123 
Cadillac sales were largely unchanged in the period 1987 to 1990, but Lincoln sales grew 
steadily, giving a 39% increase by 1990 on the 166,000 cars sold in 1987. The European 
imports, on the other hand, saw a continual deterioration in US sales during this period, 
as shown by Figure 5.16.
117 Automotive News. 6 April 1987.
118 John Edwards. Meeting with the author. January 1987. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
119 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1987. pi 7
120 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p42.
121 Lorenz, op cit. p255.
122 Automotive News 100 Year Almanac, 1996.
123 Automotive News. 8 August 1988.
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Second, the entry o f  the Japanese into the US luxury sector in 1989 had an 
immediate impact. This was a threat that had not been recognised by the Jaguar board, 
despite continual warnings by D ale124, although here it has to be noted that motor industry 
experts such as Bhaskar el a l were arguing in 1984 that the Japanese were “not a real risk 
in the short run”.125 However, in the first four months following its launch in September 
1989, Toyota achieved sales o f  16,302 cars for the Lexus LS400, with a base price o f
Figure 5.16: Indices of US Retail Sales - Overall US Market 
and Selected Luxury Marques, 1986 to 1992
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$35,000126, compared with sales o f  14,509 XJ40s in the full tw elve months o f  1989.127 
The XJ40 had a base price o f  $44,000, as shown in Table 5.3, but this was lowered to 
$39,700 at the time o f  the Lexus launch with the introduction o f  a lower specification 
model, discussed below. In calendar year 1990, its first full year o f  sales, Lexus sold a 
total o f  63,534 cars, almost equalling total BMW sales o f  63,646 cars, and N issan’s 
Infiniti Q45, with a base price o f  $38 ,000'28, achieved sales o f  23,960 cars, compared
124 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p43.
125 Bhaskar, K N e /  al. Jaguar: An Investor’s Guide (University of East Anglia, 1984). p22.
126 Automotive News. 21 August 1989.
127 Automotive News 100 Year Almanac, 1996.
128 Automotive News. 21 August 1989.
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with 13,958 XJ40s, and total Mercedes sales of 78,375 cars.129
In this environment, and well ahead of the entry of the Japanese, both 
Mercedes and BMW resorted to offering incentives to dealers and customers, measures 
previously unheard of from these manufacturers.130 At first, Jaguar, shielded by the 
backlog of orders for the XJ40, with its first quarter 1988 sales being ahead nearly 9% of 
the comparable 1987 period, and with supply not meeting demand until April 1988131, 
refrained from discounting or offering “disruptive and expensive sales incentives”.132 This 
policy was continued throughout 1988, despite sales for the remainder of the year falling 
below those of 1987, resulting in overall 1988 sales, at 20,727, being 9.6% lower than 
those of 1987. However, the situation was far worse for Jaguar than the actual fall in sales 
indicated. Having initially forecast 1988 US sales of some 28,000 cars133, the actual 
outcome was some 26% below this expectation. Indeed, in December 1987 Edwards had 
stated that if 1988 US sales did not reach 24,000 then profits would be adversely 
affected134, but by June 1988 Jaguar were admitting that sales of 23,000 was the 
maximum that could be achieved in the US in 1988.133 By June 1989, with a further 
downturn in sales, Jaguar finally admitted defeat and started to offer limited financial 
discounts to US customers in order to offload 1989 model year cars before the new model 
year136, a tactic last used by Jaguar in 1980 when seeking to offload 1979 model year 
Series III V12 cars.137 In addition, Jaguar dealers were offering customer discounts of 
$1,000-$2,000 on the $44,000 XJ40.138 In September 1989, Jaguar announced a lower- 
priced, lower-specification version of the XJ40 for the US market, retailing at $5,000 less 
than the previously cheapest XJ40 model, and also reduced the standard XJ40 price by 
$1,000.139
129 Automotive News 100 Year Almanac, 1996.
130 Automotive News. 18 April 1988.
131 Idem.
132 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1988. p i7.
133 John Edwards. Meeting with the author. October 1987 (Author’s own contemporaneous notes); John 
Egan quoted in Automotive News. 14 December 1987.
134 John Edwards. Meeting with the author. December 1987 (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
133 Tom McDonnell, Investor Relations VP, Jaguar Inc. Telephone conversation with the author. June 1988. 
(Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
136 Sunday Times. 18 June 1989; Automotive News 21 August 1989.
137 Automotive News. 10 March 1980.
138 Jaguar City Investors Meeting. June 1989 (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
139 Automotive News. 18 September 1989.
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Despite such actions, Jaguar sales continued to decline, and by 1992 had 
fallen to only 38% of their 1987 level. Jaguar insisted that its declining US sales in this 
period resulted from the overall decline in US demand for luxury cars and the greater 
intensity of competition.140 This was an explanation that seemed to be accepted without 
question, with a few exceptions, by the media at the time141, and has been repeated so 
often that it appears to have gained the status of fact, and reiterated as such in most books 
focusing on Jaguar.142 Indeed, in 2007 Lorenz still believed that it had been weak US 
market conditions per se that had adversely impacted Jaguar US sales volumes in 1987- 
92.143 However, this is a view that ignores the performance of other luxury car 
manufacturers in this period. Whilst Jaguar’s US sales in 1992 had collapsed to 38% of 
their 1987 level, for BMW the comparable figure was 75%, for Mercedes 70%, for 
Cadillac 82%, and 97% for Lincoln.144 The Japanese, on the other hand, continued to 
make strong advances, Lexus sales of 92,890 in 1992 being 46% ahead of its 1990 sales, 
and Infiniti’s 1992 sales of 44,387 represented an 85% increase over 1990.145 Obviously, 
difficult market conditions alone are an insufficient explanation for Jaguar’s US sales 
performance in this period.
The evidence indicates that the primary cause of Jaguar’s falling sales in this 
period was the major quality problems suffered by the XJ40, detailed in Chapter Seven. 
However, Jaguar’s well-honed disinformation and obfuscation skills kept news of these 
problems out of the public arena, with the only accurate contemporary account of the 
issues affecting Jaguar appearing to be that by Kenneth Fleet in The Times, who wrote 
unambiguously that, “it is quality....that is mainly responsible for falling sales”.146 But 
this was a statement that tended to be ignored by other commentators, particularly since 
there was no supporting evidence offered. Indeed, the fact that the 1989 JD Power Initial 
Quality Survey showed Jaguar having fallen to 31st place out of 37 marques147 passed
140 For example: Jaguar City Results Meetings March 1989, and September 1989.
141 For example: The Times 6 October 1988, The Financial Times 12 September 1989.
142 Thorley op.cit pi 55; Lorenz op.cit. pp255-6; Underwood op.cit pi 63; Dugdale, John. Jaguar in 
America. (Otego, New York, 1993) p249.
143 Andrew Lorenz Interview. Appendix pi 03.
144 Automotive News 100 Year Almanac, 1996.
145 Idem.
146 The Times. 8 October 1988.
147 Automotive News. 3 July 1989.
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largely without comment.
That the problems with the XJ40 received very little media coverage in the 
USA was due largely to two factors. First, the improved service offered by dealers in 
fixing problems as a result, according to Dale, of the agreement, mentioned earlier, 
between Jaguar and its dealers “to fix the customer, even if he’s outside warranty”. This 
was recognised in the 1989 JD Power survey where, despite Jaguar being placed in the 
bottom ten, its dealers were rated in second position in their abilities to fix customers’ 
problems.148 Second, Jaguar’s generosity regarding repairs and remedial work undertaken 
under warranty. In this regard Edwards remarked that, “We were paying people off to 
keep quiet in my view”.149 Weidinger recalled that, “In 1989 as much as 25% of our sales 
were replacing people’s 1988 models to avoid lawsuits”150, and later added:
In May 1987 through to the following May to September I sold seventeen 
hundred bad XJ40s....Jaguar, to their credit, would pay, pay, pay, and pay to 
repair them. They never said no to the customers. In 1989 rather than have people 
who had 1988 Jaguars sue them they would try and get some money from them 
and put them in a new car. It was awful.151
Bennett recounted how Egan had complained about warranty costs “going 
through the roof’, but observed that:
when warranty costs are high it means dealers’ service departments are busy, 
which on a short term perspective is okay, but on a long term perspective it is not 
because if they [the customers] have to keep coming in to the service department 
they’ll go somewhere else and buy another car. And that’s exactly what happened 
with XJ40. We couldn’t get our service department big enough, we couldn’t hire 
technicians fast enough to cope with the demand because the cars were just 
rolling back in time after time.152
However, the continued high level of problems with the XJ40 had an adverse 
impact on Jaguar’s image and sales volumes that was cumulative, resulting, in turn, as 
mentioned earlier, in many of Jaguar’s best dealers going out of business, thus diluting
149 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p i4.
150 Jake Weidinger. Interview with the author. May 2008. Appendix p i46.
151 Jake Weidinger Interview. Appendix pi 48.
152 Martin Bennett Interview. Appendix p48.
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Jaguar's customer service capability. Whilst little negative comment consequently 
appeared in the media, much was transmitted by word of mouth. As Dale explained:
We were cocktail party chatter. But because in 1980 we sold only 3,500 or so 
cars, something like only 0.8% of the luxury car market, nobody [customers] had 
any real experience. Then all of a sudden our market penetration explodes and 
we’re selling almost as many XJ40s as they’re selling Mercedes 300Es. Now 
when we were selling 20,000 of these XJ40s, in the cocktail party circuit it was no 
longer legends, it was “You should see how they’ve screwed me”. What we had 
done was poison the market. By the time we got to 1991 something like 85% of 
the luxury car market said they wouldn’t even go into our showrooms because of 
our quality reputation We were really heading to extinction then.153
The situation was eventually turned around by the introduction of a new 
range of Jaguars in 1993/94, and the introduction of a leasing programme in the US -  
“because nobody’d buy a car”.154 Consequently Jaguar’s US sales increased to 18,085 
cars in 1995 from the low of 8,681 cars in 1992.
5.7 The UK Market
As mentioned in Section 5.5 above, the UK, Jaguar’s domestic market, had traditionally 
been its major market, with sales, although variable, never falling below 10,000 units per 
annum in the period 1961 to 1978, and peaking at 15,925 units in 1974.155 During this 
period Jaguar was probably the market leader in the UK luxury cars sector. However, the 
effects of the recession resulting from the mid-1970s energy crisis, together with quality 
problems, and production problems, particularly industrial action, resulted in a sharp fall 
in sales in 1979, to below 10,000 units, and further sales downturns in the following two 
years, as shown in Figure 5.17.
In 1982 Egan was to remark that for Jaguar the UK was the toughest market 
in the world “because Jaguar had so many disgruntled customers there”.156 This period is 
also marked by the fact that it was during this time that Jaguar was overtaken by both 
Mercedes and BMW in terms of volume sales, as can be seen in Figure 5.18, although 
Jaguar argued, as mentioned in Section 5.4 above, that it had leadership of the segment
153 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p41.
154 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p41.
155 Whyte, op.cit. p241.
156 John Egan quoted in Automotive News. 17 May 1982.
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comprised o f  models similar to its own.
Unfortunately this is an argument which at best may be described as being 
somewhat disingenuous, but illustrative o f  the illusion Jaguar sought to create and 
maintain, and remained a feature o f  Jaguar’s PR output. In respect o f  1988 Jaguar was 
claiming that, “Daimler and Sovereign models continued their domination o f  the UK 
luxury saloon car sector, capturing a 56% share”.157
Although sales increased after 1981, Jaguar’s concentration on, and 
consequent re-direction o f  production to, the US market resulted, to all intents and 
purposes, in it putting the UK market on a care and maintenance basis until the dealer 
network was reorganized, and until the launch o f  the XJ40. This may have been a factor 
in the strengthening o f  both BM W ’s and M ercedes’ positions in the market, but sales 
figures for particular model ranges during this period do not appear to be available. 
Indeed, BMW informed the author that it does not have records o f  the sales o f  its 7 Series 
for the 1980s.158 Thus, although Jaguar sales are well below the totals o f  each o f  its 
defined competitors throughout the period, as can be seen from Figure 5.18, this has to be
157 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1988.
158 e-mail from BMW Business and Finance Communication Department, Munich, 29 September 2008.
Figure 5.17: Jaguar UK Retail Sales, and Year-on-Year % Changes,
1975 to 1992
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viewed in the context o f  the wider range o f  models offered by both BMW and Mercedes. 
Here, Finn made the observation that, “In the recession o f  the early 1990s Jaguar held its 
own against these, but the sales mix changed for both Mercedes and BMW. BM W ’s sales 
overall held up because they had the smaller 5 Series and 3 Series, and Mercedes because 
it had the smaller 190E”.159
5.18: UK Luxury C ar Retail Sales, 1978 to 1992
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The launch o f  the XJ40 into the UK market in 1986 was highly successful in 
terms o f  the interest, and demand, created, although supply constraints reduced the 
anticipated level o f  sales160, and resulted in slightly lower sales for the year as a whole, 
the major impact o f  the new car being seen in the following three years, as can be seen in 
Figure 5.18, with the 1978 sales volume figure being exceeded in both 1988 and 1989.
A factor in the improved sales volumes in the UK, as in the US, was the 
rationalisation o f  the dealer body, and the development o f  a new type o f  dealer showroom  
-  the “solus” outlet dedicated to Jaguar products, “without competing brands in the same
159 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p80.
160 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1986.
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showroom , or even more volum e orientated brands” .161 Unlike the dealers in the US, 
Jaguar’s UK dealers in the early 1980s were still also selling BL products and appeared 
to be locked in to a BL-formulated distribution system  and were resistant to the need for 
rationalization and the changes that Jaguar w ished to implement in regard to the creation 
o f  up-market prem ises and services that w ould reflect more Jaguar’s luxury image. Here, 
Egan recalled that:
One o f  the grandees o f  the dealer netw ork....cam e to see me. He said he w asn’t 
going to achieve these standards; he w asn’t going to do them; he w as going to 
have nothing to do with them. British Leyland had told him what to do and those 
were the standards he w as going to live by, and as far as he w as concerned he had 
spent the m oney, and that was it.162
This legacy o f  ingrained attitudes in the UK dealer network that Jaguar had 
inherited from BL w as som ething that Egan was anxious to challenge and overcom e for, 
as he pointed out, “ We, generally speaking, separated from British Leyland whatever w e  
were doing” .163 Even so, it is debateable as to whether Egan h im se lf identified the 
problems inherent the UK dealer network, and the consequent constraints to Jaguar’s 
sales growth, and took the lead in challenging and overcom ing these, or m erely provided 
the stamp o f  approval to the proposals formulated by others. That is, whether it w as Egan 
or one o f  his subordinates w ho formulated and implemented the radical redirection o f  the 
traditional distribution system  in the UK. A lthough Egan presents h im se lf  as being the 
driving force in the rationalization programme164, Putnam presents a different picture. 
According to Putnam, it w as he w ho led the rationalization programme, with Egan being  
loath to terminate som e dealers until persuaded otherw ise.165 This v iew  has som e support 
from there being no indication o f  a UK dealer rationalization programme until Johnson, 
w ho had recently jo ined  Jaguar from BL, announced the rationalization plan to the BL  
dealer council in March 1982.166
161 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p77.
162 John Egan. Interview with the author. October 2007. Appendix p67.
163 John Egan Interview. Appendix p67.
164 John Egan Interview. Appendix p67.
165 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i20.
166 Whyte, op.cit. p i79.
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By this time, the dealer rationalization programme had already commenced in 
the USA through a process of attrition, as was described in Sub-Section 5.6.2 above, and 
which in many respects was a continuation of the huge reduction in BL franchises in the 
USA during the 1970s. Certainly, rationalization of the UK dealer network was nothing 
new to BL, Whisler noting that, between 1968 and 1975, BL had terminated 7,000 
dealers, leaving it with some 4,000 dealers.167 Even so, as was mentioned in Section 5.2 
above, the 1980s Jaguar rationalization programme appears initially to have been a 
Jaguar Inc initiative, rather than an Egan-inspired Jaguar Group policy, but was one that 
was later taken up by the UK and European operations.
Similarly, it is unclear to what extent the up-grading of dealership premises, 
and services, originated with Jaguar itself, but certainly it appears that it was a 
development that was given considerable impetus by the ideas presented to Jaguar by 
Pendragon in 1983. Subsequently, Pendragon opened Jaguar’s first solus dealership in the 
UK, and played a large part in formulating Jaguar’s new corporate identity in the 
process168, the new premises becoming a “showcase” dealership, typifying Jaguar’s new 
corporate identity.169
The development of new premises required a significant amount of 
investment by dealers, and Finn recounted that most existing dealers reacted negatively to 
this development, with them describing solus premises as a “crazy” development since 
they would never be able to sell enough cars to get a return on the investment.170
As in the US, the impact of the rationalization and upgrading programme was 
dramatic, Putnam recalling that:
I inherited some 300 dealerships under BL, giving away 15 cars each. If you took 
the demonstrators out, there’d be virtually no cars sold. We started in 1982 and by 
1986 it was settling down at 100 cars per dealer at full margin....By 1988 we had 
111 dealers selling an average 130 cars each. We took the dealer margin 
down....We were giving them 17.5%, and took that back down to 15%, and put 
2.5% into a big pot. Those dealers who were prepared to invest in new premises 
took money out of this fund. That was the incentive....to get the dealers to invest.
167 Whisler. The British Motor Industry. p251.
168 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p77.
169 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix pl20; Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p78.
170 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p77.
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And those dealers that didn’t want to invest went. And for 10 years the dealers 
made a lot of money in the UK.171
Putnam later added that the dealer rationalization programme “cost us 
nothing....They didn’t have the degree of protection they had in the US, and it was done 
with great goodwill”.172 Consequently, “dealers made a fortune. It was probably the most 
profitable franchise in the UK”.173
Much of the sales increase after 1986 appeared to be due to the introduction 
of the XJ40 2.9-litre version which had been targeted at the upper executive car sector, 
which included certain Ford models as well as Audi, Volvo, and mid-range BMWs, 
although Jaguar was quick to point out that with the new model it was “not entering the 
executive car market”, merely lowering “the threshold of luxury car motoring”.174 Even 
so, the basic XJ40 2.9 was priced at £17,200 - below the price of the Rover Sterling, at 
£18,995, and the top-of-the-range Ford Granada 2.9 EFi Ghia at £17,478.175 By 1988, 
Jaguar was claiming that the XJ40 was “taking 25% of its sales from rival products in the 
upper executive sector”176, a statement that implied that Jaguar, with an overall sales 
increase of 30%, of which a third had resulted from increased sales of the XJ-S,177 had 
actually lost sales for its higher-priced saloons, but which was masked by the claim that, 
“Daimler and Sovereign models continued their domination of the UK luxury saloon car 
sector”.178 It is of note, however, that the price differential between the Jaguar’s higher 
priced XJ40 models and those of its German rivals in 1986 was not that great, the 3.6- 
litre Sovereign being priced at £24,995 against the BMW 735i at £20,550, and the 
Mercedes 380SEL at £24,995, and the Daimler 3.6-litre priced at £28,495 against the 
Mercedes 500SEL at £30,655.179
It is debateable, however, as to the extent to which the 2.9-litre model could 
be hailed as having been a success, one particular problem being that it was
171 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i20.
172 Roger Putnam. Telephone conversation with the author. July 2007. Appendix pl20nl32.
173 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix pi 19.
174 Jaguar Information Pack - XJ6 (XJ40) Launch, 1986.
175 Phillips and Drew Investment Circular, May 1987.
176 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1988.
177 Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1987, 1988.
178 Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1988.
179 Thorley, Nigel. Jaguar XJ40. Buying, enjoying, modifying. (Yeovil, 2002).p40; Which Car? 
March/April 1986.
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underpowered. Finn described it as not really being able to “pull your hat off’, and also 
having “a few problems technically”.180 The model was discontinued in 1990, by which 
time it had accounted for at most 10% of XJ40 total production in the period 1986 to 
1990’81, actual production being, in reality, lower than this for, as mentioned in Section
2.1 above, Thorley notes that Jaguar’s factory records do not differentiate between the 
XJ40 2.9-litre and 3.2-litre Standard/Daimler.
But despite the apparent expansion of the Jaguar customer base provided by 
the 2.9-litre model, and a motivated dealer body, UK sales fell sharply, in 1990 and again 
in 1991, the 45% sales plunge in 1991 paralleling the 50% fall in US sales in the same 
year. As with the US, the fall in sales was partly due to recessionary pressures, all three 
marques shown in Figure 5.18 seeing sales peaking in 1989 and then falling in the 
following two years. However, whilst BMW and Mercedes experienced an upturn in 
1992, Jaguar saw a further small decline, and the extent of the downturn was more 
marked for Jaguar, as may be seen in Figure 5.19. Indeed, as with the US, whilst Jaguar’s 
UK sales in 1992 had collapsed to 38% of their 1989 level, for BMW the comparable 
figure was 83%, and for Mercedes 79%. The issue in the UK, as with the US, was that of 
the quality of the XJ40 but, as in the US, Jaguar were able to prevent it entering the 
public arena, not only, according to Finn, because of the British being less demanding 
than consumers in the US, but also because of there being a nationalistic aspect: “There
was an air of optimism that the British car industry wasn’t finished everybody wanted
it [Jaguar] to win. The Press wanted it to win. Customers wanted it to win. The dealers 
wanted it to win”.182 Dale supported this view, arguing that, in any case, “the UK press 
were not going to be anti-Jaguar”.183
Putnam, attributed much of the success to the actions of the UK dealers:
In the UK and Europe we were able to maintain premiums with dealers who went 
to the final n* degree to make sure customers were looked after, even when they 
were having constant problems184,
180 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p81.
181 Thorley. Jaguar XJ40. pi 55.
182 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p83.
183 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p38.
184 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix pi 19.
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adding later that:
W e’d got the XJ40 absolutely flying away in the UK and the last thing we wanted 
to do was to see a big ‘ho-ha’ about the quality get out. We were actually quietly 
tackling the quality problem so as to not rock the boat.185
Figure 5.19: Indices of UK Sales - Overall UK Market and Main Luxury 
Marques, 1982 to 1992.
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Finn recalled how the XJ40 commanded a premium to the list price in the 
first two and a half years, as a result o f  UK demand outstripping supply, and customers 
not being too concerned about problems with the car because they knew that after a year 
they could get their money back on the car. In that sense, according to Finn, it was like “a 
bubble-type market”.186
Unlike the very real concerns expressed by the US dealers regarding the 
quality problems o f  the XJ40, mentioned in Sub-Section 5.6.2 above, Finn welcomed the 
problems with the XJ40 because it gave dealers the “opportunity to demonstrate how 
good you were”, and as a result o f  extremely good customer service and sorting out 
problems with the car the retention o f  those customers was “significantly greater than the
185 Roger Putnam telephone conversation with the author. July 2007. Appendix pi 19n 131.
186 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix pp81-82.
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most reliable product in the market because customers love som ebody looking after 
them”.187 However, Finn admitted that US customers were more quality focused than was 
the case in the UK, “and weren’t used to products that were more quirky”.188 Putnam, 
lending support to these statements, opined that, “the UK market is the biggest pushover 
in the world, not just cars, but anything”.189
However, as may be ascertained from the downturn in Jaguar’s sales volum es 
after 1989, the bubble burst after three years, with the measures undertaken by Jaguar’s 
dealers being insufficient to maintain sales, at least in line with those o f  other luxury car 
manufacturers.
5.8 Other Markets
A s discussed in Section 5.5, Egan’s stated intention in 1982 o f  developing four fairly 
similar-sized market legs became progressively unlikely to be achieved as Jaguar became 
focused increasingly on the US market. Indeed, during the period 1982 to 1992 the 
proportion o f  US and UK sales combined fell below  70% o f  Jaguar’s total sales in only  
one year, as shown in Figure 5.7 above.
A  major issue for Jaguar here was that o f  distribution, as mentioned in 
Section 5.5 above, and much effort was expended by Jaguar in appointing new  
distributors, although only a few  o f  these changes were reported by Jaguar at the time. In 
the potentially important West German market in 1983, Jaguar and the Frey Group o f  
Switzerland, a w ell established European distributor o f  cars, formed Jaguar Deutschland 
GmbH, o f  which Jaguar owned 35% .190 In Japan, another market identified as being 
potentially very important, Jaguar appointed Jaguar Japan KK (60% owned by Seibu 
Group o f  Japan, 40% by Jaguar) as its distributor.191 Both these arrangements presented 
potential problems in terms o f  D ale’s argument about the desirability o f  having wholly- 
owned distributors, although it was only in the case o f  West Germany that Jaguar 
experienced significant difficulties.
187 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p82.
188 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p83.
189 Roger Putnam telephone conversation with the author. July 2007. Appendix pi 19nl31.
190 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984.
191 Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1986, 1987.
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Indeed, Jaguar had continually held forth about the attractions o f  West 
Germany, the second largest luxury car market in the world, accounting for w ell over half 
o f  all European sales o f  luxury cars. In 1986 Jaguar estimated the size o f  the luxury car 
market in Continental Europe to be 60,000 cars per year, o f  which W est Germany 
accounted for 40,000 cars.192 However, although Jaguar was the only importer o f  luxury 
cars into Germany, it was the home market for M ercedes, BM W  and Porsche, and Jaguar 
never succeeded in achieving a market share greater than 2% in the period 1982 to 
1 9 8 7  193 Although Jaguar was not able to fully compete in the W est German market given 
that a third o f  registrations there, and 25% o f  BM W  cars sold there, in 1986 were diesel- 
engined cars194, the main problem was that Jaguar appears to have had little understanding 
of, and was not able to control, its dealers, despite the formation o f  Jaguar Deutschland. 
A s Putnam was later to explain, “the reason that BM W  and M ercedes ow n m ost o f  their 
distribution in Germany is that the German dealers are a law unto them selves ” . 195
In 1985 Jaguar was trumpeting its highest level o f  retail sales in West 
Germany -  2 ,350 units -  only to discover later that this figure had been distorted by the 
re-sale o f  som e 500 cars from Germany to the US, thus also undermining Jaguar’s 
attempts to balance its sales between different markets . 196 The m ost telling comment on 
this and the W est German market was by Putnam:
I’m afraid German dealers in the luxury sector have always been m assive grey 
marketers i f  there’s a shortage. I guess it’s a weakness on the part o f  British 
manufacturers to look at the size o f  the local German market and always plan a 
much bigger share than they could actually achieve. And, therefore, they always 
over-supplied the German market to meet that share expectation. The easiest way  
for the dealers to get rid o f  that share is to actually sell it som ewhere else, 
particularly i f  the market’s soft. It’s always been a problem . 197
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Jaguar’s actual retail sales in W est Germany never 
rose much above 2,000 cars per year in the 1980s.198 Jaguar, however, achieved some
192 Jaguar Information Pack - XJ6 (XJ40) Launch 1986.
193 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984; Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984-1988.
194 Automotive News. 26 May 1986.
195 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i21.
196 Prudential-Bache Investment Circular. 13 April 1987.
197 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix pl21.
198 Jaguar Interim Results Analysts meeting, September 1989 (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
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success elsewhere, particularly as a result o f  the introduction o f  the entry-level XJ40 2.9- 
litre model in 1986. Total sales in France reached 1,515 cars in 1988, compared to som e  
500 cars in 1986. Sales in Italy reached 804 cars in 1988, compared to 264 cars in 1986. 
Japan also started realising som e o f  its hoped-for potential, with sales o f  1,124 cars in 
1988, compared with som e 400 cars in 1986.199 But whilst comm endable, these advances 
were insufficient to offset the major downturn in the US market, and given the relatively 
small markets for luxury cars outside o f  the US, UK, and W est Germany, and Jaguar’s 
inability to make much advance in the German market, it is problematic as to whether 
Jaguar’s stated aim o f  achieving its “four leg goal” was m erely delusion on the part o f  
Jaguar’s management.
5.9 Summary and Conclusions
The Egan management failed to recognise and challenge a number o f  Jaguar’s 
organizational weaknesses that adversely impacted on its marketing effort, particularly in 
regard to areas such as market information, research, and analysis, and product planning. 
H owever, it did succeed in addressing the weaknesses inherent in the UK dealer network 
Jaguar had inherited from BL. With the assistance o f  the likes o f  Pendragon these were 
successfully challenged and overcom e. O ffsetting this, however, w as the problem o f  the 
com placency Jaguar developed as a result o f  its success in the US and which led to an 
institutional sclerosis as Jaguar becam e increasingly dependent on the US market. 
Consequently, as a result o f  it not adequately diversifying its business risk by developing  
other markets sufficiently it could not compensate sufficiently for any downturn in what 
had becom e its major market. But such analysis has to be view ed also in regard to the 
illusion that Jaguar created through its PR effort, and which was a mainstay o f  its 
marketing effort, the continued success o f  its PR creating and sustaining corporate 
arrogance.
Egan joined Jaguar at a time when one econom ic downturn was ending, and 
left as another was beginning. Although Jaguar’s sales pattern during this time might be 
said to be a reflection of, and a response to, the macro-economic cycle, it can be seen  
from the evidence presented in the preceding analysis that Jaguar’s ability to mask its
199 Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts, 1986 and 1988.
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quality problems, and project an image of a revitalised marketing-led organisation, was 
the major factor in determining its sales performance during this period. But whilst the 
illusion created by Jaguar initially enabled it to restore its poor reputation, and achieve 
record sales volumes, the problems with the XJ40 could not be so masked, at least in 
regard to its US customers, “word of mouth” being an important element in the 
maintenance of credibility in the USA.
However, such was the strength of the illusion created, and maintained, by 
Jaguar that the media hardly questioned that Jaguar’s dramatic decline in US sales was 
due to anything other than a softening of the market and intensified competition, despite 
the deterioration of Jaguar’s rating in the J D Power surveys. Indeed, Jaguar seems to 
have lost sight of Egan’s much-quoted precept, first unveiled in 1982, that, “In marketing 
and promotion the central aim is satisfying the customer”200, and instead succeeded in 
producing a great number of dissatisfied customers. Despite its increasing awareness of 
the quality problems with the XJ40, Jaguar continued to ship cars which could not match 
the image of them that had prompted customer purchase.
The portrayal of Jaguar as a marketing-led organisation also was more 
illusion than reality, Jaguar, and Egan in particular, focusing on PR aspects, with little 
attention apparently being given to market research and analysis, and market-based 
product planning and development. Consequently, Jaguar, despite making significant 
advances in its distribution in a number of markets, remained a production-led company, 
although its success in countering this image was such that few commentators would later 
question it.
One particular problem was Jaguar’s opportunism which led it to becoming 
dependent on the US market, and virtually abandoning its once-stated aim of building 
four legs in terms of markets, as well as allowing its main competitors to overtake it in its 
home market, traditionally its major market. The result of such opportunism was that 
Jaguar was widely held to be a “one market, one product” company, since over 50% of its 
volume sales were obtained in the US, and over 75% of its volume sales were obtained 
from the Series III/XJ40. It was apparent to many commentators at the time that problems 
with one or both of these variables could spell disaster for the company, but Jaguar’s
200 John Egan, cited in Automotive News. 30 August 1982.
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success in creating the illusion of a revitalised, marketing-led, company with a highly 
successful product, the XJ40, masked the extent of Jaguar’s difficulties following the 
launch of the XJ40.
Although the illusion created by Jaguar may, in the light of twenty-first 
century concerns about corporate governance and social responsibility, be criticised on 
ethical grounds, it has to be viewed more with consideration to the common practice of 
the time. Certainly, it is debateable as to the extent to which Jaguar’s PR campaign, 
resulting in the deliberate masking of its quality problems, paralleled that of other 
companies in the industry, and this is an issue that merits further study. Indeed, given the 
problems facing Jaguar in 1980 it is arguable as to whether it would have been able, 
given the limited resources available to it, to pursue any other marketing strategy. That 
this strategy eventually was the cause of Jaguar’s downfall does not detract from its 
appropriateness, or its initial success, for as Hamish Orr-Ewing commented:
The build up of the image of Jaguar by David Boole as a study of rebuilding a
company’s public image was absolutely masterly, but it had a serious backlash.....
everybody had been told that Jaguar was now a completely different business with 
a new vision of quality control, new participation by the workforce, pride, new 
product at the forefront of technology etc. That turned out not to be the case and 
there was some very serious disillusion, particularly in the US where the new “big 
cat” [the XJ40] actually turned out to be very unreliable. As a study in the 
promotion of a business without actually altering the product it was 
unquestionably a very major achievement....It worked, there’s no doubt about it. 
Jaguar was suddenly heralded as this new sparkling business producing different 
products with an industrial philosophy which was radically altering everything. 
Motoring journalists and politicians all believed it. It is astonishing to me that it 
was so successful. I’ve not known anyone else who’s been able to take a company 
which fundamentally had not been changed at all and put it on the map in a way 
that I would have thought was impossible.201
201 Hamish Orr-Ewing. Interview with the author, November 2002. Appendix p i 15.
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CHAPTER SIX
PRODUCTION AND LABOUR RELATIONS
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter Three o f  this thesis it was argued that when Egan arrived at Jaguar he 
appeared to have seen little wrong with the com pany’s corporate culture other than the 
weaknesses caused by trade union ingrained attitudes. Certainly, as this present chapter 
reveals, Jaguar in the Egan era suffered from poor manufacturing efficiency, discussed in 
Section 6.4, which may be seen to have been the product o f  a number o f  inter-related 
factors. These largely resulted from the pervasive and inflexible shop floor institutional 
structures that had becom e entrenched in the company during the L yons’ autocracy, and 
which was reinforced during the BL stewardship, as described in Section 3.7 above, and 
which included poor manufacturing system s and discipline (discussed in Sub-Section  
6.4.2), ineffectual production management (Sub-Section 6.4.3), and detrimental and 
outmoded work practices (Sub-Section 6.4.4). These, together with Jaguar’s antiquated 
manufacturing plant, discussed in Sub-Section 6.4.1, imposed considerable constraints on 
Jaguar’s ability to increase its volum e output, and contributed to increasingly poor 
product quality. This, as has been discussed in Chapter Five, impacted significantly on 
the levels o f  sales achieved by Jaguar, particularly in respect o f  the XJ40.
W hilst it is undoubtedly true that, as the Fourteenth Report o f  the House o f  
Commons Expenditure Committee in August 1975 (“ 1975 Committee”) observed, 
“H owever efficient the manufacture o f  vehicles, it is o f  little use unless the product can 
be sold”1, it has to be equally true that it is o f  little use selling a product that cannot be 
manufactured efficiently and to a defined quality. This was particularly evident in the 
case o f  Jaguar with the poor quality and reliability o f  the XJ40 being the main factor in 
the com pany’s declining sales volum es, and the company’s dem ise, in the late 1980s, 
described in Chapter Five.
1 “Motor Vehicle Industry. Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, with Evidence taken 
before the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee, and Appendices”. (Hereafter Expenditure Committee XIV 
Report). Parliamentary Papers. 1974-75. vol XXV. Para 161. p66.
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M ost studies o f  the motor industry in the last fifty years have concentrated on 
production and industrial relations because o f  their perceived central roles in the decline 
o f  the British motor industry in general, and o f  BL in particular. But, as Church has 
shown, scholars are divided on the role and importance o f  the various factors within the 
production function, with most studies ascribing the blame for production problems to 
labour, or management, or both.2
In Chapter Seven o f  this thesis it is argued that the problems with quality and 
reliability that had always been an issue for Jaguar were exacerbated in the 1980s as a 
result o f  deficiencies across many different areas o f  the Jaguar operation that emanated 
from the underlying problems o f  cultural mismatch between the various functions within 
the company and inadequate corporate resources. W hisler notes that there had been a 
tendency for British management generally to attribute the ‘quality problem ’ to poor 
workmanship3, a v iew  that had been propounded by Ray Nunwick, the Head o f  the 
Consumers’ Association Car Test Unit, when he told the 1975 Committee that, “this 
question o f  defects on new vehicles com es back at the end o f  the day to the quality o f  the 
workmanship, which is associated with the attitude o f  mind o f  the man putting the car 
together”.4 Jaguar, however, adopted a much broader stance on the issue, stating that, 
“Manufacturing shoulders the greatest responsibility for achieving the required standard 
o f  quality in finished motor cars”.5 This v iew  more appropriately indicated that the issue 
was multi-faceted, “manufacturing” embracing plant, equipment, manufacturing systems, 
and production planning and management, as w ell as workmanship.
These factors also impacted on the efficiency o f  production, an issue that was 
given great prominence by Egan in his public utterances, improvements here being cited 
as evidence o f  Jaguar’s revitalisation, and to indicate that the company had m oved away 
from many o f  the problems that had beset it, and the British motor industry generally, in 
the past. However, it is o f  note that Jaguar equated efficiency with productivity, that is, 
the number o f  cars produced annually per em ployee, rather than utilization o f  installed 
capacity. Indeed, there is no evidence o f  Egan ever having referred publicly to the
2 Church, Roy. The rise and decline o f  the British motor industry. (Cambridge, 1994). pp 120-129.
3 Whisler, Timothy R. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. A Case Study in Industrial Decline.
(Oxford, 1999). p358.
4 Expenditure Committee XIV Report. Q1715. p632.
5 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1984. pi 3.
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question o f  Jaguar’s installed capacity. Although Jaguar’s productivity continued to be 
w ell below  that o f  its main competitors the evidence indicates that the comparison in 
terms o f  the utilization o f  installed capacity would have been far more unfavourable. 
Beasley, for exam ple, admitted that Jaguar could have operated three shifts, but “w e  
never worked more than two shifts”6, while Grant revealed that a study by Ford shortly 
after its takeover o f  Jaguar indicated that the capacity o f  Jaguar’s existing plants was 
som e three and a half tim es that o f  its previous highest attained production level.7
However, the ability o f  Jaguar to achieve significant progress in improving its 
manufacturing was constrained to a considerable degree by its poor labour relations. In 
1975 the Central Policy R eview  Staff (CPRS) had listed a number o f  causes o f  poor 
labour relations in British industry, the m ost important appearing to be the following:
(i) A  lack o f  confidence in the prospects for the industry and em ploym ent within 
it.
(ii) A  serious lack o f  trust and faith between the two sides in the industry as the 
result o f  a long history o f  disagreement.
(iii) Poor channels o f  communication between management and labour.
(iv) Problems that resulted from the replacement o f  piecework by measured day 
work, including overmanning, reduced em ployee motivation, and lower 
productivity.8
A s will be shown in Section 6.4 below, Jaguar certainly suffered from each o f  
the last three factors listed, and while it attempted to improve its labour relations through 
comm unicating directly with the workforce, this failed to overcom e what were 
undoubtedly deep-rooted problems.
This present chapter exam ines the nature, and extent, o f  the problems 
impacting Jaguar’s manufacturing capabilities, and the various constituents which  
influenced and determined its production efficiency and competence in the period 1980 to
6 Mike Beasley. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix p8.
7 John Grant. Interview with the author. January 1993. Appendix p89.
8 Central Policy Review Staff (hereafter CPRS). The Future o f  the British Car Industry. (London, 1975) 
ppl01-103.
198
1990. In particular, and given the arguments in the previous chapter o f  this thesis that 
Jaguar remained largely production-led, it explores the extent to which Jaguar had 
challenged and overcom e the ingrained shopfloor attitudes which had resulted in the 
outmoded working practices and poor labour relations long associated with BL, and 
which had given the British motor industry such a bad reputation. A lso , it examines 
whether long-term improvements in production efficiency were sacrificed for short-term 
gains in production flow . A bove all, it questions the veracity o f  Jaguar’s claim s o f  being 
a rejuvenated manufacturing operation, with an enthusiastic workforce, free from strikes 
and disputes, that could deliver a quality product in good time, and considers the extent to 
which this was a carefully created illusion that was an essential elem ent in rebuilding and 
maintaining dealer and customer confidence, and hence sales and profitability.
6.2 Jaguar’s Production Facilities
The manufacture o f  motor cars by the 1970s and 1980s had becom e a highly com plex  
process, requiring considerable co-ordination o f  effort, and which consequently offered 
much scope for increasing the number o f  quality problems. Collins and Stratton9 
described the car manufacturing process in the late 1980s as comprising six successive  
stages, as follows:
(i) Pressing steel panels, the shape being imposed upon sheet steel by dies made 
o f  high-precision steel.
(ii) Assem bling the underframe or floor pan by means o f  spot w elding various 
panels together. Since the 1980s welding increasingly w as undertaken by 
robots, ensuring greater consistency and freeing workers from the arduous 
m onotony o f  doing the same job by hand.
(iii) Body-in-white assem bly, where the vehicle shell is built up through the spot 
welding o f  the body sides, roof, doors, bonnet and tailgate/boot onto the 
assembled underframe. A s with underframe assem bly, this is a process that 
has increasingly been robotized since the 1980s.
9 Collins, Paul, and Stratton, Michael. British car factories from 1896: a complete historical, geographical, 
architectural & technological survey. (Godmanstone, 1993). pp30-34.
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(iv) Painting, which involved a number o f  processes aimed at protecting the body 
against corrosion, as w ell as the application o f  various coats o f  paint.
(v) Trim, which in effect is the first stage o f  final assem bly, includes the fitting o f  
wiring loom s, glass, sound-deadening materials, and seats.
(vi) Final assem bly, involving the fitting o f  the fuel tank, engine, steering, and rear 
axle sub-assem blies, and the road wheels.
Before leaving the factory the car would undergo a water test, to check for leaks, and 
then went for a run on a rolling road, during which it received a com plete system  
check, which might then be follow ed by a road or track test.
To undertake these tasks, Jaguar operated three separate production plants 
during the period o f  Egan’s management. These were:
(i) Castle Brom wich, in Birmingham, which comprised the paint shop, and 
three separate areas for building car bodies: two for the Series III/XJ40, and one for the 
XJ-S, the plant being responsible for three o f  the six stages o f  the manufacture o f  the 
Jaguar car -  assem bly o f  the underframe, body-in-white assem bly, and painting. Jaguar, 
however, did not manufacture the pressed steel panels from which the car bodies were 
made, these being produced at, and delivered from, B L ’s Swindon plant under contract to 
Jaguar, although the dies from which the panels were formed were supplied, and owned, 
by Jaguar. The Castle Brom wich plant was brought under Jaguar’s management in July 
1980, having previously been under the direct control o f  B L ’s Specialist Cars Division.
(ii) Radford, in Coventry, which machined and assem bled the full range o f  
Jaguar engines, suspension units and axles, as w ell as a variety o f  components.
(iii) Browns Lane, in Coventry, w hose main activity w as vehicle assembly. 
Collins and Stratton described the plant as having two parallel assem bly lines for the 
saloons, which were “som e o f  the longest production lines to be seen in Britain”10, and 
one U-shaped line for the XJ-S, there having been separate lines for saloon and sports
10 Ibid. p221.
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cars ever since the introduction o f  the E-type in 1961. The plant also housed two other 
manufacturing operations. The “trim shop” manufactured trim for all cars including seat 
upholstery, door padding, arm rests, fascias and other internal items and the “saw m ill” 
produced high quality internal wooden fittings. In addition, Browns Lane built, in a self- 
contained area, the Daimler limousines, and there was a pilot plant in which new vehicles 
under development were manufactured.11
6.3 Production Output, 1980 to 1990
As is shown in Figure 6.1, during the period from 1980 to 1988, Jaguar made significant 
advances in production output as it sought to satisfy the increased demand from 
customers. From the recent low o f  13,360 cars produced in 1980, which had resulted 
from the collapse in demand described in Section 3.7 above, and from industrial disputes, 
production increased by nearly 300% by 1988, before falling again as demand once more 
fell back.
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Whilst it may appear fairly obvious, potential demand influences the choice  
o f  manufacturing methods, and, therefore, any meaningful discussion o f  production must 
be considered in relation to actual and potential demand. Jaguar production was both a 
response to, and an anticipation of, customer demand, but was governed by a number o f  
other factors that were determined by the actions o f  both management and workers. 
However, in the period o f  rapidly increasing demand in the first half o f  the 1980s, 
Jaguar’s emphasis was on m axim ising sales, with increasing the efficiency o f  the 
manufacturing operation being a secondary priority.12 Consequently, as Edwards 
admitted, problems arose because “w e pushed the volum e too much” 13, improvements in 
long term production efficiency being sacrificed for short term gains, with a consequent 
adverse impact on its cost base, discussed further in Chapter Eight.
For the reasons discussed below, and particularly because o f  the hand-built 
nature o f  much o f  the Jaguar vehicle, production levels could not necessarily be adjusted 
rapidly to cater for sudden upturns in demand, although this in itse lf might not be too 
great a problem since retail customers would often be prepared to wait for delivery, as 
was the case with the XJ40 in the UK in the two and a half years follow ing its launch due 
to demand outstripping supply.14 But, significant increases in installed production 
capacity would require capital investment in plant and equipment, together with the 
resolution o f  many o f  the issues that had resulted in production inefficiencies. Moreover, 
the measures necessary to implement such changes would have resulted in som e, at least, 
disruption to production, even i f  the consequent greater flexibility in production would 
have enabled Jaguar to manage better any fluctuations in demand. However, there was no 
great incentive to do this since for most o f  the 1980s Jaguar had little problem in 
matching production output to w holesales. Although this was not always the case in 
individual years, as is shown in Figure 6.2, the strong level o f  consumer demand 
throughout the 1980s resulting in equalisation o f  output and wholesales. Indeed, over the 
period 1980 to 1991 the net outcom e was a production shortfall to w holesales o f  only  
forty-one cars. Thus, although the upturn in demand in 1980 resulted in a production
12 Financial Times, 11 October 1990, The Times, 12 February 1991.
13 John Edwards. Interview with the author, November 2002. Appendix p60.
14 Trevor Finn. Interview with the author, July 2008. Appendix p81.
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shortfall o f  2,017 cars in that year it was compensated for in the follow ing two years, 
with production exceeding wholesales by 903 cars in 1981 and by 1,178 cars in 1982.
F igure 6.2: Jagu ar Production Shortfall (Units),
1980 to 1991.
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It has been commented upon frequently that Jaguar could have sold far more 
cars than it actually produced in the period 1982 to 1988, but was unable to do so because 
o f  other, largely interdependent, factors which constrained, at least in part, the level o f  
output.15 These, however, did not include installed capacity, since, as has been 
subsequently revealed, Jaguar’s production capacity was far greater than it admitted. In 
this regard, Grant recorded that shortly after the Ford takeover:
we did some capacity analysis o f  what could be done with the existing plants and 
it was felt that with the existing plants you could actually get 180,000 cars per 
year out o f  those existing plants. It might not be the way you would chose to do it 
but it was possible to do it. Certainly, it was possible to double the production at 
Browns Lane by a little bit o f  reprocessing o f  plant and changing the shift 
patterns.16
15 For example: The Times, 12 February 1991.
16 John Grant Interview. Appendix p89.
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Constraining factors included the efficiency o f  the manufacturing system, 
work practices, and labour relations. Whilst each o f  these impacted on production, 
discussed in the follow ing sections, there is little available evidence to enable any 
quantification o f  the limits on production imposed by any o f  these factors. On the 
contrary, Jaguar sought to maintain the image o f  a revitalised business that had moved  
away from the problems long associated with UK motor manufacturing and, with the full 
co-operation o f  a motivated workforce, was embracing new technologies and production 
systems, and Japanese-style techniques. However, as will be demonstrated, much o f  this 
was illusion.
6.4 The Problem o f  Manufacturing Efficiency
Throughout the 1980s, in its Annual Reports and Accounts and other forms o f  external 
communication, Jaguar continually sought, through emphasising its rising production 
flow  and productivity, and improved manufacturing facilities, to project an image o f  
increasing manufacturing efficiency, and improved vehicle quality. This was an image 
that was accepted largely without question at the time by both journalists and City 
analysts. However, whilst there may have been som e progress made in improving 
manufacturing efficiency during this period there is little contemporary evidence to 
directly support this claim, but much evidence to the contrary, particularly towards the 
end o f  this period, and follow ing the Ford takeover in 1990. Grant was to complain to the 
media shortly after the Ford take-over that, “Jaguar’s efficiency is not good” 17, but the 
extent o f  the problem was revealed by the Massachusetts Institute o f  Technology (MIT) 
study undertaken in 1989, and published under the authorship o f  W omack et a l the 
follow ing year.18 This study, with the data weighted to compensate for different 
specification o f  m odels and for worker absenteeism, showed that European luxury car 
manufacturers as a group took an average o f  57 hours to produce a car, whilst US luxury 
car manufacturers took an average o f  36 hours, and the one Japanese luxury car 
manufacturer included in the study took only 17 hours.19 However, within the European
17 John Grant, quoted in Automotive News. 5 March 1990.
18 Womack, James P, Jones, Daniel T, & Roos, Daniel. The Machine That Changed The World 
(New York, 1990).
19 Ibid. pp88-90.
204
group the worst manufacturing plant studied took 111 hours to produce a car -  a plant 
that A utom otive N ew s  was to reveal, without any later contradiction, as being Jaguar’s.20 
The reasons for Jaguar’s poor performance here may be analysed in terms o f  four inter­
related aspects: antiquated plant and machinery; poor manufacturing system s and 
discipline; ineffectual production management; detrimental and outmoded work 
practices. Each o f  these is discussed in the follow ing sub-sections.
6.4.1 Antiquated Plant and Machinery
Jaguar had never built its ow n factory, and the three manufacturing plants that were 
owned and operated by Jaguar in the 1980s were all old and suffered from a lack o f  
investment that dated back to the L yons’ autocracy, described in Section 3.4 above. A s 
mentioned in Section 3.7 above, BL had not attempted to compensate for the previous 
lack o f  investment in Browns Lane. In 1984, at the time he was Jaguar’s Chairman, Orr- 
Ewing had observed that:
If  you went through its [Jaguar’s] main machining operations for machining 
engine cylinder blocks, cylinder heads, gear boxes, all heavy bits, this was being 
done literally on rigs, adaptations o f  standard machine tools in m ost cases, and 
many o f  those extrem ely old. There was virtually no purposely designed machine 
tools to do special jobs.21
But the Egan management also appears to have spent little on plant, as 
Scheele noted.22 Indeed, A utom otive N ew s , follow ing the Ford bid for Jaguar in 1989, 
commented that, “Jaguar needs to invest heavily in existing plants” and revealed that, “A  
previous manufacturing director believed the only w ay to improve efficiency at the 
factory was to build a new  plant on a green field site. H is plan was rejected, and instead 
Jaguar built a superb research and developm ent centre”.23 Putnam, echoing this sentiment, 
stated a b e lie f that building a better production plant instead o f  the W hitley Engineering 
Centre was certainly one o f  Jaguar’s lost opportunities.24
20 Automotive News. 12 November 1990.
21 Hamish Orr-Ewing. Interview with the author. November 2002. Appendix p i 15.
22 Nick Scheele. Interview with the author. May 2007. Appendix pi 29.
23 Automotive News. 6 November 1989.
24 Roger Putnam. Interview with the author. November 2006. Appendix p i27.
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Operating three separate plants certainly placed Jaguar at a disadvantage in 
terms o f  both efficiency and production costs. Castle Bromwich was situated som e fifteen 
m iles from Browns Lane, the assembled bodies having to be transported by road to final 
assem bly, thus making the manufacturing process vulnerable to any breakdown o f  inter­
site linkages, increasing the costs, and exposing the painted bodywork to damage. This 
was even more o f  a problem when Jaguar chose to outsource som e aspects o f  
manufacture. Here, D aniels relates that the manufacture o f  the XJ-S cabriolet was 
“tortuous” since shells from the Castle Bromwich plant, minus roof, were transported to 
Park Sheet Metal in Coventry for the building-up o f  the veh icle’s framework and 
returned to Castle Brom wich to be put through the paint line, and thence to Browns Lane 
for final assem bly.25 However, from “final assem bly” they were transported, a fourth 
time, to Aston Martin at Bedworth for installation o f  the ‘targa’ panels and the rear hood.
At Castle Brom wich, body assem bly was undertaken manually on a flow  line 
until February 1989 when a robotic body-welding line was com m issioned. Although, in 
terms o f  car manufacture, the biggest single cost was the paint shop and body-in-white 
body assem bly, Jaguar had been slow  to install advanced automated system s at Castle 
Bromwich because, according to Beasley, “w e were low  volum e, and therefore went 
largely for low  volum e manufacturing techniques which are manual and less 
automated”.26 However, whilst appearing impressive, the new robotic system , in Ford’s 
view , was:
a bit o f  new-fangled technology that was unfortunately com pletely misguided  
because [it] was som ething that was designed to provide flexibility so you could 
do a lot o f  body styles through one fixture, through one piece o f  kit, and the sad 
thing was they ended up with only one body style, so they didn’t need any 
flexibility at all. So all the m oney they spent for flexibility was a w aste.27
During the summer o f  1986 the paint shop at Castle Brom wich was modified 
to incorporate advanced paint application techniques, but problems here in 1987 resulted 
in a production shortfall o f  1,000 cars, and a consequent adverse impact on profits.28
25 Daniels, Jeff. Jaguar. The Engineering Story. (Yeovil, 2004) p i30.
26 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p i 1.
27 John Grant Interview. Appendix p96.
28 John Edwards. Meeting with City analysts. December 1987. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
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This, o f  course, was not mentioned in Jaguar’s 1987 Report and Accounts.
The Radford plant, as Ford was to discover, apart from being a fairly old 
factory, built by Daimler in 1908, and enlarged subsequently29, had ancient machine tools 
producing som e 300-500 different bolts and other turned parts which could have been 
outsourced.30
However, it was Browns Lane that had suffered m ost from a lack o f  
investment, Grant noting that in regard to capital expenditure in the Egan era:
There was nothing major. There were bits and pieces. There were som e new  
testing facilities, testing the electrical stuff, but there was no major expenditure at 
Browns Lane that I can think of. There was obviously expenditure put in to 
actually launch the XJ40 there but there was no substantial investment in new  
equipment, or substantial rearrangement o f  the plant, or anything o f  that nature.31
The antiquated state o f  this plant had prompted A lex  Trotman, Ford 
Executive V ice President at the tim e o f  Ford’s takeover o f  Jaguar, to remark that, “There 
is nothing wrong with Jaguar that a bulldozer through Browns Lane w ouldn’t cure”32, and 
Bill Hayden, the Ford V ice President who became Jaguar’s Chairman follow ing the take­
over, to state to one o f  the tabloid newspapers that Browns Lane w as “the worst thing 
I’ve seen outside o f  Gorky”.33
Although there were problems arising from inadequate manufacturing 
systems, poor discipline, poor management, and outmoded work practices, discussed in 
the follow ing sections, the main problem arose from the antiquated final assem bly lines 
which had been in use at Browns Lane for over thirty years, but which were even older. 
Putnam wryly noted that, “We were actually building the XJ-S and the saloon on the 
flowline track that B ill Lyons had bought second-hand from the Standard Motor 
Company in the 1950s!”34 Scheele commented that there were actually tw o lines, side-by- 
side, with “different people doing different operations, so you really had to be able to 
track the quality control papers back to which line did it. That was next door to
29 Whyte, Andrew. Jaguar. The definitive history o f a great British car. p i 54.
30 Automotive News. 9 July 1990.
31 John Grant Interview. Appendix p96.
32 Quoted in The Sunday Times. 27 October 1991.
33 Quoted by Alex Trotman. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix p i39.
34 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i23.
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impossible”.35 Collins and Stratton36 noted that the lines were “relatively m odestly  
engineered”, and, echoing the findings o f  the MIT study, that, “the cars spend around two  
and a half days travelling up and down the building”. One particular disadvantage o f  this 
assembly track was that it did not permit the “doors o f f ’ system which allow ed the doors 
to be trimmed remotely from the line. This was a procedure that gave better access to the 
car’s interior for the fitting o f  the trim and seats, and significantly reduced the threat o f  
damage to the doors’ ow n trim or bodywork during these stages o f  assem bly.
Jaguar had claim ed continually in its Annual Reports and Accounts that it 
was committed to m odernising its plants, but this again appears to be part o f  the creation 
and maintenance o f  the illusion o f  it being a dynamic company. The reality seem s to be 
that Jaguar’s actions here were governed by the constraints resulting from a corporate 
ethos that could be traced back to the Lyons’ autocracy, in regard to preventing 
disruptions to production, and the m inim ising o f  expenditure on manufacturing 
operations, resulting in little modernisation being achieved at Browns Lane. It is o f  
particular note that Ford, which successfully challenged and overcam e Jaguar’s cultural 
constraints, installed a new  assem bly line in Browns Lane in 1993, at a cost o f  
£8.5m illion. This figure represented only som e 6.5% o f  Jaguar’s peak year capital 
expenditure o f  £132m illion, achieved in 1987, but which had a significant impact on 
Jaguar’s manufacturing efficiency and cost structure. The new  state-of-the-art “doors o f f ’ 
assembly track system w as made up o f  a one kilometre long assem bly track with 
overhead mounted cradles that accepted the car bodies from the body store and m oved  
them along to where they m et up with the engine and transmission assem blies. Thorley 
relates that the w hole system  allow ed more space between lines, provided for a much 
cleaner working environment, was less stressful to the workforce, and permitted the use 
o f  ‘just-in-tim e’ stock management at the trackside. 37 More importantly it gave an 
immediate gain in productivity, allow ing a maximum o f  25 cars an hour to be assembled, 
compared to the 16 cars per hour under the old system. It took a mere four weeks to 
install so there was little disruption to production, and, according to Thorley, “provided
35 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix pl29.
36 Collins and Strachan. op cit. p220.
37 Thorley, Nigel. Jaguar in Coventry. Building the Legend. (Derby, 2002). p i65.
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no problems when first initiated”.38
The success o f  the new assem bly track revealed the extent o f  the inefficiency  
o f  the previous ones. However, as was pointed out earlier, plant and machinery is only  
one o f  four interrelated factors that determined Jaguar’s manufacturing performance, as 
described in the follow ing sub-sections.
6.4.2 Poor Manufacturing System s and Discipline
Exacerbating the inefficiencies resulting from outmoded plant and equipment were the 
inadequate system s in operation and the lack o f  discipline in the manufacturing process. 
Grant found that there:
was lousy discipline on the shop floor. It w asn’t lack o f  skill or commitment by 
the people on the shop floor, it was lack o f  manufacturing discipline. It was 
paying lip service to something as sim ple as statistical process control. People 
said they were doing it but you’d walk around the factory and you’d find a 
statistical process control chart that hadn’t been filled in for three months. The 
quality measurement tools were not there, or i f  they were there they were not 
being applied. There was just a total lack o f  discipline throughout every level you 
looked at. Lousy housekeeping in the plants. The plants were dirty, disorganised, 
poor materials handling, everything. Every possible thing you could do wrong 
was done wrong.39
Scheele had discovered that, “nearly 90% o f  all [Jaguar] cars didn’t first time 
go through the water test”40, and drawing attention to another particular outcome o f  poor 
housekeeping, remarked that, “Today i f  you go into Castle Brom wich [which now  
undertakes Jaguar final assem bly] you’ll see that the floor is white, and there are no oil 
leaks. The floor is white because that means you’ll pick up an oil leak before it becom es a 
problem. The floor in Browns Lane w as caked in grime and grease”.4'
Castle Brom wich, which w as a plant with a troubled history, presented Jaguar 
with more obvious problems. Whipp and Clark related that, in 1977, “difficulties” at 
Castle Brom wich resulted in body shell production for B L ’s SD1 vehicle being 80%
38 Idem.
39 John Grant Interview. Appendix pp92-93
40 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i31.
41 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i29.
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below target.42 The problems caused by the new paint facility installed by BL at Castle 
Bromwich in the late 1970s caused considerable, and highly publicised, problems for 
Jaguar, John Egan recalling that in his early days at Jaguar:
the single biggest problem w e had was our body-in-white quality, and also paint. 
These were dreadful problems. We were reworking all o f  the cars when they came 
from Castle Bromwich to Browns Lane. We had something like six hundred 
people in something called “The Snakepit” reworking the bodies that came in 
from Castle Bromwich, and repainting every one. Every single one was repainted 
fully.43
This led to the plant being brought under Jaguar control, but as Mike Beasley
related:
W e weren’t able to overcom e the technical and the discipline problems to run the 
paintshop in Castle Bromwich for quite a long tim e....C astle Bromwich was a 
plant that M ichael Edwardes thought should close because it was unmanageable. 
And I think that in size and scope, and the way it had been managed, it probably
was unmanageable w e set about to try and get control and discipline into the
plant, and it took us two or three years to do that.44
However, B easley appeared to have been suffering a degree o f  self-delusion  
here for despite Castle Bromwich receiving considerable capital investment in the 1980s, 
manufacturing discipline remained poor. Ford found that there were:
finished body panels stacked on the floor, didn’t even have pallets for them. Had 
the bloody stu ff com ing o f f  the press and the guys just stacked the panels up, 
nestling them into each other, and sitting on the bloody floor....that gets into hand 
work to repair the panels, you know, sanding and everything to get the scratches 
off. Material control was hopeless, quality was hopeless, and the discipline o f  the 
line by Ford’s standards was appallingly bad.45
In the actual assembly process there were considerable inefficiencies 
resulting from sub-assem bly work that was undertaken at Browns Lane, Ford finding, for 
example, that Jaguar bought wheels, nuts, and washers and fitted them together on the
42 Whipp, Richard and Clark, Peter. Innovation and the Auto Industry. (London, 1986). pi 74.
43 John Egan. Interview with the author. October 2007. kppendix p65.
44 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p5.
45 Alex Trotman Interview. Appendix p i39.
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main assem bly line.46 Again, tyres and w heels had to be manually lifted onto the hubs 
during assembly, which, as Thorley commented, was “a back-breaking job  when you did 
it for a full shift”.47
Ainsworth, from the perspective o f  the shop floor, believed that, “an 
acceptance that right first every time w asn’t in the ethos at all”, and supported this with 
the follow ing description o f  car assem bly in Browns Lane in the early 1980s:
The normal w ay for a car to be built at Jaguar was: body came in from Castle 
Bromwich, went down the main assem bly lines, went into the rectification line, 
was invariably stripped down, then it went to road test, which not only road tested 
it but often stripped it down and rectified it again. Then it went over into the 
paintshop to repair minor body-in-white defects, then it went onto the refit where 
often it was re-worked again, then onto the final line where it could be re-worked 
again.48
W hilst it has been fashionable to lay much o f  the blame for the poor state o f  
Jaguar’s plants, Browns Lane in particular, as being due to lack o f  investment and general 
neglect by BL, photographs o f  the Browns Lane main assem bly hall taken in the 1960s, 
such as that included by Thorley49, show how  little working space there was, and the 
general disorder, with debris scattered on the floor. Given this, it was not surprising that 
Putnam argued that many o f  the problems at Browns Lane were “innate, dating back to 
Bill Lyons’ days”50, and that Ainsworth opined that, “Bill Lyons, who was a real 
skinflint.... had managed it on a shoestring”.51 However, Egan was only later to 
acknowledge this publicly when in referring to Lyons’ management he complained that, 
“there was a general meanness in terms o f  payment to people and in terms o f  
investm ent....They often skimped on things they really shouldn’t have done”.52
Automotive News. 9 July 1990.
47 Thorley. op.cit. p i41.
48 Bob Ainsworth. Interview with the author. October 2003. Appendix p2.
49 Thorley. op.cit. p i04.
50 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i24.
51 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p i .
52 John Egan, quoted in Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989). p207.
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6.4.3 Ineffectual Production Management
Although the factory floor managers, including foreman and supervisors, had the 
responsibility for controlling and co-ordinating the manufacturing process, labour 
discipline, and quality, their ability to do so was constrained by an organizational 
structure and m odus operandi which remained largely unaltered from the time o f  the 
Lyons’ autocracy and the BL stewardship. The empowerment o f  the trade unions 
provided by the piece-rate system, and the long-established management strategy o f  using  
labour-intensive techniques, had given the union shop stewards, as W hisler argues53, 
control over flow  and working practices. In Section 3.6 above it was noted that this, plus 
the impact o f  World War Two, resulted in the trade union institutions becoming an 
entrenched constituent o f  Jaguar’s corporate culture. At Jaguar, such union control 
continued until after the Ford takeover. Given this, and the inadequate and old production 
equipment, and the nature o f  the production system itself, it was hardly surprising that 
Jaguar’s production management, in common with those in other motor manufacturers, 
firmly embraced what W hisler referred to as “make-do-and-mend” shop-floor procedures 
in order to maintain production flow .54
A s was discussed in Section 6.3 above, Jaguar’s focus in the early and mid- 
1980s was on increasing and maintaining volum es, and this, according to Ainsworth, was 
reflected in the management o f  the plants them selves. The illusion Jaguar created through 
its PR effort was that o f  factory management w eaknesses having been successfully  
challenged through the enthusiastic adoption o f  Japanese-style techniques55, and through 
enhancing the role o f  the factory supervisors.56 But, according to Ainsworth, the reality 
was that little had changed:
A  lot o f  the change w as superficial. The plant ran in exactly the same way: all
about numbers The w hole factory was measured on numbers. H ow  many cars
o f f  the final line, how  many cars out o f  the rectification bay, how  many cars out 
o f  refit, how many cars o f f  the main assem bly line, how many trim sets out o f  the 
trim shop. I f  you didn’t make your numbers you were in trouble.57
53 Whisler. op.cit. p406.
54 Idem.
55 Bowen, David. Shaking the Iron Universe. British Industry in the 1980s. (London, 1990). pp272-73.
56 Underwood, op.cit. pp85-87.
57 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix ppl ,2.
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A s production increased during the 1980s, and more workers were em ployed, 
Jaguar sought to support the expansion o f  production and strengthen first line 
management by establishing a further layer o f  supervisors, with another forty-six 
supervisors being recruited in 1987.58 This merely added to the “layers and layers o f  
management”59 that already existed, and did little to address the fundamental problems. 
Ainsworth believed that Browns Lane, “had never been managed properly since Bill
Lyons....had left His successors didn’t have the skills to run the plant”, and that, “the
management system  was dysfunctional. N obody listened to those actually doing the job. 
In the end people on the shop floor lost interest”.60
Scheele, agreeing with Ainsworth’s view , provided strong support for the 
argument that inflexible management attitudes inhibited the implementation o f  more 
efficient processes, comm enting that:
Previously nobody wanted to hear what the shopfloor was saying. That’s how the 
auto industry ran, and really w e were fundamentally flawed because the people  
who knew m ost clearly what the problems were were the people who confronted 
the problems every day. And involving them in the definition o f  the solution o f  
the problems was not something that came naturally to the auto industry.61
Moreover, Scheele argued that the existence o f  the supervisory level defined  
the ‘them and us’ problem, and locked in place a structure that was totally out o f  date.
Ford abolished three levels o f  supervisors, who, according to Scheele, 
“weren’t doing that [supervising] anyway: they were firefighting m ost o f  the 
tim e...because it w asn’t just the manufacturing process that was out o f  control....The  
process was wrong”.62 A s a result the process management and the quality management 
was devolved to “the guys on the line”.
B easley saw the problem as emanating from management deficiencies in 
terms o f  their lack o f  understanding o f  m odem  automotive manufacturing:
58 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1987. pi 1.
59 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p3.
60 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix ppl,2.
61 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i34.
62 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i34.
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We were com ing from a cottage industry which managed symptoms and not 
inputs....our knowledge o f  process management in the sense o f  controlling inputs 
and managing the process was not something which was w ell developed. It was 
something w e were starting to understand by 1987/88.63
This was a v iew  with which Scheele agreed, adding that, “The tw o things that 
Ford brought to Jaguar were Process and Process Discipline. Ford clearly understood 
these”.64
6.4.4 Detrimental and Outmoded Work Practices.
W illiams et a l , acknowledging the existence o f  bad work practices across British 
industry, argued that, “the existence o f  such work practices reflects past union success in 
defending custom and practice when new technology is introduced” resulting from “a 
general failure o f  management control over the labour process”.65 H owever, such a view  
fails to appreciate that management, like politics, is the art o f  the possible, in that it has to 
balance factors such as corporate survival and the need to service customers against the 
demands o f  workers.
Under the Egan management, Jaguar did much to create the illusion o f  a 
company that had challenged and overcom e trade union intransigence, and consequent 
bad work practices, that had developed since the end o f  World War Two in the British 
motor industry overall. In 1982, Egan was proclaiming that, “We have to manage this 
company. At one stage the shop stewards ran it, and a bloody bad job they made o f  
it ....N o w  w e run this place, and I would rather close it down than ever run the risk o f  
surrendering management to the union”.66 But Ford was to discover that, as with the other 
three aspects affecting production efficiency, the reality was different from the projected 
image, Grant observing that in 1990:
everything that w as bad about working practices was in place at Jaguar. Things 
like working up the line to get your quota finished before the end o f  the shift so  
you could knock o f f  early, and that is terrible, it has a terrible impact on quality
63 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p9.
64 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i32.
65 Williams, Karel; Williams, John; Thomas, Dennis. Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? 
(London, 1983) p43.
66 John Egan, quoted in Automotive News. 17 May 1982.
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and productivity and everything. Total demarcations. There were appalling 
demarcations. M anagement had no control over overtime. The overtime rota was 
determined by the shop stewards. There was a w hole list o f  labour relations 
practices that were in the Dark A ges.67
Ainsworth recounted how the need to reach targets encouraged bad work 
practices, aided, i f  not actually instigated, by the supervisors:
You used to end up in situations where you would system atically find that i f  you 
got a really bad car on the final line the gaffers would push it off, push it to one 
side, push the next five cars back on, push it back onto the track again for the next 
shift. The next guy picks up the costs, the next guy picks up the fact that they’ve  
dropped a car.68
The continued tolerance o f  these, and other, bad work practices in the period 
from 1980 to 1988, and the failure o f  the Egan management to challenge the employee 
and trade union cultures that gave rise to, and supported, such practices suggests that the 
Egan management was “desperate to make cars at any cost”.69 The problem Egan faced 
was that initially he view ed his task as ensuring the survival o f  the company, but he was 
in no position to directly challenge shopfloor attitudes and bad work practices. Later, in 
the post-recovery period after 1983, faced with the need to accommodate a growing 
demand for cars, and to generate the cash required to satisfy continually growing capital 
expenditure requirements, discussed in the next section, Egan was again in no position to 
successfully undertake a radical reform o f  working practices. Indeed, by 1983 it may be 
argued that he had reinforced em ployee and trade union ingrained attitudes, and hence 
appeared to endorse bad working practices, by failing to challenge them.
At the tim e Egan joined Jaguar the company was also facing financial and 
market crises. B y 1983 the financial and market crises had disappeared, but it would not 
be until the end o f  1990, with the new  Ford management, and grave market and financial 
crises, that Ford, against a background o f  a workforce afraid o f  the possibility o f  Jaguar’s 
new owners actually closing Browns Lane, was able to tackle many o f  these work 
practice problems.
67 John Grant Interview. Appendix p96.
68 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p2.
69 The Times. 2 January 1989.
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6.5 The Issue o f  Capital Investment
A s revealed above, Jaguar’s plant and production system s in 1980 were antiquated, with 
the com pany’s machine tools, for example, being, on average, twenty years old.70 Whilst 
a considerable amount o f  the blame for this state o f  affairs was attributed by Jaguar after 
its privatisation to the “terrible under-investment in the 1970s” by BL 71, the problem, in 
fact, pre-dated B L ’s stewardship, as mentioned in Sub-Section 6.4.2 above.
Thus, a considerable amount o f  investment in new  technology and 
manufacturing system s was required in order to achieve higher productivity, and ensure 
improved levels o f  quality and reliability. Whilst, as was made clear in the preceding 
sections, this was a necessary condition for such improvements, it was not a sufficient 
condition since there w as also a requirement that shopfloor attitudes and structures be 
transformed. N onetheless, the Egan management embarked on a sizable capital 
expenditure programme without seeking to reform shopfloor structures and bad working 
practices. The consequent progressive increases in capital expenditure, shown in Figure 
6.3, amounting to a total o f  som e £670m illion in the ten years to end Decem ber 198972, 
may be regarded as impressive, particularly in relation to the lack o f  investment in the 
1970s. Indeed, in March 1987 Jaguar claimed that it had undertaken capital expenditure 
totalling £170m illion in the tw o and a half years since privatisation, a sum that it hailed 
as having exceeded the total o f  the preceding 15 years73, although this claim overlooks 
the fact that, in 1982 and 1983, it had financed some £41 m illion o f  capital expenditure 
through leasing.74
However, as w as related in Sub-Section 6.4.1 above, little o f  this expenditure 
was directed at improving productivity at Browns Lane, whilst the capital expenditure at 
Castle Bromwich was m ainly directed to the new robotic system  which Ford did not view  
as having been a good use o f  m oney, and to installing advanced paint application 
techniques. Moreover, w hilst measures were undertaken at Castle Brom wich to improve
70 Underwood, op.cit. p95.
71 John Egan, quoted in CAR magazine. October 1987. pl09.
72 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1984-89; Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984.
73 Jaguar Analysts Results Briefing. 5 March 1987. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
74 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984. p7.
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Figure 6.3: Capital Expenditure and Year-on-Year % Changes,
1980 to 1990
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productivity and quality, similar capital expenditure at Browns Lane had to await Ford 
ownership. Indeed, measures that would have significantly improved productivity at 
Browns Lane, such as a new final assembly line, were forgone in favour o f  the new  
Engineering Centre at Whitley, opened in May 1988. This site accommodated all 
Jaguar’s product engineering functions, and included facilities for vehicle design, 
advanced engineering, vehicle and component development, vehicle safety and 
compliance, and engine testing, as well as a new styling centre. Whilst Jaguar’s 
engineering department had previously been “a relatively miniscule operation without 
proper facilities”75, and undoubtedly was in need o f  better and more modem facilities, 
having previously occupied, according to Putnam, “sheds at the back o f  Browns Lane”76, 
Whitley appeared to be very much a prestige project, causing Finn to comment that, 
“Whitley, relative to the size o f  the company, was too large”.77 Unsurprisingly, it was a
75 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i29.
76 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i23.
77 Trevor Finn Interview. Appendix p79.
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development that received considerable media coverage, being hailed as bringing Jaguar, 
“to the forefront o f  the technology needed to develop and engineer tomorrow’s cars”.78 
Even so, given that the major problem with the engineering department was that o f  
inflexibility regarding its modus operandi, which Egan appeared to have failed to 
recognise, the construction o f  a “state o f  the art” new engineering facility could not p e r  se  
produce major improvements in Jaguar’s engineering effort. Consequently, Whitley 
might be seen as yet another illusion, although it is problematic as to whether Jaguar 
suffered the delusion that Whitley would prove to be a panacea for many o f  its problems. 
It is o f  note, also, that the new assembly track at Browns Lane, installed by Ford in 1993, 
cost only som e 11% o f  the £76.5m illion that it cost to develop W hitley79, and it is 
arguable as to whether the development o f  Whitley, at that point in time, was a luxury 
that Jaguar could ill afford.
At the time o f  its privatisation in 1984, Jaguar was forecasting that it would  
invest annually the equivalent o f  some 10% o f  its sales revenue80, an amount that seem s 
to have been determined by it matching the proportion spent by its German competitors 
and implying that this would represent new heights for Jaguar capital expenditure.81 But, 
as can be seen from Figure 6.4, this was a figure that had been already exceeded in both 
1981 and 1982 under BL ownership, and although capital expenditure after privatisation 
was increased gradually to Jaguar’s stated target o f  10% o f  turnover, it was a target that 
was only barely met in 1987 if  the £32m illion costs o f  the Whitley Engineering Centre in 
that year are excluded. Without Whitley, capital expenditure in 1987 amounted to 9.9%  
o f  sales revenues, and 9.0% in 1986, detailed further in Sub-Section 8.3.6 below.
Increased capital expenditure, o f  course, carried with it the burden o f  
increased depreciation charges which would be profit-diluting unless the investments 
concerned could generate returns that were at least as great as the resultant depreciation 
charges. A s revealed in Sub-Section 8.3.6 below, the rapidly increasing depreciation 
charge began to impact adversely on Jaguar’s overall profits after 1986. Even so, it was 
not until m id-1988 that its impact on profits that that were declining anyway appeared to
78 Financial Times. 24 May 1988.
79 Jaguar Reports and Accounts. 1984-88.
80 Bhaskar, K N et al. Jaguar: An Investor’s Guide. UEA Motor Industry Research Unit, 1984. p i9.
81 Underwood, op.cit. p95.
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have been appreciated by Jaguar, and this, together with Jaguar’s deteriorating cash flow  
position, led Egan to announce that Jaguar’s capital expenditure plans for 1988 had been 
“trimmed from the £140m  forecast in March to £120m ’\ 82 In the event, it was trimmed 
further, and emerged finally at £103.8m illion. Although in early 1989 Jaguar was 
forecasting annual capital expenditures o f  between £100m illion and £1 lOmillion83, the 
downturn in the com pany’s fortunes in that year forced a further reduction, to some 
£74m illion.
O f course, given the impact o f  increased levels o f  depreciation on Jaguar’s 
profits, it is arguable as to whether Jaguar had been deluding itself that it could not only 
fund ever- increasing levels o f  capital expenditure out o f  its own cash flow s, without
Figure 6.4: Capital Expenditure as % of Sales Revenues, 
1980 to 1990
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the need for a Rights Issue, as discussed in Sub-Section 4.3.2 above, but also bear the 
consequent dilution on its Profit and Loss account. As was pointed out in Chapter Four,
82 Automotive News. 13 June 1988.
83 Jaguar Analysts Results Briefing. 16 March 1989 (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
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prior to 1986 and the problems caused by the XJ40, the Egan management appeared to be 
deluding itself over a range o f  issues. Despite the enforced cutbacks in capital 
expenditure in 1988, Egan was adamant in the follow ing year that the company could 
fund the heavy future capital requirements from its own resources.84 But there is little 
doubt that Jaguar itself, particularly given the downturn in profits from 1989 onwards, 
could not even have began to fund from its own resources the £1 billion that Ford, by 
1994, expected to have invested in the company in the seven years to 1996.85
6.6 Labour Productivity
There are a number o f  ways in which production efficiency may be quantified, the 
method utilised normally being determined by the means o f  production. For example, in 
activities where production is capital intensive, efficiency is likely to be measured in 
relation to the average level o f  capital employed, whilst in labour-intensive industries the 
measure is normally related to numbers employed. In motor manufacturing, efficiency  
might be measured in terms o f  the number o f  hours taken to produce a vehicle, as with 
the MIT study mentioned in Section 6.4 above, or, more usually, in terms o f  the number 
o f  vehicles produced per year per average employee.
Egan, from an early stage, had recognised that Jaguar suffered from what he 
termed the “British disease”86; that is, low  productivity as measured by output per 
em ployee, and resulting from overmanning. This was a feature that had been inherent in 
the British motor industry generally, according to the 1975 Committee87, and which the 
Committee held as emanating from the use o f  old and outdated plant and machinery, or 
from “the employment o f  more men than are needed to do the job with existing 
equipment”. The CPRS in 1975 observed that the m ove to measured day work from 
piecework was a major factor in overmanning as in many plants, “the changes took place 
before soundly based manning levels had been agreed”.88 A lso, the CPRS reported that 
the change to measured day work was considered to have reduced productivity 
substantially as a result o f  workers now lacking any positive incentive to keep the
84 Sir John Egan. Evidence to the Trade and Industry Committee, 8 November 1989. p6.
85 Financial Times. 28 September 1994.
86 Automotive News. 30 August 1982.
87 Expenditure Committee XIV Report. Paras 105,106. p42.
88 CPRS. pi 02.
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assem bly lines working, and because o f  the large increase in the number o f  supervisors. 
A s noted in Sub-Section 6.4.3 above, Jaguar introduced a further layer o f  supervisors in 
1987. Whisler relates that poor work organization is another contributory factor to low  
productivity89, and within this might be included the aspects previously discussed in Sub- 
Sections 6.4.2 to 6.4.4.
Overmanning became only too apparent at Jaguar in 1979 and 1980 as a 
result o f  the fall in output, resulting from the marked downturn in demand, and the 
disruption caused by industrial disputes, with labour productivity falling to just 1.4 cars 
per em ployee in 1980. However, within two years labour productivity had nearly 
doubled, to 2 .74 cars in 1982, as shown in Figure 6.5, and given the continual emphasis 
placed by Egan on the need to improve Jaguar’s productivity to the 6.0 vehicles per 
annum achieved by M ercedes90, it is pertinent to exam ine the issues affecting Jaguar’s 
manufacturing efficiency as measured by its productivity levels in the Egan era, and the 
extent to which changes in productivity levels reflected fundamental improvements in 
Jaguar’s manufacturing effort.
Labour productivity is determined by one or more o f  a number o f  factors, the 
most obvious being those o f  the volum e o f  production achieved and the numbers 
employed, since doubling the level o f  production with the same number o f  em ployees 
doubles labour productivity, other factors being held constant. But there are other 
determinants o f  productivity, including the amount o f  manufacturing that is contracted 
out to third parties, the availability o f  bought-in components, the extent to which a 
production process is labour-intensive, or capital-intensive, the efficiency o f  the 
machinery and tools used in the production process, and the efficiency o f  labour itself, 
and its organisation, given the production processes and disciplines involved. From the 
earlier discussion, it is apparent that inflexible em ployee and trade union attitudes were a 
constraint on the more efficient use o f  labour, and the employment o f  more efficient 
production system s, and hence inhibited increases in productivity. Such ingrained 
attitudes could result in industrial action, with a consequent loss in output, and lower 
productivity, as noted above and further discussed in Section 6.7 below. A lso, as shown
89 Whisler. op.cit. pl82.
90 Automotive News. 30 August 1982; 6 October 1986; Financial Times, 19 April 1988.
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Figure 6.5: Average Number of Employees and Vehicle Output per Employee,
1981 to 1990.
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Note: The slight fall in productivity in 1986 undoubtedly resulted from temporary disruption to production 
caused by the introduction of the XJ40.
in Sub-Section 6.4.1 above, Jaguar spent little on modernising its manufacturing 
facilities, and so the substitution o f  capital for labour, whereby a new machine might 
replace the work undertaken by, say, two em ployees, can be dismissed as a factor in the 
rise in productivity at Jaguar in 1982 compared to 1980. Thus, it is fairly apparent that the 
96% increase in productivity in this period was largely due to the 65% increase in 
production, and the 15.5% reduction in the average numbers employed in 1982 compared 
to 1980.
During 1981 and 1982, Jaguar’s total numbers employed were reduced 
significantly, by nearly 20%, from 9,725 at the end o f  1980 to 7,832 at the end o f  19829', 
although taking the average employee numbers for both years, the reduction was 15.5%. 
Whilst the details o f  how  this was achieved have not been available, it is apparent that 
Jaguar had a number o f  options available to it to reduce manning to a level more in line 
with the lower production requirements resulting from the fall in demand in 1979 and 
1980. The most obvious course o f  action might have been for Jaguar to operate only one
91 Jaguar Offer for Sale Document, 1984. plO.
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o f  its two Series III lines at Browns Lane, thus reducing by half the number o f  Series III 
assembly line workers, although given the total Browns Lane manufacturing headcount 
reduction o f  som e 892 em ployees by end-1982, or som e 25% o f  the end-1980 total, this 
does not seem to have been the case. More likely is that Jaguar reduced the numbers o f  
workers engaged on other, non assem bly line, production-related activities such as the 
construction o f  seats and o f  doors. A s W eidinger observed, much o f  the Series III was 
hand-built.92 Thus, the number o f  em ployees required for such tasks w ould vary in some 
proportion to the level o f  output. Moreover, quality improvements in the Series III would  
have allowed Jaguar to reduce the numbers employed on rectification work, described by 
Ainsworth and Egan, and quoted in Sub-Section 6.4.2 above. In this respect it may be 
noted that the elimination o f  “the Snakepit” mentioned by Egan would have enabled 
Jaguar to have reduced its Browns Lane workforce by som e 600 em ployees, or 67% o f  
the total number o f  redundancies at this plant between 1980 and end 1982. One certain 
aspect, however, is that a significant part o f  the headcount reduction in this period was 
achieved through cutting the numbers o f  support staff, with administration staff being 
reduced by 352, or 34% o f  their 1980 total, and overseas sales and service staff by 201, or 
39% o f  their 1980 total.93
With the further 27% increase in output in 1983, productivity improved by 
24.5%, but this was accompanied by a 9.8% rise in em ployee numbers, possibly  
reflecting the labour intensive nature o f  craft-based operations such as seat manufacturing 
and door construction, but certainly also the result o f  a shopfloor culture which, in 
seeking to maintain established work practices, and demarcations, underlay worker 
resistance to management’s demands for increased productivity. This meant that 
expansion o f  production could be achieved only with greater labour inputs, as had long 
been the case in the British motor industry.94 Allowance had also to be made for 
absenteeism, which Trotman opined “was H ellish” and “sick leave was way out o f  what 
we [Ford] would consider normal”.95 Undoubtedly, as is apparent from the improvements 
implemented by Ford, discussed below, it is these factors that resulted in the largely
92 Jake Weidinger. Interview with the author. 19 May 2008. Appendix pl47.
93 Jaguar Offer for Sale Document, 1984. plO.
94 CPRS. p i02.
95 Alex Trotman Interview. Appendix pl41.
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unchanging, or slowly increasing, levels of productivity in the period 1984 to 1988, as 
shown in Figure 6.5, despite the 85% increase in annual vehicle output in this period. 
Whilst commendable, the productivity levels achieved were far short of Egan’s oft-stated 
target of 6.0 vehicles per employee, due in large measure to the continual increase in 
employee numbers in the period 1983 to 1988. Thereafter, productivity again declined 
due to Jaguar’s failure to reduce employee numbers in line with the fall in production in 
1989 and 1990. In 1991 Ford reduced the workforce further, to some 8,000 employees at 
a cost of £42.5million, giving an average employee number for the year of some 10,050, 
but with output falling by 22,967 vehicles, or some 55% of the 1990 total, productivity 
was reduced to 1.87 vehicles.96
Jaguar’s stated policy had been that “any increase in the total number of 
employees brings improvements in productivity”97, although this was a statement that was 
not repeated after 1985 for reasons that are obvious from Figure 6.6. This shows that after 
privatisation there was only one year, 1988, in which the proportional increase in the 
number of cars produced exceeded the proportional increase in the number of employees.
As can be seen from Figure 6.7, Jaguar suffered the problem of a continual 
rise in total employee costs throughout the period 1983 to 1990, even in 1989 and 1990 
when vehicle output reduced, and employee numbers were cut (by some 500 people in 
the first half 1989). In every year in this period, with the exception of 1983 when 
wholesales experienced a sharp recovery, the percentage increase in total employee costs 
was greater than that for vehicle production, thus demonstrating Jaguar’s lack of control 
over employee costs, and its generosity regarding pay awards. This is discussed further in 
Sub-Section 8.3.1 below.
It is also relevant at this point to note the relationship between capital 
expenditure and labour costs. Given that a proportion of this capital expenditure was 
aimed directly at modernising plant and systems it could be expected, as mentioned 
earlier, that this would result in the substitution of capital for labour. However, this does 
not appear to have been the case. As is shown in Figure 6.8, employee numbers increased 
every year from 1983 to 1988, dropping only slightly in 1989 and 1990, and labour costs
96 Jaguar Report and Accounts 1991; Financial Times 28 September 1994.
97 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1984 pl2; 1985 p8.
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increased continually, and disproportionately, from 1983 to 1990, despite the significant 
increases in capital expenditure up to 1987.
Figure 6.8: Indices of Total Employee Numbers, Labour C osts, 
and  Capital Expenditure, 1982 to  1990
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In contrast, the capital expenditure programme instituted by Ford at Jaguar, 
the new assembly line at Browns Lane enabling vehicle output to be increased to 25 cars 
per hour, com pared to 16 per hour with the old assem bly lines98, was accompanied by a 
significant reduction in em ployee numbers, from 12,100 at end 1990 to 6,750 at end 
199399, although outsourcing o f  sub-assem blies such as dashboards and seats100 also 
resulted in a reduction in the num bers directly em ployed by Jaguar. However, much o f  
this change was made possible only because the synchronous exogenous forces o f  new 
decision maker, m arket crisis, financial crisis, and threat o f  closure enabled Ford to 
challenge and overcom e Jaguar’s shopfloor ingrained attitudes and bad work practices, as 
Grant related in respect o f  the measures undertaken in 1990/91, and Scheele in respect o f
98 Thorley. op.cit. p i65
"  Financial Times. 28 September 1994.
100 Thorley. op.cit. ppl76, 178.
226
the more significant measures implemented in 1992/93.101 Consequently, despite a further 
10% fall in output to 20,601 vehicles in 1992, productivity made som e recovery, to 2.77  
vehicles, but in 1993, with the 41% increase in output to 29,077 vehicles, productivity 
advanced to 4.26 vehicles.102 This exceeded the previous peak productivity figure o f  4.05  
vehicles achieved in 1988 and, i f  output had been at the 1988 level, would have resulted 
in productivity o f  7.6 vehicles, other things being equal.
6.7 The Illusion o f  Improved Labour Relations under Egan
A s was revealed in Sub-Section 4.3.3 above, PR played a key role in restoring Jaguar’s 
fortunes, and was the means by which Jaguar masked its considerable problems. An 
essential aspect o f  the illusion o f  a rejuvenated Jaguar was the projection o f  the image o f  
it enjoying harmonious industrial relations in an industry that, by 1980, had becom e 
renowned for its record o f  strikes and disruptions, as Egan was quick to point out in 1984 
ahead o f  privatisation.103 Restoring external belief in Jaguar’s ability to deliver a quality 
product on time because it had an enthusiastic workforce dedicated to that end, therefore, 
was vital to rebuilding dealer and customer confidence.
The projection o f  greatly improved industrial relations at Jaguar was the more 
believable because it demonstrated the success o f  the Thatcher government’s aims in 
respect o f  changing UK industrial relations. Commencing in 1980, the Thatcher 
government had set out to radically reform industrial relations law, aiming especially to 
curb the power o f  the trades unions which was often seen as acting as a brake on 
productivity and investm ent.104 “Restrictive practices” by means o f  which unions sought 
to influence manning levels, the pace o f  production, and the introduction o f  new  
equipment and methods o f  working were seen as being particular problems, especially 
since they were backed up with the threat o f  industrial action such as strikes, working-to- 
rule, and overtime bans.
The programme o f  reform instituted by the government during the 1980s was 
accomplished by means o f  a series o f  Employment Acts (in 1980, 1982, 1988, and 1989),
101 John Grant Interview. Appendix pp 96-97; Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i33
102 Jaguar Report and Accounts 1991,1992,1993; Financial Times. 28 September 1994.
103 Blackrod Limited. Jaguar ‘Risk and Opportunity \  (London, 1984) [VHS Video]
104 Shackleton, J. R. “Industrial Relations Reform in Britain since 1979” in Journal o f Labor 
Research, Volume XIX, Number 3 (Summer 1998). p582.
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the Trade Union A ct in 1984, and the W ages A ct 1986. Each dealt w ith specific areas o f  
industrial relations, the 1984 act, for example, introducing secret ballots o f  union 
members before industrial action could be implemented. Shackleton sees the reforms as 
covering several broad areas. First, they narrowed the legitim ate action that could be  
undertaken by a trade union in pursuit o f  a dispute, by requiring, for exam ple, requiring 
ballots prior to strikes. This requirement w as gradually tightened over tim e to make it 
increasingly difficult for strike action to be approved. Second, unions were made 
financially responsible for civ il wrongs committed by their members, a measure aimed at 
reducing the incidence o f  unofficial industrial action. Third, government support for 
collective bargaining w as removed. Fourth, the scope o f  the closed shop (where only  
union members could be em ployed) was gradually narrowed until its existence was  
abolished in 1990. Finally, unions’ own organization and procedures were reformed, 
measures here including the requirement to hold secret ballots to elect officials, and 
protection against expulsion from unions for non-support o f  strikes.105 During the 1980s 
the UK  w as also required by the European Community to extend a variety o f  individual 
employment rights (for exam ple, extended coverage o f  sex discrimination law), much o f  
which was included in em ploym ent legislation.
This gradualist approach to reform, and the defeat o f  the miner’s strike in 
1984, proved to be politically successful, and succeeded in its main aims, listed in the 
previous paragraph. Here, Shackleton notes that, “Whereas in 1979 unions organized 
over half the work force, bargained on behalf o f  m any more, and occupied a powerful 
political position, by the m id-1990s their membership had fallen by 40  percent and their 
political influence had dwindled to insignificance”.106 Evans e t a l  reported that the 
number o f  strikes declined substantially during the 1980s, reaching its low est level for 
some 50 years. In 1979 there were 2125 strikes; by 1990 the figure had fallen to 630, 
Evans e t a l  opined that, “These figures point to a significant change in the conduct o f  
British industrial relations, arguably reflecting the em ergence o f  a new  set o f  attitudes 
among union leaders and members”.107 A s Evans et al further opined, the legislation was
105 Ibid. pp587-588.
106/£>/</. p581.
107 Evans, Steve, Ewing, Keith, and Nolan, Peter. “Industrial Relations and the British Economy in the
1990s: Mrs Thatcher’s Legacy” in Journal o f Management Studies, Volume 29, Number 5 (September
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clearly aimed also at increasing managerial control o f  industrial relations108, but, as 
discussed below , this was not the result at Jaguar. Indeed, there is no evidence o f  the 
Thatcherist legislation having any impact at Jaguar, it being apparent that the pattern o f  
industrial relations at the company during the Egan era w as the exact opposite o f  that in 
the econom y as a w hole, with a considerable worsening o f  industrial relations being  
experienced at Jaguar in the second h a lf o f  the decade. The Thatcherist ideals in regard to 
industrial relations w ould not be reflected at Jaguar until Ford acquired the company.
From 1980 to privatisation, Jaguar suffered no industrial disputes.109 Egan 
continually sang the praises o f  the enthusiasm o f  the Jaguar workforce110 and, in 1984, 
ahead o f  privatisation, w as claim ing that Jaguar’s management and the workforce were 
“a cohesive force”.111 But although som e progress had been made in industrial relations in 
the period follow ing the strike in 1980 at the tim e Egan joined Jaguar, the absence o f  
industrial disputes during 1980 to 1984 w as due to a number o f  factors. Certainly, one 
reason appeared to be the increased confidence o f  the workforce as Jaguar’s sales 
increased, but also o f  note w as Egan’s unwillingness, in the light o f  the need for higher 
output, or inability, as noted earlier, to attempt to directly confront shopfloor or trade 
union attitudes, and hence resolve the problems o f  detrimental work practices and 
deficient production management.
Edwardes had criticised the Jaguar workforce for considering them selves to 
be elite, something he saw  as constituting an enormous attitude problem112, but others saw  
the more positive side o f  it. Putnam, for exam ple, recounted that:
the workforce were absolutely brilliant -  the number o f  visitors I took round [the 
factories] couldn’t believe how  friendly the workforce was, how  keen the workers 
were to talk to outsiders -  not run forklift trucks at them as they w ould in 
Longbridge.113
1992). p576.
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Grant agreed that Jaguar “was a very friendly company”, but pointed to som e 
o f  the deep-rooted problems, particularly resulting from an inflexible management 
culture, relating that:
There was a great spirit about the company but it was all being channelled in the 
wrong direction. There was a great desire actually for the company to perform  
better but the people on the shopfloor were very frustrated because they were not 
being given the tools to do the job  they wanted to do....T here w as a lack o f  trust, 
there was a lack o f  b e lie f in the management because they w ouldn’t listen, they  
w ouldn’t respond when people complained. When they complained about 
legitimate concerns they had they didn’t get any reaction; this prejudices the v iew  
about the management. I think that was rampant.114
W hilst Egan recognised the problem o f  the lack o f  trust in the management, 
he failed to understand the basic cause, and the need, therefore, to introduce reform  
within all functions and at all levels throughout the company. A  major difficulty here, 
according to Edwards, was that Egan “thought that everyone at Jaguar should love him  
because he’d done such wonderful things for Jaguar, and he couldn’t understand the blue- 
collar mentality”.115 A  further problem, pointed out in Sub-Section 4.3.1.3 above, was that 
Egan’s personal charisma and leadership qualities failed to have much impact on the 
workforce, and such rebuffs must have resulted in his ego being constantly dented. 
Undoubtedly, Egan failed to appreciate that the ingrained shopfloor attitudes could not be 
m odified by means o f  personality alone, and his failure to do so did not make for a 
harmonious relationship with the workforce. Ainsworth recalled that on his arrival at the 
strike-bound Jaguar Egan called a meeting with the shop stewards:
Egan told us how  he thought he’d turn Jaguar into a first class company, paying 
the top w ages etc, and ended by banging the table and asking ‘Are you with m e?’ 
The shop stewards were stunned. The senior shop steward said ‘Y ou’ll have to 
forgive us i f  you haven’t got the response you want, but w e ’ve  been here a long 
time and w e ’ve  heard it all before’. Egan literally withered before the onslaught.116
However, Egan later made no attempt to conceal his animosity towards the 
trade unions, continually attacking them in the media with such statements as, “Since the
114 John Grant Interview. Appendix pp97-98.
1.5 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p61.
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war the workforce has been exploited by the political objectives o f  the trades unions for 
purely political ends. They certainly haven’t done the working man any good”.117 Here, 
Egan demonstrated his lack o f  understanding that the long history o f  (often justified) 
mistrust in management by the workers had reinforced the influence o f  the trade 
unions118, and had resulted, as noted earlier, in trade union structures becom ing an 
integral part o f  Jaguar’s corporate ethos. This w as not something that could be reversed 
through appealing directly to the workforce through a communications programme alone, 
as shown in the next section, but required other measures that were not undertaken until 
Ford acquired Jaguar.
From the resolution o f  the 1980 strike through to 1988, Jaguar carefully 
maintained the illusion o f  there being few , i f  any, industrial relations problems at Jaguar, 
and although it w as difficult to conceal the strike over pay in 1984 shortly after 
privatisation, resulting in the loss o f  production o f  1,000 cars119, little attention was 
accorded it in the media. In the follow ing years Jaguar’s public reporting o f  the effect o f  
industrial disputes w as carefully worded to maintain the illusion o f  good labour relations, 
leading to such press comm ents as, “Considering the legacy he inherited, Egan has 
handled Jaguar’s industrial relations with consummate skill”.120 In 1984, apart from the 
strike over pay, Jaguar claim ed that there were no other “major disputes”121, and that in 
1985 there were “no significant industrial disputes”.122 Follow ing this, Jaguar claim ed that 
in 1986 only 0.1% o f  total working hours were lost through industrial disputes123, a figure 
that fell to 0.046%  in 1987124, but then rose again to 0.3% in 1988, a year in which  
“relatively little industrial unrest occurred”.125 The problem here is that o f  understanding 
what constitutes a “major dispute” or “significant dispute”, for without knowing the 
actual number o f  “total working hours” involved, the impact o f  industrial disputes on the 
company is somewhat problematic, particularly since the total number o f  working hours
117 John Egan quoted in Automotive News. 17 May 1982.
118 Whisler. op.cit. pp210-218. Underwood, op.cit. p85.
119 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1984. pi 1.
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them selves would vary from year to year according to the numbers em ployed. Indeed, it 
is o f  particular note that, after 1984, Jaguar carefully avoided any reference to lost 
production in terms o f  numbers o f  cars.
However, the industrial relations situation at this tim e, in reality, was far 
different from the illusion carefully nurtured by Jaguar, and by 1988 Jaguar could no  
longer conceal the extent o f  its industrial relations problems from a m edia that was 
becom ing increasingly sceptical o f  the Jaguar myth, and which w as to report on “an 
atmosphere o f  simmering resentment on the shopfloor that has m anifested itself in 
sporadic walk-outs over the last tw elve months”.126 W hen Ford took control o f  Jaguar it 
discovered, in marked contrast to the illusion that had been created, that Jaguar’s labour
relations “were appalling the strike record w as appalling...there were very few  days
that were strike-free”.127 The reason w hy Egan had been unable to successfully challenge 
the entrenched shopfloor institutions was, in Grant’s v iew , because:
Jaguar having been privatised never had the m uscle to stand up to the 
unions....because at the tim e they needed the volum e, their sales were going up
and they couldn’t jeopardise their production Later on, they were trying to
introduce the new  car and they couldn’t jeopardise the new  launch so they had to 
roll over there also. Gradually, Jaguar had gone backwards and backwards and 
backwards. Every tim e they were tested [by the unions] they gave way. They 
were being tested all the time, giving w ay all the time. So, by the end o f  1989 
labour relations were at the stage that basically reflected the worst days o f  the 
1960s.128
Beasley admitted that during the 1980s he spent “something like half to three- 
quarters o f  m y tim e negotiating with trade unions as a manufacturing guy” .129 A s a 
yardstick here, the CPRS reported that, “plant managers in the British car industry claim  
to spend almost half their tim e dealing with labour disputes w hile their counterparts in 
Belgium  and Germany spend 10-15 per cent o f  their time on such problems”.130
But the Ford success in challenging and overcom ing ingrained shopfloor and 
bad work practices at Jaguar had a dramatic impact, for as Grant recounted:
126 Financial Times. 9 January 1989.
127 John Grant Interview. Appendix p96.
128 John Grant Interview. Appendix p96.
129 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p5,
130 CPRS. p46.
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The strike record in the previous tw elve months having been single figures o f  
days that were free o f  disruption, in the next tw elve m onths there was no 
production lost due to disruption at all. It absolutely transformed the labour 
relations, underpinned o f  course by the fact that it w as a pretty gloom y tim e when 
people were getting made redundant and all the rest o f  it, but the labour relations 
had been absolutely transformed by those actions.131
6.8 The Communication Programme
In an attempt to improve the labour relations problems at Jaguar, Egan instigated a 
comprehensive communication programme with Jaguar’s managers and shopfloor 
workers. This aimed at involving the entire workforce in the com pany’s recovery 
programme, and at circumventing, and diluting the power of, the trade unions.132
The issue o f  poor comm unications between management and labour had been 
identified by the CPRS in 1975 as being one o f  the main causes o f  poor industrial 
relations in British industry133, it noting that:
There are few  effective channels o f  downward communication, and in many cases 
management only  comm unicates to its workforce through trade unions and shop 
stewards. This process o f  communication, which is largely by word o f  mouth, 
often leads to inaccuracies and distortions. In addition, not only are the channels 
o f  communication often inadequate, but the transmission o f  information is often 
impeded by the lack o f  adequate communications equipm ent.134
The comm unications programme instigated by Egan w as w idely publicised  
by Jaguar as an essential elem ent in its attempts “to bring about a revolutionary shift in 
the industrial culture o f  the car industry”.135 But there was little that w as particularly new  
about the concept, or its implementation, other than the utilisation o f  m odem  technology  
such as videos and video-conferencing. The use o f  bulletin boards, posters, and staff 
magazines had been used by Lyons, as mentioned in Chapter Three, to inform his shop 
floor workers on various issues. Edwards, who regarded the comm unications programme 
as being “pretty radical”, recounted how  he and Egan together w ould talk to all the labour
131 John Grant Interview. Appendix p97.
132 Underwood, op.cit. p85.
133 CPRSplOl.
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135 Underwood, op.cit. p84.
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force in a day: “Five hundred a session, answering any questions anybody w anted In
one day w e were talking to eight thousand people”.136 Such m ass communication 
sessions, in fact, had been a feature o f  B L ’s communications, Edwardes describing how  
at Austin Rover in 1979, “Harold M usgrove and his team put the product strategy across 
to som e 18,000 em ployees - on day and night shifts - talking virtually continuously to 
groups o f  1,000 people at a tim e”.137
But, with the exception o f  the Quality Circles, discussed in the next section, 
communication tended to be downwards only, which w as perhaps not too surprising 
given that when, according to Ainsworth, “people spoke out o f  turn at som e o f  these 
meetings they were warned o f f  by the foremen”.138 Eventually, according to Edwards, 
although die communication programme continued throughout the period o f  Egan’s 
management, “w e ended up turning our back on it to som e extent”139, something that did 
not appear to go unnoticed on the shopfloor. Ainsworth opined that Egan got bored with 
the communication m eetings, and “left them to other directors or managers to do”.140 
However, given the deteriorating labour relations discussed in the previous section, it is 
obvious that the com m unications programme had proven to be singularly ineffective in 
strengthening labour relations.
6.9 The Myth of the Success of Jaguar’s Quality Circles
From 1982 onwards Egan w as to make much o f  the success o f  Quality Circles in 
improving quality standards at Jaguar. First highlighted as an important factor in Jaguar’s 
quality improvement, and worker comm unications, programmes in Egan’s address to the 
Automotive N ew s W orld Congress in August 1982, their continued importance and 
growth was usually reported on in the com pany’s Annual Reports. In 1982 Egan was 
reporting the existence o f  60 Quality Circles involving 10% o f  the workforce.141 B y 1987 
this figure had increased to 100 Quality C ircles142, and to 200 by 1988143. These figures
136 John Edwards Interview. Appendix pp58-59.
137 Edwardes, Michael. Backfrom the Brink. An Apocalyptic Experience (London, 1983). p i72
138 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p3.
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look impressive, but Underwood records workers’ claim s that these are deceptive since 
some Quality Circles failed to meet as often as w as believed.144 Indeed, it is clear now  
that the accounts o f  the influence and success o f  the Quality Circle in Jaguar was more a 
part o f  the illusion Jaguar sought to create -  inculcating and reinforcing a public 
perception o f  excellence and superiority that in reality did not exist. In this regard, it is 
problematic whether the doubling o f  the number o f  Quality Circles in 1988, the year in 
which quality problems were the main factor in the halving o f  Jaguar’s profits, was a 
genuine attempt to resolve the m any quality issues with the XJ40, or whether the 
reporting o f  it w as the important point. A s trade unionist Ron N ew com be observed, “One 
o f  the things about Quality Circles is that i f  you tell the customer you ’ve got Quality 
Circles in your factory, they think they’re getting a better motor car —  so let them  
believe it!”145
W hilst the label “Quality Circle” w as new  to Jaguar, the concept was not; the 
objectives and format appearing to be little different from the Joint Production 
Committee set up by Lyons in 1946, mentioned in Section 3.5 above. In its new  guise the 
procedure, at the tim e it w as re-introduced into Jaguar, had been a feature o f  US and 
Japanese manufacturing for som e time. A s with the Joint Production Committee it 
involved a small group o f  workers from the same work area m eeting voluntarily, often 
with one or tw o managers, to discuss, and, hopefully, so lve their work problems.146 The 
resultant benefits were postulated to be not only quality improvements and productivity 
savings, but also a m ore highly motivated workforce w ho w ould begin to be more 
involved with the company, and feel a greater sense o f  purpose with management. 
According to Iacocca, w ho introduced Quality Circles in Chrysler, their main benefit is 
that, “the word gets around pretty quickly that management is listening, that w e really 
care about quality, that w e ’re open to new  ideas....T hat may be the m ost important 
consideration o f  all w hen it com es to quality— that the worker believes his ideas w ill be 
heard”.147
H owever, from the perspective o f  the shop floor there were tw o problems
144 Underwood, op cit. p91.
145 Quoted in Underwood, op cit. p91.
146 Underwood, op cit.p88.
147 Iacocca. op cit. pI75.
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presented by Quality Circles. The first w as that they were seen as being aimed at routing 
employees away from trades union influence or control, as previously pointed out in Sub- 
Section 4 .3 .2 , Ainsworth recounting that, “Egan was pretty anti-union, and w e [the shop 
stewards] thought Quality Circles were a w ay o f  circum venting the unions”.148 Second, 
there w as the problem that m ost o f  Jaguar’s shop floor workers believed, according to  
Ainsworth, that Quality Circles “were only a talking shop. It w as a case o f  going through 
the motions. The fundamentals were that people did not believe the management was  
interested in quality”.149 This echoed Grant’s observation, quoted in Section 6.7 above, 
that, “there w as a lack o f  trust, there w as a lack o f  b e lie f  in the management because they 
wouldn’t listen, they w ouldn’t respond w hen people com plained”. This assertion 
regarding management insularity w as w ell illustrated by the fo llow ing anecdote from 
Grant regarding an assem bly worker w ho finally found a sympathetic audience in B ill 
Hayden:
This guy was putting in a plastic w heel arch wire which w as pre-drilled to match 
up with the pre-drilled holes in the bodywork. But they didn’t match up, and the 
part was too big, so he had to bend it in a w ay that it w as not designed to be bent 
to make it fit, and then he had to get a drill and drill holes through the painted 
bodywork, which w as an absolute criminal act - you don’t drill holes through 
painted bodywork because it’s a guaranteed rust problem. And, he w as not only  
drilling holes through painted bodywork, he w as having to drill them blind - up 
through the w heel arch, and he knew  that there were w ires on the other side. And 
he said ‘I can’t see i f  I’m drilling through the w ires but I have to drill the thing to 
make it fit. I’v e  been com plaining about this since the car w as introduced in 1986, 
but nothing’s been done about it. I’ve  complained ’til I’m blue in the face - 
nobody w ill pay any attention’. H e hated having to do it, he knew he w as doing 
the wrong thing, but h e’d been given no option.150
B easley believed that Quality Circles worked, “in so much as they m oved us 
forward”, but qualified this statement by adding that they did not “m ove us forward far 
enough”.151 Scheele doubted that much could have been achieved since, “people hadn’t 
been trained in all the techniques that you need to be trained in before Quality Circles
148 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p3.
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have any use. They weren’t dealing with data. What they were dealing with w as ‘I think 
it’s this’ or ‘I think it’s that’”152. Edwards adopted a more extreme view , and w as quite 
emphatic that “Quality Circles were a lot o f  bullshit”153. Certainly there w as a 
considerable element o f  illusion regarding the success o f  Quality Circles, but also there is 
little doubt that Egan suffered from delusion here. Indeed, Underwood narrates how, by 
1989, Egan had recognized that he had not always been given an accurate picture o f  what 
was being achieved by his Quality Circles, admitting that, “there w as seem ingly more 
being done than actually was being done”, with the instructions given to Jaguar’s 600  
middle managers often being reported as having been actioned when they had not.1S4
6.10 Summary and Conclusions
The creation and maintenance o f  the illusion o f  Jaguar as a company with a rejuvenated 
manufacturing operation, free o f  many o f  the industrial relations problems that had given  
the British motor industry such a poor reputation, was an important elem ent in restoring 
and maintaining dealer and customer confidence, and thus enhancing its sales 
performance, and profitability. The extent o f  this illusion would only becom e apparent 
after Ford acquired the company when it achieved a transformation o f  labour relations, 
and significant improvements in productivity, through its success in challenging and 
overcoming the ingrained attitudes prevalent throughout Jaguar.
Although Jaguar remained a production-led company, as was shown in the 
previous chapter o f  this thesis, its ability to improve the efficiency o f  its manufacturing 
function was constrained by its management’s opportunistic volum e-focused strategy, 
and its consequent inability, or unwillingness, to challenge and reform the corporate 
culture which gave rise to poor labour relations. Consequently, little changed from the 
time that Jaguar had been owned by BL, with the Egan management failing to recognise 
that much o f  the problem resulted from the corporate ethos it had inherited from BL, with 
both labour and management pursuing their own selfish interests.
Jaguar’s production facilities, in terms o f  both plant and equipment, 
particularly that at Browns Lane, remained antiquated and suffered from deficiencies in
152 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i32.
153 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p61.
154 John Egan quoted in Underwood, op cit p204
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regard to manufacturing system s, discipline, and production management, and from 
outmoded working practices. Undoubtedly Jaguar’s management must shoulder much o f  
the blame for this situation, failing to recognise and address the weaknesses resulting 
from a dysfunctional organization, and inadequate corporate resources. Furthermore, 
management seem ed concerned that attempts to reform outmoded and restrictive working 
practices would jeopardise production in a period o f  rising demand, and thereby damage 
the com pany’s prospects. It is not surprising, therefore, that Jaguar’s failure to tackle the 
issue o f  bad working practices resulted in it being able to achieve increased production 
only through the time-honoured method o f  em ploying more people, and thereby 
sacrificing its w ell-publicised productivity targets. Exacerbating this w as the consequent 
employm ent o f  more supervisors, w ho became part o f  the problem rather than the 
solution. The fallacy o f  this w as demonstrated by Ford who, in abolishing three 
supervisory levels, and empowering the assem bly workers, did much to break down 
cultural barriers within Jaguar and resolve many o f  the problems adversely impacting on 
production.
Its production problems were masked so successfully by Jaguar, through 
obfuscation and through focusing attention on a prestige project such as W hitley and the 
increasing levels o f  capital expenditure, that they attracted little comment from the media, 
or the City, at least w hile Jaguar’s profits continued on an upward path. In any case, 
whilst Jaguar continued to be perceived as a success story, few  commentators were likely  
to want to question whether such success w as ill-founded.
Jaguar’s success in maintaining the illusion o f  it having few  labour relations 
problems was apparent from the little attention this received from media and City 
audiences. Indeed, such audiences had been reassured as a result o f  Jaguar’s continued 
promoting o f  the success o f  its programme o f  directly communicating with the 
workforce, and particularly its Quality Circles, in overcom ing labour relations and quality 
problems. A s with other aspects, such as marketing and quality issues, it is testimony to 
the strength o f  Jaguar’s PR effort, and the extent to which the audience for Jaguar’s PR  
m essages wanted to believe it, that it was able to maintain this illusion for so long. A s 
was noted in Section 5.7 above, Finn believed that everybody wanted Jaguar to win, and 
received considerable support for its PR effort, at least initially, from external influences
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such as the government, with Norman Tebbit, a member o f  the Thatcher Government, 
praising Jaguar’s success on television.155
The PR effort, however, w as even more successful in concealing the nature 
and extent o f  Jaguar’s quality problems, particularly in regard to the XJ40. These issues 
are discussed in the follow ing chapter.
155 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p51.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
QUALITY AND RELIABILITY, AND THE SUPPLIER ISSUE
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter Three o f  this thesis it w as disclosed that quality had long been a problem for 
Jaguar, although in the 1950s much o f  this stemmed from manufacturing deficiencies as 
quality w as sacrificed for volum e. H owever, it w as not until the launch o f  the Series III in 
1979 that design faults becam e a significant cause o f  quality problems. A s has been 
shown in Sub-Section 5 .6 .4 , it w as the perception o f  improved quality that enabled 
Jaguar's U S sales recovery in 1981. Sales growth continued until the U S launch o f  the 
XJ40 in 1987 when the quality problems o f  that m odel led to problems for Jaguar, and 
the consequent take-over by Ford at the end o f  1989. Given its central importance in 
determining the fortunes o f  Jaguar, it is appropriate that the issue o f  quality should be 
treated as a discrete topic, and exam ined in greater depth in this present chapter.
A  motor car is a highly com plex and expensive p iece o f  machinery, 
consisting o f  thousands o f  different parts, which, as M otoring Which? informed its 
readers in 1972, “you should be able to  rely on not to break down, nor spend much time 
off the road in need o f  repair”.1 Indeed, Marcus Jacobson, C h ief Engineer o f  the 
Automobile Association, in giving evidence to d ie 1975 Committee, stated that a motor 
car should be like a Sw iss watch -  “Y ou buy it at the price which you can afford; you get 
it serviced once a year and forget about it”.2 This, the Com m ittee concluded, “underlines 
the paramount importance o f  producing a reliable and fault-free product in the first 
place”.3 However, the problem is that the motor car, unlike a Sw iss watch, is invariably 
subjected to high levels o f  wear and tear, and to extrem es o f  temperature, and, at best, as 
Motoring Which? pointed out, “cannot be expected to perform entirely without fault”.4
1 Motoring Which? July 1972. p i02.
2 “Motor Vehicle Industry. Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, with Evidence taken 
before the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee, and Appendices”. (Hereafter Expenditure Committee XIV 
Report). Parliamentary Papers. 1974-75. vol XXV. Q1681. p627.
3/bid. para 170, p75.
4Motoring Which? July 1972. pl02.
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Even so, the magazine added, som e marques offered better standards o f  reliability than 
others, and reliability was often the most important factor determining the overall 
fortunes o f  any particular motor manufacturer.
Reliability obviously is a function o f  the quality o f  design, materials, and 
workmanship that goes into the manufacture o f  any particular motor car, and is an aspect 
o f  paramount importance to consumers in determining the choice o f  vehicle. The CPRS 
in 1975 concluded that while not specific to the motor industry, a high standard o f  quality 
and reliability was essential given the importance o f  car purchase to consumers and o f  
market share to manufacturers, noting that the motor car was usually the second largest 
item o f  family expenditure on durable goods after a house.5 Indeed, in the late 1970s, “the 
average car-owning household spent 15.8% o f  expenditure on the car, divided roughly 
equally between usage and acquisition costs”.6
Ray Nun wick, the Head o f  the Consumers’ Association Car Test Unit, 
informed the 1975 Committee that there was considerable evidence to suggest that 
reliability was the main factor in a customer’s choice o f  a car7, a v iew  that was echoed 
twelve years later when J D  Power, addressing the 1987 World Auto Congress, stated 
that, “The buyer selects a car based on quality and reliability, not on image as in the 
past”.8 M ike Dale strongly supported this view , asserting that in the U SA , because o f  the 
lack o f  adequate public transportation outside the cities, reliability was the crucial factor 
determining motor car purchase, and far more so than in a small country like the UK .9
Given this, it follow s that a high standard o f  quality and reliability is an 
important determinant o f  market share. Here, N igel Fox, Head o f  Car Test Project Work, 
M otoring Which?, informed the 1975 Committee that, “the amount which the customer is 
prepared to buy again follow s very closely in general the reliability o f  the product”.10 The 
CPRS noted that, “Low quality leads to customer dissatisfaction and to a long-term loss 
o f  market share”11, and that, “once a reputation for quality begins to be eroded, recovering
5 Central Policy Review Staff. (CPRS). The Future o f the British Car Industry. (London, 1975) p26.
6 Foreman-Peck, James, Bowden, Sue, and McKinlay, Alan. The British Motor Industry.
(Manchester, 1995) pi 94.
7 Expenditure Committee XIV Report. Q1705. p631.
8 Automotive News. 3 August 1987.
9 Mike Dale, e-mail to the Author. 13 July 2007. Appendix p35n36.
10 Expenditure Committee XIV Report. Q1716. p632.
11 CPRS. op.cit. p68.
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that reputation is difficult, expensive and time consuming”.12 W illiam s e t a l  chose to 
ignore such evidence, and argued, in relation to BL sales in the 1970s and 1980s, that, 
“external market limitations are more fundamental than the poor quality o f  the company’s 
product”13, but offered no evidence o f  their own to support such a statement. A s was 
demonstrated in Chapter Five above, the vital aspect is that o f  image, or reputation, since 
it is consumers’ perceptions o f  the quality and reliability o f  a particular marque that 
determine its sales in a particular market, such perceptions being determined by diverse 
influences such as advertising, media coverage, and peer group influence. The reality is 
that reliability, by definition, is a function o f  the long-term usage o f  a particular vehicle, 
and cannot, therefore, be determined by inspection alone. It is not too surprising, 
therefore, that perceptions o f  reliability seldom  match reality, for as Iacocca observed in 
regard to restoring a quality image, “With something so important, you can’t just wave a 
wand and presto! Even i f  your product gets better right away, it takes time for the public 
to realize it”.14
Despite its undoubted importance, reliability, according to M otoring Which? 
in 1972, was, “more a pious hope -  and an often disappointed hope at that -  than a fact, 
in most m odem  motor cars” 15, and opined that, “as far as cars are concerned, the word is 
something o f  a euphem ism ”.16 In support o f  these statements the magazine cited the 
results o f  a survey o f  23 ,500  members o f  the Consumers Association which showed that 
over half o f  the cars belonging to these members had spent some time o ff  the road in the 
previous year, “beyond the tim e they needed for ordinary servicing”.17 Although Whisler 
records that poor quality and reliability were features long associated with British-made 
cars18, it is clear from M otoring Which?, and other surveys, that no model or marque, no 
matter what country o f  manufacture, was without som e fault, and that levels o f  quality 
and reliability varied according to manufacturer and m odel. Indeed, whilst the 1975
12 Ibid. p70.
13 Williams, Karel, Williams, John, Haslam, Colin. The Breakdown o f Austin Rover: a case study in the 
failure o f business strategy and industrial policy. (Leamington Spa, 1987). p72.
14 Iacocca, Lee. Iococca. An Autobiography. (New York, 1984) pl73.
15 Motoring Which? July 1972. pl02.
16 Ibid. p98.
17 Idem.
18 Whisler, Timothy R. Niche Products in the British Motor Industry: A History o f MG and Triumph Sports 
Cars, 1945-1981. Unpublished PhD thesis. London, London School of Economics, 1991. p315.
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Committee expressed concern that, “the British performance had been discem ibly poorer 
for some years, and that there was no sign o f  an improvement”, it noted that vehicles 
produced by Continental manufacturers were not without their quality problem s.19
Furthermore, poor quality and reliability w as not a feature o f  British and 
European motor manufacturers alone, but was, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
an issue o f  equal concern to at least some North American motor manufacturers. Iacocca 
relates that when he becam e head o f  Chrysler in 1979 he found that, for years, 
“Chrysler’s quality had been so poor that the dealers got into the habit o f  expecting to 
rebuild the cars when they received them”.20 Likewise, Halberstam recounts how for 
Ford’s North American operations in 1978, “quality was becom ing an issue, although 
something o f  a secret one”21, but, even so, it was not tackled until Philip Caldwell became 
Ford’s President in 1979, and it took over two years for the measures consequently 
adopted to result in improved quality.22 Luxury cars also experienced problems in this 
area, Cadillac in particular suffering from the 1970s onwards as it increased production at 
the expense o f  quality, a m ove that, according to Keller, “would nearly cripple 
Cadillac”.23 Indeed, as Keller further notes, during the 1970s and early 1980s, “the high- 
sticker Cadillac cars were rife with defects, many o f  which were severe enough to make 
the car inoperative or dangerous on the highway.”24
Thus, during the 1970s at least, a degree o f  unreliability formed part o f  the 
price o f  vehicle ownership, but whilst reliability w as o f  vital concern to many consumers, 
not all behaved rationally in their purchase behaviour. Rational factors here, other than 
price, include, as noted earlier, perceptions o f  reliability, quality, and safety. However, 
non-rational factors such as fashion, the image given o f f  by a particular marque, or 
greater actual performance were also important and might be considered reasonable 
trade-offs for lower levels o f  reliability. Support for this was provided by M otoring  
Which? in 1972 when its survey found that the Jaguar XJ6 was one o f  the three cars 
which its members stated they were most likely to buy again, prompting it to comment:
19 Expenditure Committee XIV Report. Para 164 pp72-73.
20 Iacocca. op cit. p i72.
21 Halberstam, David. The Reckoning (London, 1987) p609.
22 Ibid p643.
23 Keller, Maryann. Rude Awakening. The Rise, Fall, and Struggle fo r  Recovery o f  General Motors 
(New York, 1989). p75.
24 Idem.
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The Jaguar’s popularity is particularly remarkable in v iew  o f  the fact that it is 
very unreliable, typically spending a week o f f  the road in need o f  repairs each 
year. It is expensive to run - about £20 a week. But it does give an excellent 
combination o f  speed, good handling and comfort. If it were more reliable, it 
would be an outstandingly good car.25
Such surveys found that the higher priced specialist or luxury cars had an 
image o f  higher levels o f  quality and reliability, than did lower priced m odels, although 
somewhat paradoxically a specialist car such as a Jaguar is, as Grant noted, more 
com plex, and therefore, “there are more things that can go wrong”.26 Sir William Lyons 
defined the specialist car as being “one which offered particularly high standards o f  
design, manufacture and performance —  with an emphasis on quality and luxury, 
particularly i f  it were a saloon or a convertible. These attributes appealed to the 
connoisseurs o f  motoring who were invariably prepared to pay a considerable premium 
for such vehicles”.27 Echoing this, Bill Hayden, the Ford V ice President appointed as 
Jaguar’s Chairman in 1990, observed that, “A  person doesn’t buy a Jaguar and expect it 
to be fraught with quality problems”.28 But, unfortunately, the Jaguar product in 1990 was 
indeed fraught with quality problems, the extent o f  which, as already noted in Sub- 
Section 4.2.3 above, had “nearly brought the company to its knees”.29
This present chapter explores the reliability and quality issues that faced 
Jaguar, their causes, and their consequent impact on the company, and questions not only 
whether Jaguar’s ability to conceal the extent o f  its quality problems was its most 
successful illusion, but also whether these problems were not overcom e because o f  
Egan’s failure to identify the weaknesses in Jaguar’s corporate culture, and bring about a 
radical redirection o f  Jaguar’s entrenched engineering and managerial functions.
A s was the case with Chapter Four o f  this thesis, much o f  the data and 
analysis presented in this chapter is based on information obtained from personal 
interviews. This is o f  necessity, given the refusal o f  Ford to allow  the author access to the
25 Motoring Which? April 1972. p71.
26 John Grant. Interview with the author. January 1993. Appendix p91.
27 Quoted in Adeney, Martin. The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History o f  Britain’s Car Industry.
(London, 1988) p i27.
28 Quoted in Automotive News. 9 July 1990.
29 Nick Scheele. Interview with the author. May 2007. Appendix p i30.
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Jaguar archives, but given the anecdotal evidence regarding the shortcom ings o f  Jaguar’s 
data collection and analysis in respect o f  quality issues during the Egan era30, it is 
problematic whether the archives would reveal much more than has been obtained in this 
study. Whilst personal recollections o f  the problems with quality, and the part played by 
the engineering function, might w ell have been prone to exaggeration, or personal bias, 
particularly old anim osities, the degree o f  unanimity across the interviewee group, 
suggests that a considerable degree o f  reliance can be placed on the information thus 
obtained. Indeed, the evidence thus collected leaves little scope for ambiguity regarding 
the nature and extent o f  Jaguar’s quality problems. Even so, whilst there has been less 
scope to do so, given the lack o f  archival and published material on the subject, 
triangulation has been undertaken wherever possible. There is, therefore, a considerable 
degree o f  confidence in the soundness o f  the analysis presented in the follow ing sections.
7.2 Warranty Claims, and Other Costs o f  Poor Quality and Reliability 
In common with all other motor manufacturers, Jaguar sold its cars with a warranty, or 
guarantee, under which defects w ould be rectified, and defective components would be 
repaired or replaced free o f  charge to the owner, the costs o f  so doing being invoiced to 
Jaguar by the dealer concerned. Warranties were, and continue to be, seen as “a sales 
tool....[w hich] provide the customer with peace o f  mind”31, and undoubtedly played a 
particularly important part in the sale o f  higher-priced cars. Indeed, as “a Jaguar 
spokesman” commented in 1986, “European cars are primarily luxury cars. Extended 
warranties are an extended marketing tool. It’s difficult to sell a $30,000 car on 12 and 12 
[one year/12,000 m iles]”.32
In 1984, at the tim e o f  Jaguar’s privatisation, it offered a warranty coverage 
o f one year, except in North Am erica where the warranty covered twenty-four months, or 
36,000 m iles, whichever was reached first, in addition to which there was a six-year body 
corrosion warranty.33 H owever, Jaguar was still not com petitive with M ercedes which, in 
1984, increased its three-year/36,000-m ile complete-car warranty to four years, or 50,000
30 John Grant Interview. Appendix p91; Mike Dale. Interview with the author. June 2007. Appendix p46; 
Mike Beasley. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix p7.
31 “Mercedes spokesman” quoted in Automotive News. 5 May 1986.
32 “Jaguar spokesman” quoted in Automotive News. 5 May 1986.
33 Jaguar Offer for Sale document, 1984. p5.
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m iles.34 It was not until 1986 that Jaguar, as part o f  the launch package for the XJ40, 
increased its warranty coverage to three years, or 36,000 m iles.35
Claims against warranty were the direct price paid by Jaguar for poor quality 
and reliability and, as such, provide som e degree o f  quantification o f  the problem. 
However, it has to be appreciated that warranty costs in a particular year, although 
charged to that year’s profits, do not necessarily relate to that year’s turnover given the 
two or three years’ warranties applicable in the U SA , so that repairs under warranty 
might w ell relate to a car that was sold in a previous year. Indeed, it is possible that the 
increase in the 1985 warranty figure, for exam ple, was in part a function o f  the 50% 
increase year on year U S sales in 1983, and the further 20% increase in 1984, although 
there were som e other specific problems, such as three recalls on the Series III V I2 in the 
USA in that year.36 A s is shown in Figure 7.1, warranty costs were gradually and 
significantly reduced in respect o f  the Series III, but then increased dramatically due to 
the quality defects and reliability problems o f  the XJ40. These issues are discussed in the 
sections that follow .
The significance o f  warranties is that their costs became a major contributory 
factor in the decline o f  Jaguar’s profits from 1987 onwards (see Sub-Section 8.4.7 
below). Indeed, Grant observed that fixing the quality was Ford’s absolute prerequisite 
when it took over Jaguar since, “The future, in fact, was rapidly disappearing in a cloud 
o f warranty claim s because the quality had just been catastrophic”.37 Exacerbating these 
warranty costs, but not quantifiable, were the “out o f  warranty costs” which were claims 
allowed by Jaguar Inc for rectifying faults which occurred, for example, when a vehicle  
may have been just outside the warranty, or m ileage, period. In addition, in relation to the 
XJ40, there were the costs o f  recalling vehicles to rectify Jaguar-identified problems. 
Such costs, according to D ale, amounted to “many m illions o f  dollars”.38
Other non-quantifiable costs resulting from the quality issue were those 
resulting from increased research and developm ent expenditure due to re-engineering 
work, rectification follow ing assem bly, and re-specification, retooling, and process
34 Automotive News. 5 May 1986.
35 Idem.
36 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p38.
37 John Grant Interview. Appendix p87.
38 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p46.
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reorganisation that resulted from inaccurate and flawed designs, particularly in respect o f 
the XJ40 (see Section 7.7 below), although these aspects were common to all Jaguar 
models prior to the Ford takeover, as was revealed in Sub-Section 6.4.2 above.
Although such costs were damaging to the company’s finances, they paled 
into insignificance compared to the impact that poor quality and reliability had on the 
company’s reputation, and hence sales volumes. As was explained in Sub-Section 5.6.5 
above, Jaguar Inc. attributed the downturn in its US sales volumes in the period 1988 to 
1991 largely to Jaguar once again suffering from a poor quality image following the US 
launch o f the XJ40, rather than the decline in the overall market. This led The Sunday 
Times to comment, well after the Ford takeover, that, “The company is paying the penalty 
for quality defects”.39
39 The Sunday Times. 27 October 1991.
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Interestingly, this was hardly a new experience for the British motor industry 
for, as Whisler has shown, the poor quality, and resulting high warranty claim s and poor 
product image, o f  the Triumph Herald were the “primary short-term factors” in the 
financial crisis that led to the bankruptcy o f  Standard-Triumph in 1960/61 f°
7.3 The Causes o f  the Quality Problem
A search o f  the literature reveals considerable debate regarding the primacy o f  causation 
o f  the poor quality o f  British-built cars in the post-war period up to 1990. Whisler notes 
that there was the tendency for management to attribute the ‘quality problem’ to poor 
workmanship41, a view  that had been propounded by Nunwick when he told the 1975 
Committee that, “this question o f  defects on new vehicles com es back at the end o f  the 
day to the quality o f  the workmanship, which is associated with the attitude o f  mind o f  
the man putting the car together”.42 Williams e t a l  have disputed this view , arguing that, 
“work practices can only directly explain a small proportion o f  the quality deficiencies o f  
British manufactures”43, and lay the blame firmly on “management”.44 However, given 
that management, by definition, has ultimate responsibility, and accountability, for the 
firm’s actions and outcom es, the W illiams et a l  argument can be seen as little more than a 
truism, contributing nothing to an understanding o f  the fundamental issues involved. 
Whisler, on the other hand, argued that, at the macro level, the causes o f  low  quality 
“related to the industry’s wider problems”45, and here his advocacy o f  the explanation 
offered by the rigidity o f  pervasive corporate socio-econom ic institutions46 is compelling, 
but, once again, the relative importance o f  the myriad o f  factors that could lead to poor 
quality have to be considered.
These factors are com plex and interrelated and, in addition to poor 
workmanship, and the problems caused by deficiencies in the manufacturing process
40 Whisler, Timothy R. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. A Case Study in Industrial 
Decline. (Oxford, 1999) p334.
41 Ibid p358.
42 Expenditure Committee XXIV Report. Q1715. p632.
43 Williams, Karel, Williams, John, Thomas, Dennis. Why are the British Bad at 
Manufacturing? (London, 1983) p46.
44 Idem.
45 Whisler. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994 p358.
46 Ibid. p9.
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itself, described in Chapter Six above, include defective designs, processes, and parts. 
These deficiencies were exacerbated, in the case o f  British manufacturers generally, by 
the refusal o f  management to entrust labour with the responsibility for quality control*7 
and, furthermore, in the case o f  Jaguar by the refusal o f  management to listen to the 
quality concerns raised by the workforce and the unions.48 W hisler argues persuasively 
that such attitudes were the product o f  management fears that labour would redirect 
empowerment towards industrial action.49 However, there is very little quantitative 
evidence regarding the relative importance o f  the factors leading to overall poor quality 
in the 1980s, either from the industry overall or from Jaguar. Certainly, Jaguar, despite 
the hype o f  the early Egan days, had little idea o f  the relative importance o f  the factors 
that had resulted in high warranty costs, discussed in Sub-Section 4.3.1.1 above. Grant 
recalled that Jaguar’s end o f  production line quality assessm ent system , when it was first 
acquired by Ford, “w as not honest. Things they didn’t know how  to fix they didn’t 
count”.50
One study that did provide som e indication o f  the relative importance of, and 
responsibility for, faults leading to warranty claim s was published in the 1975 CPRS 
report. This was based on an analysis o f  the causes o f  the top ten warranty problems 
identified by consumers on three different m odels produced by the same, unidentified, 
manufacturer. The results are shown in Table 7.1 below.
Since the actual m odels concerned were not identified it is pointless 
attempting any explanation o f  the reasons for the different patterns o f  causation -  for 
example, whether due to greater com plexity o f  design or greater difficulty o f  
manufacture. However, the study does draw attention to the problems, and consequent 
disproportionately high costs, o f  faulty design, an aspect that seem s to have been ignored 
by many academics. Indeed, W hisler, writing som e sixteen years after the publication o f  
the CPRS report, observed that, “no one has closely examined the connection o f  
unreliability with poor engineering”.51 This is particularly true in regard to Jaguar in the
47 Ibid p358.
48 John Grant Interview. Appendix p98; Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i34; Bob Ainsworth. Interview 
with the author. 16 October 2003. Appendix p2.
49 Whisler. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. pp358, 403.
50 John Grant Interview. Appendix p91.
51 Whisler. Unpublished PhD thesis, p i6.
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Table 7.1: Causes of Top Ten Warranty Problems for Three Models from an 
Unidentified UK Car Manufacturer
Responsibility
(Examples)
Model X 
% of 
Faults
Model X 
% of 
Warranty 
Costs
Model Y 
% of 
Faults
Model Y 
% of 
Warranty 
Costs
Model Z 
% of 
Faults
Model Z 
% of 
Warranty 
Costs
Component
Supplier
(Inoperative 
switch, printed 
wiring defects)
28 13 20 12 31 13
Design
(Speedometer 
cable, clutch 
judder) 29 29 68 83 54 67
Manufacture
(Water leaks, door 
lock)
43 58 12 5 15 20
Source: CPRS Report, 1975. p ll
1980s, probably due, at least in part, to what Autom otive N ew s  later referred to as Jaguar 
having “cleverly prevented” its major problems from “tarnishing the company’s 
rejuvenated reputation”52, but also due to Egan’s early tactic o f  successfully deflecting the 
blame onto component suppliers, as discussed in Section 7.8 below. However, it is clear 
from the anecdotal evidence gathered for this thesis that whilst problems in 
manufacturing produced a number o f  quality problems, discussed in Section 6.4 above, 
the poor quality o f  the XJ40 ow ed much to pervasive weaknesses in Jaguar’s own 
product engineering department, Scheele stating categorically that, “the problems on the 
XJ40 were largely engineering in nature”.53
Dale recalled that, in retrospect, his project engineer on the XJ40 had told 
him there had been over 250  things that, “w e knew were wrong with the car that we  
simply couldn’t fix  because there just w asn’t time, there just w asn’t the engineering 
ability”.54 Weidinger in discussing the quality problems o f  the XJ40 drew a distinction
52 Automotive News. 2 April 1990.
53 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i30.
54 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p34.
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between engineering-originating problems, and those that resulted from defective  
components, or manufacturing deficiencies:
The XJ40 had many, many faults, and what was the bad part was it had faults that 
couldn’t be repaired. We could replace motors and transmissions; w e could fix 
leaks; w e could fix different things when they failed. There w as a high rate o f  
failure. Things like when you’re going up a hill at 60mph and the shifts wouldn’t 
operate effectively. It would struggle to get up - it was clearly an engineering 
problem. There were quite a few  o f  those.55
7.4 Product Engineering and the Quality Problem
Although the problems attributable to Jaguar’s product engineering function had been 
masked by the com pany’s w ell-executed PR agenda, there are four issues that are readily 
identifiable: lack o f  engineering resource; em ploym ent o f  inadequately qualified 
engineers; engineering’s concern with engineering excellence p e r  se  and its failure to 
appreciate commercial realities; the failure, or refusal, o f  engineering to incorporate 
manufacturing considerations into their designs. These are discussed in turn in the sub­
sections that follow.
7.4.1 The Issue o f  the Lack o f  Engineering Resource
The fundamental problem appeared to be that Jaguar was under-resourced in terms o f  
engineering capability. A s Grant pointed out:
[Jaguar] had 230 engineers back in the early 1980s. By the time the XJ40 was 
launched the com pany had 430  engineers....230 or 430 engineers are not enough 
to be able to design and develop a car with the sophistication o f  the XJ40. It can’t 
be done, never mind looking after sustaining the existing products that always 
require som e on-going engineering work as w ell.56
This v iew  w as supported by M ike Dale who stated that, “Jim Randle was 
trying to run two m odel lines, the XJ-S and the Series III, and was trying to put the XJ40 
together on 200 engineers. So he could have been a genius, but it wouldn’t have 
worked”.57 Egan, in retrospect, agreed with this view , reflecting that, “perhaps w e’d given
55 Jake Weidinger. Interview with the author. May 2008. Appendix pl45.
56 John Grant Interview. Appendix p90.
57 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p34.
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him [Randle] a job that was impossible to do with the resources he had”, but that at the 
time had failed to appreciate this because Randle “was always very optim istic about what 
he could do”.58 Here it is o f  note that Jaguar, in another example o f  obfuscation, never 
revealed publicly the numbers o f  qualified, or experienced, product engineers it 
employed, but rather, in its Annual Reports and Accounts, referred to numbers o f  staff 
employed in the “Engineering Function”, which undoubtedly included technicians and 
other support staff. This probably accounts for the difference in the figure o f  430  
engineers in 1986 quoted by Grant, and the “over 1,000” staff employed in the 
engineering function at the end o f  1986 stated in the Jaguar 1986 Annual Report.59 This 
was in sharp contrast to the 2,000 engineers who Bhaskar et a l  cited as being employed 
by BM W  in 1984, and the 5,000 engineers employed by Daim ler-Benz60, although we  
cannot be sure whether the title “engineer” meant the same for each company.
It is problematic as to the extent to which advances in the technological aids 
to design, such as Computer Aided Design, in the 1990s onwards enabled the substitution 
o f  capital for labour in the research and design function. W ynn-W illiams found that in 
2005/6 Aston Martin had an R&D strength o f  170 people, and Bentley employed 600, 
both companies “claim ing that this gave them design authority with detailed assistance on 
request available from their parent companies”. Wynn-Williams postulated that a basic 
model range o f  three distinct m odels could be supported by an R&D strength o f  “around 
1200 personnel”.61
However, in the 1980s, what is certain is that, with the increasing 
sophistication o f  motor vehicles, there was an increasing demand for engineers. Indeed, 
to develop its highly successful Lexus LS400, discussed in Sub-Section 5.6.5 above, 
Toyota committed 2 ,300 technicians, and 1,400 engineers to the six-year project62, and 
when the car was eventually launched in the USA, dealers, according to Bennett:
58 John Egan. Interview with the author. October 2007. Appendix p72.
59 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts1986. pi 1.
60 Bhaskar, K N et al. Jaguar: An Investor’s Guide. (University of East Anglia, 1984) pi 9.
61 Wynn-Williams, Michael S., A Role fo r  International Vertical Joint Ventures Within An 
Automobile Industry Paradigm. Unpublished PhD thesis. Cardiff University, October 2007. ppl41-2.
62 Automotive News Marketing ’90 Extra, 1990.
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were all surprised just how good the car was, just how  reliable it was, just how  
well engineered it was, and the worst w e could say w as “It’s boring”, which it 
certainly was — getting in and turning the key and it starts every time, it never 
breaks down, and so on. Quite a boring car!63
The origins o f  this shortage o f  engineers at Jaguar may be traced as much to 
Lyons’ direction o f  the company as to Jaguar’s integration into BL. W hisler relates that 
the indigenous com panies in the British motor industry o f  the pre- and immediate post­
war eras were each dominated by one designer, who, “operated in virtually autonomous 
isolation” and reigned supreme over the engineering department, aided by a support staff 
o f  technicians to undertake the detailed w ork.64 This was a structure that was very evident 
in Jaguar in the era o f  Lyons, and then under Bob Knight, Lyons’ immediate successor as 
design supremo.65 It w as a system that eschew ed the skills o f  the formally trained 
engineering graduate in favour o f  the practical training o f  the engineering apprentice, 
with BL in the 1970s adopting a policy o f  extending its product engineering apprentice 
scheme rather than recruit formally trained engineers who, in any case, were in relatively 
short supply.66
Problems caused by a shortage o f  engineering resource could, o f  course, be 
surmounted by using external resources, such as contracting out work to consultant 
automotive engineers such as Hawtal Whiting, who designed and engineered vehicles for 
General Motors and Ford UK. Indeed, the shortage o f  suitably qualified engineers at 
Jaguar probably explains w hy the Series III saloon, launched in 1979, was styled by 
Pininfarina o f  Italy67, and w hy the body design o f  the XJ40 was undertaken by BL rather 
than Jaguar.68 However, there is no evidence that Jaguar ever took advantage o f  external 
engineering resources fo llow ing the appointment o f  Randle as Engineering Director in 
1980, which is unsurprising given that Randle was extremely protective o f  what he 
regarded as being “his territory”.69 It is likely that Randle’s own inflexibility in this 
regard developed from his training at Rover which he had joined as an engineering
63 Martin Bennett. Interview with the author. July 2008. Appendix p i7
64 Whisler. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. pl61.
65 Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989). p56.
66 Whisler. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. ppl56-161.
67 Thorley, Nigel. Jaguar in Coventry. Building the Legend. (Derby, 2002). pl30.
68 John Grant Interview. Appendix p90.
69 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p37.
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apprentice, and was reinforced at Jaguar, particularly since Lyons still ran Jaguar during 
Randle’s first seven years with the company.
7.4.2 The Issue o f  Engineering W eaknesses
This problem, which became progressively linked to that o f  the shortage o f  engineers, 
concerned the actual capabilities o f  British motor engineers. W hisler refers disparagingly 
to the “myth o f  British motor-engineering excellence” in the 1950s and 1960s, and argues 
that weaknesses in engineering “contributed to the decline and prostration o f  British 
Leyland”.70 This is in marked contrast to the writings o f  many academics w ho, in praising 
the likes o f  Issigonis, best known as the designer o f  the M ini, have helped perpetuate the 
myth, with W illiams et al, for example, praising BM C ’s engineering as “world class”.71 
However, even the renowned Mini did suffer from major design faults, one o f  which Bob 
Dale, former head o f  Lucas Autom otive, described as being:
the transverse engine on the Mini and the open grill. They put the electrics 
between the engine and the grill. It was a low  slung car, so in w et conditions 
water poured through the grill onto the electrics (distributor coil etc), leading to 
shorting. This w as put down to being a problem with the electrics....T he ignition 
problem was obvious to everyone. Their [BL’s] answer was to shove a cover 
between the grill and the electrics -  but the radiator is supposed to cool the 
engine, so the engine now  was overheating. The problem was a design fault in 
putting the ignition on the wrong side o f  the engine, but it was seen as another 
case o f  ‘B loody Lucas!’72
The engineering inadequacies highlighted by such an exam ple became even  
more o f  a problem in the 1970s as the “practical men”, as Whisler euphem istically refers 
to the apprenticeship-trained engineers73, lacking the necessary expertise, struggled to 
cope with the more com plex engineering demands resulting from increasingly stringent 
pollution and safety legislation, increased consumer demands for greater comfort and 
ride, and the greater use o f  electronics.74 But, as W hisler observes, the lack o f  formally
70 Whisler. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. p i57.
71 Williams, Karel, Haslam, Colin, Williams, John, Johal, Sukhdev, with Adcroft, Andy. Cars. Analysis, 
History, Cases. (Providence, 1994) p i37.
72 Bob Dale. Interview with the author. May 2007. Appendix p30.
73 Whisler. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. pi 57.
74 Idem.
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trained engineers limited a com pany’s stock o f  engineering know ledge to that possessed  
within the existing engineering function, with the introduction o f  new concepts and ideas 
being limited by the insular nature o f  apprentice training, and the rigidly defined 
positions o f  the engineering supremo and his support staff, the latter being capable only 
o f  implementing m odifications such as spin-offs to existing m odels.75 It had become 
obvious that experience was no longer a substitute for expertise. Indeed, the lack o f  
formal training and the requirements for ever-increasingly sophisticated designs often 
resulted in imprecise and inaccurate specifications, and inaccurate original drawings.76 
This does much to explain the problems experienced by Jaguar with the XJ40 mentioned 
in Section 7.3 above, and detailed further in Section 7.7 below.
7.4.3 The Issue o f  Engineering’s N eglect o f  Commercial Aspects
Here the problem resulted from the tendency for the product engineers, operating in the 
autonomous isolation referred to above, to focus almost exclusively on the purity o f  the 
product design, and engineering challenges, to the exclusion o f  factors such as the 
differing requirements of, and physical conditions in, the markets at which the cars would 
be targeted, as w ell as the need to generate profits. This appeared to have been 
particularly true o f  Jaguar, where, as disclosed in Sub-Section 4.3.1.2 above, Randle ran 
the engineering function as a fiefdom , there being an absence o f  the process and 
discipline in place to ensure that engineering was doing what it should have been doing, 
although there appeared to be exceptions. One such case was the XJ-S convertible for the 
US market, which appears to have been forced upon engineering by Jaguar Inc, but on 
which Randle, in D ale’s v iew , did “a fine job ”.77 Generally, however, Jaguar’s engineers, 
in the opinion o f  Scheele, “were engineering cars for trolloping round the Warwickshire 
countryside, and they didn’t design cars with any knowledge o f  what the US conditions 
were like, and w e suffered m assively as a result”.78 Two examples cited by Scheele, 
resulting from this lack o f  empathy with US customers, were those o f  the XJ40 being 
sold in the U S market without air bags, because “Jim Randle didn’t believe in air bags”,
75 Ibid pi 62.
76 Idem.
77 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p35.
78 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix pi 36.
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and without cup holders since Jaguar’s engineers were incredulous o f  the idea that 
anybody would want to have a drink in a Jaguar.79 But o f  greater consequence was the 
failure to account for different clim atic conditions, this leading to considerable reliability 
problems, as detailed in Sub-Section 7.6.4 below.
Jaguar’s engineers, as noted in Sub-Section 4 .3 .1 .2  above, seem  to have 
enjoyed a considerable degree o f  freedom in terms o f  what they worked on, and, 
according to Scheele, disdained resolving problems with the XJ40 “because they were 
often boring”.80 A s recorded in Section 5.3 above, Putnam cited this factor as being the 
reason why Jaguar did not have diesel engines for such a long time. At the opposite end 
of the spectrum was the XJ220 concept car which eventually went into limited 
production, 280 cars being made, and which w as “an absolute unmitigated disaster” 
according to Putnam. But, it was a project that besotted the engineers to such an extent 
that, “they were playing around with the XJ220” when they should have been focusing on 
the F-type.81
7.4.4 The Issue o f  the Failure to Incorporate Manufacturing Considerations into Product 
Design
This was a major problem, another product o f  the autonomous isolation o f  the designers, 
resulting from there being little or no relationship between product engineering and 
manufacturing, for it is one thing to design a vehicle, and hand-build a prototype, but 
quite another to build it successfully in volum e on a production line. The issue here, 
according to Whisler, w as that the product engineers designed cars with little or no 
consideration for how  they would be built, resulting in numerous product quality defects, 
and consequent redesign, rectification, and retooling.82 This was not a problem restricted 
to the indigenous British motor manufacturers for, as Iacocca related in regard to 
Chrysler in 1979:
I’d call in a guy from engineering, and he’d stand there dumbfounded when I’d 
explain to him that w e had a design problem or som e other hitch in the
79 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i36.
80 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix pi 30.
81 Roger Putnam. Interview with the author. November 2006. Appendix pl22, and pl22nl38.
82 Whisler. The British Motor Industry 1945-1994. pp157-163.
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engineering-manufacturing relationship He might com e up with a terrific new
design. There was only one problem: he didn’t know that the manufacturing 
people couldn’t build it. Why? Because he had never talked to them about it.83
This was a problem that appeared to be particularly acute at Jaguar when Jim 
Randle was its Engineering Director, Scheele observing that, “for whatever reason, there 
was a huge dichotomy between engineering and manufacturing”.84 Scheele cited the 
wiring in the XJ40 as an example o f  the quality problems resulting from engineering’s 
failure to take manufacturing considerations into consideration:
[The XJ40] had low  voltage electric wiring switchgear. And that wiring was a
common loom  from end to end you drag it through the car, it gets caught, it
gets trapped, it gets pinched. You then get shorts. You get all the electrical 
problems that the XJ40 was prone to.85
That Randle should regard, and manage, engineering as his personal fiefdom  
is not that surprising given that all the departments at Jaguar under Egan enjoyed a 
considerable degree o f  autonomy, as noted in Sub-Section 4.3.1 above, and Randle’s 
“practical man” values and beliefs. Having joined Rover as an engineering apprentice in 
1954 at the age o f  sixteen, and m oving to Jaguar in 196586, and thus steeped in the 
traditions o f  the British product engineering culture, it is natural that Randle should have 
sought to maintain, and jealousy guard, the autonomy o f  his department. Indeed, Dale 
relates that Randle had little understanding o f  the commercial realities o f  the business, 
and was, for example, offended by the high levels o f  profit being obtained from the 
Series III Vanden Plas.87 The consequences for Jaguar o f  such lack o f  commercial 
awareness, however, were to be disastrous, as is discussed in Section 7.8 below.
7.5 Jaguar’s Record o f  Quality Problems
Although the Jaguar quality defects first became a major problem in the 1970s, as 
mentioned in Section 3.7 above, Jaguar cars, like most other marques and m odels, had
83 Iacocca op cit. p i53.
84 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i31.
85 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i30.
86 Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989) p71.
87 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p37.
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always suffered quality problems to som e degree. Thorley relates that, in the immediate 
post-war years, there were numerous complaints from Jaguar’s distributors about the 
quality o f  the cars, leading Lyons to emphasise to the workforce the importance o f  
quality through notices placed around the factory, and through articles in the company’s 
in-house magazine.88 However, quality was a problem that was still in evidence in the late 
1950s when gigantic banners proclaiming the importance o f  quality to jobs were erected 
on the assem bly lines.89 It is not possible to ascertain to what extent quality problems at 
that time resulted from design faults, but obviously Lyons believed that the main issue 
was that o f  poor workmanship. It is o f  note, however, that whilst there were quality 
defects during these periods, unreliability w as hardly mentioned as being an issue. 
According to W ood, it was in the 1968/75 era, with the advent o f  the XJ6 Series, that 
“unreliability began to infect the Jaguar marque”, illustrating this statement by quoting 
the experience o f  John Barber, M anaging Director o f  BL at this time, who had logged up 
fifty faults in a few  months in one XJ6 “when ten was about average”.90
The problem o f  reliability became more acute for Jaguar as the 1970s 
progressed, with the Series II, launched in 1973, becoming well known for its quality 
problems.91 The Series II w as more technically advanced than the Series I, being designed 
to meet changing legislation, particularly in the USA, and undoubtedly suffered from 
many o f  the design faults identified in the Series III, in essence a Series II modification. 
The quality issue with the Series II was exacerbated by deteriorating standards o f  
workmanship and assem bly at Browns Lane as a result o f  increasing conflict between 
workers and the BL management92, and by the imposition o f  the sourcing o f  component 
parts by BL.93 Body panels, manufactured at B L ’s Swindon plant, suffered quality 
problems caused by poor tooling, whilst body-building and painting was undertaken by 
BL at the then Pressed Steel Fisher Castle Brom wich plant where BL had installed highly 
sophisticated Thermo Plastic A crylic low-bake paint technology.94 However, this “fancy
88 Thorley. op cit. p53.
89 Ibid p83.
90 Wood, Jonathan. Wheels o f  Misfortune: The Rise and Fall o f  the British Motor Industry 
(London, 1988). pi 90.
91 Thorley. op cit. /?pl29,130.
92 Thorley. op cit p i28.
92 Ibid. pi 30.
94 Underwood, op cit pp50-51.
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new paint facility”, as Grant observed:
didn’t work. The paint would fall o f f  the cars. You couldn’t get the paint to stick 
so they had to ship, as a temporary expedient to get cars into production, the 
bodies from Castle Bromwich back to Browns Lane to put them through the 
repair paint facility they had at Browns Lane, but where they could only paint 
them in three colours....It was an absolute nightmare.95
Ainsworth, from the perspective o f  the shop floor, thought the Series III was, 
“so bad that w e’d effectively been selling people second-hand cars. W e’d be repainting 
cars systematically and a few  weeks later they would look as i f  they had just been 
repaired”.96 By the end o f  the 1970s, according to Thorley, “dealers were complaining 
about the amount o f  rectification work they had to carry out and owners were losing faith 
in the once prestigious marque.”97
By this time, the problem o f  Jaguar’s quality and reliability, according to 
Michael Edwardes, w ho had becom e Chairman o f  BL in Novem ber 1977, “was a thorny 
one, for even many o f  Jaguar’s most enthusiastic owners in the United States would say 
‘It’s better to have tw o, i f  you want to be sure one stays on the road.’”98 For Edwardes, 
part o f  the problem was the ingrained attitudes at Jaguar, which he saw as manifested in 
the “enormous” elitist attitude o f  both Jaguar workers and its management, with some 
managers, in his v iew , being “more concerned with producing new m odels and reaching 
new standards o f  engineering excellence, than with managing the business”.99 Edwardes 
noted, “that warranty costs were too high; that dissatisfied customers wrote or telephoned 
us from as far afield as the w est coast o f  the United States, and that the failure o f  
components, particularly electrical, was putting the reputation o f  the car at great risk”.100 
However, as may be appreciated from the discussion in the following sections, it is 
problematic as to whether the failure o f  electrical components can be blamed on the 
component manufacturer or on inappropriate specification, or inept installation, on the 
part o f  Jaguar.
95 John Grant Interview. Appendix p90.
96 Bob Ainsworth Interview. Appendix p2.
97 Thorley. op cit. pl28.
98 Edwardes, Michael. Back from  the Brink. An Apocalyptic Experience (London, 1983) p i 76
99 Ibid pi 75.
100 , , _
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Such was the poor reputation o f  Jaguar in the important USA market that, at 
this time, JD Power did not include Jaguar in its annual independent report on 
automakers’ customer satisfaction because so few  Jaguar owners were w illing even to 
discuss their ownership o f  the cars.101 Another particular problem for the US market was 
that o f  delivery timing, Dale recalling that Jaguar was so late in starting production on the 
1981 model year cars that it gave up and went straight to the follow ing model year.102
7.6 The Resolution o f  Series III Quality Issues under Egan. A  Triumph o f  Style over 
Substance?
7.6.1 The Quality and Reliability Problem in 1980
When Egan took charge o f  Jaguar, product quality and reliability was disastrous. 
According to Grant, “It was just an absolute nightmare. Everything was wrong with the 
cars. Nothing would fit. It was terrible”.103 Warranty costs were running at 9% o f  
turnover, as shown in Figure 7.1, and the cars had a widely held, and indisputable, 
reputation for poor reliability.104 Underwood states that Egan accepted that the cars had a 
poor reputation for reliability, but believed initially that it was exaggerated by the sales 
department as an excuse for their failing to sell cars.105 Given Egan’s strong antipathy 
towards all aspects o f  BL, discussed above in Chapter Four, and that at this time Jaguar’s 
sales were the responsibility o f  B L ’s overseas sales division, it is perhaps not too 
surprising that Egan should be somewhat blinkered in his v iew s here. However, as 
Underwood further relates, Egan was disabused o f  this notion when, in June 1980, he met 
with twenty-five UK  Jaguar dealers who made Egan realise that the cars were “badly 
manufactured, badly assem bled and badly serviced”.706 This apparently came as a 
considerable shock to Egan who came to the obvious conclusion that improving the 
quality o f  the cars had to be his first priority.
Dale, Michael. “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the US”. Fortune. 28 April 1986. pi 10. 
Idem.
101 
102
103 John Grant Interview. Appendix p90.
104 Underwood, op cit p73.
105 Ibid. p72.
106 Ibid. p74.
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7.6.2 Resolving the Quality and Reliability Problem: Restoring the Quality
The subsequent actions undertaken by Jaguar under Egan’s direction were w ell 
publicised by the company and have been w ell documented. A s a result, the Jaguar 
account has becom e accepted as fact. According to the version related by Egan to the 
Automotive N ew s World Congress, when he took over Jaguar he discovered “far too 
many complaints from customers and dealers” about quality and reliability, and set about 
ascertaining the nature and extent o f  the problems through a research programme which 
interviewed hundreds o f  Jaguar owners, and com petitive car owners. 107 The replies, 
according to Egan, were correlated with Jaguar’s own warranty statistics (which given 
that Jaguar had no warranty data, as revealed in Section 7.3. above, was another example 
o f  Jaguar creating an illusion o f  professionalism ) and from this som e 150 faults were 
discovered, 60% o f  which were attributed to suppliers, although this is a figure that is 
subject to considerable debate (see Section 7.8 below).
A s a result, Egan set up multi-disciplinary “task forces” to deal with the 
various problems, and got suppliers to agree to not only pay for replacement parts but 
also the dealer costs o f  replacing them. Assem bly line problems were addressed, 
“workers and managers w ho consistently failed to achieve the high quality 
standards...were dism issed”108, and, m ost importantly o f  all, the paint problems were 
resolved follow ing Jaguar taking over the Castle Bromwich factory, and the discarding o f  
the low-bake paint system .709 Indeed, Whyte cites Beasley as opining that the successful 
integration o f  Castle Brom wich into the Jaguar system was essential to Jaguar’s 
survival.110 With the aim o f  involving the workforce in the quality improvement 
programme, video programmes were used to communicate various issues, and Quality 
Circles, discussed in Section 6.9 above, were introduced. The end result o f  all these 
measures according to Thorley was “dramatically improved quality”, and a resolution o f  
delivery problems111, with Egan claim ing in August 1982 that, “95% o f  production is now  
on time”112, although this claim  may w ell have been merely rhetoric.
107 Automotive News. 30 August 1982.
108 Idem.
109 Thorley op cit p i36, Whyte op cit p i76.
110 Whyte, op cit. pi 76.
111 Thorley op cit p 137.
112 Automotive News. 30 August 1982.
261
7.6.3 Resolving the Quality and Reliability Problem: Restoring the Image
Having set about re-establishing quality the next thing was to re-establish the image o f  
Jaguar as a high quality, reliable product. Here, Egan adopted the tactic o f  directly facing 
up to the quality issue, admitting the severity o f  the problems, but rather cleverly masking 
the in-house problems by placing much o f  the blame on the component suppliers, and 
then assuring the world that such problems were being resolved. The continual 
promulgation o f  the quality improvement m essage was effective for, as Autom otive N ews  
was later to remark, “He [Egan] had the sense to realize that i f  you keep talking about 
quality, people w ill eventually believe you have a quality product”.113 K ey was the US 
market, and the beginning o f  the turnaround here was marked by the visit o f  the US 
Jaguar dealers to Browns Lane in June 1981, related in Sub-Section 5.6.2 above. To 
reinforce the quality story in the USA an improved warranty, o f  36,000 m iles, or two 
years, was introduced in April 1982, and increased advertising emphasised quality.114
Quality was also a constant feature o f  Jaguar’s Annual Report and Accounts, 
the first Annual Report follow ing privatisation proclaiming: “Consistent achievement o f  
higher quality standards, reflected by fewer warranty claims per car, signify progress in
the quality and reliability o f  our veh icles Major improvements to our product quality
and reliability were the key to our recovery five years ago”.115 However, the figures 
which formed the basis for such statements were not supplied. A  similar m essage was 
broadcast in the 1985 Annual Report which stated that, “Jaguar’s drive to improve quality 
and reliability continued during 1985 and this was reflected in a further reduction in the 
number o f  faults per car reported by customers”.116 This statement seemed to be 
supported not only by Jaguar’s increased sales, particularly in the U SA , but also by 
Jaguar’s considerably improved ratings in the J D Power Customer Satisfaction surveys, 
recorded in Sub-Section 5.6.4 above.
113 Automotive News. 2 April 1990.
114 Automotive News. 26 April 1982.
115 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1984. pl3.
116 Jaguar Annual Report and Accounts 1985. pl2.
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7.6.4 Resolving the Quality and Reliability Problem: The Reality
Statements in the Annual Reports and Accounts, and the progressively lower warranty 
costs, seem  to affirm the resolution o f  the reliability problem, but much appeared to be a 
product o f  Jaguar’s PR effort. Certainly, whilst Jaguar did resolve a number o f  the quality 
issues it faced in 1980, the extent to which it made any significant progress is open to a 
great deal o f  debate, for as Autom otive N ew s  commented in regard to the Series III, “The 
reality was that Jaguar’s quality improved from poor to mediocre. The company was 
never going to have the cash to ‘engineer’ its way out o f  the bad quality hole”.117 The 
crucial paint issue was resolved, as noted above, resulting, in Grant’s view , in “very good 
paint quality”, but, according to Grant, “most o f  the rest o f  it was bullshit. The quality o f  
the Series III was never very good”.118 B easley indicated som e sympathy with this 
sentiment, but was not as harsh in his comments, maintaining that, “We got the Series III 
to be a more credible car. It w asn’t a very brilliant car, but it was a more credible car”.119
There is a considerable amount o f  anecdotal evidence available regarding 
quality problems at this time, and it is apposite to mention certain specific examples to 
illustrate some o f  the points referred to above. In regard to suppliers, Dale cites the 
problem with the Borg Warner transmission on the Series III which “was good for 30,000  
miles, but after that you were living on borrowed time”, noting that this was something 
Jaguar had to live with since, “there was no w ay w e could have afforded to engineer a 
new one”.120 It is problematic, however, whether this difficulty emanated with the 
component supplier, or whether it resulted from Jaguar’s original specification, an issue 
which is further discussed in Section 7.8 below. Dale also cited the incidence o f  what 
Jaguar Inc referred to as “UTEs” (Underhood Thermal Events), as an example o f  
engineering faults. The problem here resulted from the introduction o f  the fuel injection 
system on the Series III V I 2, Dale relating that:
Jim [Randle] took som ething that had five pounds [psi] fuel pressure and took it 
up to thirty pounds, and they did it all with hand clamps. We had all these joints 
with jubilee clips around them and the vibration would cause leaks, and the fuel 
would pull in between tw o o f  these. Sooner or later there would be something that
117 Automotive News. 2 April 1990.
118 John Grant Interview. Appendix p90.
119 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p8.
120 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p36.
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would set the fuel o f f .  They became known as “UTEs”, for “Underhood
Thermal Events”. There were two or three recalls while they [Jaguar engineering] 
tried to fix it all with the hose clamps. In the end they had to bolt it together like 
everybody else does it. You can’t really, i f  you don’t have thirty or forty hose 
clamps, run thirty pounds pressure.121
Finally, there were reliability issues that Jaguar “never recognized”, Scheele 
providing the example o f  the fuel pump problem on the Series III, the temperature 
extremes in the Middle East and in the southern U SA  causing cavitations (the formation 
o f  bubbles, or a vacuum, in the fuel, resulting in engine misfiring, or shuddering). The 
local agents solved the problem them selves by replacing the fuel pump with one that 
could withstand the temperature regim es.122 It is o f  note that engineering featured, either 
directly, or because o f  its part in component specification, to som e degree in each o f  
these examples. Generally, defective parts gave the least problem as in many cases they 
could be easily replaced, as W eidinger testified123, and, as Table 7.1 shows, they generally 
accounted for a relatively small proportion o f  total warranty costs. Design-originating 
faults, on the other hand, were the most costly to rectify, and often the costs o f  re­
engineering would be prohibitive.
7.6.5 The Paradox o f  Improved Customer Satisfaction Ratings at a time o f  Continuing 
Quality Issues
Despite the apparent resolution o f  the problems, there remained significant quality issues 
with the Series III, a statement that appears to be difficult to reconcile with the improving 
JD Power Customer Satisfaction Survey ratings. Obviously, customer perception now  
was that Jaguar had improved its quality and reliability, but, equally, i f  the reality did not 
match this perception then the poor reputation would again becom e paramount, as was to 
happen later with the XJ40. H owever, whilst the quality o f  the Series III did not improve 
that much, the customer satisfaction ratings continued to climb. There are three factors 
which help to provide an answer to this apparent paradox.
121 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p38.
122 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i31.
123 Jake Weidinger Interview Appendix p i45.
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First, the limited improvements in quality, magnified by the significant public 
relations and advertising efforts given to these, backed, for exam ple, by the better 
warranty offered in the USA, seem ed to be sufficient to convince people that Jaguar’s 
quality actually had improved significantly. Jaguar’s PR activity w as particularly 
vigorous and press comment regarding Jaguar after 1981 was invariably positive, thus 
reinforcing the m essage o f  Jaguar’s rejuvenation. In Scheele’s v iew  the effect o f  the PR 
campaign was reinforced by the management’s arrogance, which also masked the reality:
John [Egan] believed that the quality had improved. When he took over and took 
it private, the quality was appalling. But he then had a quality push and said that it 
was better. And the Series III did get a bit better, but not very much better in 
reality. But he believed his own PR because he went out and told everyone that 
Jaguar quality was now  the best in the world etc e tc .124
Second, there w as the fact that customers were prepared to trade-off factors 
such as quality against other attributes. Here, a slight improvement in quality, and 
reputation, might be sufficient to make such a trade-off attractive. Grant certainly 
supported such an assessm ent, comm enting that Jaguar had:
got to a point where by British standards the Series III was acceptable. By  
international standards it really w asn’t a strong competitor, but because it was so 
beautiful-looking people forgave it. It was a very unique car. It had this fantastic 
ride, it had this lovely silky engine, particularly in the V I2, and the car looked 
fabulous. It was unique and everybody fell in love with it so they forgave its 
quirks. But it had lots o f  quality problems when you look.125
Adding support to this analysis, Bennett, commenting on the US market, 
opined that, “There was always something that w as a little bit different about Jaguar. It
had a cachet. People dreamed o f  owning a Jaguar and it was its “Britishness” that
people were enamoured with. So, they bought a car that was far from perfect”.126
Third, and certainly the m ost important factor in regard to the U S market, was 
the part played by the dealers, as discussed in Chapter Five above. A s a result o f  dealer
124 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i30.
125 John Grant Interview. Appendix p90.
126 Martin Bennett Interview. Appendix p i2.
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action, customer satisfaction ratings rocketed, reflecting the vastly improved service 
levels, rather than any significant improvements in the quality o f  the cars them selves. A s 
Automotive N ew s  pointed out in retrospect: “Egan realized that dealers must be able to 
offer the highest standard o f  service. Then, i f  there were faults, customers would not be 
perturbed”.127 If  this v iew  was correct then Egan may be seen to have been echoing 
Iacocca who, in the mid 1970s, when still at Ford, confessed that Ford aimed at creating 
“a dealer organization that w ill fix  up the cars and guarantee that they’ll function right”.128 
Here, Iacocca “was admitting that Ford . . . .  was pushing onto the dealers the burden o f  
supplying customers with an acceptable car”.129 However, there is no evidence o f  Egan 
appreciating the effort expended by the US dealers in this regard, Egan stating that, “The 
US dealers didn’t really expect to do very much to the car, and they didn’t!”130 But, on the 
contrary, Bennett recalled that in regard to the Series III:
A s a dealer w e used to have to do a lot to the car - what was supposed to be a pre­
delivery inspection was actually a partial re-build. It was quite amazing. I always 
remember in the last year o f  the car, 1987, w e were actually putting lead on the 
left rear door sill because the tooling at that point was so worn out that you  
couldn’t get a rubber seal big enough to actually stop the wind noise so w e would  
build it up by putting a quarter o f  an inch o f  lead in there and paint it, and put a 
brand new carpet in to cover it.131
But, as Dale admitted, whilst such action was possible with the Series III, the 
problems with the XJ40 were just too overwhelm ing.132
7.6.6 The Triumph o f  Illusion and its Consequence
It is apparent that Jaguar’s PR effort created a powerful image in regard to improvements 
in vehicle quality and reliability, but much o f  this restored reputation turned out to be 
illusion. Consequently, Jaguar had to pay a high price for its PR success, as did many o f  
its US dealers, a number o f  whom  became bankrupt, as mentioned in Sub-Section 5.6.5 
above. A major problem, noted in the previous section, was that Jaguar’s management
127 Automotive News. 2 April 1990.
128 Halberstam. op cit. p461.
|29 Idem.
130 John Egan Interview. Appendix p74.
131 Martin Bennett Interview. Appendix p i2.
132 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p40.
266
appears to have suffered the delusion that such improvements were real and, as a result, 
failed to address many o f  the underlying causes o f  the problems with its vehicles. 
Certainly, it is fairly obvious that Egan’s much lauded commitment to quality control was 
little more than an emphasis upon superficial and expedient measures instead o f  sound 
engineering and manufacturing methods. M oreover, the preoccupation with increased 
output apparently often led to lower quality standards than Egan claimed. This would 
become abundantly clear with the US launch o f  the XJ40 which Beasley described as 
being “a huge rude awakening for all o f  us”.133
7.7 The XJ40 - The Nadir o f  Jaguar Quality and Reliability
The improved image that Jaguar enjoyed by the m id-1980s, enhanced by its successful 
privatisation and PR, engendered expectations that the new car was going to be 
wonderful, Autom otive N ew s  confidently announcing that, “the m odel’s true significance 
is that it w ill enable Jaguar to reach the customer satisfaction and dealer quality levels 
achieved by M ercedes-Benz, the industry’s leader and Jaguar’s big rival”.134 Jaguar 
believed it had good cause to be comfortable with such statements since the car “was the 
most tried and tested ever produced by the Company”, having covered 5.5 m illion m iles 
o f road proving135, and had been w ell received by the motoring press.136 However, all the 
road testing had been undertaken using hand-built prototypes, and the cars test-driven by 
the press had also been hand-built137, the favourable press comment leading to 
management delusion138 for the production m odels proved to be o f  greatly inferior 
quality. Indeed, the XJ40 was, as Grant noted, a car that suffered “appalling quality. It 
was terrible in virtually every respect”.139 Other Jaguar or Ford executives were equally 
condemnatory in their comm ents, Edwards describing the car as “a dog”140, Dale 
remarking that the “XJ40 w asn’t just bad, it was stunningly bad!”141, and Scheele that
133 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p8.
134 Automotive News. 6 April 1987.
135 Jaguar XJ40 Launch Press Release. 8 October 1986.
136 John Edwards. Interview with the Author. November 2002. Appendix p53.
137 Daniels, Jeff. Jaguar. The Engineering Story. (Yeovil, 2004). pi 64.
138 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p53.
139 John Grant Interview. Appendix p90.
140 John Edwards Interview Appendix p53.
141 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p34.
267
“the XJ40 nearly brought the company to its knees, and should have done actually”.142
The problems with the car were wide-ranging and deep-rooted, ow ing much 
to what Putnam referred to as “a combination o f  design faults”, due to the fact that, “the 
car w asn’t properly engineered”.143 This v iew  was supported by Scheele who, as 
previously noted, was adamant that, “the problems on the XJ40 were very largely 
engineering in nature. They were in-house”777, and Edwards who scathingly remarked 
that, “Jim Randle put his efforts into engineering cars that didn’t bloody work”.145
Apart from design faults there were other engineering-originating problems, 
the most fundamental one, noted in Sub-Section 4.3 .1 .2  above, being that engineering did 
not talk to manufacturing, and v ice  versa, so that manufacturing considerations were not 
taken into account in the design .146 This resulted in a car that w as unsuited to assembly 
line production, or, as Edwards believed, “couldn’t be built. It was not developed enough 
from a manufacturing point o f  v iew ”.147 This situation w as exacerbated by the fact, that 
after the launch o f  the XJ40, “manufacturing couldn’t get the engineers to re-engineer the 
product for assem bly feasibility”.148 Dale adds that another major problem was that 
Randle had no training in producing a car for production149, whilst Edwards blames also 
the fact that Jaguar’s management generally suffered a lack o f  experience in launching 
new cars, the last previous launch having been that o f  the XJ-S in 1975.150 Engineering 
also failed to specify adequate or appropriate tolerances for component parts.151 There 
undoubtedly were problems arising from the deficiencies o f  Jaguar’s three plants, but 
these, according to Scheele, were self-contained, and, as with any issues with component 
supply, could be resolved, as Ford was later to demonstrate.152
142 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i30.
143 Roger Putnam Interview. Appendix p i 19.
144 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i30.
145 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p61.
146 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i30.
147 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p56.
148 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i30.
149 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p34.
150 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p59.
151 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p l3 1.
152 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix pp129-30.
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Dale complained that the XJ40 deficiencies embraced:
everything from door handles, door motors, w indow s, the bodywork didn’t fit, the 
wind noise was horrendous, to the self-leveling suspension -  absolutely bloody 
hopeless: it seized up, it collapsed. The w indow s w ouldn’t work, the door locks 
gave up, the doors w ouldn’t shut because they didn’t fit, and w e were plagued 
with wind noise and water leaks.153
A major problem was caused by the batteries going flat i f  the vehicle was left 
for more than a few  days, Dale recounting that, “A  lot o f  our vehicles were owned by 
people who traveled and left their cars at airports and came back to find the car 
immobilized”.154 A s related in Section 7.3 above, Jaguar Inc later catalogued over 250  
things that they knew were wrong with the car that they sim ply couldn’t fix  because 
“there just w asn’t time, there just w asn’t the engineering ability”.155
Scheele identified four main packages o f  problems still bedeviling the XJ40 
in 1992: water leaks; paint finish; windshield; electrics.156 O f these, only paint finish was 
not a product engineering-related problem, and it is useful to provide som e further 
illustrations o f  the problems arising from faulty engineering.
Water leaks was the main issue, which Scheele stated came as no surprise, 
having discovered that, “nearly 90% o f  all cars didn’t first tim e go through the water 
test”. Whilst it would have been easy to blame the weatherseal supplier, the reality was 
that the door gaps were not right, the door opening was not right, and therefore the 
flanges and the seal system  had to be redesigned. Whilst engineering initially stated it 
could not be fixed, it w as done eventually.157
Another significant problem, mentioned in Sub-Section 4.3.1.2 above, and 
which “gave rise to significant customer complaints”, concerned the windscreen. This 
resulted from there being only one wiper, the actual wiper mechanism lifting o ff  the 
window at higher speed. It w as a problem that, according to Scheele, got, “a hell o f  a lot 
better by getting a more forceful and better aerodynamically tuned wiper blade” but
153 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p34.
154 Mike Dale, e-mail to the author. July 2007. Appendix p34n35.
155 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p34.
156 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p l3 1.
157 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix pp !3 1-32.
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which continued to be a problem until “w e got rid o f  the single wiper blade”.158
Dale provides a measure o f  the scale o f  the immediate problem, relating that 
in the U SA  Jaguar offered a free breakdown towing service for the XJ40, and that in the 
first year “We towed 40,000 times. In theory w e towed every single vehicle tw ice”.159 The 
impact o f  such reliability problems on Jaguar’s reputation was dramatic, and devastating, 
as was the effect on financial performance, as discussed in Chapter Eight below. In the 
1988 JD Power Consumer Satisfaction Index Jaguar fell to 18th place, being overtaken by 
Lincoln, BM W , V olvo, Audi, and Saab, all o f  whom  were below  it in 1987.160 By 1992 
Jaguar had fallen to 35 place, Scheele wryly noting that it was “kept out o f  last place by 
that stellar European import called Yugo. That is how bad it was.”161
Following the realization o f  the problems with the XJ40, it “was all hands to 
the pump in terms o f  design changes, manufacturing process changes here, extra checks 
there, to try and manage the outcom es better, and get stuck into the suppliers parts that 
were giving major problems”.162 For the US, a package o f  thirty or forty “fixes” was 
organized for the dealers to install, Dale informing them that, “Look, you know what a 
screw-up w e’ve got, now w e ’ve got to dig ourselves out with the customers. W e’re going  
to have to bring every single car back in, w e’ve got to handle this thing right, w e’ve got 
to put the car right”.163
Despite such actions, quality remained the major issue at the time that Ford 
acquired Jaguar. Grant provided a measure o f  the scale o f  the problem, relating that Ford 
found that when it started applying to Jaguar its Uniform Product Assessm ent Systems 
(UPAS), which measured quality according to the number o f  demerits per one hundred 
cars, new highs were recorded. This was a measure o f  quality as perceived by the 
customer -  visible items, things that were working or not working -  and weighted by the 
severity o f  the problem. So, the higher the score, the greater the quality problem overall. 
Whilst a Ford Scorpio w ould typically score 250-300 points, and a Lincoln Continental 
perhaps 300-350 points, Jaguar, Grant noted, “was com ing out with scores o f  about
158 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix pl32.
159 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p33.
160 Automotive News. 8 August 1988.
161 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix pl31.
162 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p9.
163 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix pp41-2.
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2,500, whether it was an XJ-S or an XJ40. The old Series III, which w as still being 
manufactured, was the best, it was better quality than the other tw o cars, but was still up 
around the 2,000 mark”.164
Although the more radical action undertaken by Hayden in the first two years 
o f Ford’s ownership o f  Jaguar resulted in the UPAS score falling to 450 points, Hayden, 
o f necessity, had had to focus on the more immediate issues o f  assem bly and 
workmanship, introducing process management and process discipline. But, as Scheele 
related, and which has been noted above, many design faults, which would not be 
necessarily apparent to a customer, remained, testifying to the primacy o f  Jaguar’s 
product engineering in the problem o f  quality and reliability.
7.8. The Supplier Issue
As shown in Sub-Section 7.6.2 above, in seeking to rehabilitate Jaguar’s reputation in the 
early 1980s, Egan promoted an image o f  much o f  the blame for poor quality and 
reliability being due to sub-standard components supplied by outside firms, these being 
responsible for 60% o f  all Jaguar’s quality problems. “Outside firms” here include 
Pressed Steel Fisher which supplied body and paint from its Castle Bromwich plant, and 
which accounted for som e 16% o f  the imported cost o f  the car (that is, som e £800 o f  the 
£5,000 total imported cost in 1980).165 Egan was being somewhat disingenuous in this 
regard since, for much o f  1980, Castle Bromwich may not have been under the control o f  
Jaguar, but was, in fact, part o f  BL, as was Jaguar, and therefore could equally be 
regarded as an internal supplier. Even so, body and paint notwithstanding, Jaguar at this 
time had very little internal data on which to base such accusations regarding its 
suppliers, and such claim s have to be regarded, in part at least, as a PR tactic to focus the 
blame away from the real issues. Indeed, Bob Dale dism isses the 60% figure as being 
“John Egan speak”166, and given that Lucas was the single largest truly external 
component supplier, by number o f  components and by overall value, to the Series III, 
such a view  has to be taken seriously. Scheele, broadly agreeing with Dale, argues that it 
is always difficult to be precise about the cause o f  quality problems stating that, “w e
164 John Grant Interview. Appendix p91.
165 John Edwards, e-mail to the author, 18 July 2007.
166 Bob Dale. Interview with the author. May 2007. Appendix p28.
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loosely attribute: w e say a third o f  the problems are assembly, a third are engineering, a 
third are component manufacture”.167
That all Jaguar m odels suffered som e quality problems resulting from  
component supply issues is beyond doubt, but their nature and magnitude is uncertain. 
Component suppliers had their own manufacturing problems, and there were many 
instances o f  components that simply failed to work, or could not m eet the required 
reliability standards168, but, as Scheele pointed out with regard to the XJ40, “i f  these had 
been the only issue w e could have sorted them out”. The more intractable problems with 
components resulted from inappropriate or inadequate specifications, faulty design, or 
cost considerations.
Bob Dale observed, echoing the example o f  the fuel pump cited in Sub- 
Section 7.6.4 above, that Lucas electrical equipment on the Series III in North America 
was notoriously unreliable, the problem in part being that it was having to put up with 
temperature changes which were never experienced in Britain, and which were not 
allowed for in the specification, failing to take into account that som e Lucas equipment 
was temperature sensitive, or suffered water ingress problems.169 On the XJ40 Bob Dale 
attributed component problems to Jaguar’s failure to provide exact specifications, or to 
require numerous changes, recalling that, “the component industry was constantly faced 
with post-production changes in specification. It was a nightmare, especially in the early 
‘80s. Talk about Oops! Only three months into production and ‘w e want this and that 
changed’”.170 Jaguar was fortunate in that a number o f  component companies, particularly 
some o f  the larger ones, were prepared to accommodate any such behaviour given that 
the quantities it purchased were tiny in motor industry terms -  “a m easly 50,000 vehicles 
[a year]”.171 In this regard, M ike Dale observed that, “the people who did the air 
conditioning/climate control, som e French company, were learning as they went 
along”.172 Mike Dale also cited an example o f  Jaguar’s cost considerations resulting in 
quality problems: “I said to Lucas once that the windscreen motors were inadequate, and
167 Nick Scheele Interview. Appendix p i30.
168 Mike Beasley Interview. Appendix p7.
169 Bob Dale Interview. Appendix p28.
170 Bob Dale Interview. Appendix p30.
171 Bob Dale Interview. Appendix p30.
172 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix pp46-47.
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they said ‘Yes, they are, but you w on’t pay for the ones w e recommend’”.173
Bruce Blythe, Ford Vice President and an alternate director o f  Jaguars Cars 
from 1990 onwards, whilst not impressed with the quality o f  components supplied to the 
XJ40, came to appreciate that it was much more a Jaguar originating problem:
Supply quality was lousy, and yet when you went to the suppliers and really 
started to raise the roof about them not building parts to specification it became 
pretty clear that i f  they built to specification you couldn’t put the car together. It 
was engineered so loosely that they had accommodated the engineering 
deficiencies by m odifying the parts on an informal basis so, when you were trying 
to hammer them on the head saying you’ve got to have better quality, better 
prices, better productivity, and you’ve got to build to specification, they were 
saying ‘Yes, okay, I’ll do that, but what happens to your cost curves? You w on’t 
be able to build anything’.174
7.9. Summary and Conclusions
Whilst problems with quality and reliability had always been an issue for Jaguar, as with 
nearly every other motor manufacturer, it is clear from the preceding analysis that the 
considerable quality problems that existed in 1980 were the product o f  a long established 
corporate ethos. Consequently, Egan’s failure to recognise and address the weaknesses in 
Jaguar’s manufacturing and engineering institutional structures only served to exacerbate 
the underlying problems o f  institutional dysfunction and inadequate corporate resources. 
A s a result, Jaguar’s quality problems were not resolved to any great extent during the 
first half o f  the 1980s, and reached a nadir with the launch o f  the XJ40. Far from 
achieving new standards o f  excellence, the products built during Egan’s era, in the view  
o f  Hamish Orr-Ewing, Jaguar’s Chairman at the time o f  the flotation, and a long time 
Jaguar enthusiast, were “the most unreliable and unsatisfactory in the history o f  the 
company”.175
A s has been demonstrated, whilst the quality and reliability problems resulted 
from deficiencies across all aspects o f  the Jaguar operation, the fundamental problem lay 
with Jaguar’s own product engineering department. But, given that engineering was 
permitted to operate in autonomous isolation, with no management checks and controls to
173 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p47.
174 Bruce Blythe. Interview with the author. January 1994. Appendix p26.
175 Hamish Orr-Ewing. Interview with the author. November 2002. Appendix pi 15.
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ensure that it was doing what it should have been doing, it was a problem that was not 
recognised until after the launch o f  the XJ40. Indeed, given the enormity o f  the problems 
with the XJ40 it was a problem that could no longer be denied. Even so, the quality 
problems that were the product o f  design faults, resulting from inadequate engineering 
resources, and weaknesses in engineering capability, could not be easily put right, and 
many remained unresolved.
It is apparent that the public b e lie f in the rejuvenation o f  Jaguar from 1982 
onwards was very much a triumph o f  style over substance, the initial m ea culpa tactic 
adopted by Egan o f  facing the quality issue head-on, admitting the severity o f  the 
problems, but blaming component suppliers, cleverly masked the in-house problems 
which would have been much less easily understood by Jaguar’s customers. However, as 
has been argued in this chapter, the success o f  this policy led to complacency, Jaguar’s 
management at the time appearing to have suffered from the delusion that they had 
resolved the quality and reliability problems.
Having successfully laid the blame at the door o f  the component suppliers 
once, it was hardly an option that was open with regard to the XJ40 as to have done so 
would no doubt have called into question the competence o f  the Jaguar management. 
Indeed, Jaguar could not admit publicly that its much heralded, and greatly tested, new  
model was a quality disaster. A s Blythe put it, “What was Egan’s choice? To tell you 
‘I’m running a wreck’?”176 To have done so would undoubtedly have led to a complete 
collapse o f  confidence in the company, and would have been the precursor to calling in 
the receivers. The only realistic alternative course open to Jaguar was that o f  trying to 
resolve the quality problems as best it could whilst using its strong PR capability and its 
dealer network to mask the reality o f  dramatically reduced product reliability.
That the Egan management was only partially successful in this strategy is 
readily apparent. W hilst a number o f  the superficial and more “quick fix” issues were 
resolved, many o f  the problems resulting from design errors were basically “unfixable”. 
Jaguar, however, was successful in terms o f  the illusion it maintained regarding the high 
quality o f  the XJ40. Although the sales o f  the car plummeted in the all-important US  
market, Jaguar masked these, as reported in Sub-Section 5.6.5 above, by blaming the
176 Bruce Blythe Interview. Appendix p i9.
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overall decline in demand for luxury cars, and the strengthening US Dollar. With little or 
no comment regarding quality problems appearing in the press at the time, the public 
image o f  the company and o f  the XJ40 remained untarnished. Indeed, it is remarkable 
that Jaguar was able to maintain this illusion long after the XJ40 ceased production, as 
Mike Dale demonstrated with the following statement:
I saw a piece in a magazine only a few  years ago that said “The XJ40 -  the car 
that saved Jaguar” on the front cover. I looked inside, and there was a big picture 
o f  Jim [Randle]. They’d gone to Jim, and Jim had told them what a wonderful car 
it was. But it was a heap o f  crap! It bankrupted us!177
177 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p37.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE
8.1 Introduction
Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 above showed the changes in Jaguar’s profits over three clearly 
defined phases o f  its history during the Egan era, and Chapters Four to Seven examined 
the individual factors involved. Profits represent the difference between a company’s 
revenue, or turnover, in a particular period and the costs o f  achieving that revenue in that 
same period, so the success o f  a company is judged not only by its ability to increase 
sales but also by its ability to keep control o f  costs, hence ensuring that profits rise in 
some proportion to its sales. A s is apparent from Tables 4.2, and 4.3, and Figure 8.13 
below (see page 375), Jaguar’s profits after 1985 did not rise in proportion to its sales but, 
on the contrary, declined whilst sales increased.
The purpose o f  this present chapter is to provide an explanation for this 
outcome through a quantitative analysis in financial terms o f  the impact on Jaguar’s 
profits o f  the various factors previously discussed in this thesis, and hence to test the 
validity o f  Jaguar’s arguments regarding the reasons for its declining profits. Section 8.2 
reviews Jaguar’s profit record, summarised in Table 8.1 (page 357), the main elements o f  
which are examined in Sections 8.3 and 8.4. Section 8.3 examines revenue aspects, the 
main factors here being sales volum es (Sub-Section 8.3.1), US pricing (8.3.2), and 
currency (8.3.3). Costs are examined in Section 8.4, the main elem ents here relating to 
employees (8.4.1), administration (8.4.2), distribution (8.4.3), purchasing (8.4.4), 
research and development (8.4.5), depreciation (8.4.6), and warranties (8.4.7). Finally, 
Section 8.5 examines Jaguar’s cash flow  position and questions whether Jaguar’s 
management was deluding itse lf in regard to the arguments it was putting forward about 
the strength o f  its cash position.
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8.2 Profit Record
Whilst pre-tax profits have been the most widely accepted measure o f  the results o f a 
company’s activities, since they provide a quick and easy gauge o f  performance, they are 
open to manipulation o f  various kinds, for, as Smith pointed out, “profits are no more 
than ‘an opinion’ -  the result o f  the accountants ‘true and fair view” ’.1 At best, therefore, 
pre-tax profits per se are a very unsatisfactory guide. To arrive at a meaningful measure 
of performance, an analysis o f the different items that are used to create the actual pre-tax 
profit figure is necessary. This is particularly true given the pattern o f  Jaguar’s profits just 
before and during its period as a publicly quoted company, as shown in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: Pre Tax Profit (£m illion) and Year-on-Year % Changes,
1980 to 1990
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Source: Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984 to 1990; Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984.
Jaguar’s profits recovery and growth in the period 1980 to 1985 was 
attributed by Egan to “improved quality o f the car; better productivity; and an improved 
distribution system”.2 However, it has to be acknowledged that the apparent resolution o f 
these problems, whilst important, merely facilitated the profits recovery, and that it was
1 Smith, Terry. Accounting fo r  Growth. (London, 1992). p6.
2 Automotive News. 6 October 1986.
277
the coincidence o f  the emergence from recession o f  the important US market with the 
strengthening o f  the US Dollar that resulted in Jaguar’s continuous profits improvement 
in this period, as discussed in Sub-Section 8.3.3 below.
If it was this coincidence o f  circumstances that propelled Jaguar’s profits 
advance in the first half o f  the decade, it was the reversal o f  these factors that, according 
to Jaguar, produced the decline in its profits in the second half o f  the decade. The 
resultant pattern produced in Figure 8.1 demonstrates a near symmetry which is not 
altered by the fact that there were one-off launch costs (£11 m illion in 1986, £20m illion in 
1987) charged against profits resulting from the introduction o f  the XJ40. Jaguar’s 
explanation for the downturn, being that o f  adverse currency movements and falling US 
demand from 1987 onwards, tended to be accepted at the time, and since, by a variety o f  
commentators, including many City analysts and journalists, examples o f  which are cited 
in footnote 28 in Chapter Four (page 112). But it is a somewhat superficial explanation, 
failing to address, for example, other reasons for the decline in profits at a time when 
Jaguar’s sales volum es in the USA continued to be at historically high levels, and it was 
achieving higher prices. Some commentators, however, did appreciate that there were 
more deep-rooted problems, an investment circular from the stockbroker Barclays de 
Zoete Wedd at the end o f  1988 commenting that:
We are told that it is the weakness o f  the dollar that is the cause o f  Jaguar’s 
current problems -  it may be a contributory factor but consider Jaguar’s profits o f  
£91.5m pre-tax in 1984, the year o f  its stock market flotation, against current year 
estimates o f  perhaps £45m  pre-tax. Given that Jaguar’s hedged US$ rate in the 
current year is only 15% lower than that o f  1984, that its projected US volume 
sales are 16% higher (21,000 units against 18,000 in 1984) and that Jaguar’s US  
retail prices are som e 35% higher than 1984 it would appear that the US$  
exchange rate is merely a convenient whipping boy. The truth seems to be that 
Jaguar’s cost base has got out o f  control, its labour relations and productivity 
continue to cause problems, and that its marketing planning has fallen short, 
especially with regard to the US market.3
Even so, it is noticeable that there was no mention o f  the quality issue, perhaps testifying 
to the success o f  Jaguar’s PR effort in masking this problem.
3 Barclays de Zoete Wedd Investment Circular. 9 December 1988.
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The main elements in Jaguar’s profit and loss account are shown in Table 8.1, 
and the following two sections provide an analysis o f the various factors involved.
8.3 Revenues
From the nadir o f its fortunes in 1980, Jaguar enjoyed nine consecutive years o f  growth 
in sales revenues, producing a seven-fold increase in this period, from £166.4million in 
1980 to £l,139.7million in 1989, as shown in Figure 8.2. This amounted to an average 
annual gain o f  31%.
Figure 8.2: Turnover (£million) and Year-on-Year % Changes, 
1980 to 1990
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Source: Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984 to 1990; Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984.
As with all companies, Jaguar’s sales revenues were determined by the 
volume o f product sold multiplied by the prices achieved. In terms o f products, the main 
items were motor vehicles, although some 8% o f sales related to parts, and there was also 
a very small element o f  revenue derived from the supply o f the J60 motor engine for 
military armoured vehicles. For the purpose o f this analysis, revenues from parts and 
military engines are ignored since it can be reasonably assumed that parts were a constant 
proportion o f turnover, and military engine sales were so minor as to be o f little 
consequence. Two other factors affecting changes in revenues are those o f  the sales mix
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Table 8.1: Jaguar Profit & Loss Account 1980 to 1990
Year to  end Decem ber: 1980
£m
1981
£m
1982
£m
1983
£m
1984
£m
1985
£m
1986
£m
1987
£m
1988
£m
1989
£m
1990
£m
Turnover 166.4 195.2 305.6 472.6 634.1 746.5 830.4 1002.1 1075.5 1139.7 1016.1
Production Labour Costs N/A N/A 53.4 67.5 84.5 102.2 123.8 149.6 162.4 167.6 170.2
Purchasing Costs 112.2 116.3 154.8 225.6 292.1 332.8 381.1 493.0 557.8 658.3 580.7
Depreciation 5.6 7.3 6.4 8.6 10.4 14.9 28.9 44.2 58.9 71.0 63.8
Research & Dev 5.2 9.8 12.8 16.5 23.0 35.0 35.2 50.4 55.7 52.5 54.9
XJ40 launch Costs 11.0 20.0
Other Op Costs n/a n/a 0.7 0.8 1.5 8.9 9.1 7.9 5.1 2.6 4.3
Warranties* 15.0 14.0 21.0 28.0 36.0 53.0 50.0 47.0 73.0 128.0 88.9
Balance of Costs** 52.1 49.7 13.3 35.4 47.6 31.0 7.1 20.8 32.5 35.8 21.4
Total C ost of S a les 190.1 197.1 262.4 382.4 495.1 577.8 646.2 832.9 945.4 1115.8 984.3
G ross Profit -23.7 -2.1 43.2 90.2 139.0 168.7 184.2 169.2 130.1 23.9 31.8
Distribution Costs 7.3 7.8 13.8 13.3 18.0 19.7 20.6 23.9 28.0 26.1 23.7
Admin Expenses 8.1 11.2 14.8 22.0 34.3 41.2 56.8 60.7 62.7 62.6 69.7
Operating Profit -44.3 -30.9 10.1 51.1 86.7 107.8 106.8 84.6 39.4 -64.8 -61.6
Related Cos n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.0 2.9 2.9 1.3
Net Investment Income -3.0 -0.8 -0.5 -1.1 4.6 13.1 13.9 11.4 5.2 3.6 -5.9
Pre Tax Profit -47.3 -31.7 9.6 50.0 91.5 121.3 120.8 97.0 47.5 -58.3 -66.2
Notes:
Figures in black are given in the Offer for Sale document and Annual Reports and Accounts, or from other sources. Figures in blue are computed or 
estimated from information provided.
* Actual Warranty figures supplied by John Edwards.
** In 1980 and 1981 includes production labour costs
and the geographic mix. Changes in the product sales m ix would alter overall revenues, 
with, for example, an increased proportion o f  higher priced vehicles such as the XJ-S  
Grand Tourer, or the Daimler Sovereign, providing a boost to revenues. However, given  
that little information has been made available about changes in the product sales m ix, 
this aspect cannot be quantified from available information, and it has to be assumed, for 
the purpose o f  this analysis, that, taken in isolation, variations in this element w ill have a 
neutral effect on, or cancel out each other in relation to, changes in sales revenues overall. 
Changes in the geographic sales mix, on the other hand, had a profound effect on overall 
revenues, particularly given the increased importance to Jaguar o f  the US market.
Indeed, in Jaguar’s case an additional and vitally important factor, and one 
that was fairly unique for a British company at this time, was that o f  the US  
Dollar/Sterling exchange rate, discussed in Sub-Section 8.3.3 below. A s related in 
Section 5.5 above, Jaguar’s sales and marketing thrust under Egan was directed mainly at 
the USA, resulting in revenues from this market increasing unabated som e fifteen-fold, 
from £37m illion in 1980 to a peak o f  £555.1m illion in 1987. This represented an average 
annual increase o f  53.7% in this period, before suffering a decline o f  nearly 16%, to 
£467.6m illion, in 1988. O f particular note is the resultant dependency o f  Jaguar on the 
US market, with its US revenues, in Sterling terms, increasing from 22.3%  o f  overall 
revenues in 1980 to over 60% in the years 1983 to 1986, as may be seen in Figure 8.3.
Apart from the importance o f  the US to Jaguar in terms o f  volum es and 
proportion o f  its overall revenues, the U S also provided Jaguar with premium revenues, 
as may be seen from Figure 8.4. In 1980, the proportion o f  Jaguar’s revenues from the US  
was lower than the proportion o f  its w holesales to that market, reflecting its weak  
position in the US at that time, and the consequent lower prices that were obtained 
compared to other markets. But from 1982 onwards, as a result o f  some combination o f  
premium pricing, a higher proportion o f  top o f  the range vehicles in the product sales 
mix, increased volum es, and the impact o f  favourable currency exchange rates, the US  
proportion o f  its overall revenues exceeded, by a considerable margin, the US proportion 
o f  its total wholesales. The analysis o f  Jaguar’s revenues that follow s focuses on the US  
aspects since these, obviously, are the major factors o f  concern to such enquiry.
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Figure 8.3: Turnover (Cmillion) by Region, and % of turnover 
from the UK and USA markets, 1980 to 1988
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Figure 8.4: Jaguar US W holesales and US Car Revenues as % of Total 
Jaguar W holesales and Car Revenues, 1980 to 1988
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The corollary to Jaguar’s increased dependence on the US was that o f  its 
reliance, for maintained profits, on the level o f  the US Dollar/Sterling exchange rate, a 
factor over which it could exercise no control. Here, it is o f  note that Jaguar did much to 
underplay the extent o f  the effects o f  favourable exchange rates when engaging with the 
City and media audiences whilst profits were increasing, but the reverse was true after 
1986, when the then unfavourable exchange rate became the principal pretext for Jaguar’s 
profits decline. However, not all commentators were convinced by Jaguar’s lamentations, 
as demonstrated by The Sunday Times when it commented, “A  word o f  advice to Sir John 
Egan: don’t use the rise in sterling as an excuse for Jaguar’s recent profit performance. 
The Japanese and W est German car companies have had strong currencies for years, yet 
Mercedes, for instance, has 61% o f  the imported luxury car market in the United States”.4 
It may be seen from Figure 8.5 that Jaguar’s revenue per US vehicle w holesale increased 
considerably over the period, reflecting price increases, currency benefits, and changes in 
the sales mix, particularly as a result o f  a larger proportion o f  higher priced Vanden Plas 
saloons and XJ-S coupes being sold. A s shown in Figure 5.1 above, US sales o f  XJ-S 
models as a proportion o f  total US sales steadily increased from 17.1% in 1983 to 25.5%  
in 1990. Although there was a slight drop in wholesale revenue per vehicle in 1986 this 
was due mainly to a greater proportion o f  the lower priced Series III saloons being 
included in the sales mix. Whilst average revenue per wholesale vehicle fell in 1988, due 
largely to the fall in the value o f  the US Dollar, it remained significantly ahead o f  that 
achieved in 1983, a year in which Jaguar reported a similar level o f  pre-tax profit.
8.3.1 Sales Volumes
Jaguar’s focus on the US market at the beginning o f  the period, and the consequent 
readjustment o f  supply, resulted in an overall decline in total wholesales in 1981 since the 
increase in US w holesales failed to compensate for lower wholesales elsewhere. Jaguar 
thereafter enjoyed seven years o f  continuous growth in total wholesales, as may be seen 
from Figure 8.6. During this period, wholesales increased
4 Sunday Times, 4 September 1988.
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Figure 8.5: US W holesales - Average Revenue (£) per Vehicle, 
and Year-on-Year % Changes, 1980 to 1988
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Figure 8.6: Total W holesales, and Year-on-Year % Changes, 
1980 to 1990
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some three and a half times, from 13,933 vehicles in 19815 to a peak o f  50, 603 vehicles 
in 19886 -  an average annual rate o f  growth o f  21% over the period. The slowing o f  
growth in 1986 was due to the launch o f  the XJ40 in the UK and Europe which resulted 
in “supply constraints created by the change-over to production o f  the new  range”.7 
Indeed, UK turnover remained virtually unchanged at £131.5m illion in 1986, compared 
to £130.7m illion in 1985, as was the case with regard to European turnover - 
£63.5m illion in 1986, compared to £61.5m illion in 1985.8 In 1987 UK  turnover increased 
by 65% to £217.4m illion, and European turnover by 69% to £107.1 m illion.9 This resulted 
from the initial enthusiastic reception o f  the new model, with Jaguar reporting demand 
running ahead o f  supply, and more than compensated for the decline in US wholesales 
since this market also suffered supply constraints following the 1987 launch there o f  the 
XJ40.10 Other markets continued to offset the downturn in US w holesales in 198811, but 
growth overall was limited to 2.9%. However, in 1989 total wholesales began a four-year 
US-led decline, reaching a nadir o f  21,797 units in 1992.12
The impact o f  the remarkable six years o f  continuous growth in US 
wholesales from 1982 onwards is shown in Figure 8.7. From 1980 to 1986, US 
wholesales increased tenfold, from 2,518 vehicles in 198013 to 24,901 in 198614, an 
average annual increase o f  som e 50%. A s mentioned above, the drop in wholesales in 
1987 resulted from the US launch o f  the XJ40, whilst the further decline in 1988 was 
attributed by Jaguar to the general deterioration in the North American market for 
European luxury cars.15 Figure 5.8 above showed that at the retail sales level Jaguar 
experienced a decline o f  9% in US sales in 1988, but only 6% in 1987, thus 
demonstrating the timing differences between wholesales (to distributors) and retail sales 
(to end user customers).
5 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984. p3.
6 Jaguar Annual Report 1988. p4.
7 Jaguar Annual Report 1986. p i5.
8 Ibid. p26
9 Jaguar Annual Report 1987. p30.
10 Ibid pi 7.
11 Jaguar Annual Report 1988. p i7.
12 Jaguar Accounts 1993. p i.
13 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984. p3
14 Phillips and Drew, Investment Circular, May 1987.
15 Jaguar Annual Report 1988 p i7.
285
30000
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From 1989 onwards, under Ford control, figures for the US market were not 
published separately, but combined with those o f Canada in a new “North America” 
category.
8.3.2 US Pricing
As revealed in Section 5.3 above, in the US market throughout the 1980s Jaguar obtained 
some 75% or more o f its vehicle sales from the Series III, and then the XJ40, saloon. 
Included in this was the higher specification, and higher priced, Vanden Plas version, 
introduced in 1982. However, Jaguar never provided a breakdown between the sales of 
the two versions. The Vanden Plas saloon and the XJ-S Sports Coupe, introduced in 
1981, were both priced some 10% higher than the basic Series III/XJ40, but pricing 
changes tended to maintain the differential between the different models. Consequently, 
an appreciation o f  the effects o f  price changes in the US market on Jaguar’s overall 
performance may be obtained by restricting the analysis to that o f  the pricing changes o f 
the basic model. In order to simplify the analysis it has been assumed that particular
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prices were in force throughout the calendar year, when in fact prices generally related to 
the model year, which began in October. However, in general, over tim e the resultant 
differences will tend to be evened out.
In Section 5.4 above, it was revealed that for m ost o f  the 1980s Jaguar 
carefully positioned itself in terms o f  price between the Cadillac Seville and the Mercedes 
300E. In this respect Jaguar tended to be a price follower rather than a price leader. 
Nevertheless, as was shown in Sub-Section 5.6.4 above, and illustrated in Figure 5.15, 
Jaguar obtained price increases o f  nearly 62% for the Series III in the period 1980 to
1987. In September 1987 the XJ40 was launched at a price 8% higher than the Series III, 
and its initial success allowed a price increase o f  7.4% in February 1988, but then the 
weakening o f  demand precluded any further price rises until May 1989 when a nominal 
1 %  increase was imposed.
Thus, during the eight years to 1988 the retail US Dollar price o f  the basic 
saloon model increased by 87.5% - from $23,200 in March 1980 to $43,500 in February
1988, an average annual increase o f  8.4% .16 However, as a result o f  the further softening 
o f  demand, and to combat the entry o f  the Japanese into the US luxury vehicle market, 
Jaguar introduced, alongside the existing XJ40 model, a lower specification saloon for 
the 1990 model year, priced som e 10% below  that o f  the existing entry model.
8.3.3 Currency
With as much as 85%, and seldom  less than 75%, o f  Jaguar’s turnover in the period 1983 
to 1990 being derived from exports from the U K 17, the Sterling exchange rate was an 
important factor in the com pany’s profitability. However, according to Edwards, the 
benefits o f  favourable exchange rates from 1980 to 1985 gave rise to an arrogance on the 
part o f  Jaguar that prevented cognisance o f  a number o f  its long term problems18, and the 
strength o f  Sterling after 1985 provided Jaguar, currency hedging benefits 
notwithstanding, with a convenient excuse for lower profits. It may well have been true, 
for example, as Egan asserted in 1988, that at that time, “each 10 cents o f f  the dollar is
16 Automotive News. Various Issues.
17 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984, and Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984 to 1990.
18 John Edwards, Interview with the author, November 2002. Appendix p52.
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costing us £35m o ff  the bottom line”19, but there were other factors that did, or could, 
compensate for the strength o f  Sterling. In revenue terms, increased prices in the US, and 
the increased focus on the UK, for example, should have mitigated to som e extent the 
negative impact o f  the rise o f  Sterling. Indeed, UK  revenues increased from £131m illion, 
representing some 16% o f  total turnover in 198620, to £309m illion, representing some 
29% o f  total turnover in 1988.21 Even so, the changes in the U S Dollar/Sterling exchange 
rate could not fail to have a significant impact on Jaguar’s overall revenues, and hence 
profits, over the course o f  the 1980s, given the level o f  its US sales, and the extent o f  this 
is explored in the follow ing analysis.
A s shown in Figure 8.8, the US Dollar strengthened significantly against 
Sterling in the first h a lf o f  the decade, before weakening again in the second half. Indeed, 
the US Dollar reached its zenith against Sterling in March 1985 with a rate o f  £1=$ 1.064, 
but then quickly weakened to below  $1.20, ending 1985 at $1.44.22 B y 1988 there were 
considerable fluctuations in the exchange rate, and although the rate seldom went above 
$1.70, it was below $1.80 for much o f  the year.
At the time that the US Dollar was strengthening, and subsequently due also 
to the benefits o f  its currency hedging operations from 1985 onwards, Jaguar obtained a 
greater proportion o f  its profits from currency movem ents than it did from manufacturing 
and selling motor vehicles. According to Edwards, over half o f  Jaguar’s peak pre-tax 
profits o f  some £120m illion in both 1985 and 1986 resulted from movements in the US  
Dollar, and from the com pany’s in-house treasury operations, Jaguar maintaining a 
$1 billion forward hedge for much o f  the tim e.23 Treasury operations also involved other 
currencies, although these were hardly ever publicized by Jaguar, and certainly never 
quantified in terms o f  rates obtained, but the addition o f  exchange benefits other than 
those from the US Dollar resulted in total currency benefits o f  som e £80m illion at the 
pre-tax level in 1985 and 1986.24 Unfortunately, without access to Jaguar’s internal
19 Financial Times. 22 August 1988.
Jaguar Annual Report 1986. p26.
21 Jaguar Annual Report 1988. p32.
22 Datastream.
23 John Edwards. Telephone conversation with the author, December 2006. Appendix p52n68.
24 Roger Putnam, Interview with the author, November 2006. Appendix pi 18.
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Figure 8.8: US Dollar/Sterling Exchange Rates, Quarter-end and Year
Average, 1980 to 1989
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records it is not possible to detail the impact o f  currency fluctuations, particularly since 
the accounting treatment adopted by Jaguar was that o f booking on a monthly basis 
profits resulting from treasury operations. The turning point, according to Edwards, was 
March 1985 when the US Dollar reached near parity with Sterling before weakening 
again, to an exchange rate o f  £1=$1.44, by the year end. However, this highly favourable 
exchange rate allowed Jaguar to book a profit o f £25million for March 1985 alone -  its 
best month ever for currency profits.25 Obviously, this was balanced by other months 
when there were little or no profits booked, and some when losses resulted.
An indication o f  the impact o f the strengthening o f the US Dollar in the 
period before Jaguar commenced currency hedging is provided by Figure 8.9. The impact 
on revenues o f changes in the value o f  the US Dollar is given by the difference between 
the current year US turnover in terms o f the current year exchange rate, and that o f the 
previous year. Thus, for example, US Dollar revenues (unit price in US$ times volume) 
in 1981 o f $176.6million gave Sterling revenues o f £87million (at the stated exchange 
rate o f £1=$2.03). At the previous year’s stated rate (£1=$2.32) the 1981 US revenues 
would translate as £76 .lmillion. The difference o f £10.9million (shown by the red
25 John Edwards telephone conversation with the author. December 2006. Appendix p52n68.
289
column) is the gain from the change in exchange rates, and is a direct addition to profits. 
Relating this to the change in profits for the year, it can be seen that o f  the profit 
improvement o f £15.6million (to a loss o f £31.7million for the year), £10.9million was 
directly attributable to more favourable exchange rates. As can be seen, the improvement 
in the exchange rate increased overall revenues by £23.3million in 1982, and undoubtedly 
was a significant contributor to the pre-tax profits turnaround o f £41.3million achieved in 
that year. Likewise, the £40.3million currency benefit to revenue in 1983 obviously was 
the major factor in that year’s profits advance.
Figure 8.9: Changes in US Dollar/Sterling Exchange rate, the impact on 
Jaguar Revenues, and comparison with Jaguar Pre-Tax Profits,
1980 to 1984
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As mentioned above, at the end o f 1984, with the possibility o f a 
strengthening o f Sterling, Jaguar began to sell forward its currency positions on a rolling 
twelve-month basis. However, whilst hedging helps smooth out short-term fluctuations, it 
cannot provide a great deal o f protection against the sort o f unfavourable long-term trends 
that Jaguar encountered in the second half o f the 1980s. Jaguar’s currency hedging 
operations resulted in considerable benefits when the direction o f exchange rate 
movements could be correctly anticipated, as demonstrated in Figure 8.10, but might
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produce losses otherwise. Figure 8.10 shows the difference between the actual US 
Dollar/Sterling exchange rate, and Jaguar’s hedged rate, and gives an indication o f the 
potential gains or losses from currency hedging. Thus when the actual rate is £1=$1.64 
then $164 translates as £100, but the hedged rate o f $1.44 gives £113.9, a gain o f £13.9 
per $164 o f revenue. But, when the hedged rate is below the actual rate (that is, giving 
less pounds per dollar -  shown in Figure 8.10 as the hedged rate line being above that o f 
the actual rate line) then there is an exchange loss. Thus a hedged rate o f  £1=$1.70 gives 
£96.5 per $ 164 -  an exchange loss o f  £3.5 per $164 o f revenue.
Figure 8.10: Com parison Jaguar Average hedged US Dollar/Sterling  
Exchange Rate with Market Rate, 1985 to 1989
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Jaguar did well in protecting its revenues from the worst o f  the adverse 
currency fluctuations up to 1988, but then, with the rate at $1.80 or below (for example, 
$1.90) in mid-1988, sold forward at $1.70. In the event, although the rate was at $1.70 or 
below for the first three months o f  1989, it thereafter strengthened, to above $1.60 for 
five months o f the year, with an average rate for the year o f  $1.64. Jaguar emphasised
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that this was one factor resulting in currency exchange reducing Jaguar’s pre-tax profits 
by £ 18.5m in the first six months o f 1989.26
Because o f Jaguar’s accounting treatment o f currency gains mentioned above, 
it is difficult to determine the actual benefits through an analysis o f the published data. 
However, the difference between Jaguar’s average sold forward US Dollar rate and the 
actual average market rate applied to US Dollar revenues does provide an indication o f 
the potential gains, or losses, from currency hedging.
Figure 8.11 demonstrates the potential benefits from 1985 through to 1988. 
From the information provided by Edwards it is known that Jaguar exceeded the potential 
for currency profits in 1985 provided by its hedging programme. In each o f the other 
three years, the actual exchange rate was never above that o f the hedged rates obtained, 
with no opportunity therefore for additional profits, and the potential benefits shown are 
unlikely to have been fully realised. Indeed, in 1988 currency benefits were some £45m
Figure 8.11: Potential benefits (£m illion) from Jaguar's US Dollar Hedging 
Programme, 1985 to 1988
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26 Jaguar City Analysts Results Briefing 13 September 1989. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
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lower at the pre-tax level compared to 1987, o f which some £35m was accounted for by 
changes in US Dollar exchange rates.27
8.3.4 Comparison o f  Changes in Main Elements o f Jaguar’s US Revenues.
The above analysis o f  the three main determinants o f Jaguar’s US revenues (in Sterling) 
has demonstrated that the changes in each should have contributed to increased revenues, 
and, hence, improved profits. Ignoring the first two years o f recovery when the relatively 
low figures would have given a distorted picture, all the indices were ahead o f  the 1982 
base figure, as shown in Figure 8.12. O f particular note is that the
Figure 8.12: Indices of Main Elements of Jaguar's US Revenues (in 
Sterling), 1982 to 1988
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Datastream; Automotive News Various Issues.
volume index was well ahead o f  that for currency exchange over the whole period, and 
that after 1986 the indices for both price and volume were ahead o f the US Dollar 
exchange rate index. This provides support to the argument that currency, whilst 
important, was not the crucial element that Jaguar had been portraying, something that 
Bhaskar et al in 1984 had pointed to, confidently forecasting that, even at a rate o f $2.25,
27 Jaguar City Analysts Results Briefing 16 March 1989. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
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“Jaguar would still be profitable (just) as long as sales held up”.28 Indeed, at the end o f  
1987 Egan was saying that, “What’s happened in the US is that luxury-car pricing has 
been more or less in line with depreciation o f  the dollar. So, in a way, w e ’ve been able to 
keep pace”.29 In 1981 Egan had stated that, “We are satisfied with the pound at $2.30, so 
at $1.88 w e’re quite happy”30, but by 1988 Jaguar was telling journalists that it was 
“difficult to make profits with Sterling above $1.80”.31 What had changed in the 
intervening period was Jaguar’s cost base, and the extent o f  this change, and its 
composition, is explored in the following section o f  this chapter.
8.4 Costs
In Section 8.1 above it was pointed out that the success o f  a company is judged not only 
by its ability to increase sales but also by its skill in keeping control o f  its costs, hence 
ensuring that its profits rise in som e proportion to its sales. The three most widely used 
measures o f  profit, and which are stated in Jaguar’s accounts, are those o f  Gross Profit, 
Operating Profit, and Pre-tax Profit, although for the purpose o f  this analysis Gross Profit 
may be regarded as the most useful measure because it includes direct production costs, 
such as materials and labour, rather than indirect costs such as administration, and 
therefore is the best indicator o f  a company’s production efficiency. However, as may be 
seen from Figure 8.13, which plots the indices o f  these three profit measures together 
with the index o f  turnover, the relative movement in all three profit indices for Jaguar is 
very similar over time. In the period 1980 to 1983, the three profit indices shadow the 
turnover index, indicating that Jaguar was able to match costs with turnover. However, 
the profits indices start to decouple from the turnover index from 1984 onwards, 
indicating that Jaguar had started to lose control o f  its costs as it pushed for ever-higher 
sales volumes, as was noted in Section 6.3 above.
28 Bhaskar, K N et al. Jaguar: An Investor’s Guide. UEA Motor Industry Research Unit, 1984. pi 17.
29 Automotive News. 14 December 1987.
30 Automotive News. 10 August 1981.
31 The Independent. 27 August 1988.
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Figure 8.13: Indices of Jaguar Revenue and Profit Measures, 
1980 to 1990
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Sources: Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984 to 1990; Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984
Indeed, following the launch of the XJ40 in 1986, and particularly following 
its US launch the following year, costs appear to have got out of control to a great extent. 
This would certainly have been surprising to the City audience which had been told 
repeatedly in analysts meetings that the new model would be much easier, and hence 
cheaper, to build than the one it was replacing. In March 1985, the stockbroker Hoare 
Govett, echoing what had been stated in the recent Jaguar results meeting, had written 
that, “after the first year the introduction o f the XJ40 should yield significant reductions 
in manufacturing costs, with a consequent benefit for margins”32, whilst in January 1987 
the stockbroker Phillips and Drew reported that, “the new model potentially offers 
approximately 20% productivity gains due to greater ease o f assembly”. 33 However, in 
May 1987 Philips and Drew were warning that:
32 Hoare Govett, Investment Circular. 21 March 1985.
33 Phillips and Drew Investment Circular. 27 January 1987.
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Although there are substantial cost savings from the simplified construction o f  the 
new model [XJ40], such as the use o f  fewer body panels, material costs have 
increased because it incorporates many more costly electronic and electrical 
components. We estimate that these have risen by approximately £1,200 per car.34
It was not until late 1988, in the face o f  potential financial losses in 1989, that 
Jaguar appreciated the urgency o f  addressing its costs issue, and announced a cost- 
reduction programme aimed at reducing its costs by £50m illion in 1989, and some 5% 
per annum thereafter.35 For the first half o f  1989 Jaguar was able to announce that it had 
achieved cost savings o f  £12.1 m illion.36 This, however, was insufficient to compensate 
for the £33m illion dilution resulting from lower US sales volum es and adverse currency 
exchange.
Costs, however, comprise several different categories o f  expense, all o f  which 
seldom move together in the same direction. For example, the purchase o f  new machinery 
will result in higher depreciation charges, but may require less labour, thus reducing 
direct labour costs by a greater amount, and hence w ill give improved profit margins. In 
Jaguar’s case, given the considerable disparity that emerged between the turnover and 
profits indices after 1985, it is obvious that the problem related to more than one area o f  
cost, as will be demonstrated in the following sub-sections.
8.4.1 Employment Costs
In Section 6.6 above, the problem o f  the continual rise in total employee costs throughout 
the period 1983 to 1990 was discussed. There it was noted that these costs continued to 
rise even in 1989 and 1990 when vehicle output reduced, and employee numbers were 
cut. This was illustrated in Figure 6.7. In every year in this period, with the exception o f  
1983 when w holesales experienced a sharp recovery, the percentage increase in total 
employee costs was greater than that for vehicle production, thus demonstrating Jaguar’s 
lack o f  control over em ployee costs, and its generosity regarding pay awards. This 
present sub-section discusses this further, examining the impact o f  changes in 
employment costs on Jaguar’s profits.
34 Phillips and Drew Investment Circular. May 1987.
35 Jaguar City Analysts Results Briefing 26 August 1988. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
36 Jaguar City Analysts Results Briefing 13 September 1989. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
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Since employee information must be disclosed as a note to the Accounts in 
the Annual Report and Accounts, it is a fairly straightforward task to analyse changes in 
employment costs. Unfortunately, the Jaguar Offer for Sale document does not disclose 
employment costs and consequently the figures for 1980 and 1981 cannot be included in 
this analysis, but in any case the profit figures for these two years, and that o f  1982, are 
too low for them to be used as a base year for calculating indices. The figures for 1983 
and 1984 are taken from the Jaguar’s 1984 Annual Report and Accounts. The relationship 
between total employment costs and operating profit in terms o f  their indices is shown in 
Figure 8.14. From this it can be seen that total employment costs continued to rise 
throughout the period, despite the significant fall in operating profits after 1986.
However, despite this inverse relationship after 1986, it may be seen from 
Figure 8.15 that the increase in total employment costs during this time, whilst an 
obvious contributory factor to reduced profitability, was not the sole factor, particularly 
after 1987. In 1988, for example, total employment costs increased by some £18million, 
whilst operating profit fell by some £45million.
Figure 8.14: Indices of Jaguar Operating Profits and Total Employment
Costs, 1983 to 1990
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Figure 8.15: Jaguar Total Employment Costs and
Operating Profit (Emillion), 1983 to 1990
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Whilst total em ployment costs are stated in the Annual Reports and Accounts, 
these are not analysed further there in terms o f function; that is, production, 
administration, and distribution. However, in conformity with legal requirements, a 
breakdown o f employee numbers was provided in terms o f two categories: production, 
and administration and distribution. Assuming that there is not a great deal o f difference 
between average costs per employee for the two categories, an estimate o f total employee 
costs relating to production and for the combined distribution and administrative 
functions can be made. The resultant estimated production employee costs are shown in 
Table 8.1 above, but are not discussed any further here since an analysis o f these in 
relation to gross profit reveals a picture little different from that o f that o f total 
employment costs to operating profit.
The estimated administrative and distribution employee costs as a proportion 
of total administrative and distribution costs are shown in Figure 8.16. That the 
proportion taken by employee costs fell significantly in 1984 was probably largely due to 
the sharp rise in administrative expenses as a result o f the incremental costs resulting
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Figure 8.16: Distribution and Administration Employee Costs as % of Total 
Administration and Distribution Costs, 1982 to 1990
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Source: Jag u a r Reports and Accounts 1984 to 1990; Jaguar Offer for Sale document, 1984.
from Jaguar’s privatization, and it is o f  note that these increased nearly threefold in the 
four years to 1987, and remained at this higher level for the remainder o f the period under 
review. But, given the much lower increases in distribution costs compared to that for 
adm inistration expenses, it is likely that the increased employee costs related in a large 
part to the administration area, discussed in the following sub-section.
8.4.2 Adm inistration Expenses
This category typically includes administrative staff salaries, including those o f directors, 
adm inistration buildings’ costs, and professional fees. Unlike Jaguar’s Distribution Costs, 
discussed in the following sub-section, these continued to rise, in absolute terms and as a 
percentage o f  turnover, for much o f  the period, as can be seen in Figure 8.17.
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Figure 8.17: Administration Expenses (Emillion), Year-on-Year % Changes, 
and as % of Turnover, 1980 to 1990
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Undoubtedly these increases resulted largely from the persistent recruitment 
o f engineers, discussed in Sub-Section 7.4.1 above, the numbers o f whom increased by 
nearly 80% between 1984 and 1988, from 675 at the end o f 1984 to nearly 1,200 at the 
end o f 198837, and the costs associated with the Whitley Engineering Centre, discussed in 
Section 6.5 above.
8.4.3 Distribution Costs
Generally, Distribution Costs include all the costs o f holding goods for sale, promotional, 
advertising and selling costs, employee costs, and the costs o f transferring goods to 
customers. As can be seen from Figure 8.18, these costs as a proportion o f turnover rose 
in 1982, reflecting the initial costs o f  greater dealer support as the new franchising 
arrangements took effect. However, costs as a proportion o f turnover thereafter fell 
rapidly as Jaguar was able to take advantage o f the economies o f  scale allowed it by the 
dramatic upturn in demand from 1982 onwards, and the company did well to maintain 
these costs at some 2.5% o f annual turnover during the remainder o f  the period.
37 Jaguar Report and Accounts, 1985 and 1988.
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Figure 8.18: Distribution Costs (Emillion), Year-on -Year % Changes, and as 
% of Turnover, 1980 to 1990
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8.4.4 Purchasing Costs
Jaguar tended to comment at length about its suppliers, but seldom provided an indication 
o f the cost o f materials used in vehicle production, possibly for reasons o f commercial 
confidentiality. However, in its Annual Report and Accounts for 1985, 1986, and 1987, 
Jaguar did provide a figure for its total external purchases. These included capital 
expenditures which are separately stated in the Accounts, and stripping these numbers out 
o f the external purchases total gives a figure for production materials purchases. This 
emerges as a virtually constant 59% o f  the total Cost o f  Sales figure, and it is this 
percentage that has been applied in the Profit and Loss Account in Table 8.1. However, 
the figure for 1989 is likely to be overstated, due to the warranty cost-driven increase in 
the Cost o f  Sales figure for the year, with as much as £100million o f  the Purchasing Costs 
figure being “Balance o f  Costs” . It should be noted that there is often scope for purchase 
costs as a proportion o f  total costs to fall as production volumes increase due to discounts 
obtainable for higher volumes purchased, and it is surprising that this does not appear to 
have been the case with Jaguar. However, one likely explanation for this was the
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incremental cost o f  installing, throughout the 1980s, increasingly sophisticated, and 
expensive, equipment on jaguar’s vehicles in order to meet higher safety and pollution  
requirements, and customers’ demands for higher levels o f  comfort and refinement. As 
noted at the beginning o f  Section 8.4, Phillips and Drew in 1987 estimated that the costs 
of electronic and electrical components on the XJ40 exceeded the costs o f  those on the 
Series III by som e £1,200 per car. Even so, by September 1989 Jaguar announced that it 
was looking to its suppliers to reduce their prices for various com ponents.38
8.4.5 Research and Developm ent Costs
Jaguar treated its expenditure on research and product developm ent as a revenue expense, 
included in cost o f  sales. The annual Research and D evelopm ent (R& D) expenditure, the 
year-on-year change, and the spend as a total o f  turnover, are shown in Figure 8.19. 
However, the cost o f  R& D appears to be understated in this figure, given that som e £75m  
had been invested by BL in the period January 1981 to March 198339, and that costs o f  
component R&D were often shared on an equal basis with component suppliers.40
Jaguar’s often stated intention was for R& D spend to be fairly constant at 4%  
of annual turnover, but it exceeded 5% in 1981, and in 1987-1989, due to the extra spend 
required to resolve the quality problems discussed in Section 7.7 above.
O f particular import to the present discussion is the impact o f  increased R& D  
spend on profits and this can best be judged by reference to the rate o f  increase in R& D  
spend compared to that o f  Cost o f  Sales overall. Figure 8.20 shows the rates o f  increase 
of R&D spend and cost o f  sales as indices with 1981 as the base year since 1980 is 
considered to be too low  to be meaningful as an index base. A s can be seen, for m ost o f  
the period the rate o f  increase o f  R& D spend exceeded that o f  the rate o f  increase o f  Cost
38 Jaguar 1989 Interim Results Analysts Meeting. September 1989. (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
39 “Trade and Industry Select Committee. Finance for BL. Third Report, together with the proceedings o f 
the Committee relating to the Report and the Minutes of Evidence”. Parliamentary Papers. 1980-81. 
vol XL (HC 490). p61.
40 Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984. p6.
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Figure 8.19: Annual R&D Spend (Cmillion), Year-on-Year % Changes, and 
R&D Spend as % of Turnover, 1980 to 1990
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Figure 8.20: Indices o f R&D Spend and Cost of Sales, 
1981 to 1990
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o f Sales, resulting in additional profits dilution, and thus demonstrating another area 
where control o f costs could have been improved.
8.4.6 Capital Expenditure and Depreciation
As was made apparent in Chapter Six, a considerable amount o f investment in new 
technology and manufacturing systems was required in order for Jaguar to achieve higher 
productivity, and ensure improved levels o f quality and reliability. At the time o f its 
privatisation in 1984, Jaguar was forecasting that it would invest annually the equivalent 
o f some 10% o f its sales revenue41, a target that was exceeded only in 1987 if the costs of 
the Whitley Engineering Centre are excluded.
Figure 6.4 above showed capital expenditure as a proportion o f sales revenues 
in the period 1980 to 1990. Figure 8.21 shows the levels o f capital expenditure, and 
depreciation charges, from 1980 to 1990.
Figure 8.21: Capital Expenditure and Depreciation Charge (Cmillion), 
and Year-on-Year % Changes, 1980 to 1990
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Source: Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984 to 1990; Jaguar Offer for Sale document, 1984
41 Bhaskar, K N e /  al. Jaguar: An Investor’s Guide, p i9.
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Jaguar’s Annual Reports and Accounts record that capital expenditure was 
increased gradually to Jaguar’s stated target o f  10% o f  turnover but this, as already stated, 
was achieved only in 1987 if  Whitley is excluded. Whitley resulted in additional 
expenditure - stated as £10m illion in 1985 (17.5% o f  the total capital expenditure for the 
year), £18m illion in 1986 (19.2% o f  the total), £32m illion in 1987 (24.2% o f  the total), 
and £15million in 1988 (14.6% o f  the total). The realisation by m id-1988 o f  the downturn 
in its prospects, and the extent to which this would exacerbate a deteriorating cash flow, 
and reduce further profits as a result o f  increased depreciation charges, led Egan to 
announce that Jaguar’s capital expenditure plan for 1988 had been “trimmed from the 
£140m forecast in March to £120m ”.42 In the event, it was trimmed further, and emerged 
finally at £103.8m illion. Although in early 1989 Jaguar was forecasting annual capital 
expenditures o f  between £100m illion and £110m illion43, the downturn in the company’s 
fortunes in that year forced a further reduction, to some £74m illion.
O f course, given the impact o f  increased levels o f  depreciation on Jaguar’s 
profits, it is arguable, as was pointed out in Section 6.5 above, as to whether Jaguar had 
been deluding itself that it could not only fund ever-increasing levels o f  capital 
expenditure but also bear the consequent dilution on its Profit and Loss account. But, as 
mentioned in Chapter Four, prior to 1986 and the problems caused by the XJ40, the Egan 
management appeared to be deluding itself over a range o f  issues. Despite the enforced 
cutbacks in capital expenditure in 1988, Egan was adamant in the following year that the 
company could fund the heavy future capital requirements from its own resources.44 But 
there is little doubt that Jaguar itself, particularly given the downturn in profits from 1989 
onwards, could not even have began to fund from its own resources the £1 billion that 
Ford by 1994 expected to have invested in the company in the seven years to 1996.45 
However, capital expenditure levels only became a major issue for the Egan management 
after 1986 when the rapidly increasing depreciation charge itself began to impact 
adversely on Jaguar’s overall profits, as Figure 8.22 and Table 8.1 reveal. A s is readily
42 Automotive News 13 June 1988.
43 Jaguar Analysts Results Briefing. 16 March 1989.
44 Sir John Egan Evidence. 8 November 1989. “Trade and Industry Select Committee: Special Shares and 
the Department of Trade and Industry. Minutes of Evidence 13 December 1989 (Printed with HC 617-i 
1988/89)”. Parliamentary Papers. 1989-90. vol XIV (HC 90-i). p6.
45 Financial Times. 28 September 1994.
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apparent, the increased level o f depreciation charges by 1989, in itself, had a significant 
adverse impact on gross profits.
It is also relevant at this point to explore briefly the relationship between 
capital expenditure and labour costs. Given that much o f the expenditure was aimed 
directly at modernising plant and systems it could be expected, as was discussed in 
Section 6.6 above, that a proportion o f such expenditure would result in the substitution 
o f capital for labour. However, this was not the case. As was shown in Figure 6.7 above, 
employee numbers increased every year from 1983 to 1988, dropping only slightly in 
1989 and 1990, and labour costs increased continually from 1983 to 1990, despite the 
significant increases in capital expenditure up to 1987 shown in Figure 8.21.
Figure 8.22: Depreciation as % of Gross Profit before Depreciation Charges,
1982 to 1990
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Note: the figures for 1980 and 1981 are excluded from this Figure since both years incurred losses, and 
although 1981 reported a gross profit it was insufficient to cover depreciation charges, which 
accounted for 140% of gross profit before depreciation
8.4.7 Warranty Costs
Jaguar treated warranty costs as a direct charge to the profit and loss account, a provision 
being made for each vehicle sold during the financial period, based on actual cost
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experience. If not incurred during the financial year o f  the sale o f  the vehicle this 
provision would be shown as an accrual on the balance sheet. However, whilst warranties 
were quantified in the 1984 Offer for Sale document as £32.7m illion at 31 March 1984, 
o f  which £18.1 m illion fell due after more than one year46, Jaguar thereafter steadfastly 
refused to disclose their level. The changes in the accruals figures provided in the Annual 
Report and Accounts do provide a good indication o f  the extent of, and changes in, 
Jaguar’s warranty costs, but they do not necessarily correspond with the actual amount 
charged during the financial year due to claims made on vehicles sold in the same 
financial year as the claim, and since unused provisions may have been written back to 
the profit and loss account. However, Edwards was able to provide the actual warranty 
costs during the 1980s, and these are shown in Figure 7.1 above and Table 8.1 above.
The major quality problems suffered by Jaguar when Egan joined the 
company have been detailed in Section 7.6 above. These resulted in warranty costs that, 
according to Edwards, “were m assive in 1980; that was one o f  the problems”.47 During 
the early 1980s warranty costs were running at some £1,000 per car, or between 6%  and 
9%  o f  turnover, but the resolution o f  a number o f  the problems gradually reduced this 
figure to below 5%  o f  turnover by 1987, as is shown in Figure 7.1 above. (However, as 
stated in the note to Table 7.1, the warranty costs as a percentage o f  turnover is 
conservative, due to the inclusion o f  parts and military engines in the overall turnover 
figure). But, as discussed in Section 7.7 above, the XJ40 became a major problem for 
Jaguar, being a model on which the warranty costs “got out o f  control”48. Certainly, by 
1989 warranty costs exceeded 11% o f  turnover, and remained at a high level the 
following year. Here, Grant, commenting on the situation when he arrived at Jaguar at the 
end o f  1989, remarked that, “Warranty costs at Ford would typically run at, say, 2% o f  
revenue, and marketing costs at closer to 9-10% o f  revenue, broadly across Europe. 
Jaguar got it the other way round”.49 In this regard it should be added that although the 
combined marketing and warranty costs as a percentage o f  revenue would, on this basis,
Jaguar Offer for Sale document 1984. p i4.
47 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p53.
48 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p53.
49 John Grant. Interview with the author. January 1993. Appendix p92.
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be the same for the two companies, Grant made the point that Jaguar’s marketing costs as 
a proportion o f  revenues did not have to be as high as they were for Ford.50
The escalation o f  warranty costs from 1987 onwards obviously had a marked 
impact on Jaguar’s profits, as may be seen from Figure 8.23, where levels o f  gross profit, 
both before and after warranty costs, are plotted. After several years, with the exception 
o f 1985, when warranty costs as a proportion o f revenues continually fell, and two years 
when the actual costs gently declined, the dramatic increase from 1988 onwards had a 
significant direct adverse impact on gross profits, and which o f  itself accounted for a 
considerable part o f  the profits downturn in these years.
Figure 8.23: Im pact of W arranty Costs on Gross Profit, 
1980 to 1990
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Table 8.2 provides an indication o f  the impact on Jaguar’s gross profits, and 
pre-tax profits, by comparing the actual warranty costs with those that would have 
resulted from a constant rate o f  2% o f turnover, in line with that experienced by Ford. As 
can be seen, the difference between the actual and 2% rates exceeds the downturn in both
50 John Grant Interview. Appendix p94.
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profit measures in the period 1986 to 1988, and accounts for nearly all o f  the profits 
downturn in 1989. Moreover, the increase in actual warranty costs in 1989 accounted for 
over half the profits downturn in that year. It is o f  note also that in 1990 gross profits 
increased by £7.9m illion whilst warranty costs reduced by £39.1 m illion, demonstrating at 
that time the influence o f  factors other than warranty costs on the com pany’s profits.
Table 8.2: Impact of Increased Warranty Costs on Gross Profits 
and on Pre-Tax Profits, 1986 to 1990.
Year to end December: 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Warranty Costs £m (as per 
Figure 7.1) 50.0 47.0 73.0 128.0 88.9
Change in Warranty Costs £m -3.0 -3.0 +26.0 +55.0 -39.1
Warranty Costs £m at 
constant 2% o f  turnover 16.6 20.0 21.5 22.8 20.3
Difference between actual 
Warranty costs and at 2%. £m +33.4 +27.0 +51.5 +105.2 +68.6
Change in reported Gross 
Profit £m +15.5 -15.0 -39.1 -106.2 +7.9
Change in reported Pre-tax 
Profit £m -0.5 -23.8 -49.5 -105.8 -7.9
Source: Figures supplied by John Edwards; Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1986 to 1990.
8.4.8 Other Costs
There are two lines o f  miscellaneous cost included in Table 8.1. First is that o f  “Other 
Operating Costs”, which appears as a discrete item in the Profit and Loss Account. This is 
not a large area o f  cost, and includes contributions to the Employee Share Scheme, 
directors’ emoluments, and hire o f  plant and machinery. The largest item under this 
heading was that o f  the Share Scheme, which in both 1985 and 1986 amounted to 
£6.4million (over 70% o f  the total in both years). The marked fall in the “Other Operating 
Costs” figure after 1988 results from the ending o f  the Scheme following the Ford 
takeover.
The second line, that o f  “Balance o f  Costs”, is a residual figure, but with the 
exception o f  the inclusion o f  em ployee costs in 1980 and 1981, no single aspects o f  cost 
can be identified from the company’s Annual Reports and Accounts. It is o f  note, 
however, that there was a distinct pattern in the movement o f  these costs, as may be seen
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from Figure 8.24, which shows the changes in the total o f “Other Costs” . O f note is the 
marked rise in these costs after 1982, the sharp fall in 1986, and then a further increase.
Figure 8.24: Total Other Costs (Cmillion), and as % of Revenues,
1982 to 1990
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8.5 Cash Flow
In 1988, with the prospects o f a major profits downturn, Jaguar began to focus on, and 
direct the attention o f  the financial community towards, its strong cash positions. After 
all, as Smith, among others, was later to point out, “Profits are someone’s opinion 
whereas cash is a fact” .51 On this view, as long as Jaguar could generate sufficient cash to 
pay its bills, profits d idn’t matter that much, at least in the short term. Contingency plans 
seem to have been discussed by the Jaguar management following the October 1987 
stockmarket crash, with the company subsequently quietly informing the financial 
community in a series o f private meetings that, in the event o f a major problem, such as 
from a further major downturn o f the US Dollar, “W e’ll run the business for cash - reduce 
capital expenditure, slow research and development activities, and so on” .32 Obviously, in
31 Smith, Terry, op cit. p200
52 John Edwards. Meeting at BZW (stockbrokers) December 1987 (Author’s own contemporaneous notes).
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the first few  months o f  1988 this action was not regarded as being necessary, since at that 
time Jaguar announced planned higher levels o f  capital expenditure for the year. But it 
was a plan that Jaguar was forced to put into effect to some degree in 1988 when the 
extent o f  its financial problems became apparent, as was pointed out in Section 8.4.6 
above.
As mentioned in Sub-Section 2.4.2 above, Jaguar’s accounting treatment o f  
profits may be regarded as being fairly conservative, being free o f  the creative accounting 
techniques adopted by many o f  the highly acquisitive companies during the 1980s. But, 
there are a number o f  areas, as has been demonstrated in the previous sections o f  this 
Chapter, where Jaguar’s Reports and Accounts conceal rather than reveal. Given Smith’s 
maxim, quoted above, it might be expected that a more indicative measure o f  Jaguar’s 
success, and its ability to survive as an independent company, was its cash generation 
ability, and its cash balances. But here there are problems in undertaking an independent 
analysis o f  the cash aspects since it was not until 1991 that companies were required by 
law to publish a cash flow  statement. This provided far greater transparency than the 
Sources and Applications o f  Funds statement that companies had been required to publish 
previously, and which Smith regards as not having been terribly useful.55 Even so, these 
particular Jaguar statements do provide a sufficient indication o f  Jaguar’s cash flow  for 
the purposes o f  this thesis.
Cash inflow is largely the sum o f  pre-tax profit plus the depreciation charge 
for the year, whilst for Jaguar the main cash application was capital expenditure, plus 
some £30m illion to £50m illion in respect o f  dividends and taxation. Figure 8.25 shows 
Jaguar’s cash flow s, year-end cash balances, and capital expenditures from 1984 to 1990. 
Obviously, with Jaguar’s profits increasing significantly in the period to 1986, and cash 
flow well-covering capital expenditure, it was easy for it to build up its cash balances, 
which reached a peak at £151m illion at the end o f  1986. But in 1987 the increased capital 
expenditure exceeded cash generated, and had to be funded from cash reserves. This was 
fine as a short-term measure, but the continued downturn in profitability required Jaguar 
to address the more fundamental issues, which it did only partially. A s mentioned in
53 Smith, Terry, op cit. p200.
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Section 8.4 above, Jaguar in 1988 took action to reduce its costs, including capital 
expenditure, but it was a case o f too little, too late, with costs remaining too high given
Figure 8.25: Cash Flows, Capital Expenditures, and Year-end Net Cash 
Balances (Emillion), 1984 to 1990
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Source: Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts 1984 to 1990.
the extent o f the downturn Jaguar experienced in 1989, and which was to last for six 
years before the company was able to return to profit. As can be seen, there was 
insufficient cash generated in 1989 or in 1990 to fund capital expenditure, or taxation, 
and the company, by this time owned by Ford, ended 1990 with a negative cash balance 
of £52.5million. But, the dangers o f  this situation were not acknowledged by Jaguar, at 
least not openly.
Indeed, in November 1989, post the Ford takeover bid, Egan was telling the 
House o f Commons Trade and Industry Committee that, “at no time did we run any risk 
at all o f being short o f cash”, particularly since Jaguar, according to Egan, had yet to 
utilise agreed lines o f  credit o f  £300million with normal commercial banks.54 This may 
have been “spin” by Egan, as he sought to maintain the illusion that had been so skilfully 
created, or it may have been further self-delusion, but when interviewed for this research
£ 1 32.0m
£125.5m
54 Sir John Egan Evidence. 8 November 1989. “Trade and Industry Select Committee”, op.cit. p6
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he was still maintaining that Jaguar could have stayed in business as an independent 
company despite the 1990s recession.55 However, it is extremely doubtful whether Jaguar, 
as an independent company, could have survived the downturn o f  the next few years, 
recording pre-tax losses that totalled £735.2m illion in the six years to the end o f  1994. 
Indeed, Edwards admitted that if  Jaguar had still been independent, given the economic 
scenario, then “in 1992 w e’d have got wiped out in a few months”.56
8.6 Summary and Conclusions
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that Jaguar’s downturn in profits after 1986 
resulted from a variety o f  different factors, not merely those on the revenue side o f  the 
profits equation. Much o f  the blame for the problems here can be attributed to the self- 
delusion of, and the extent o f  the illusion created by, Jaguar’s management. Whilst the 
US Dollar/Sterling exchange rate obviously played a part in the downturn, it was a factor 
that was too readily adopted as the principal villain o f  the piece by Jaguar who refused to 
acknowledge, or admit to, many o f  its own problems, particularly the quality issue. As 
has been shown in Section 8.2.3, Jaguar had been happy with a Sterling exchange rate o f  
$1.88 in 1981, yet by 1988, despite the benefits o f  price increases in the US and 
significantly higher sales volumes, was complaining that it could not make profits with a 
rate at $1.80.
What has been apparent is that the strengthening o f  the US Dollar in the first 
half o f  the decade had posed a significant PR, or image, problem for Jaguar, as explained 
in Section 8.3.3. Certainly, Jaguar could not admit the extent to which currency 
movements had propelled its own remarkable profits progression in the years 1983 to 
1986 without shattering the illusion it had carefully constructed o f  itself, and, as has been 
shown, “spin” had been a very important factor in Jaguar’s rehabilitation. Certainly, if  
Jaguar had admitted that over 50%, and perhaps as much as 80%, o f  its peak pre-tax 
profits resulted from favourable currency movements, as revealed in Sub-Section 8.3.3, it 
is hardly likely that it would still have been held up as a leading example o f  a successful
55 John Egan. Interview with the author. October 2007. Appendix p68.
56 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p63.
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British manufacturing company, and this might have had an adverse impact on sales, and 
on its share price.
Obviously, there were different, and more real, problems after 1987 when, as 
hedging positions unwound, strong Sterling diluted Jaguar’s overseas revenues, whilst at 
the same time Jaguar’s US sales fell. Few observers at the time questioned that this 
decline in sales was anything other than the effect o f  the downturn o f  the US economy, or 
the impact o f  the Stockmarket crash on the demand for imported luxury cars but, in part 
at least, the fall in its US sales volumes was o f  Jaguar’s own making, due to quality 
problems with the XJ40, as was shown in Chapter Seven. Indeed, as has been made clear 
from the above analysis, the vital issue was that o f  the financial impact o f  the quality 
issue, the increased warranty costs being the single most important cost element in 
Jaguar’s profit downturn from 1986 onwards. But, the quality issue also had a 
devastating, but unquantiflable, impact on revenues due to the consequent adverse impact 
on US volumes, discussed in Sub-Section 5.6.5 above.
If nothing else, the problems caused by the strength o f  Sterling after 1987 
gave Jaguar a convenient excuse for falling profits. But as Derek Baron, the Chairman o f  
Ford o f  Britain, was to remark, “You can’t get around the exchange-rate problem. What 
you can get around is the cost problem”57. However, as the above analysis has revealed, 
Jaguar had not only done little to get around its cost problems, but had exacerbated them 
for, in pushing for ever-higher sales volum es during the mid-1980s, it lost control o f  its 
costs in most key areas o f  its operations, as is apparent from Figure 8.13. Labour costs 
were a crucial area, but Jaguar’s ever-increasing levels o f  capital expenditure did not 
seem to have been aimed at the substitution o f  capital for labour, as had been the trend in 
most manufacturing industries at the time. On the contrary, Jaguar’s higher capital 
expenditure was accompanied by higher em ployee numbers at higher rates o f  pay. So, 
when US sales volum es fell, Jaguar was left with a level o f  labour costs that was 
unsustainable, but which it was slow  to correct. The W hitley Engineering Centre was also 
a source o f  higher costs, due to the recruitment o f  significant numbers o f  additional 
engineers, the high running costs o f  what was an expensive facility, and the costs o f  
funding its development. Indeed, it may be argued here that this was a facility that Jaguar
57 Sunday Times 24 September 1989.
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could not afford, and which, given its performance, contributed to Jaguar’s declining 
profitability. Certainly, Jaguar seems to have achieved a poor return from its increasing 
expenditure on R&D and capital expenditure, and which, as has been shown, resulted in 
profits dilution. A s is readily apparent from Figure 8.22, the increased level o f  
depreciation charges by 1989, in itself, had a significant adverse impact on gross profits.
Lastly, in relation to costs, the launch o f  the XJ40 in 1986 demonstrated the 
extent to which management had failed in terms o f  controlling most aspects o f  the 
business. Heralded as being easier to make than the saloon it was replacing, the XJ40 
should have yielded an automatic 20% productivity improvement, but this did not 
materialise and the shortfall in efficiency gains, plus the high warranty charges as a result 
o f  quality problems, greatly added to the cost base.
The company’s financial performance, discussed above, obviously had a 
direct bearing on its relationship with its City investors, and this is a topic that is 
examined in the follow ing chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE CITY DIMENSION
9.1 Introduction
A s a first step to its potential divestment by BL, the Jaguar business was re-registered as 
a private limited liability company, under the name Jaguar Cars Holdings Limited, in 
September 1982, the Certificate o f  Incorporation being issued on 15 October 1982. On 16 
June 1984 the company became Jaguar pic, and in August 1984 was listed on the London 
Stock Exchange through an Offer for Sale o f  177.88 million Ordinary Shares at 165p per 
share, raising £293.5m illion, all o f  which went to BL, and indirectly to the government, 
as the owner and vendor o f  the company.
A s was recounted in Sub-Section 4.2.2 above, the listing o f  the company on 
the London Stock Exchange was not the Jaguar management’s preferred course o f  action, 
but was a m ove that was determined more by political considerations on the part o f  the 
Thatcher Government than by the commercial benefits that would accrue to the company. 
Unlike many other company initial public offerings, or flotations, there would be no cash 
inflow to Jaguar itself from the sale o f  its shares. A s Putnam observed, the company was 
floated merely “with its cashflow, and a half-developed new m odel”, and the funds for 
new plant were just not available, and could not be generated from operations.1 O f 
course, additional cash might have been raised through an Equity Rights Issue, but, as 
previously discussed in Sub-Section 4.3.2 above, this would have required a radical 
change in Egan’s attitude in regard to Rights Issues and so was never attempted. O f note 
is that the pressures resulting from market and financial crises after 1987 resulted in a 
turnaround in Egan’s view s. He was now  prepared to countenance a Rights Issue, even if, 
as revealed in Sub-Section 4.2.5 above, it was not in the best interests o f  existing 
shareholders, in order to maintain, albeit somewhat modified, his aspiration regarding 
Jaguar’s corporate independence through cementing an alliance with General Motors.
1 Roger Putnam. Interview with the author. November 2006. Appendix p i23.
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A major problem with being a publicly quoted company was that Jaguar’s 
management had no experience o f  dealing with the City audience, and the specific 
informational requirements o f  that audience, and did not handle communications with the 
City audience at all well. Whilst some Jaguar directors, such as Beasley, saw being a 
quoted company as putting additional pressures on the management2, both Edwards3 and 
Egan did not regard it as making much o f  a difference in terms o f  the way the company 
was managed. In this respect, however, Egan went on to contradict h im self by stating 
that, “the constant urge to be more profitable next year actually did lead one into making 
mistakes”.4 Moreover, there was no appreciation, as admitted by Egan, that investors 
might be prepared to take a long term investment stance, and support the share price, and 
the company’s independence, despite short term downturns, i f  Jaguar explained the issues 
fully to them.5 Indeed, the realisation in 1989 that the shareholders were only interested in 
the share price going up appears to have com e as something o f  a shock to the Jaguar 
management6, and demonstrates the extent to which they were out o f  touch with their 
shareholders. A s related in Sub-Section 4.3.1.3 above, Blythe, who had previous 
experience o f  dealing with US automotive analysts, observed that David Boole adopted 
an almost arrogant manner when talking to City analysts, an attitude which made Blythe 
feel uncomfortable.7 Indeed, from its first dealings with the City ahead o f  its flotation, 
Jaguar appeared to regard City analysts in much the same way that it did motoring 
journalists - merely as another conduit for promoting the company’s positive image, and 
hence enhancing sales o f  vehicles.8 There did not appear to be a great deal o f  appreciation 
that Jaguar’s share price, over which analysts had varying degrees o f  influence, 
determined the com pany’s cost o f  capital.
A s already noted, Jaguar did not use its listing to raise cash through a Rights 
Issue to fund its own development, but it is also somewhat remarkable that Jaguar, unlike 
many ambitious, expanding, companies in the 1980s, an era o f  corporate activity that has
2 Mike Beasley. Interview with the author. February 2003. Appendix plO.
3 John Edwards. Interview with the author. October 2003. Appendix p63.
4 John Egan. Interview with the author. October 2007. Appendix p73.
5 John Egan Interview. Appendix p73.
6 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p62.
7 Bruce Blythe. Interview with the author. January 1994. Appendix p27
8 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p63.
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been described, rightly, as “the decade o f  the deal”9, took no advantage o f  its listing to 
make acquisitions. Indeed, the listing o f  its shares in the U SA  in the form o f  American 
Depository Receipts (ADR s) on the National Association o f  Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation (N A SD A Q ) system  in Novem ber 1985 had little purpose, 
according to Edwards, other than that o f  promoting the Jaguar brand nam e.10 Such failure 
to make use o f  its listing to raise funds for capital investment and to make acquisitions 
may certainly be regarded as a lost opportunity, and an example o f  what in regard to 
corporate governance, discussed in Sub-Section 4.3.3 above, Dedman referred to as the 
shirking aspect o f  managerial expropriation.77
This present chapter, which is based in part on the author’s own experience as 
a City motor industry analyst during the 1980s, examines the opportunity that was 
presented to Jaguar by its public quotation, and its performance as a publicly quoted 
company. Section 9.2 looks at Jaguar’s relationship with its City audience, exploring the 
extent to which Jaguar’s management was able to understand, and to satisfy, the 
requirements o f  the City regarding communication, and information, from quoted 
companies. It also discusses som e o f  the dynamics o f  fund management, considers the 
role o f  stockbrokers’ analysts, reviews issues such as corporate governance and short- 
termism, and exam ines the mechanisms o f  ‘Exit’ and ‘V oice’ in regard to the influence 
shareholders attempt to bring on the management o f  listed companies, particularly when 
they are dissatisfied with the performance o f  their investee companies. Section 9.3 
describes the process o f  Jaguar’s flotation on the London Stock Exchange, and then on 
NASDAQ , the subsequent share ownership structure, and the implications for Jaguar’s 
ability to remain an independent company. Finally, Section 9.4 examines the factors 
impinging on the Jaguar share price, noting in particular the extent to which the share 
price was governed by m ovem ents in the Sterling/US Dollar exchange rate, and other 
factors, over which Jaguar had little or no direct control.
9 Smith, Terry. Accounting fo r  Growth (London, 1992) pi 5.
10 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p63.
11 Dedman, Elisabeth. “The Cadbury Committee recommendations on corporate governance -  a review of 
compliance and performance impacts” in International Journal o f Management Reviews, Volume 4, 
Issue 4 (December 2002). p336.
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9.2 The City Audience: Requirements, and Jaguar’s Response.
In dealing with the City, Jaguar’s main task was to satisfy the information requirements 
o f  two main groups -  the institutional investors, who were the main market for its shares, 
and stockbrokers, particularly analysts, who played a major role in advising and 
influencing investors, and w hose v iew s could have a significant impact on the share 
price. The following three sub-sections discuss the dynamics and modus operandi o f  both 
these groups, and their comm unication requirements, and the extent to which Jaguar 
satisfied these requirements.
9.2.1 Institutional Investors.
In the two decades before Jaguar once again became a quoted company there had been a 
marked change in the com position o f  the ownership o f  UK shares which had profound 
consequences for quoted com panies’ communication with their shareholders. In 1963, 
individuals owned som e 54% o f  UK  equities, in terms o f  type o f  holder, but by 1981 this 
had nearly halved to 28%. This change resulted from the growth o f  UK Pension Funds, 
Insurance Companies, and Unit Trusts, and their increased exposure to equities, as 
opposed to bonds. These financial, or fund management, organizations had a combined 
holding o f  58% o f  UK equities in 1981, compared to only 17% in 1963.12
A s opposed to the private individual shareholder, who had no one to answer 
to but him self i f  he lost m oney through investment, the managers o f  pension funds, and 
other financial investing organizations, were paid to look after money that had been 
deposited with them, and were responsible to boards o f  directors, or boards o f  trustees, in 
much the same w ay as the managers or executive directors o f  public companies were 
responsible to their boards o f  directors, and, ultimately, their shareholders. Generally, 
fund managers were under constant and intense pressure from the trustees o f  pension 
funds, and, in the case o f  investment o f  unit trusts, their boards o f  directors, to maximise 
performance, usually measured on a quarterly basis and against some benchmark such as 
the FT AllShare Index. It m ight be that the actual Index had declined by, say, 10% in the 
quarter, but i f  the fund had declined only 8% then it would have been a satisfactory 
result, the fund having outperformed (that is, performed better than the Index ) despite the
12 Office for National Statistics. Share Ownership (London, June 2001).
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fact that the monetary value o f  the fund had fallen in the quarter. In a number o f  instances 
in the 1980s, and increasingly so in the 1990s, underperformance resulted in trustees 
placing pension funds with external managers, and the sacking o f  the in-house investment 
managers. Likewise, i f  a pension fund was being managed externally, then poor 
performance might result in the trustees m oving the fund to a different external fund 
management company. G iven the pressure on them to constantly outperform came a 
greater requirement from fund managers to reduce risk, and hence for the monitoring o f  
company performance, and an anticipation o f  future performance, not only o f  the 
company’s financial results but also in terms o f  share price movements. Hence the 
increasing concern with, and emphasis on, good corporate governance which became 
apparent in the 1980s in those institutions, particularly pension funds, that adopted long 
term perspectives in regard to their various shareholdings. The assessment and 
monitoring o f  risk becam e paramount in a decade which, as noted in Sub-Section 4.3.3 
above, witnessed som e spectacular corporate collapses. Given the City caveat, often 
appearing on investment application forms as a warning to potential private investors, 
that, “Past performance is not necessarily a guide to the future”, it is hardly surprising 
that successful investm ent in equities was view ed as more art than science, with the 
potential risks involved having to be understood, as far as was possible, and balanced 
against the potential returns.
H owever, the stance adopted by institutional investors towards corporate 
governance, and in regard to direct involvem ent with the companies in which they had 
shareholdings, depended on a number o f  inter-related factors, including those o f  the 
reasons for the purchase o f  the holding, the type o f  investment fund involved, and its size, 
and a defined time horizon. The type o f  fund would invariably dictate the main reason for 
purchase o f  a particular share, with, for example, Income Funds looking for stocks 
offering the prospect o f  better than average yields from dividends; their only concern was 
that o f  the security o f  the dividend payment, and would sell a holding once the yield fell 
below a benchmark level, irrespective o f  an otherwise good financial performance from 
the company. Other types o f  fund included High Performance Funds seeking holdings in 
companies offering the prospect o f  above average earnings growth over a defined period, 
and Trading Funds looking to realize short term profits through actively buying and
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selling shares. Thus, a share might be bought by a Trading or a High Performance fund in 
the belief that it would increase in value by, say, 10%, over the next six  months, and once 
this objective had been met, i f  only within a few  weeks, would be sold again. Such profit- 
taking was a normal part o f  stock market activity, but was never really understood by 
companies and led to industrialists, particularly in the m id-1980s, accusing fund 
managers o f  “ ‘short-termism’ in their eagerness to accept takeover bids and their 
unwillingness to back com panies prepared to invest in the future at the expense o f  today’s 
profits”.13 However, in many cases such apparent outrage seem ed to be more concerned 
with excusing, or disguising, corporate failings than a response to disloyalty by 
institutional investors. Interestingly, as Golding observes, whilst short-termism became 
the subject o f  a vigorous public debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the issue 
subsequently virtually disappeared from v iew .14
An important aspect o f  institutional investment, particularly in the 1980s, 
irrespective o f  the type o f  fund concerned, w as that o f  stock-picking. This term relates to 
the fact that fund managers w ould include in their portfolios only those stocks which 
would satisfy certain criteria. For long term funds especially, financial aspects, such as 
the strength o f  the balance sheet, were the m ost important criteria, but two other factors 
of importance to long term fund management investors, since they were seen as 
underpinning a com pany’s future performance, and which are mentioned in many books 
concerned with the C ity15, were:
(i) Quality o f  management and its track record. Obviously, this, at least in part, 
tended to be a subjective assessm ent, but fund managers usually wanted to be 
able to m eet management, in the persons o f  the C hief Executive and the 
Finance Director, in order to feel comfortable that the management was both 
professional and competent. Interestingly, particularly in the light o f  the 
comments presented in Chapter Four about the Jaguar management’s personal 
view s regarding their ow n shortcomings, there is no evidence that the City, at 
any time prior to 1989, ever questioned the com petency o f  the Jaguar
13 Golding, Tony. The City: inside the great expectation machine (London, 2003). p i80.
14 Idem.
15 For example: Golding, op. cit. pp 171 -3.
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management in terms o f  its ability to manage the company. The fact that 
Egan, in particular, had no previous experience o f  motor vehicle 
manufacturing was something that never received comment.
(ii) A clear, believable, and achievable strategy. A s indicated in Sub-Section 4.3.4  
above, Jaguar never formally articulated a long term strategy to a public 
audience, such as the City, and consequently there was always some doubt as 
to what the com pany’s goals might be. Jaguar’s only stated objective was to 
increase its sales and output o f  motor vehicles, both in regard to the existing 
m odels, and through the launch o f  new models. This was not a strategy that 
most analysts or investors were completely comfortable with, particularly 
given Jaguar’s high degree o f  exposure to the US market, and hence the US 
Dollar.16 A lso, as was pointed out above, the 1980s was a decade o f  
considerable corporate activity, with the likes o f  W illiams Holdings, BTR, 
and Hanson, growing rapidly through acquisition, the combined value o f  UK  
mergers and acquisitions increasing from £1.5billion in 1980 to £26.1 billion 
in 1989.17 There was som e concern, therefore, that Jaguar looked somewhat 
exposed as a result o f  its limited focus in terms o f  markets and products, and 
the nature o f  the competition it faced, as discussed in Chapter Five (see 
especially Sections 5.4 and 5.5, above).
But another important factor was the fund manager’s stance with regard to the 
market sector within which the stock was classified. A  particular sector, for example, 
might be avoided com pletely i f  it was perceived that the risk factor attached to the 
industries, or the com panies, classified within that sector was too high. Alternatively, a 
fund might be highly positive about a particular sector in relation to that sector’s likely 
performance relative to the market overall, and adopt an overweight position, or be 
cautious about a sector and adopt an underweight position. Thus for example, in the mid 
1980s the motor sector accounted for som e 6%  o f  the total value o f  the FT AllShare
16 Hoare Govett Investment Circular, 1 August 1984; Bank in Liechtenstein Investment Circular, 28 
October 1985; Prudential-Bache Investment Circular, 13 April 1987.
17 Smith, op. cit. p 15.
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Index. A fund that had, say, 8% o f  its total value in the motor sector would be said to be 
overweight in the sector, and underweight if  the holding was below  6%. Generally, a 
fund would have a limit, defined by its actuaries, as to the amount that the fund might be 
overweight in a particular sector. So, i f  a sector performed particularly w ell and the 
sector’s weighting in the fund consequently, for example, doubled, then the fund might 
be forced to sell som e o f  its holding in the sector in order to bring the weighting more 
into line with the benchmark set by its actuaries.
Such selling activity for this and other examples cited above can best be 
described as being “technical” since it did not depend on a fund manager’s view  on a 
company. Neither could it be construed in any way as resulting from disappointment with 
a company’s performance, or being an attempt to influence the board o f  a company, for 
example, to replace the C hief Executive, or an attempt to adopt corporate governance 
best practice. Such “technical” buying and selling o f  shares in the 1980s increased also 
from the growth o f  Indexed, or ‘Tracker’ Funds. This type o f  fund sought to eliminate the 
problems o f  underperformance by holding stocks that reflected the composition o f  the 
Index concerned. Thus, i f  a particular stock accounted for 1% o f  the Index then 1% o f  the 
total value o f  the fund would be held in that stock. Consequently, the performance o f  the 
fund would parallel that o f  the Index, and so could never underperform the Index, but, on 
the other hand, could never outperform it either. Changes in the actual constituents o f  an 
Index, and the issue and cancellation o f  shares by companies (both o f  which were 
common features in the deal-driven 1980s) resulted in a constant need to buy and sell 
shares in order to rebalance the fund.
“Technical” selling aside, it is obvious from the discussion above that certain 
types o f  funds, such as High Performance funds, did have short-term time horizons, but 
there is little evidence that this was widespread among institutional investors. Indeed, 
Gaved points to studies which show that institutional investors regularly supported 
incumbent management teams and played a major role in thwarting hostile takeover bids, 
and that half the bids characterised as ‘hostile’ actually failed.18 However, short-termism 
was not an accusation that could be levelled at the City alone for it was a phenomenon 
that was to be observed among many listed companies. The argument here was that
18 Gaved, Matthew. Ownership and Influence. (London, 1994). pi 5.
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investors had becom e too focused on short-term profits and changes in share prices, and 
had failed to probe deeply enough into companies’ long-term performance. 
Consequently, corporate managers took measures to make their profits look as good as 
possible in the short term, often to the detriment o f  their company’s long term health. 
Indeed, as has been noted by Smith19, many companies in the 1980s engaged in 
misleading and even fraudulent accounting practices to inflate their short-term profits, a 
sentiment expressed also by Carty20 who showed that merger and acquisition accounting 
throughout the 1980s had been abused by companies. There was also a certain irony in 
the situation relating to many pension funds in that the pressure on fund managers to 
perform came from the trustees, many o f  whom in the case o f  company pension funds 
were directors or em ployees o f  quoted companies. A s Plender noted, most large 
companies regarded the pension fund as a profit centre, a good short-term profit by the 
pension fund allow ing the company contribution rate to be set at a level that boosted 
company earnings.21 Thus, the impulsion to short-termism by pension funds would often 
come from the very corporate directors who accused the City o f  short-termism.
Pension funds, looking to fund pension payments in, say, ten years’ time, 
generally had the longest time horizons, typically purchasing a stock for five years or 
more. Here, Lindey claimed, in 1996, that UK pension funds held their equities on 
average for about eight years.22 However, in the 1980s even pension funds would set 
longer term share price targets (relative to the market) and would sell the holding once 
the price has reached that target unless new information had led them to review those 
targets. Longer term funds also tended to dispose o f  their holding i f  a company produced 
unsatisfactory results, or failed to adopt corporate governance best practice, although 
after 1990, when recession hit, fund managers “found themselves forced to adopt a more 
interventionist stance towards their investments”.23 The options pursued by institutional
19 Smith, op.cit.
20 Carty, James. “Accounting for Takeovers” in Cosh, Andy, Hughes, Alan, Singh, Ajit, Carty, James, and 
Plender, John. “Takeovers and Short-termism in the UK”. Institute fo r Public Policy Research. Industrial 
Policy Paper Number 3. (London, 1990) pp21-32.
21 Plender, John. “Some Policy Options” in Cosh et al. op.cit. pp33-45.
22 Lindey, Geoff. “The Myners Report and Greenbury” in Westall, Andrea (ed). Competitiveness and 
Corporate Governance. (London, 1996). p38.
23 Golding, op.cit. p i80.
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investors in seeking to influence corporate boards may be considered in terms o f  
Hirschman’s concepts o f ‘exit, voice and loyalty’.24
Although Hirschman’s analysis was concerned primarily with the options 
available to dissatisfied customers o f  a company, or members o f  an organization, it has 
been applied by various scholars25 to the responses o f  institutional investors when 
dissatisfied with the performance or behaviour o f  a company, particularly as a response to 
decline as evidenced in reduced profits or dividends. In these instances investors may 
choose to “Exit”, that is, sell their shares, and as a result o f  the consequent fall in the 
share price “management is impelled to search for ways and means to correct whatever 
faults have led to exit”.26 Alternatively, investors may prefer to retain their shares and 
exercise their “V oice”, expressing “their dissatisfaction directly to management or to 
some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest 
addressed to anyone who cares to listen.”27 A s a result, management once again is 
impelled to correct whatever faults led to shareholder disquiet. Thus, “management 
....engages in a search for the causes and possible cures o f  dissatisfaction”28, and “V oice” 
may be best defined as an “attempt to change rather than escape from an unsatisfactory 
situation”29. Finally, “Loyalty” is the special attachment that “holds exit at bay and 
activates voice”, inducing investors to stay on in “the hope...or reasoned expectation that 
improvement or reform can be achieved from within”.30
O f these options, m ost writers have noted that “Exit” has normally been 
preferred to “V oice”. However, “Exit” might prove costly, especially when a company is 
in difficulty and the share price is likely to be depressed. In this situation, investors might 
decide to hold their stock, but remain passive in the assumption that their ability to 
change the strategy o f  the directors is minimal, or alternatively they might opt to exercise
24 Hirschman, A.O. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States. 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1970)
25 For example: Dedman op.cit. p347; Dimsdale, Nicholas “The Need to Restore Corporate Accountability: 
An Agenda for Reform” in Dimsdale, Nicholas, and Prevezer, Martha (eds). Capital Markets and 
Corporate Governance. (Oxford, 1994). p20; Gaved op cit. ppl 1-12.
26 Hirschman. op.cit. p4.
27 Idem.
28 Ibid. p33.
29 Lloyd-Jones, Roger, Maltby, Josephine, Lewis, M.J., and Matthews, Mark. “Corporate Governance in a 
Major British Holding Company: BSA in the Interwar Years” in Accounting, Business & Financial 
History, Volume 16, Number 1 (March 2006). p71.
30 Hirschman. op.cit. p77.
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“V oice”, utilizing the opportunities afforded by the governance m echanisms o f  public 
companies to hold directors to account through, for example, the company’s Annual 
General M eeting (AGM ). Here, Lloyd-Jones e t a l provide a well-docum ented account o f  
how disgruntled B SA  shareholders, largely individuals, in the 1920s and 1930s used 
“V oice” in the company’s AGM  and elsewhere to force changes in the company’s 
governance.31 But, by the 1980s, as noted above, institutions had becom e the largest, and 
most important, investors in UK equities, and as Dimsdale observed, institutions did not 
generally intervene at AGM s to express their dissatisfaction. Dimsdale, writing in 1994, 
pointed out that, “major financial institutions have not until recently put greater pressure 
on boards when they are concerned about the fortunes o f  a company. These institutions 
could bring about changes in a board and possibly displace a CEO. Frequently this has
not happened ‘Exit’ has frequently been preferred to ‘V oice’ ”.32 However, Gaved,
also writing in 1994, observed that, “For institutional investors, making the choice 
between  exit and voice is the exception rather than the rule -  in m ost cases neither choice 
is exercised and investors do nothing”.33 Bowden provided support to this view, 
observing that, “City/industry relations and the operation o f  the external mechanisms o f  
corporate governance have rarely in the United Kingdom been dominated by either the 
full exit (that is, the disposal o f  all equity holdings in a given company) or the voice  
strategy”34, and introduced another option, that o f  “Limited Exit”, arguing that this was 
“the key option”. In the exercise o f  this option, “the principal sells sufficient shares to 
effect a fall in the market price which makes the company vulnerable to take-over. This 
gives warning to management that unless performance is improved, they are at risk o f  
displacement”.35
H ow ever whilst Hirschman’s concepts o f  ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ provide a 
means for understanding the ways in which customers respond to dissatisfaction with 
companies, it is a framework which in respect to investor behaviour appears to be little 
more than a truism. Certainly, there is not a great deal o f  empirical evidence to support its
31 Lloyd-Jones et al. op.cit.
32 Dimsdale. op.cit. p20.
33 Gaved op cit. p99.
34 Bowden, Sue. “Corporate Governance in a Political Climate: The Impact of Public Policy Regimes on 
Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom” in Parkinson, John, Gamble, Andrew, and Kelly, Gavin 
(eds). The Political Economy o f  the Company. (Oxford -  Portland, 2000). pp 184-5.
35 Ibid. p i85.
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premises in regard to specific cases. Investors may w ell “Exit” as a result o f  
dissatisfaction with a company’s performance, but “Exit” is as likely, i f  not more likely, 
to occur as a result o f  the “technical” factors discussed above. The problem is that 
without knowing an investor’s reasons for his actions, it is impossible to conclude that a 
particular instance o f  selling is an “Exit” in the Hirschmanian sense o f  the term. 
Similarly, in the 1980s, whilst “V oice” undoubtedly did occur there is very little evidence 
o f  specific overt “V oice” activity, in contrast to the BSA example stated above, with 
“Voice” being restricted to private meetings between investors and the management o f  
the companies concerned, or conducted through an intermediary such as a stockbroker. It 
may also be argued that the prospect o f  a hostile bid may not only inhibit “Exit” 
altogether, but also lead to further share purchases, since investors may stand to get a 
better price from the potential bidder than from the market. A lso, the prospect o f  a hostile 
bid adds an incentive to fund managers to abstain from “V oice” activity. The risk for the 
investor is what price the bidder would pay. Finally, it may be argued that “Loyalty” may 
merely represent investor inertia. In certain instances, however, the decision to retain a 
disappointing stock m ay result from a fund manager not being prepared to admit that he 
made a mistake in buying the stock in the first place, which an “Exit” might be taken as 
implying. These concepts and issues as they related to Jaguar are discussed in Sub- 
Section 9.2.3 and Section 9.3 below.
9.2.2 Stockbrokers
Although it was possible to transfer shares without going through the stock market itself, 
in practice all share trading w as channelled through stockbrokers who placed the business 
with various jobbing firms on the floor o f  the Stock Exchange. The constant interaction 
between jobbers and brokers on the floor o f  the Exchange resulted in a fairly free flow  o f  
information about trading in a particular stock, and enabled a company’s corporate 
broker, discussed below , to provide feedback to its corporate client regarding movement 
in the client’s share price or volum es traded. This was something that was changed 
following the City’s “B ig  Bang” in October 1986 (see page 332).
To assist fund managers with their assessment o f  a particular company, and 
its shares, not only at the time o f  initial investment but also in regard to keeping investors
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informed o f  any changes that might affect that investment once made, stockbroking firms 
employed researchers, or “analysts”, to provide information about various companies to 
the fund managers. It was these stockbrokers’ analysts who were the primary City 
audience for companies seeking to communicate their financial results and other 
developments to the fund management community, although the larger organizations 
such as the Prudential did themselves employ a limited number o f  analysts to provide 
impartial research. Analysts disseminated their v iew s on the companies they researched 
verbally to their investment clients either in one on one meetings or by telephone, or 
would write an investment, or research, note on a company and its shares which would be 
printed and circulated to a firm’s institutional investment clients. Generally, an analyst 
would write a fairly lengthy research review on a company ahead o f  the company’s initial 
public offering, or when som e important development occurred (such as a merger), or 
when initiating research coverage o f  a major company, and would write fairly short notes 
following the publication o f  a company’s Interim (half year) Results, and Preliminary 
(full year) Results. Usually, on the day o f  a results announcement a company would hold 
a meeting with all analysts concerned to provide them with further information 
concerning the results, and answer any questions they might have. Given that analysts 
were employed to becom e expert in the companies and industries that they were 
researching, they were expected to be able to anticipate problems such as poor financial 
results, and warn the fund managers accordingly, so that the latter might take appropriate 
action, such as selling their shares. This was especially true if  the reasons for a particular 
purchase were no longer valid -  for example, anticipation o f  the dividend being cut when 
the shares had been bought for income, as opposed to growth in earnings.
There were, however, a number o f  problems with this system, which became 
more acute follow ing “B ig Bang”. A  major concern was that o f  the variable quality o f  
analysts, and their work. Undoubtedly, there were analysts who had a very good 
understanding o f  the companies and industries they researched, and these often were 
invited to present papers at industry conferences or seminars, or advise corporate clients 
on industry developments. However, as Marsh noted, analysts generally were criticised 
for having “only the haziest understandings o f  the markets, technology and competitive 
pressures under which a company is operating; for their failure to ask intelligent or
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penetrating questions, particularly about future strategy and innovation; for their failure 
to detect warning signs in the accounts o f  some recent corporate failures; and for failing 
to produce original research”.36 Consequently, much published research w as superficial, 
particularly that relating to company results announcements, and like m ost newspaper 
articles merely regurgitated company handouts. The problem, as Marsh correctly 
identified, lay in recruitment policy, and training and education. Analysts in the 1980s 
were not required to be graduates, or have any professional qualifications, although most 
in fact were graduates, and a number had previously qualified as Chartered Accountants. 
Whenever possible, stockbroking firms recruited analysts from the industries that they 
were required to research, so that they had som e work experience o f  the sectors 
concerned. However, in the first ha lf o f  the 1980s such recruitment was not easy since 
stockbroking salaries were below  those that could be obtained in industry, although a 
profitable year for a firm could result in bonuses o f  tw ice salary being paid. Before “Big  
Bang” stockbroking firms were required by the rules o f  the Stock Exchange to be 
partnerships, and the em ployees o f  these firms were required to share some o f  the 
partners’ risks, in terms o f  comparatively low  salaries, but then enjoyed some o f  the 
returns in a profitable year in terms o f  bonuses.
Once recruited, analysts received only on the job training, stockbroking 
partnerships being loath to incur expenditure on formal training. If an analyst wished to 
become a partner in his firm then he had to becom e a member o f  the Stock Exchange, 
which might involve passing its membership exams, but more often was achieved on the 
basis o f  experience; that is, the number o f  years that the individual had been employed in 
a stockbroking firm. The syllabus for the Stock Exchange exams, however, centred 
around stock exchange practice, regulation, and the obligations o f  members. In the mid 
1970s the Society o f  Investment Analysts (SIA) had been founded to provide a 
professional body and professional qualification for investment analysts. The exams 
consisted o f  five papers -  tw o in Techniques o f  Investment, and a paper each in 
Introductory Econom ics, Investment Regulation and Practice, and Interpretation o f  
Company Reports and Accounts. However, there was little incentive to become a 
member o f  the Society, and by the m id-1980s membership consisted largely o f  those who
36 Marsh, Paul. “Market Assessment o f Company Performance” in Dimsdale and Prevezer. op.cit. p92.
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had joined as founder members, or awarded membership without examination for time 
served as an investment analyst. However, neither the Stock Exchange exam s nor the SIA 
exams provided much o f  a preparation for the role o f  an analyst, Marsh suggesting, quite 
appropriately, that analysts “would also benefit from a rather broader management 
education, embracing operations management, marketing, and business strategy, ideally 
leavened with som e first-hand exposure to business and management issues”.37 After 
“Big Bang” every analyst was required to becom e a “Registered Representative” before 
he could advise investors, or publish research in his own name. This involved taking an 
on-line multiple choice exam , the topics largely involving regulation and stock market 
practice, but existing analysts were accorded the qualification automatically.
The lack o f  know ledge or experience o f  an industry mentioned above was 
especially true in regard to Jaguar. At the time o f  Jaguar’s privatisation there were few, if  
any, UK analysts, or fund managers, who had an in-depth knowledge o f  automotive 
manufacturers, and the potential risks involved. The reason for this was that analysts, o f  
necessity, focused their attention on UK com panies w hose shares were actively traded on 
the London Stock Exchange. At the time o f  the flotation o f  Jaguar in 1984 there were no 
other publicly quoted, actively traded, UK automotive manufacturers, and no reason 
therefore for UK  analysts to have had much understanding o f  this particular aspect o f  the 
industry. Another factor here was that, during the early and m id-1980s, there were few  
cross-border investment funds in existence, m ost UK  funds being invested in UK equities 
alone.38 There was no reason, therefore, for investors to have any knowledge o f  the 
operations o f  the likes o f  BM W  or M ercedes. Likewise, stockbrokers’ analysts focused 
purely on UK com panies, and none knew a great deal about the dynamics o f  vehicle 
manufacturers. Those analysts w ho had specialised in motor sector companies had been 
restricted by the liquidity o f  shares to focus on component companies such as Lucas and 
GKN. N o one researched BL, 99.7%  o f  w hose shares were held by the government and 
were hardly traded, and few  analysts or investors had ever seen inside a vehicle assembly 
plant and, therefore, had nothing with which, for example, to compare the assembly lines 
at Browns Lane. Consequently, it was easy, therefore, for Jaguar to foster with UK
37 Ibid. p93.
38 Golding, op.cit. p i29.
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analysts and investors, at least initially, the illusion o f  increased efficiency, and to 
conceal many o f  its problem areas, and to persuade analysts, in the first few  years at least, 
to accept unquestionably what it reported to them, and then to disseminate that to their 
own investor clients,
In contrast, the US stockbroker automotive analysts who started following  
Jaguar much later were far more knowledgeable about automobile manufacturing, having 
direct knowledge o f  the manufacturing facilities o f  Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, 
and, in some cases, o f  plants operated by European and Japanese automotive 
manufacturers. A s a result, they were much less prone to accept the Jaguar “spin” at face 
value. Here, Grant recalled one European tour by US stockbroker analysts who:
were visiting Ford o f  Europe as their last stop. We picked them up in the Ford o f  
Europe plane from Birmingham airport where they had visited Jaguar the 
previous day, and all the w ay down in the aeroplane they were talking about the 
‘Dark A ges’ that they had just witnessed the day before, and how astounding it 
was, and how they were all going to downgrade Jaguar as a result.39
Another problem with the stockbroking modus operandi, and which Jaguar 
and many other com panies seldom seem ed to appreciate, was that stockbrokers made 
money mainly by buying and selling shares on behalf o f  their clients, and would 
constantly be searching for reasons for their clients to buy or sell particular stocks. 
Institutional investors, particularly Pension Funds, had continual inflows o f  cash which 
needed to be invested, and would look to analysts for advice as to which shares offered 
the best investment prospects. But analysts would also be expected to recommend selling 
those shares offering poorer investment prospects. Here, however, there were not that 
many industrial com panies that understood that a “Sell” recommendation by an analyst 
might have little to do with the quality o f  that particular company p e r  se, but reflected the 
view o f  the future performance o f  the company’s shares. Often, such a recommendation 
might be view ed in a bad light by the company involved, with the analyst concerned 
being accused o f  “short-termism” by irate corporate managers, and who in extreme cases 
might refuse further contact with the analyst involved. Generally, the stock market 
Overall, and analysts in particular, were often criticised for being focused only on the
39 John Grant. Interview with the author. January 1993. Appendix p85.
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current year prospects. Marsh rejected this assertion, pointing out that there is no 
evidence “to support the ‘myopic hypothesis’ that the stock-market has a short-run focus 
on the current year’s reported earnings rather than a multi-year horizon”.40 Indeed, during 
the 1980s analysts were expected to provide two years’ forecasts for the companies they 
researched, a longer time horizon being thought, by companies as w ell as the City, to 
involve too many imponderables to allow quantitative forecasts that could be regarded as 
anything other than “best guesses”. However, research notes appertaining to Jaguar 
showed that whilst analysts forecasted only two years’ actual profits and dividends, often 
considerable attention was given to other, non-quantified, aspects such as the likely 
impact o f  a company’s strategy, or the longer term prospects for the industry, or the 
quality o f  management, and made Buy or Sell recommendations accordingly.
The dynamics o f  stockbroking was changed considerably by the de-regulation 
o f  the London stock market in October 1986, dubbed “B ig Bang”. This abolished fixed 
commission charges, ended the distinction between stockjobbers and stockbrokers, 
allowed limited liability companies to belong to the London Stock Exchange and to deal 
in shares, and replaced share trading on the floor o f  the Stock Exchange with electronic 
screen-based trading. Consequently, most stockbroking firms became “Securities 
Houses” making markets in shares, as w ell as acting as agents. This required more capital 
than could be afforded by the old partnerships and “Big Bang” was accompanied by a 
considerable number o f  brokering firms merging or being taken over by banks, and the 
entry o f  a number o f  new  securities houses, particularly American, into the market. 
Previously, brokers had tended to specialise in particular areas o f  the market, especially 
in regard to research, with, for example, perhaps twelve firms providing fairly 
comprehensive coverage o f  the motors sector, but after “Big Bang” all firms sought to 
provide a full research coverage o f  the market, with the result that the number o f  motor 
sector analysts more than doubled. Obviously, many o f  these analysts were new to the 
sector, i f  not the stock market, their research output serving to reinforce concerns among 
both fund managers and companies regarding the quality o f  research.
One particular result o f  “B ig Bang”, and the lower com m issions earned from 
institutional clients, was that the attention o f  brokers, many under new ownership, was
40 Marsh, op.cit. p73
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focused increasingly on the most profitable parts o f  their business. Certainly, profits from 
broking alone in the aftermath o f  the 1987 “Crash” were dwarfed by those to be made 
from market-making and corporate advisory work. A s a result, analysts started to shift 
their focus from the interests o f  their external clients, the fund managers, to their internal 
clients, the market makers and corporate finance departments. The conflicts o f  interest 
which started to develop were increasingly visible to fund managers, who realized that 
more and more o f  the information and investment advice they were receiving from 
analysts reflected internal vested interests. Thus, for example, an analyst might 
recommend a stock as a “Buy” because his firm’s market makers wished to reduce the 
amount o f  that stock held on their books. A s a result there was a growing amount o f  
direct contact between fund managers and companies, leading to greater use o f  “Voice” 
by fund managers, particularly when concerns developed from 1990 onwards about the 
impact o f  econom ic recession. However, this hardly affected Jaguar since it had ceased to 
be a quoted company by this time. One other change o f  note following “B ig Bang” was 
that with the introduction o f  electronic share dealing, there was no longer the interaction 
between jobbers and brokers on the floor o f  the Exchange, and market makers in the new  
securities houses seldom spoke to their competitors. It became very difficult, therefore, 
for a broker to provide feedback to its corporate clients regarding the reasons for 
movements in share prices or volum es traded, particularly in terms o f  whether they 
resulted from a change in view s on fundamentals, or a change in sentiment, or technical 
factors in the market (see page 341).
9.2.3 Jaguar’s Relationship with its City Audience
As mentioned above, Jaguar’s management had no experience o f  dealing with the City 
audience, or the specific informational requirements o f  that audience, and did not handle 
communications with the City audience at all well. Indeed, from its first dealings with the 
City ahead o f  its flotation, Jaguar appeared to regard City analysts in much the same way 
that it did motoring journalists - merely as another conduit for promoting the company’s 
positive image, and hence enhancing sales o f  vehicles.
In 1984, at the time o f  the flotation, UK analysts were virtually united in their 
caution regarding the merits o f  Jaguar as an investment, pointing to the problems facing
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the company and the risks attached to investing in a one-product company heavily 
dependent on the fickle US market, to say nothing o f  the volatile currency aspect. 
Likewise, few fund managers saw Jaguar as being a sound long term investment, being 
concerned particularly about the likely volatility in the share price given the cyclical 
nature o f  the motor industry, and the consequent likely variations in profits. At this time, 
Egan (doubtless being required to do so by both his legal and financial advisors) was at 
pains to point out that Jaguar represented “a rich spectrum o f  risks and rewards”.41 From 
1985 onwards nothing further was heard from Egan about the risks, only the rewards, and 
given Jaguar’s impressive profits rise in the period to 1987, at least, few  analysts were 
prepared to do other than be fairly enthusiastic about the company, especially given the 
continual “spin” emanating from Egan and Jaguar’s PR department.
Given this, and im pressive increases in profits and a rising share price, it was 
easy for Jaguar to foster with UK  analysts and investors, at least initially, the illusion o f  
increased efficiency, and to conceal many o f  its problem areas. Whilst Jaguar profits 
were rising in the years to 1987 it perhaps did not matter that much, although if  the 
reasons for the rise in profits had been apparent it would have given som e warning o f  the 
potential risks. Those analysts w hose detailed analysis suggested that currency benefit in 
1985, for example, w as responsible for a large proportion o f  Jaguar’s pre-tax profits, 
were informed that such a conclusion was incorrect when they approached the company 
for verification before dissem inating such a v iew  to investors.42 Since the consequent 
promulgation o f  such findings would, in effect, be calling the company deceitful, they 
were seldom published by the analysts concerned. But whilst some analysts did often 
draw attention to the risks posed, for exam ple, by currency factors, none recognised the 
problem o f  warranties in respect o f  the XJ40, let alone attempted to quantify their impact 
on profits. It was easier to accept, at face value, Jaguar’s explanation o f  the negative 
impact o f  the strength o f  Sterling after 1988, and the downturn in the US market for 
imported luxury cars. G iven that there was much information that was not revealed by 
Jaguar, as recounted in Sub-Section 2.4.2 above and in various sections o f  Chapter Eight, 
it was difficult to argue otherwise. A s revealed in Sub-Section 4.3.1.3 above, Jaguar had
41 Quoted in Blackrod Limited. Jaguar ‘Risk and Opportunity’. (London, 1984) [VHS Video]
42 Author’s own contemporaneous notes. December 1985.
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misrepresented things to the City about the development o f  the XJ41, or F-type, but there 
is no evidence that this was ever appreciated by the City audience at the time.
Such issues, and the emphasis on future prospects, demonstrate the aptness o f  
the much quoted aphorism that, for investors, “Perception is greater than Reality”. It was 
this that enabled Jaguar to perpetuate the illusion o f  success for so long with the City 
audience, its “major problems being cleverly prevented from tarnishing the company’s 
rejuvenated reputation”.43 Even so, as discussed in Section 9.3 below , a number o f  UK  
institutional investors, who had never regarded the stock very highly anyway, took 
advantage at this time o f  the rising share price to realise profits. This was not “Exit” in 
the Hirschmanian definition o f  the concept. H owever, when reality overtook perception, 
in m id-1988, and Jaguar began to fail to realise City expectations, it was abandoned by 
many o f  its UK fund management investors, such m oves at this time being “Exit” in the 
Hirschmanian sense. There is no evidence, however, o f  investors exercising “V oice”, 
although concerns may w ell have been conveyed to Jaguar through intermediaries such as 
its corporate broker. H owever, at this tim e Jaguar faced increasing criticism from 
stockbrokers’ analysts. Egan did little to restore his management’s credibility at this time 
when he started attacking the v iew s o f  financial analysts, the Sunday Times reporting him 
as saying that, “City criticism s o f  his firm had been ‘naive’, ‘unduly harsh’ and ‘ill- 
informed’”, that, “the analysts’ gloom  is premature”, and that, “the City w ill have to get 
used to varying earnings from a com pany that is inevitably vulnerable to cyclical and 
currency swings”.44 This, o f  course, w as m erely replaying back to the City the original 
concerns that it had about the stability o f  earnings from a motor company. There was, 
however, some evidence that “Exit” was inhibited to an extent by the prospect o f  a hostile 
bid. Indeed, fund managers, and stockbrokers alike took som e comfort from the belief  
that, if  Jaguar was having problems, then one o f  the large automotive companies, such as 
Ford, General Motors, or BM W , w ould take it over before it went bankrupt.45 In the 
event, o f  course, the C ity’s pessim ism  proved more than justified, Jaguar reporting a pre­
tax loss o f  £58.3m  in 1989 (Egan having told investors previously that, “Jaguar w ill make
43 Automotive News. 2 April 1990.
44 Sunday Times. 4 September 1988.
45 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p52.
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a good profit in 1989”46), and, under Ford’s ownership, further considerable pre-tax 
losses in each o f  the follow ing five years.
From 1988 onwards there w as an increasing cynicism  towards Jaguar that 
became progressively more difficult for the company to counter. Even so, analysts who 
did not give support to the Jaguar account o f  events tended to be given short shrift, or 
otherwise denigrated, by Jaguar’s comm unications department, or by Egan himself, as 
illustrated above. Overall, however, a more realistic approach to the City tended to be 
adopted from 1988 onwards when John Edwards, perhaps reacting to “V oice” criticisms 
regarding the disclosure aspect o f  Jaguar’s corporate governance, played a larger role in 
engaging with analysts and fund managers. Here, Edwards provided a greater realism in 
relation to the information made available to analysts, in evident contrast to the 
propagation o f  illusion previously encountered. Even so, aspects such as the impact o f  
poor quality and reliability continued to be carefully concealed.
Retrospectively, after the takeover by Ford, Jaguar’s obligation as a publicly 
quoted company to satisfy the requirements o f  the financial community was used as an 
additional excuse for it not having attempted to overcom e a number o f  its problems. 
David Boole, for example, talked about the requirement in the 1980s to “balance the 
needs o f  the shareholders and the company”.47 This was a v iew  with which investors 
might agree in principle, but in practice w ould be more likely to hold that their own long 
term interests might best be served by the rapid resolution o f  a company’s problems, even 
if  there was a short-term adverse impact on profits. Investors, therefore, in this instance 
would be likely to exercise “Loyalty”, and be supportive o f  the company. But, for Jaguar 
to admit to such problems w ould have shattered the illusion that it had carefully 
constructed. Again, Professor Dan Jones, possibly echoing Jaguar itself, was quoted as 
nominating Jaguar’s stock exchange listing as responsible for Jaguar being unable to
resolve its “retrograde shopfloor practices” since “Egan constantly had to watch the
stock price”48. Such a statement, however, ignores the fact that Egan, prior to 1984, had 
had four years to tackle the shopfloor issues without having a share price to worry about.
46 The Times. 29 November 1988.
47 Automotive News. 12 November 1990.
48 Idem.
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9.3 The Offer for Sale, and the Consequent Shareholder Base
As noted above, the Jaguar listing involved the sale o f  177.88 m illion Ordinary Shares. In 
addition, a further 2 .12 m illion ordinary shares were distributed to directors and 
employees, taking the total number o f  shares in issue to 180 m illion. Henceforth, the only 
further share issues w ould be in respect o f  various em ployee share option schemes. Also, 
there was issued a Special Rights Redeem able Share o f  £1 (the so-called “Golden Share”) 
which could be held only by the Secretary o f  State for Trade and Industry, acting on 
behalf o f  the Crown, and which w ould be redeemed at par by Jaguar on 31 December 
1990. Amongst other things this instrument prevented any single beneficial holding in 
Jaguar exceeding 15% o f  the total number o f  shares in issue, thus in effect preventing a 
takeover o f  the company. H owever, the irony here was that it was the actions o f  the 
Secretary o f  State for Trade and Industry in 1989 in respect o f  the Golden Share that 
facilitated the takeover o f  Jaguar by the Ford Motor Company that was described in Sub- 
Section 4.2.5 above.
Prior to the listing, Jaguar was still owned by BL, and whilst Egan may have 
been impatient to exert his independence it was still BL which dictated the appointment 
of Jaguar’s advisors. In the period before “B ig  Bang”, companies undertaking share 
issues were required to appoint both a merchant bank and a corporate stockbroker, the 
former to be responsible for the technical and legal requirements o f  a share issue, and the 
latter being the essential link to investors - to ensure the orderly distribution o f  shares to 
investors and the secondary underwriting o f  shares by fund managers. The insistence by 
BL that its own financial advisor, H ill Samuel, be the sole merchant bank involved with 
the flotation, was the cause o f  further friction between BL and Jaguar, which had wanted 
to appoint its own merchant bank.49 Indeed, fo llow ing its listing, Jaguar was quick to 
appoint Morgan Grenfell as its merchant bank advisor, with George Magan as the bank’s 
director responsible for the Jaguar business. B L ’s long tim e corporate stockbroker, Laing 
and Cruickshank, was appointed stockbroker to the offer, but was reinforced by the 
appointment also o f  Cazenove & Co, the C ity’s leading corporate broker, and one with an 
unparalleled reputation for ensuring the success o f  corporate actions such as new share 
issues, and which would be appointed Jaguar’s sole corporate stockbroker following the
49 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p57.
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flotation. The appointment o f  Cazenove to the Offer was particularly apposite since the 
UK financial community proved to be not that enthusiastic about the flotation o f  Jaguar’s 
shares, as mentioned above, and anecdotal evidence at the time suggested that some 
effort was required by Cazenove to get the offer underwritten by fund managers. The 
offer itself, however, was eight times oversubscribed, thanks to the enthusiastic interest 
generated by Jaguar car-owning private investors.
The extent o f  this interest by individuals in the shares is revealed by the first 
analysis o f  shareholdings provided by Jaguar. A s at 6 March 1985, some 86% o f  
shareholders held 500, or less, shares each, and som e 98% o f  shareholders held 5,000, or 
less, shares each.50 This percentage was unchanged at 98% in the last published Jaguar 
shareholders analysis o f  5 March 1989, but these holders accounted for only 11% o f  the 
total o f  182.9 m illion shares in issue by this tim e.51 It would thus appear that Jaguar 
enjoyed the loyal support o f  its private shareholders throughout the period o f  it being a 
public company.
The same could not be said o f  its institutional investors. Following the listing, 
there were 133 non-US holders o f  over 200,000 shares (“large holders”), accounting for 
some 70% o f  the shares in issue. These probably were all institutional investors. In mid- 
November 1985 the listing o f  Jaguar A D R s on N A SD AQ , and the anticipation o f  that 
event, provided a large market for Jaguar shares, which allowed UK fund managers to 
sell their Jaguar holdings into a rising market for the shares. It is o f  note that the buyers 
o f  ADRs in the US tended to be high wealth individuals, who were as enthusiastic about 
the Jaguar car as were the UK private investors, but unlike their UK counterparts were far 
more fickle, tending to trade shares more. Furthermore, being highly nervous o f  potential 
loss-producing situations they were less likely to exercise “Loyalty” in the face o f  falling 
share prices. Indeed, it was easier for UK  private investors, who had bought the shares at 
165p in the flotation, to exercise “Loyalty” given that throughout the period o f  Jaguar’s 
listing these UK shareholders had the comfort o f  their holdings remaining in profit, even 
following the dramatic share price fall follow ing the October 1987 stockmarket “Crash”.
50 Jaguar Annual Report 1984 p39.
51 Jaguar Annual Report 1988 p45.
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The impact o f  the US listing on the Jaguar share price was spectacular, 
raising it from 293p at the time o f  the introduction o f  AD Rs in Novem ber 1985 to 518p a 
year later, an increase o f  77%, and resulted in Jaguar being one o f  the best performing 
shares o f  that twelve-month period. By 4 March 1987, the share price having risen a 
further 10% to 571p, but o f f  its high o f  627p achieved on 27 February 1987, some 49% 
o f  Jaguar shares were held in A D R  form, and the number o f  large holders had nearly 
halved to 74.52 However, the stockmarket “crash” o f  October 1987 reversed the position 
somewhat, with nervous US investors divesting their holdings, so that by 4 March 1988 
ADRs accounted for just under 30% o f  the shares in issue, and large holders, who 
between them now held some 40% o f  the shares in issue, had once again increased, to 
107.53 By 5 March 1989 A D R  holdings had fallen further, to som e 24% o f  the total 
shares, and large holders, owning a total o f  som e 45% o f  the shares in issue, had risen 
only marginally54, suggesting that at least som e large holders had increased the size o f  
their holdings. What cannot be ascertained, but undoubtedly had som e effect on US 
investor nervousness about Jaguar, is the part played by the realisation by them that 
quality problems were once again plaguing the Jaguar car. However, speculation about a 
takeover bid for Jaguar propelled further US buying, so that, by the time o f  the 
announcement by Ford, som e 50% o f  the shares were represented by A D R s55, the 
majority o f  which had been bought merely on the prospect o f  fairly quick profits resulting 
from a takeover.
9.4 Share Price Performance
Although in the ultimate analysis a com pany’s share price, as with any other price, is 
governed by the laws o f  supply and demand, the UK stockmarket is far from being a 
perfect market, as was made apparent, for example, in the discussion above with regard 
to “technical” selling. Indeed, the determinants o f  supply and o f  demand are often 
irrational, and price m ovem ents are contingent on the availability o f  shares for purchase. 
In stockmarket parlance, shares might be “tightly held” (that is, existing shareholders are
52 Jaguar Annual Report 1986 p38.
53 Jaguar Annual Report 1987 p43.
54 Jaguar Annual Report 1988 p45.
55 David Boole telephone conversation with the author. 20 September 1989 (Author’s own 
contemporaneous notes)
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unwilling to sell their holdings), resulting in little share price m ovem ent. Thus, the 
greater the “liquidity” o f  a stock (that is, the greater the volum e o f  shares that can be 
traded), the greater the likelihood o f  changes in the share price. A s w as revealed in the 
previous section, the demand for Jaguar shares by U S investors was m et by UK fund 
managers reducing their holdings, the increased trading o f  the shares fuelling further rises 
in the share price.
Generally, share price changes result from three factors, labelled 
fundamentals, sentiment, and technical, as discussed fairly fully in most books on the 
workings o f  the City.56 A ll three factors played a part in the performance o f  the Jaguar 
share price over the period o f  its listing, and it is relevant to this discussion to outline 
each before examining the part played by them in determining the pattern o f  the Jaguar 
share price.
“Fundamentals” refers to those aspects that actually affect a company and its 
prospects, and w ill include past and forecast financial performance, and also the share 
price in relation to these, and to the relative prices o f  other shares. A s such they are 
readily identifiable, and can be quantified. “Sentiment” is a difficult term to define 
concisely, but refers to the subjective, and emotional, aspects affecting a share price -  the 
rise in a share price, for exam ple, on the appointment o f  a new C hief Executive which the 
market believes might result in improved profitability. A lso, different sectors in the 
stockmarket can m ove in or out o f  fashion, often for no particular reason. “Technical 
factors” (different in essence from the “technical” selling discussed in Section 9.2.1 
above) relate to the often short term influences on a share price, arising, for example, 
from a large holder o f  a particular share selling the holding. Since most professional 
investors w ill do this gradually, so as not to adversely affect the share price, market 
makers, in the absence o f  an equally large buyer o f  the shares, w ill look to keep the share 
price relatively depressed w hile there is a “stock overhang” in the market, lest they buy 
too many shares which they then cannot trade out again quickly.
Sentiment w as undoubtedly the major factor influencing the stockmarket 
overall in the 1980s. Fuelled by com panies’ strong earnings growth, privatisations such 
as British Gas and British Telecom  in the early part o f  the decade which encouraged
56 For example: Golding. The City.pp77-8.
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individual investors to invest in stocks and shares, and the growth o f  merger and 
acquisition activity, share prices experienced a strong secular, or long term, “bull 
market”. In relation to the stockmarket this term relates to the situation where the 
prevailing trend o f  share prices is upwards, as opposed to a “bear market” where the 
reverse is the case. Although there were periods which saw bear phases due, for example, 
to profit taking, and a major, but relatively short-lived, downturn with the “Crash” o f 
October 1987 (discussed below), the trend o f  share prices during the decade was 
unrelentingly upwards. This can be seen clearly from Figure 9.1 which plots the absolute 
movement in the FT AllShare Index over the decade. During the decade, the FT AllShare 
Index rose by 430%, from 227 at 31 December 1979 to 1204 at 29 December 1989.
F i g u r e  9 .1:  C h a n g e s  in the  FT  A l lS h a r e  I n d ex ,  M o n t h ly ,  
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Jaguar shares started trading on 8 August 1984, and ended the day at 179p, an 
8% premium to the offer price.57 Generally, new offers were priced on the basis o f being 
at a slight discount, perhaps 10%, to the market valuation, so the premium attained by 
Jaguar demonstrated that the financial advisors had been correct in the pricing. The 
subsequent changes in the Jaguar share price are shown in Figure 9.2, and the
57 Throughout this section all share prices and share performance figures are sourced from Datastream.
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performance o f  the shares relative to the FT AllShare Index is shown in Figure 9.3. In 
these, a number o f  distinct phases may be discerned.
Figure 9.2: Jaguar Closing Share Price, Weekly, 
from 10 August 1984 to 31 December 1989
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In the period to end October 1984 the shares tended to reflect the market’s 
view o f  the fundamentals, underperforming the market overall as may be seen in Figure 
9.3, as a result o f  the uncertainty regarding Jaguar’s future earnings. Initially, most 
analysts viewed Jaguar as a recovery stock, but were cautious o f  the profits potential, and 
what the City referred to as “quality o f  earnings” -  in this case the extent to which 
Jaguar’s profits reflected its success as a vehicle manufacturer, and the extent that 
earnings were due to “non-quality” factors, such as currency, that were beyond its 
control. However, the optim istic noises made by the company to analysts and investors at 
the end o f  1984 resulted in forecasts being revisited, and the start o f  the shares 
outperforming the FT AllShare Index, a trend that would continue until the stockmarket 
“Crash” in October 1987. During this period, investors would realise greater gains from 
investing in Jaguar shares alone than they would in investing in the stockmarket as a 
whole. In the week before the announcement, in March 1985, o f  the 1984 full-year 
results, the share price reached a high point o f  362p, as may be seen in Figure 9.2. 
Although the 1984 pre-tax profits o f  £91.5m illion exceeded analysts’ original forecasts o f
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some £80million plus, they were disappointing to some, with the more cautious 
institutional investors realising profits, and the share price consequently trading at a 
lower level o f  between 260p and 280p for much o f  the period March to September.
Figure 9.3: Indices Jaguar Share Price and FT AllShare Index, Weekly,
10 August 1984 to 29 December 1989.
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It is far ffom certain, however, to what extent this depressed share price 
reflected selling activity, and to what extent it resulted from a lack o f  buying interest by 
investors. In the latter case, market makers would normally allow the share price to fall 
gradually until it found a level at which buyers re-emerged. Even so, it is o f  note that this 
lower level represented a discount to the stockmarket overall o f  some 25% on forecast 
Price-Eamings Ratios (PERs), again demonstrating the caution with which the shares, 
and the increased profits forecasts, were being viewed, something which was not 
dissipated by Jaguar announcing, in September, 1985 Interim results that were at the top 
end o f  market expectations.
As discussed in the previous section, the N A SD A Q  listing gave a major fillip 
to the shares, which rose to 470p by the time o f  the announcement o f  the 1985 full-year 
results in March 1986, having outperformed the market by 23% in the previous three 
months. In other words, an investor would have achieved a 23% higher return by 
investing only in Jaguar shares than would have been achieved by investing in the market
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as a whole. During this period, the discount to the market PER mentioned above was 
reduced to 11%. By the beginning o f  July 1986 the shares had risen by a further 23%, to 
576p, as a result o f  high US investor sentiment ahead o f  the launch o f  the XJ40, bolstered 
by presentations to the US financial community by Jaguar management, which led to the 
belief that Jaguar shares were cheap compared to those o f  BM W  and Mercedes. As 
described earlier, the share price was also boosted by the increased availability o f  shares 
as many UK fund managers took advantage o f  the rising share price to reduce, or sell 
completely, their holdings. Undoubtedly, such selling had little to do with “Exit” in the 
Hirschmanian sense, but resulted rather from the desire to “lock-in” profits from a 
spectacularly successful investment. Equally likely was that Trading Funds had 
demonstrated “short-termism” in buying in anticipation o f  the share price rising as a 
result o f  US buying, and then realising the consequent profit. However, there were no 
complaints at this tim e from Jaguar about “short-termism”. By the time o f  the 
announcement o f  the 1986 Interim results, in August 1986, the shares had outperformed 
the market by an impressive 44% over the previous tw elve months, the discount to the 
market PER being reduced to 7%.
The shares now  settled at this higher level, but with further share price rises 
reflecting not only what were perceived as improving fundamentals, with analysts’ 
forecasts o f  1987 full-year profits com m only being around £130m illion pre-tax58, but also 
a raging bull market, the FTSE Index rising som e 40.9% in the first nine months o f  1987, 
and the FT AllShare Index rising 44.7% in the same period, as may seen from Figure 9.1. 
For most o f  this period, having reached a peak o f  627p at the end o f  February, Jaguar’s 
shares traded in a fairly tight range o f  520p to 540p. This gave Jaguar a market value o f  
between £941 m illion and £977m illion, and given the continuing enthusiasm for the 
shares, particularly in the USA, this presented an ideal opportunity to raise additional 
funds through a Rights Issue. For example, at this level, Jaguar could have realised some 
£400million net through a Rights Issue on the basis o f  a one-for-two offer at a 10% 
discount, this being the sum estimated to be the cost o f  developing a new saloon car.59
58 Hoare Govett, Investment Circular, 19 August 1986; Phillips & Drew Investment Circular, 27 January 
1987; Prudential-Bache Investment Circular, 13 April 1987; Scrimegour Vickers Investment Circular, 27 
May 1987.
59 Sir John Egan. Evidence to the Trade and Industry Committee, 8 November 1989. “Trade and Industry
344
Likewise, such an issue could have financed an acquisition such as that o f  Land Rover. 
However, as related in Sub-Section 4.3.2 above, Egan was obdurate in this regard, 
believing that Jaguar’s capital requirements could be funded out o f  its ow n cash flow , 
which in the analysis in Sub-Section 8.3.6 above was shown to have been unrealistic. 
Egan was forced to change his v iew  in regard to Rights Issues in order to maintain, i f  
somewhat modified, his aspiration regarding Jaguar’s corporate independence, with a 
Rights Issue, in 1989, being part o f  the proposed deal with General Motors. But such a 
move would have been quite expensive, given the lower share price at that time, and not 
in the best interests o f  its shareholders. Furthermore, it would have hardly been in accord 
with corporate governance best practice. Indeed, Edwards went further than this when he 
opined that, “the General Motors deal would have been a disaster for the shareholders”.60 
Undoubtedly, the failure to build up a war chest through a Rights Issue in early 1987, 
ahead o f  the US launch o f  the XJ40, can be regarded as a lost opportunity.
In the w eek o f  19 October 1987 the w orld’s stock markets suffered a major 
reverse, shedding a huge value in a very short period o f  time. B y the end o f  October the 
FT AllShare Index had fallen by som e 26%, and continued a downward path during 
November, before stabilising in December. Likewise, in the U SA  the D ow  Jones 
Industrial Average Index had fallen 22.6%  by the end o f  October. Whilst the causes o f  
the “Crash” are problematic, what is certain is that markets in the first nine months o f  the 
year had become overheated and shares generally had become overvalued. Indeed, in the 
view o f  some commentators, the “Crash”, w hilst dramatic, and painful for some 
investors, was little more than a much needed correction, the FT AllShare Index, for 
example, still ending 1987 at a higher level than it had began it, at 895 on 25 December 
1987 compared to 836 on 2 January 1987. H owever, the “Crash” resulted in Jaguar’s 
share price more than halving, from 577p on 16 October to 270p on 12 November, as it 
was marked down alongside all other shares. However, the shares fell proportionately 
more than the market overall, as may be seen in Figure 9.3, due to concerns about the 
company’s fundamentals, and the likelihood o f  distressed US private shareholders, seeing 
their personal wealth under threat, selling their shares. The latter concern proved to be
Select Committee: Special Shares and the Department of Trade and Industry. Minutes of Evidence
(Printed with HC 617-i 1988/89)” . Parliamentary Papers. 1989-90. vol XIV (HC 90-i). p6.
60 John Edwards Interview. Appendix p56.
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justified, as shown in Section 9.3 above, with the proportion o f  shares held in A D R  form 
falling from 49% o f  the total in February 1987 to just under 30% in March 1988. The 
concern regarding the fundamentals largely revolved around concerns that Jaguar sales in 
the important US market would fall due to the dilutive impact o f  the “Crash” on 
individuals’ wealth. However, this concern proved to be unfounded, Dale noting, as 
mentioned in Section 5.6.5 above, that the “Crash” did “not have much effect at all”61 on 
Jaguar sales.
In the immediate aftermath o f  the “Crash”, Jaguar continued to put a positive 
spin on its prospects, Egan, in comm enting on the 1988 outlook in December 1987, 
stating that, “We should be back on a growth tack. W e sort o f  gave the analysts support at 
f  100m, but said it w ouldn’t be as good as last year”.62 A s a result there was an upturn in 
market sentiment with som e improvement in the share price, with the shares trading 
above 300p until the announcement o f  the 1987 full-year profits in March 1988. The 
fundamentals were reasserted fairly quickly, and although m ost analysts, encouraged by 
Jaguar to do so, retained their forecasts o f  1988 full year profits being in excess o f  
£100million, there w as now  considerable cynicism  in the market in general in regard to 
Jaguar, as illusion gave w ay to realism. The share price, therefore, started to discount a 
major downturn in profits, trading below  300p again. This was evidenced further by the 
limited impact on the share price o f  the major downgradings by analysts o f  1988 profits 
forecasts, to as low  as £40m illion pre-tax63, follow ing the announcement o f  the 1988 
Interim results in August 1988. It is o f  note that from the “Crash” to September 1989 the 
shares mainly underperformed the FT AllShare Index.
In 1989, however, sentiment again started to play a major role in determining 
the share price, as the v iew  developed am ong many analysts that i f  the then Jaguar 
management could not resolve the com pany’s problems, and develop a clear strategy, 
then it was likely to be subject to a takeover bid. There is no evidence, however, o f  the 
exercise o f  “V oice” by Jaguar’s shareholders in this regard at this time, although it is 
likely that Jaguar’s corporate broker w ould have informed the company o f  this view . 
From the time o f  the announcement o f  the 1988 full-year profits in March 1989, when it
61 Mike Dale Interview. Appendix p42.
62 John Egan quoted in Automotive News. 14 December 1987.
63 The Independent, 27 August 1988.
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was first appreciated that Jaguar might actually report a pre-tax loss for 1989, the share 
price became increasingly subject to bid speculation, the price being driven upwards by 
increased speculative buying by US investors, as described in the previous section. The 
extent o f  “short-termism” here among investors cannot be ascertained, although it is 
always a feature in any rising market, and buying shares in order to accept a bid is, o f  
course, the opposite o f  B ow den’s “Limited Exit” concept.
Given the importance attributed to the US Dollar in regard to Jaguar’s profits, 
it is pertinent to question the extent to which changes in the Sterling/US Dollar exchange 
rate influenced Jaguar’s share price. W hilst there is little evidence o f  investors trading 
Jaguar shares merely because o f  changes in the US Dollar exchange rate, it is highly 
probable that som e such trading did occur. However, o f  more relevance to the equity 
investor was the impact that changes in the Sterling/US Dollar rate had on Jaguar’s 
profits p e r  se -  in other words, the effect on the fundamentals.
It is difficult, however, to ascertain the relationship between share price and 
exchange rate with any degree o f  accuracy due to the number o f  other factors influencing 
the share price, and which have been mentioned above. Indeed, the correlation coefficient 
o f the share price and currency exchange indices for the entire period emerges at -0.17, a 
figure which indicates that the relationship was not statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Nonetheless, there were structural changes in the relationship within the period 
overall, and when the period is broken up the relationship during certain phases do 
become highly correlated, the coefficients cited below  all being significant at the 1% 
level. A s can be seen in Figure 9.4, there were apparent relationships between the two 
indices over those periods when the fundamentals were the main factor determining share 
price movement.
Figure 9.4 appears to show  a distinct coupling o f  the movement o f  the two  
indices in the period from August 1984 to June 1985, even i f  they can hardly be said to 
move in parallel. Statistical analysis o f  the tw o indices over this time period results in a 
correlation coefficient o f  +0.95. This coupling can be seen to have been interrupted 
during the re-rating o f  the shares due to heavy buying by US investors, from November 
1985 to June 1986, resulting in a strong inverse correlation coefficient o f  -0.65 for this 
period. But once the shares had becom e established at a higher price level, after February
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1987, the coupling o f the two indices appears to have resumed, resulting in a correlation 
coefficient o f +0.61 for the period March to October 1987. The “Crash” o f October 1 
caused a further, somewhat temporary decoupling, but the relationship between the two 
indices appears to have resumed in November 1987, albeit with the shares now trading at 
a lower level, until September 1989, the correlation coefficient for this period emerging 
at +0.63. After this point, intense bid speculation became the only factor determining the 
share price.
Figure  9.4: I n d i c e s  J a g u a r  S h a r e  P r i ce  a n d £ / U S $  E x c h a n g e  Rat e  
A u g u s t  1 9 8 4  to  D e c e m b e r  1 98 9
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Source: Datastream
9.5 Summary and Conclusions
The listing o f Jaguar’s shares in 1984 appeared to all intents and purposes to be a product 
of expediency, serving no practical purpose other than being the only means acceptable to 
all parties concerned by which Jaguar could be freed from the shackles o f BL ownership. 
Indeed, once the shares were listed, the Jaguar management, adopting a negative stance in 
respect o f Rights Issues, took no advantage o f its stockmarket quote to raise additional 
funds for capital investment, or for acquisitions. This seemingly inflexible position 
appeared to have been reconsidered when a deal with General Motors became contingent 
on a Rights Issue. The fact that Jaguar did not attempt a Rights Issue earlier was not only
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a lost opportunity but suggests that Jaguar’s financial planning w as inadequate, being 
founded on the delusion that it could continue to fund its future developm ent from its 
own resources.
Perhaps as a consequence o f  its particular arrogance, Jaguar failed to 
appreciate the growing requirements o f  its City audience regarding corporate governance 
best practice. O f especial note was the need for Jaguar to make the City aware o f  its 
longer term strategy, a key factor in underpinning investor confidence in any company. 
As a result, the Jaguar share price tended to be driven by other, somewhat myopic, 
considerations, often fuelled by Jaguar’s own PR efforts. Such considerations included 
the US listing o f  the shares, and various announcements regarding sales and production 
figures. The lack o f  understanding o f  motor manufacturing by UK analysts and investors 
prevented any real challenge to Jaguar’s PR obfuscation and hence failed to provide the 
basis for “V oice” to be exercised by investors. Indeed, there is no evidence o f  “V oice” 
being exercised by investors at any point, which is hardly surprising given that, the period 
immediately following the “Crash” being the notable exception, few  investors would 
have lost money as a result o f  their Jaguar holdings. The other major influence on the 
share price for much o f  the time before 1989 was fluctuations in the Sterling/US Dollar 
exchange rate.
Whilst “short-termism” undoubtedly was a feature in the market for Jaguar 
shares, there was little evidence o f  it having had a major impact on the share price. A lso  
there was no evidence o f  investors exercising the Hirschmanian option o f  “Exit”, at least 
until after 1987 when reality overtook perception, and Jaguar began to fail to realise City 
expectations. Consequently it was abandoned by many o f  its UK institutional investors, 
who sold their holdings, and from this tim e onwards there was an increasing cynicism  
towards Jaguar that became progressively more difficult for the company to counter, and 
which paved the w ay for the successful hostile bid by Ford.
During its period as a quoted company in the 1980s, Jaguar suffered 
significant periods o f  volatility in its share price, this being driven at varying points by 
fundamentals and market or investor sentiment. A s the above analysis has demonstrated, 
the Sterling/ US Dollar relationship was an important influence on the Jaguar share price 
during periods when fundamentals were asserted. However, sentiment played a far
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greater role in determining Jaguar’s fate, and here much o f  the problem o f  a lack o f  
support from stockbrokers and investors may be attributed, as related above, to Jaguar’s 
lack o f  understanding o f  the City, and its consequent inadequate level o f  communication 
with the City audience.
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CONCLUSION
MAIN FINDINGS
In the Introduction, the aim s o f  this thesis, and the m ain research issues, were defined, 
and the conclusions stated b elow  relate to each o f  these.
1. What was the nature of the Jaguar company under Egan’s management? Does the 
conventional view of it as a revitalised modem company, which encountered difficulties due to 
factors beyond its control, have a basis in fact, or is this illusion created by Jaguar’s remarkable 
public relations effort?
The evidence presented in this thesis g ives strong support to the prem ise that the 
image o f  Jaguar as a rejuvenated and efficient com pany w hich, under the direction o f  
enlightened entrepreneurial m anagem ent, had resolved its quality problem s was to a 
large extent an illusion created and m aintained by Jaguar’s well-orchestrated public 
relations effort. H ow ever, it is arguable as to whether, in the early 1980s, Jaguar had 
much choice, g iven  the problem s facing it and the lim ited resources available to it, to 
pursue any marketing strategy other than that founded on public relations, and this, as 
has been shown, w as the essential elem ent in  rebuilding and maintaining dealer and 
customer confidence, and hence sales and profitability. The illusion created was 
further aided by the im pact o f  favourable currency exchange rates in the first h a lf o f  
the 1980s w hich propelled Jaguar’s profits to record levels, currency contributing 
some £80m illion o f  Jaguar’s peak pre-tax profits o f  £121 m illion  in 1985.
A s has been dem onstrated, Jaguar’s public relations efforts successfully  
concealed Jaguar’s failure to address m any o f  the problem s it had inherited from BL, 
and which had g iven  the British m otor industry such a poor reputation. Such 
problems, w hich included the effects o f  antiquated manufacturing plant, poor 
manufacturing system s and discipline, ineffectual production management, and 
detrimental and outm oded work practices, rem ained basically  unresolved under the 
Egan management. Jaguar’s failure to tackle the issue o f  w orking practices, and other 
production issues, resulted in it being able to achieve increased production only  
through the tim e-honoured m ethod o f  em ploying m ore people, and thereby sacrificing 
its well-publicised productivity targets. H ow ever, the public relations-driven
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perception that Jaguar w as now  free o f  many o f  these problem s w as an important 
element in restoring and maintaining dealer and custom er confidence, and thus 
enhancing Jaguar’s sales performance, and profitability.
M uch w as also made o f  the abilities and success o f  Jaguar’s management, 
particularly in regard to Egan who, in the conventional v iew  o f  the company, was 
credited with personally restoring the com pany’s fortunes in the early 1980s. A s the 
evidence m akes clear, there w as m uch truth in this v iew  although Egan’s leadership 
abilities became greatly exaggerated by Jaguar’s h ighly-effective PR campaign, much 
o f  which was devoted to prom oting Egan him self. H ow ever, the success o f  the PR 
campaign appears to have had a detrimental effect on Egan, with him  starting to 
believe more the illusion created about Jaguar, and him self, rather than the reality, 
something w hich considerably dim inished his m anagement and leadership skills. 
Egan was credited w ith changing the focus o f  Jaguar’s management effort but, as has 
been shown, the portrayal o f  Jaguar as a m arketing-led organisation also was more 
illusion than reality. Jaguar, and Egan in particular, concentrated on PR aspects, with 
little attention apparently being given  to market research and analysis, and market- 
based product planning and developm ent. Consequently, Jaguar, despite making 
significant advances in its distribution in  a number o f  markets, remained a production- 
led company.
Finally, this thesis has show n that the conventional v iew  o f  Egan’s 
management team  as being h ighly effective, experienced executives, who operated as 
a cohesive unit ow ed m ore to illusion  than to reality. Indeed, m ost o f  Egan’s 
department heads appear to have been lacking in  both ability and experience, with  
some being prepared, w ith the benefit o f  hindsight, to admit to their own  
shortcomings. M oreover, there appears to have been little effective co-ordination and 
control o f  the com pany’s activities, Egan allow ing m any o f  Jaguar’s functional 
departments to be run as personal fiefdom s. A s has been noted in this thesis, it was 
only in 1989, in the light o f  a dramatic downturn in profits, that Egan admitted that 
Jaguar’s management, once heralded as a m odel o f  successful British management, 
could “better m anage” the business.
2. What were the problems impacting on Jaguar’s performance in the 1980s under the Egan 
management, and were these the principal causes of Jaguar’s considerable difficulties in the 
second half of that decade? Was the failure to recognise and resolve the various problems a
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result of management delusion, exacerbated by its initial success in turning round the 
company?
The evidence presented in this thesis has demonstrated that the prime reason for the 
dramatic downturn in Jaguar’s fortunes after 1986 w as the poor quality and reliability  
o f  Jaguar’s new  m odel, the X J40, w hich resulted in a considerable decline in sales in 
the important U S market. Testim ony for this is provided by both anecdotal evidence, 
and by the dramatic increase in warranty costs show n in Table 8.1 above. This 
problem was cleverly hidden from the m edia by Jaguar’s public relations efforts and 
there was general acceptance o f  the Jaguar version o f  the problem  resulting from the 
strength o f  Sterling and the low er demand for luxury cars in the U S market, factors 
over which Jaguar could exert no control. Underlying the quality problem, which  
existed when Lyons controlled the com pany, and w as never resolved at that time, 
were a plethora o f  contributory factors, m any o f  w hich  also originated from the time 
o f  the Lyons autocracy, but w hich, as W hisler has revealed, were com m on to the 
indigenous British motor industry.
A s has been revealed in  this thesis, w hilst the quality and reliability 
problems resulted from deficiencies across all aspects o f  the Jaguar operation, the 
fundamental problem lay w ith Jaguar’s ow n product engineering department. Under 
the Egan management, engineering w as permitted to operate in autonom ous isolation, 
with no management checks and controls to ensure that it was doing what it should 
have been doing, w ith the resultant problem s not being recognised within Jaguar until 
after the launch o f  the X J40 in the U S A  in 1987. The evidence indicates that many o f  
the XJ40 quality issues w ere the product o f  design faults, resulting from inadequate 
engineering resources, and w eaknesses in engineering capability. These could not be 
easily fixed, and som e rem ained unresolved. The quality problem w as also impacted 
by the almost non-existent level o f  com m unication betw een Jaguar’s engineering  
function and its manufacturing operation, w ith the product engineers designing cars 
with little or no consideration for h ow  they w ould be built, resulting in numerous 
product quality defects, and consequent redesign, rectification, and retooling. 
Moreover, Jaguar’s antiquated production facilities, in  terms o f  both plant and 
equipment, suffered deficien cies in regard to manufacturing system s, discipline, and 
production management, and from  outm oded working practices, thereby contributing 
to the quality problem. U ndoubtedly, Egan, w ho w as personally deficient in vehicle
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engineering and manufacturing experience, must shoulder m uch o f  the blam e for this 
situation, failing to recognise and address the w eaknesses in Jaguar’s manufacturing 
and engineering functions. The consequent continuance o f  this situation served to 
exacerbate the underlying problems as production increased. In particular, Egan 
appeared to be afraid that attempts to reform outmoded and restrictive working 
practices w ould jeopardise production in a period o f  rising demand, and thereby 
damage the com pany’s prospects. Accordingly, Jaguar’s quality problems were not 
resolved to any great extent during the period o f  the Egan management.
Egan had recognised, shortly after he joined Jaguar, that quality problems 
were a major issue, and set about resolving these. W hilst he achieved som e success in 
improving the quality o f  the Series III m odel, at least to a level sufficient to convince 
people that Jaguar’s quality actually had improved significantly, Egan appears to have 
convinced h im self that he had resolved all the Series III quality problems, which  
seem ed to be confirm ed by the significant increase in sales achieved by Jaguar after 
1981. However, Jaguar’s rapid and spectacular recovery in the period 1980 to 1983 
resulted in the Jaguar m anagement, as a w hole, and in terms o f  its individual 
members, becom ing increasingly arrogant, refusing to acknow ledge or see Jaguar’s 
deep-rooted problem s. In particular, as the evidence has shown, Egan became 
increasingly prone to b elieve his ow n PR statements, and tended to lose touch with  
reality, suffering considerable delusion in regard to Jaguar’s manufacturing 
operations, the quality o f  its products, and the prospects for the company.
A bove all, Jaguar’s recovery and growth in the period to 1986 resulted in 
Egan deluding h im se lf that Jaguar could remain a totally independent car company 
that could becom e the “English BM W ”, that the luxury car market w ould support 
Jaguar’s growth aspirations, and that Jaguar had nothing to fear from the entry o f  the 
Japanese into the luxury car market. M oreover, Egan suffered the delusion that Jaguar 
had the resources, and could generate sufficient cash, to achieve his aspirations. A s a 
result, Egan refused to consider raising additional funds from external sources such as 
City investors through a R ights Issue. A lthough Jaguar had done much to improve its 
engineering capability, especially  through the opening o f  W hitley, but not its 
engineering-manufacturing interface, this appears to have been at the expense o f  
modernizing its assem bly operations w hich remained highly labour-intensive.
M oreover, in an era w hen motor vehicles were becom ing increasingly  
sophisticated in terms o f  both passenger comfort and technology, m odel developm ent
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required significant amounts o f  investm ent, in  addition to expenditure on m odem  
plant and equipment. This w as dem onstrated by Ford w ho, in the four years follow ing  
its $2.6billion acquisition o f  the com pany, invested another $2billion  in Jaguar to 
enable it to achieve international com petitiveness w ith the likes o f  BM W .
3. Did Jaguar’s failure in the 1980s reflect lost opportunities?
There were various opportunities available to the Jaguar m anagem ent in the 1980s for 
improving or developing the business, any o f  w h ich  m ight have changed the outcome 
o f  the story, but w hich were not adopted, and to catalogue these w ould not in itse lf  
serve any useful purpose. For exam ple, it m ight be argued that Jaguar could have 
done more to address the w eaknesses o f  its engineering and manufacturing operations, 
and the failure to have done so w as a lost opportunity. H ow ever, tw o particular 
opportunities which were spum ed or rejected by the Jaguar m anagem ent are worth 
noting, since the adoption o f  either w ou ld  have been likely  to have had a marked 
impact on the future direction o f  the business.
First, the opportunity presented to Jaguar to acquire the Land Rover 
company, thereby, in Putnam ’s v iew  (noted in Sub-Section 4 .3 .4  above), giving  
Jaguar critical m ass, particularly in terms o f  distribution, and probably in terms o f  
purchasing power. The acquisition o f  Land Rover could have resulted in a lowering o f  
the overall cost base as functions were m erged and, also, it w ould  have assisted Jaguar 
considerably in overcom ing the w eaknesses in  its engineering function. Paradoxically, 
however, it was major opposition to the m erger com ing from Jaguar’s Engineering 
Director that led to the Land R over opportunity being rejected. A s  has been noted, 
Ford acquired both Jaguar and Land R over and, in  effect, m erged the two operations, 
later selling them  as a package to Tata M otors in 2008.
Second, Jaguar’s m anagem ent refused to take advantage o f  the 
opportunities afforded it by its position as a publicly quoted com pany. A s has been  
demonstrated, Egan w as aware that a considerable amount o f  cash w as required to 
fund Jaguar’s future developm ent, but refused to use its listing to raise cash through a 
Rights Issue. It is also som ew hat remarkable that Jaguar, unlike m any ambitious, 
expanding, com panies in the 1980s, took no advantage o f  its listing to make 
acquisitions, unlike L yons in  the 1960s. Indeed, the listing o f  its shares in the U S A  on  
the N A SD A Q  system  in N ovem ber 1985 had little purpose other than that o f
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promoting the Jaguar brand nam e. Such failure to make use o f  its listing to raise funds 
for capital investm ent and to m ake acquisitions m ay certainly be regarded as a lost 
opportunity.
MAJOR LIM ITATIONS OF THE A N A L Y SIS
In any research project the major lim itations are likely to be those o f  the nature and 
availability o f  source material, and the constraints im posed by the shortage o f  time 
and other inhibiting factors. Consequently, few  studies o f  this type are as 
comprehensive in their coverage o f  the subject as m ight be desired, and this project, 
unfortunately, is no exception.
A s has been m ade clear, the refusal o f  Ford to a llow  access to the Jaguar 
corporate archives o f  the period prevented possib le  quantification o f  anecdotal, and 
other, evidence regarding, for exam ple, production lost through industrial disputes, 
and any internal com m entary on such disputes, and thus com parison with other 
companies in the industry. Such archival material m ight also have provided  
additional, and significant, insights into, and enabled som e quantification of, the 
quality problems suffered by Jaguar, and provided evidence to support or refute the 
findings o f  this thesis that delusion and illusion  played a significant part in the Jaguar 
story in the 1980s. W hilst considerable useful inform ation has been obtained from  
personal recollection, its reliability and validity has to be set against the caveats  
usually appertaining in regard to such sources, and w hich were described in Sub- 
Sections 2.2.2 and 2 .2 .3  o f  this thesis. Furthermore, g iven that this study w as aimed at 
a business, rather than a social, history o f  Jaguar, interview s were largely restricted to 
those who could provide a broader, but fairly detailed, perspective o f  Jaguar, m ainly  
executives o f  Jaguar or other com panies, w ith the only shop floor perspective 
provided by a former senior shop steward at Brow ns Lane.
A s w ith all studies o f  this type, the research effort w as constricted by time 
considerations, and the com parative narrowness o f  the subject matter o f  the thesis, 
focus being directed, o f  necessity , onto those areas m ost germane to the defined aims 
o f the study. Thus, although detailed com parisons w ith other m otor manufacturers o f  
the period, particularly B M W  and M ercedes, m ight have been desirable, the amount 
o f effort required in attem pting to access, and research, such archival sources might 
well have proved counterproductive. In any case, it is difficult to attempt comparisons
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with other U K  motor manufacturing companies given the uniqueness o f  Jaguar in 
terms o f  its size, and its products. Consequently, this study sought, and has presented, 
evidence that related to the specific issues and their analysis, but even then allowance  
had to be made for the dearth o f  archival material. For exam ple, both BM W  and 
M ercedes proved unhelpful in regard to providing 1980s sales figures for m odels that 
competed with Jaguar at this tim e, claim ing that this information w as not held by 
them, although BM W  w as happy to provide overall sales figures, and 7 Series 
production figures.
AREAS FOR FURTH ER RESEARCH
This thesis has sought to provide a com prehensive study o f  the problems suffered by 
Jaguar during the 1980s and the reasons w hy the company, under the Egan 
management, failed to resolve these. This is the first academic study to have focused  
on Jaguar and, other than W hisler’s work on BL, is the only study o f  a British motor 
company to have highlighted the issues o f  quality problems and pervasive weaknesses 
in the engineering function. This therefore presents possibilities for research into other 
British motor com panies to ascertain i f  the findings o f  this thesis, and those o f  
W hisler, m ight be further supported, or undermined. In particular, studies o f  Ford UK  
and Vauxhall, both Am erican ow ned and managed companies, w ould demonstrate 
whether such problem s, particularly in regard to the engineering function, which  
adversely impacted the performance o f  BL and Jaguar, were industry-wide in the UK, 
and i f  not, as appears to be the case by the tim e Ford acquired Jaguar, how  they had 
been successfully  challenged and reformed. Little is generally known about the 
quality issues at Ford, although som e indications have been provided en passan t in 
this study. Similarly, little is know n o f  the engineering function, or quality issues, at 
Vauxhall, H olden’s book on that com pany providing little or no illumination on these 
subjects. M oreover, the findings o f  this thesis could be tested against the international 
experience, exploring whether an absence o f  ingrained attitudes were major factors in 
the success and growth o f  BM W , M ercedes, and, later, Lexus, in the period 1970 to 
1990 and beyond. Further research into Jaguar itself, follow ing the Ford takeover, 
would also be relevant since there is the issue o f  why Jaguar again experienced  
considerable financial d ifficu lties after 2000, despite the fact that Ford had 
successfully challenged ingrained attitudes and reformed bad work practices at
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Jaguar, and had invested considerable sum s in plant m odernization a n d  research and 
development.
358
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Newspapers and Periodicals 
Automotive N ew s  1980-1990  
The Economist 1980-1990  
Financial Times 1982-1994
Miscellaneous UK  National Newspapers and M agazines, 1980 to 1994.
M otoring Which? 1962-1972  
Archival Sources
Society o f  Motor Manufacturers and Traders, Autom otive Data Services Records. 
Companies House: Jaguar Annual Accounts 1989 to 1992.
Official Publications
Bank o f  England Quarterly Inflation Report, February 2009.
Cadbury, Sir Adrian (Chairman). The R eport o f  the Committee on the Financial Aspects
o f  Corporate Governance. (London, 1992).
Central Policy R eview  Staff. The Future o f  the British C ar Industry. (London, 1975)
“Motor Vehicle Industry. Fourteenth Report, with Evidence taken before the Trade and 
Industry Sub-Committee, and Appendices. 6 August 1975”. Parliam entary Papers. 1974- 
75. vol XX V (617)
Office for National Statistics. Share O wnership  (London, June 2001).
Society o f  Motor Manufacturers and Traders. The M otor Industry o f  G reat Britain. 
Various Years 1950 to 1990.
“Trade and Industry Select Committee. BL pic. Third Report, together with the 
proceedings o f  the Committee relating to the Report and the Minutes o f  Evidence”. 
Parliamentary Papers. 1983-84. vol XL (H C  490)
359
“Trade and Industry Select Committee. BL pic. Fourth Special Report. 30 July 1984” 
Parliam entary Papers. 1983-84. vol XLVI (HC 607)
“Trade and Industry Select Committee. BL pic. Minutes o f  Evidence. 24 July 1985” 
Parliam entary Papers. 1984-85. vol XXII (HC 569)
“Trade and Industry Select Committee. UK Motor Components Industry. Minutes o f  
Evidence. 27 Novem ber 1985”. Parliam entary Papers. 1985/86. vol XIX (H C 91-i) 
“Trade and Industry Select Committee. UK  Motor Components Industry. Minutes o f  
Evidence. 15 June 1986”. Parliam entary Papers. 1985/86. vol XIX (H C  91-ii)
“Trade and Industry Select Committee. Motor Components Industry. Trade and Industry 
Select Committee third report, with proceedings, evidence and appendices (Evidence 
previously HC 143 i-xii 1986/87)”. Parliam entary Papers. 1986-87. vol X  (HC 407)
“Trade and Industry Select Committee. The UK Motor Components Industry: 
supplementary report. First report from the Trade and Industry Select Committee, with 
appendix (Government’s response to the Committee’s third report o f  session 1986/87 
(HC 407) ) and proceedings”. Parliam entary Papers. 1987-88. vol XIV (H C  316)
“Trade and Industry Select Committee: Special Shares and the Department o f  Trade and 
Industry. Minutes o f  Evidence 13 December 1989 (Printed with HC 617-i 1988/89)”. 
Parliam entary Papers. 1989-90. vol XIV (H C  90-i).
Jaguar/BL Publications.
“Jaguar pic. Offer for Sale by Hill Samuel &Co. Limited on behalf o f  BLMC Limited”. 
(Issued July 1984)
Jaguar Annual Reports and Accounts, 1984 to 1992.
Jaguar Information Pack - XJ6 (XJ40) Launch, 1986.
Jaguar Press Releases, 1984 to 1989.
Secondary Sources
Books
Adeney, Martin. The M otor M akers. The Turbulent H istory o f  B rita in ’s  C ar Industry. 
(London, 1988).
Bhaskar, K N e /  al. Jaguar: An Investor's Guide. (University o f  East Anglia, 1984). 
Boddy, David. M anagement. An Introduction. Third Edition. (Harlow, 2005).
360
Bowen, David. Shaking the Iron Universe. British Industry in the 1980s. (London, 1990).
Bower, Tom. The Paym aster. G eoffrey Robinson, M axwell an d  N ew  Labour.
(London, 2001).
Carr, Christopher. B rita in ’s  C om petitiveness: the M anagement o f  the Vehicle 
Com ponents Industry. (London, 1990).
Caves, Richard E, and Krause, Lawrence (eds) B rita in ’s  Econom ic Perform ance  
(W ashington DC, 1980).
Chick, Martin (ed). Governm ents, Industries an d  M arkets (Aldershot, 1990).
Church, Roy. The rise an d  decline o f  the British m otor industry. (Cambridge, 1994).
Collins, Paul, and Stratton, M ichael. B ritish  car fa c to ries  from  1896: a  com plete  
historical, geographical, arch itectural & technological survey  
(Godmanstone, 1993).
Daniels, Jeff. British Leyland: The Truth B ehind the C ars  (London, 1980).
Daniels, Jeff. Jaguar. The Engineering Story. (Y eovil, 2004).
Dawson, Chester. Lexus: The R elentless Pursuit. (Chichester, 2004).
Dimsdale, N icholas, and Prevezer, Martha (eds). C apita l M arkets an d  Corporate
Governance. (Oxford, 1994)
Dugdale, John. Jaguar in A m erica. (O tego, N ew  York, 1993).
Dunlop, A lex (ed). C orporate G overnance an d  Control. (London, 1998).
Dunnett, Peter. The D ecline o f  the British M otor Industry. The Effects o f  Government 
Policy, 1945-1979. (London, 1980).
Dymock, Eric. The Jaguar File  (Sutton V em y, 1998).
Edwardes, Michael. Back fro m  the Brink. A n  A pocalyptic  Experience  (London, 1983).
Elbaum, Bernard and Lazonick, W illiam  (ed s) The Decline o f  the British Economy
(Oxford, 1986).
Foreman-Peck, James, Bow den, Sue, and M cK inlay, Alan. The British M otor Industry.
(Manchester, 1995).
361
Gaved, Matthew. C losing the Communications Gap: D isclosure an d  Institutional 
Shareholders. (London, 1997)
Gaved, Matthew. Ownership an d  Influence. (London, 1994).
Golding, Tony. The City: inside the g rea t expectation machine (London, 2003).
Griffiths, Ian. Creative Accounting  (London, 1986).
Halberstam, David. The Reckoning  (London, 1987).
Harvey, Chris. G reat M arques. Jaguar  (London, 1982).
Henry, Anthony. Understanding S trategic M anagem ent (Oxford, 2008).
Hirschman, A.O. Exit, Voice a n d  Loyalty. R esponses to D ecline in Firms, Organisations 
and States. (Cambridge, M ass., 1970)
Holden, Len. Vauxhall M otors and the Luton Economy, 1900-2002. (Woodbridge, 2003).
Iacocca, Lee. Iococca. An A utobiography. (N ew  York, 1984)
Johnson, Peter (ed). The Structure o f  British Industry. (London, 1988)
Keller, Maryann. Rude Awakening. The Rise, Fall, and  Struggle f o r  R ecovery o f  General 
M otors. (N ew  York , 1989)
King, Peter. The M otor Men. P ioneers o f  the British C ar Industry. (London, 1989).
Long, Brian. The M arques o f  Coventry. A H istory o f  the C ity ’s  M otor Industry.
(Exeter, 1990).
Long, Brian. Jaguar XJ-S. The Full S tory o f  J a g u a r’s  G rand Tourer. (Dorchester, 2000).
Lorenz, Andrew. A Fighting Chance. The reviva l andfuture o f  British manufacturing 
industry. (London, 1989).
Lewchuk, Wayne. Am erican technology an d  the British vehicle industry 
(Cambridge, 1987).
Parkinson, John, Gamble, Andrew, and K elly, Gavin (eds). The P olitica l Economy o f  the
Com pany. (Oxford — Portland, 2000).
Pendlebury, Maurice and Groves, Roger. Com pany Accounts. Analysis, Interpretation
and  Understanding. (London, 1994).
362
Political and Econom ic Planning. M otor Vehicles: A R eport on the Industry.
(London, 1950).
Porter, Philip. Jaguar. The Com plete Illu stra ted  H istory. Third Edition. (Y eovil, 1995).
Rhys, D G. The M otor Industry. An Econom ic Survey. (London, 1972).
Robson, Graham and Langworth, Richard. Triumph Cars. The Com plete Story. Second
Edition. (Croydon, 1988).
Rodger, Leslie W. M arketing in a  C om petitive Economy. Third Edition. (London, 1971).
Smith, Terry. Accounting f o r  G row th  (London, 1992).
Thoms, David, and Donnelly, Tom. The C oventry M otor Industry : Birth to  Renaissance?
Second Edition (Aldershot, 2000).
Thompson, Paul. The Voice o f  the Past. O ra l H istory. Third Edition. (Oxford, 2000).
Tosh, John with Lang, Sean. The Pursu it o f  H istory. Aims, m ethods an d  new directions in
the stu dy o f  m odem  history. Fourth Edition. (Harlow, 2006).
Thorley, N igel. Jaguar. The Com plete Works. (Bideford, 1996).
Thorley, N igel. Jaguar in Coventry. Building the Legend. (Derby, 2002).
Thorley, N igel. Jaguar XJ40. Buying, enjoying, modifying. (Y eovil, 2002).
Turner, Graham. The L eylan d P apers. Second Edition. (London, 1973).
Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan a n d  Jaguar. (London, 1989).
Westall, Andrea (ed). C om petitiveness an d  C orporate Governance. (London, 1996).
Whipp, Richard and Clark, Peter. Innovation a n d  the Auto Industry. (London, 1986).
Whyte, Andrew. Jaguar. The definitive h istory o f  a  g rea t British car. Second Edition. 
(W ellingborough, 1985).
Williams, Karel; W illiams, John; Thomas, Dennis. Why are the British B a d  a t
M anufacturing?  (London, 1983).
Williams, Karel; W illiam s, John; Haslam, Colin. The Breakdown o f  Austin Rover: a  case  
study in the fa ilu re o f  business s tra tegy  a n d  industrial policy. (Leamington Spa, 1987).
363
Williams, Karel; Haslam, Colin; W illiams, John; Johal, Sukhdev; with Adcroft, Andy.
Cars. Analysis, History, Cases. (Providence, 1994).
Willman, Paul and Winch, Graham. Innovation and M anagement Control. Labour
Relations a t BL Cars. (Cambridge, 1985).
Wilmshurst, John. The Fundamentals and Practice o f  Marketing. (London, 1978).
Whisler, Timothy R. A t the E nd o f  the Road. The R ise and Fall ofAustin-H ealey, MG, 
an d  Triumph Sports Cars. (Greenwich and London, 1995).
Whisler, Timothy R. The British M otor Industry 1945-1994. A Case Study in Industrial 
Decline. (Oxford, 1999).
Womack, James P, Jones, Daniel T, & R oos, Daniel. The M achine That Changed The
W orld (N ew  York, 1990).
Wood, Jonathan. Wheels o f  M isfortune: The Rise an d  F all o f  the British M otor Industry 
(London, 1988).
Unpublished Dissertations
Beattie, Richard J., The U K  M otor Industry an d  Governm ent Industrial Policy, 1979  
-1989. Unpublished M Sc thesis. University o f  Manchester, 1990.
Holden, L.T., A H istory o f  Vauxhall M otors to  1950. Industrial Developm ent and  
Im pact on the Luton Economy. Unpublished MPhil thesis. The Open 
University, 1983.
Whisler, Timothy R., N iche Products in the British M otor Industry: A H istory o f  M G and  
Triumph Sports Cars, 1945-1981. Unpublished PhD thesis. London, 
London School o f  Econom ics, 1991.
Wynn-Williams, M ichael S., A Role f o r  International Vertical Joint Ventures Within An
A utom obile Industry Paradigm . Unpublished PhD thesis. 
Cardiff University, October 2007.
Journals and M agazines
Dale, Michael. “H ow  w e rebuilt Jaguar in the U S”. Fortune. 28 April 1986
Foreman-Peck, James. “R eview  o f  A t the End o f  the Road. The Rise and Fall o f  Austin-
H ealey, M G, and Triumph Sports Cars by Timothy R. W hisler”. 
The Journal o f  Econom ic H istory. Volume 56, Number 4 
(Decem ber 1996). pp939-940.
364
Maccoby, Michael. “Narcissistic Leaders. The Incredible Pros, The Inevitable Cons”.
H avard  Business Review . 78(1). January-February 2000.
Learned Papers
Booth, Alan. “The manufacturing failure hypothesis and the performance o f  British
industry during the long boom ” in Econom ic H istory R eview , Volume 56, 
Number 1 (February 2003). p p l-33 .
Bowden, Sue, Foreman-Peck, James, and Richardson, Tom. “The Post-war Productivity 
Failure: Insights from Oxford (C ow ley)”. M iddlesex U niversity Business 
School D iscussion P aper N o 85. June, 2000.
Broadberry, Stephen and Crafts, N icholas. “UK productivity performance from 1950 to 
1979: a restatement o f  the Broadberry-Crafts v iew ” in Economic H istory  
Review, Volum e 56, Number 4 (November 2003). pp718-735
Church, Roy. “Deconstructing Nuffield: The Evolution o f  Managerial Culture in the 
British Motor Industry” in The Econom ic H istory Review, N ew  Series , 
Volum e 49, N o  3 (August 1996). pp561-583.
Cosh, Andy, Hughes, Alan, Singh, Ajit, Carty, James, and Plender, John. “Takeovers and
Short-termism in the UK ”. Institute fo r  Public Policy Research. 
Industrial P o licy  P aper N um ber 3. (London, 1990)
Dedman, Elisabeth. “The Cadbury Committee recommendations on corporate
governance -  a review o f  compliance and performance impacts” in 
International Journal o f  M anagem ent R eview s, Volume 4, Issue 4 
(Decem ber 2002). pp335-352.
Dellheim, Charles. “The Historian and Corporate Culture” in The Public H istorian , 
Volum e 8, Number 2 (Spring 1986). pp9-22.
Evans, Steve, Ewing, Keith, and Nolan, Peter. “Industrial Relations and the British 
Econom y in the 1990s: Mrs Thatcher’s Legacy” in Journal o f  
M anagem ent S tudies , Volum e 29, Number 5 (September 1992). 
p p 571-589.
Foreman-Peck, James. “Exit, V oice and Loyalty as Responses to Decline: The Rover
Company in the Inter-War Years” in Business H istory , Volume 
23, Number 2 (July 1981). ppl91-207.
Goodman, John. “Industrial relations and restructuring in manufacturing: Three case 
studies in the United Kingdom” in International Labour Review , 
Volum e 128, Number 5 (1989). pp601-620.
365
Lloyd-Jones, Roger, Maltby, Josephine, Lewis, M.J., and M atthews, Mark. “Corporate 
Governance in a Major British Holding Company: B SA  in the 
Interwar Years” in Accounting, Business & Financial H istory , 
Volum e 16, Number 1 (March 2006). pp69-90.
Randle, J N . “The D esign and Developm ent o f  a N ew  Luxury Sector Autom obile” in The 
Jaguar X J40 Project. P apers presen ted  a t a  sem inar sponsored  by The 
Autom otive D ivision o f  The Institution o f  M echanical Engineers. (London, 
1986).
Rhys, D.G. “The European Motor Industry -  A  Future o f  Change”. P aper p resen ted  to 
the M anchester S ta tistica l Society  (Manchester, March 1986).
Salama, Alzira. “The use o f  an organisation’s biography as a research method” in
M anagem ent Education and D evelopm ent, Volum e 23, Issue 3 (Autumn 
1992). pp225-233.
Shackleton, J. R. “Industrial Relations Reform in Britain since 1979” in Journal o f  Labor 
R esearch , Volum e XIX, Number 3 (Summer 1998). pp 581-605.
Stephens, N eil. “Collecting Data from Elites and Ultra Elites: Telephone and Face-to-
Face Interviews with M acroeconom ists” in Qualitative Research. Volume 
7, Number 2. M ay 2007. pp203-216.
Whipp, Richard, Rosenfield, Robert, and Pettigrew, Andrew. “Culture and
Competitiveness: Evidence from Two Mature UK  Industries” in Journal o f  
M anagem ent Studies. Volum e 26, Number 6. Novem ber 1989. pp561-585.
Websites
Bryman, Alan E. Triangulation.
http://www.referenceworld.com/sage/socialscience/triangulation.pdf. Accessed  
22 December 2008
M iscellaneous
Blackrod Limited. Jaguar ‘Risk an d  O pportun ity’. (London, 1984) [VHS Video]
366
APPENDIX
This Appendix contains the transcripts o f  the taped interviews conducted for this study, 
edited in regard to grammar and syntax, the translation from the spoken to the written 
word, and in respect o f  those comm ents that interviewees asked be treated as being “o ff  
the record”. Where interviewees gave a particular emphasis or reaction, this is conveyed  
in the transcript by exclam ation marks, or by m eans o f  underlining.
Footnotes are used to provide background on individuals mentioned by interviewees, 
to explain, or elaborate on, events, technical terms mentioned, and comments made, and 
also to provide, where appropriate or feasible, supporting or contradictory evidence 
obtained through the technique o f  triangulation.
Many o f  the interviews were com m enced or carried out prior to the recent requirements 
to obtain formal research ethics approval for conducting interviews. To demonstrate that 
the author has com plied with ethical considerations regarding the recording o f  interviews, 
and the use o f  material thus obtained, retrospective permissions in respect o f  some o f  the 
later interviews are included at the end o f  this Appendix.
List of Interview Transcripts
INTERVIEWEE PAGES
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Transcript of the interview with Bob Ainsworth on 16th October 2003 
What was your background with Jaguar?
I became a senior shop steward at almost exactly the same time that John Egan took over 
at Jaguar, so I never participated in the dispute at that time. When Egan arrived he called 
a meeting with the shop stewards. I think it w as Browns Lane and Radford that 
participated, not Castle Brom wich.1 Egan told us how  he thought h e’d turn Jaguar into a 
first class company, paying the top w ages etc, and ended by banging the table and asking 
“Are you with me?” The shop stewards were stunned. The senior shop steward said 
“You’ll have to forgive us i f  you haven’t got the response you want, but w e ’ve been here 
a long time and w e ’ve  heard it all before”. Egan literally withered before the onslaught. 
Egan didn’t know what he was talking about with regard to cars. It w as all superficial 
with him. He was superb at presentation, but not as far as follow ing up was concerned. A  
lot o f  the change w as superficial. The plant ran in exactly the same way: all about 
numbers. About four tim es a day you reported to W ally2 regarding the numbers.
Egan thought w e were a load o f  B olshies. He genuinely thought w e’d go out on strike 
against the privatisation, but our guys hated being part o f  BL, so a strike was a complete 
delusion. What w e got in share options was an awful lot more than w e expected. Egan 
bought us off. We deliberately decided to trail our coats and maintain his fears. We knew  
that we couldn’t do anything about the privatisation, but we got the price up. I’m 
convinced that he deliberately ramped up the share price by making out it was worth a lot 
more.3 He knew that the Golden Share would only last five years. I think the XJ41 was 
part o f  the hyping up.
When Ford came in, Hayden4 just took a grip, and he was astonishing. He knew what he 
was talking about. With Egan it w as all PR. He used to walk around the factory, showing 
himself, playing at being Chairman. I w as enormously impressed with Hayden. He ran 
the company on quality. H e actually went and sat in on the quality control meetings and 
with the car inspections. The dealers felt that they had really been bullshitted that there 
had been a turnaround in quality. The Ford management had to counter that.
The plant had never been managed properly since Bill Lyons, who was a real skinflint, 
had left. Lyons had managed it on a shoestring. It was a classic case study. H is successors 
didn’t have the skills to run the plant. We didn’t know how  to build cars. Egan was 
heavily into Dem ing,5 but it was done in a superficial way. Egan allowed a group to go to 
Japan in the autumn o f  1983, and I was one o f  them. W e all saw things there that we
1 The Castle Bromwich plant was not part o f Egan’s remit at that time (April 1980) but became part of the 
Jaguar operation in August 1980.
2 Wally Turner, Browns Lane plant director, reporting to Mike Beasley, Manufacturing Director
3 This comment relates to the Jaguar share price in 1989, ahead of, and at the time of, the Ford bid.
4 Bill Hayden CBE, Ford Motor Company Vice President, and Chairman of Jaguar from March 1990 to 
March 1992.
5 Deming’s systems for improving quality control and productivity had been widely adopted by the 
Japanese who regarded Deming as a guru. (Halberstam. The Reckoning. (London, 1987). p311-18)
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couldn’t believe. We couldn’t, for example, understand the Kanban system .6 So that was 
a good thing; it was a glim pse on how it would have to be.
The management system w as dysfunctional. Nobody listened to those actually doing the 
job. In the end people on the shop floor lost interest. Everybody knew that a car would be 
stripped down at the end o f  the line and repainted. I think something w as done about it 
during the Egan years, something they called “consolidation”. They m odified  the layout. 
But effectively w e built system s on top o f  system s.
What were the problems with production?
The normal way for a car to be built at Jaguar was: body came in from C astle Bromwich, 
went down the main assem bly lines, went into the rectification line, w as invariably 
stripped down, then it w ent to road test, which not only road tested it but often stripped it 
down and rectified it again. Then it went over into the paintshop to repair minor body-in- 
white defects, then it w ent onto the refit where often it was re-worked again, then onto 
the final line where it could be re-worked again. That is the w ay w e built cars. This was 
in the 1980s. Consolidation sorted out som e o f  it, but there was still an acceptance that 
right first time every tim e w asn’t in the ethos at all. This was the central change that 
Hayden made. First he had to break through the m assive cynicism  because w e ’d been 
told so many, many tim es that quality came before numbers. N obody believed  the 
management when they said that because repeatedly and continually that had simply not 
happened. You used to end up in situations where you w ould system atically find that if  
you got a really bad car on a final line the gaffers would push it off, push it to one side, 
push the next five cars back on, push it back onto the track again for the next shift. The 
next guy picks up the costs, the next guy picks up the fact that they’ve dropped a car. The 
whole factory was measured on numbers. H ow  many cars o ff  the final line, how many 
cars out o f  the rectification bay, how  many cars out o f  refit, how  many cars o f f  the main 
assembly line, how  many trim sets out o f  the trim shop. I f  you didn’t score your numbers 
you were in trouble. So you fiddled the quality system atically and the unions raised this 
again, and again, and again. The w hole quality system  was so inefficient.
The XJ40 was a lot simpler than the old car, but it never looked a Jag. That was the 
complaint that the dealers made. But the car before [Series III] was so bad that w e’d 
effectively been selling people second-hand cars. W e’d be repainting cars systematically  
and a few weeks later they w ould look as i f  they had just been repaired.
6 Foreman-Peck et al described the Kanban System thus: “Inputs [to each cell consisting o f  15 to 20 
workers] arrived in panniers that were colour coded complete with the ‘kanban’ or demand note raised by 
the factory on receipt of the order and translated into appropriate amounts o f materials available to each 
cell. Stock reductions worth millions o f pounds were claimed for the new system” (Foreman-Peck et al, 
The British Motor Industry. (Manchester, 1995). p242.)
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At what point in the hierarchy did management break down?
The people who knew what w as going on on the production line weren’t listened to.
There were layers and layers o f  management. In the 1970s when I started at Browns Lane 
the men were on piecework and it w as the shop stewards who got the line going again. 
When we m oved to flat rate nobody cared. There was a big strike at Jaguar in 1972 to 
keep the piecework system , but w e lost.7
What about Quality Circles?
We [the shop stewards] were worried about them. Egan was pretty anti-union, and we 
thought quality circles were a w ay o f  circumventing the unions. But Quality Circles were 
only a talking shop. It w as a case o f  going through the m otions. The fundamentals were 
that people did not believe the management were interested in quality. Egan got bored 
with quality circles. Egan w as into communication; he was fed up o f  communicating with 
the workforce through the unions and started comm unications m eetings, but he got bored 
with them and left them to other directors/managers to do. Som e people spoke out o f  turn 
at some o f  these m eetings and were warned o f f  by the foremen.
7 The Flat Rate (or Measured Day Work) system was imposed on Jaguar by BL. This is discussed in 
Section 3.7 in the main text.
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Transcript of the interview with Mike Beasley on 10th February 2003 
What was your background with Jaguar?
I started with Ford in trucks in the Thames Valley on the w est site at Langley, and I 
joined Jaguar originally in 1974 as a manufacturing engineer, which was my background, 
and spent som e time here in the days o f  Geoffrey Robinson. I found Geoffrey Robinson a 
fascinating boss. He was a great motivator, surprisingly loose on facts and data 
management, but that’s not terribly unusual for the time in the 1970s I think.8 Come the 
Ryder Report, I went to C ow ley for a w hile doing a BL job, a manufacturing engineering 
job, and came back to Jaguar, just ahead o f  Egan joining, as plant director o f  Browns 
Lane in 1979. When I first came here one o f  the first major tasks was to build a 
paintshop, an ill-fated paintshop. The paintshop had been started and after a while I 
looked at it and said “What’s the capacity w e want?”, and nobody really knew.
We had huge problems because the British Ley land solution was to leave the bodies in 
Castle Bromwich, which is where they were built, paint them at Castle Bromwich, and 
then ship painted bodies over to Browns Lane. Geoffrey Robinson’s plan was to expand 
Browns Lane to include paintshop initially and then later body-in-white, and we had a 
layout here as to how  it w as going to include body construction as w ell as paint, which 
was a much more sensible approach to trying to say i f  this company is going to be 
relatively small in current industry terms and a niche manufacturer then it made sense to 
try and concentrate on the 100, maybe 140, acres that were available at Browns Lane.
One o f  the things w e did when w e were looking at sizing it in John Egan’s time was to 
say what sort o f  size and scope were w e really looking for, and how were w e going to 
grow the company. One o f  the clear limitations was the address, Browns Lane, and the 
way to start trying to change that was to consider applying for an access at the back o f  the 
site. Thoughts were along those lines in days before Ford took over, but they weren’t firm 
plans. Once w e’d started to m ove the company forward and build and look at expansion, 
then many o f  those plans came up. Single assem bly line, for example, in Browns Lane 
had long been looked at and planned. In fact, there were plans existing when I first came 
to Jaguar for a single assem bly line. Those things got developed and were bom under 
Ford when cash availability, knowledge, and expertise came.
What were the main production problems in 1980?
The biggest issue w e  faced was paint. Sim ply an availability o f  painted product from 
Castle Bromwich. That was part o f  the old Pressed Steel Fisher side o f  the business and 
we had severe difficulty in terms o f  quality and volum e o f  painted product supplied from 
Castle Bromwich, and w e did a lot o f  work with them to try to overcome those problems. 
Some o f  those issues included trying to focus on just two or three colours for a few  
months in order to g ive them a chance to get into control and start supplying in better 
volume and better quality. W e originally had red, white, and yellow  as a way o f  just
8 Mike Dale was far more forthright in his views on Geoffrey Robinson, stating in an e-mail o f 5 August 
2008 to the author “From our point o f  view he was very bright, but totally out o f control. The only way 
he got work out of the unions was by promising them the earth, and the results were astonishingly bad 
both from a quality and a production angle”.
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starting and I’ve got som e pictures o f  Browns Lane full o f  red, white, and yellow  Jaguars. 
Well, it was intended for a few  months and it lasted rather a long time. It was just 
ridiculous. We weren’t able to overcom e the technical and the discipline problems to run 
the paintshop in Castle Bromwich for quite a long time. In fact, it w asn’t until John 
Egan’s time when w e actually took over Castle Bromwich that w e were able to work with 
the management there and get the place under control, and even that took quite a long 
time. Remember, Castle Bromwich was a plant that Michael Edwardes9 thought should 
close because it was unmanageable. And I think in size and scope and the way it had been 
managed, it probably w as unmanageable. What w e took over was a relatively small 
element o f  it. A  lot had been m oved out o f  it by then, and w e set about to try and get 
control and discipline into the plant. And it took us two or three years to do that.
What about Browns Lane, because there were obviously problems there?
We had lots o f  issues. Quality was poor. Quality standards were poor. Design levels were 
okay theoretically but when practically applied were not so good. And w e, and much o f  
the rest o f  the car industry in the UK, despite Dem ing, did not understand variability in 
those days. And it w asn’t until Ford came and drove in process management and we 
understood or started to truthfully understand variability in manufacture and what it 
meant, and I mean that not only in manufacturing but in engineering terms too, in design 
terms too, that w e started to really make huge strides on quality improvement. In the days 
under John Egan w e did not understand. W e had Dem ing, w e talked to Dem ing’s people, 
we used some o f  D em ing’s people in order to try to improve things. We recognised the 
need, and w e started to feel our way. John used to use the term “white stick”, for obvious 
reasons. We used to feel our way. W e started to try and feel our w ay to understand the 
issues; the root causes o f  the issues, rather than just look at the symptoms, and try and try 
and manage the symptoms. Som ething that’s second nature now, but wasn’t then. We 
were working our w ay through som e o f  that at the time that Ford bought Jaguar. It was 
the event o f  Ford buying Jaguar, Ford bringing process disciplines, know-how, and 
management skills which enabled us to make the rapid progress that w e made in the 
1990s. In the 1980s the progress w e made was self-driven with a relatively poor UK  
infrastructure to try and support companies that were actually trying to m ove themselves 
forward. We couldn’t turn to universities or to training support or management support. 
You needed to go find it, touch it, invent it, yourself. In an environment where, frankly, 
trade unionism had run companies o f  this size and structure, in the car industry 
particularly, that was a very, very difficult management environment to operate in. I can 
remember in the 1970s I spent 80%-85% o f  m y time in negotiations with trade unions. 
That changed under M ichael Edwardes, and improved again with John Egan because o f  
the environment w e tried to set, but I still spent something like half to three-quarters o f  
my time negotiating with trade unions as a manufacturing guy, whereas today they are 
much more part o f  the team than they are the opposition.
9 Michael Edwardes. Chairman o f BL, 1977-82.
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Wasn’t it true that in the 1980s you were doing two year pay deals, and every two 
years you had a strike over pay without the other disputes that you had?
Yes, and that was part o f  that long process o f  trying to m ove from trade unions being in 
opposition to management to being in a position where trade unions and management 
looked outside o f  the company for the opposition. That took a long time. That took the 
1980s to achieve. It w asn’t until the early 1990s that w e genuinely started to move 
forward. That was in part due to the leadership o f  the trade unions at the time, and also 
the leadership o f  management.
What about the high level of warranties in the early 1980s?
We had a very large supplier issue. Som e o f  the improvements w e made in the early 
1980s in John Egan’s tim e were in-house improvements, doing things better ourselves, 
particularly trying to find the find the things ourselves and protect the customer. And we 
did m ove forward. There’s no question about that. The cars that w e built in the later days 
o f  John Egan were considerably better than the cars w e built in the early days, when he 
first came. We did a huge amount o f  work with the supply base, trying to get the supply 
base to improve the quality o f  the products they gave us, or alternately resource from 
someone who could. And at one stage I remember the discussion with John Egan, John 
Edwards, and others in the Board about i f  the only way w e could achieve this goal o f  
supply base support is to source with the same supply base that M ercedes Benz sources 
from, then so  be it. That’s what w e would have to do. And several o f  our re-sourcing 
actions were actually into BM W  or M ercedes’ suppliers’ German supply base in order to 
try and improve quality. And som e o f  them w e are still with. ZF, for example, on gear 
boxes. I remember us having horrendous problems with gear boxes from GM and from 
Borg Warner. Horrendous problems! And those problems were mitigated by design 
changes and by forcing them to improve the quality o f  what they did. And remember, we 
didn’t wholly understand variability in those days, and w e were driving “white stick” as 
John Egan used to say. We did a lot o f  work with tyre manufacturers. We thought it 
would be nice to have round tyres, to quote an example that’s often used. I remember 
getting into deep issues with, and sending a lot o f  people into, our steering supplier, our 
power steering rack supplier to stop them leaking. Power train we made ourselves. The 
engines w e made ourselves. W e had som e issues because som e o f  the technology dated 
from the 1940s. The XK engine, as wonderful a job as it did for Jaguar, by the mid 1980s 
was getting tired, and it was certainly w ell amortised kit that it was made on, that’s for 
sure. The facilities were extraordinarily w ell amortised. Electrical issues. Harness 
manufacturer! Phew!
APPENDIX
Was Lucas supplying the harnesses?
We tried to improve and work with Lucas, and in the end w e were getting to resource 
away from RISTS.10 Again at the end o f  John’s tim e, and into Ford’s, w e were m oving  
away from RISTS. There w eren’t many parts on the car which were thoroughly reliable, 
and it was a function o f  our design, our suppliers’ design, and their manufacturing 
capability, and our manufacturing capability. Jaguar had stood still in the BL days and 
not moved forward.
Did they have an incentive to do so?
No. I think they probably didn’t. W e didn’t have the data to know. That’s the worrying 
thing now, looking back with the benefit o f  wonderful hindsight. We had a warranty 
system which was designed to pay the m oney, not designed to g ive you data on what the 
issues were. Unbelievable now , but it was true. In fact, w e had just started to change our 
warranty system so that w e did understand what the hell was going on when w e went into 
Ford. And as a result, the combination o f  the Ford processes and the Jaguar’s legacy 
processes in the early 1990s gave us an enormous amount o f  data. We had better data 
than Ford had then on warranty, but that w as because w e had com e from such an awful 
position. But Ford brought process management. That was the key difference; that was 
the key thing that was lacking. We did not understand adequately process management. 
We did not understand cause and effect w ell enough. We did not understand w ell enough 
controlling inputs. We were still trying to manage symptoms.
Did Quality Circles actually work?
In so much as they m oved us forward they worked. Did they m ove us forward far 
enough? No! We had management ginger groups with the same sort o f  goal and 
objective: to m ove our management processes forward. Did they work? Yes! Did they 
work well enough, far enough, fast enough? N o! Could w e have m oved faster in John’s 
days? Yes, I think w e could have done. H ow  much faster is a moot point because you can 
move a company at a rate at which can absorb change, and w e m oved forward quite a lot 
in John’s time. It’s often said w e  were running fast to keep up with his marketing ideals, 
and the PR, but w e did m ove forward. The last Series I lls  were much, much better cars. 
XJ40 was a rude awakening in terms o f  a product.
What happened with the XJ40?
We approached the car with an am azing level o f  naivety. N ot w ell executed, not 
thoroughly thought through from a design point o f  v iew , and despite all the m illions o f  
road miles we actually put into developm ent, and w e did put a lot o f  development road 
miles into it, we certainly gave the custom er a lot more problems than w e should have by 
a factor o f  several: two, three, four. W e ran fast to try and correct it but the damage was 
done. There’s no doubt. I think w e w ent into that launch with an enormous level o f  
naivety on new cars. Jaguar hadn’t launched a new  car since XJ-S. That’s not strictly
10 RISTS was the Lucas subsidiary manufacturing automotive wiring harnesses.
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true, we did stop making XJ-S for a year and w e had to re-launch it, but it was much the 
same. And Jaguar had com e from being a company that was very low  volum e, and you  
made to fit, to becom e a higher volum e operation, even though less than fifty thousand, 
which was making to specification. And that was a big change, and a change that was 
extraordinarily painful. There are still parts on our sister com pany’s Defender, for 
example, which are made to sam ple.11 There’s no drawing, even today. So to get to a 
position where you make to specification, then you understand the specification and the 
variability in the manufacturing process, and you design for that, and you manufacture 
process control for that were lessons w e didn’t learn until the early 1990s.
What was the capacity of the plant for the XJ40?
I can’t remember. Certainly w e never worked more than two shifts. W e could have gone 
to three shifts. W e’d have had logistics issues but w e’d have found ways to overcome 
those. We could have gone onto three shifts but w e never even talked, or thought, about 
it. We did understand then that the luxury car business is a pull business, not a volume 
car push business, and the perfect solution is always to make one car less than you can 
sell. We never quite got it, but w e  did at least aim for that.
Was the XJ40 a car that wasn’t designed to be manufactured?
That’s true in part. It had lots o f  design issues, and w e spent a lot o f  time and effort in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s correcting those. W e had a lot o f  supplier issues still. We 
tended to push our design requirements to the limit o f  manufacturing capability and just 
beyond; both o f  ourselves and our suppliers. I’m not getting at our supply base 
particularly. We did not protect the customer w ell enough with XJ40, there’s no question 
about that. The US launch o f  XJ40 was a huge rude awakening for us, a huge 
reawakening, and I think driven by the fact that the U S dealers were owner-entrepreneurs 
largely, still are, and had invested a lot o f  m oney in XJ40 in their facilities. Therefore, 
they had got a lot o f  personal equity riding on it, and had expectations o f  improvement, 
which were not unrealistic, far beyond Series III. And, as I say, w e had got the Series III 
to be a more credible car. It w asn’t a very brilliant car, but it was a more credible car, and 
it was more competitive in quality and reliability for its tim e, i f  not perfectly competitive, 
and XJ40 was terrible. It w as an awful step back, and it took us two years to even get 
closer to where w e’d been with Series III. I do remember deciding that w e wanted 
interior changes, and significant interior changes, to the trim before w e came to launch. 
When we first started to make the prototypes w e said “This is hopeless, this is not a 
Jaguar, w e need to change, change, change!!”
11 “Sister company” here refers to Land Rover which was bought by Ford from BMW for £1.8billion in 
2000, and joined Jaguar as a constituent o f Ford’s Premier Automotive Group.
- 8 -
APPENDIX
How much of the problem was supplier originating on XJ40?
It was probably close to six  and two-thirds in the margin more on the Jaguar side than the 
supply base. At the end o f  the day Jaguar is responsible for what it gives to the customer, 
so in terms o f  culpability it was probably 60% Jaguar and 40% supplier.
How was that allowed to happen? Was it the lack of management controls?
We were coming from a cottage industry which managed symptoms and not inputs. A s I 
said, our knowledge o f  process management in the sense o f  controlling inputs and 
managing the process w as not something which w as w ell developed. It w as something we 
were starting to understand by 1987/88, which was too late for XJ40. We needed to start 
that five or six years before.
So what was done to sort it?
The only thing you can do under those circum stances was all hands to the pump in terms 
of design changes, manufacturing process changes here, extra checks there, to try and 
manage the outcomes better, and get stuck into the suppliers parts that were giving major 
problems. But it was an interesting, it w as an exciting tim e shall w e say. Very difficult!
Why didn’t you have diesel-engined cars in the 1980s?
We had lots o f  diesel installation programmes in Jaguar, back to the tim es before John, 
and subsequent to John, and during John’s tim e w e tried various diesels in cars and cried 
off and decided not to.
What about the impact of external factors in the late 1980s?
The environmental pressure had started to com e. It cam e in shock waves. It was not seen 
by us as a growing continuum. W e only saw  the shock w aves o f  oil pressures or oil 
issues, or supply issues. W e didn’t see a steadily building environmental pressure then. 
The other thing o f  course w as the exchange rate. In the early days h a lf our product went 
to the US, which is still crudely the case, and the pound at $1.10 w as like Christmas Day 
every day. At $1.80 it hurt, and hedging can only delay the dreadful day. It’s not a 
solution, it’s only a w ay o f  trying to m anage your w ay through a crisis, and I think w e’ve  
got to have made more m oney out o f  hedging than w e  made out o f  making cars actually.
When they arrived didn’t Ford find that the faults per car were still incredibly 
high?
Yes they did, they certainly did. Ford brought the concept o f  process management to us, 
and one o f  the things that the Ford people w ill probably tell you is that Jaguar by then 
absolutely recognised the need, but didn’t understand how , and when Ford brought some 
“hows” they were taken quite readily, and adopted very readily, and adopted with 
probably more purity and integrity than Ford had adopted those processes. And Jaguar
APPENDIX
did adopt those processes. It changed them somewhat to make them more appropriate for 
a smaller company with a lot o f  volum e. But the essence behind them were understood 
and adopted. So w e started to understand process management, w e started to understand 
teamwork, and w e started to understand measuring and controlling inputs. W e understood 
Ford Q1 processes on quality and cost measurements. We actually put back some cost 
programmes that I put in here when I first came to Jaguar in the early 1970s. And in 
many ways w e went back to basics and made quite radical improvements and started to 
move the business forward, particularly after about three or four years with the changed 
trade union environment, which was brought about as much by trade union leadership as 
it was by management. People like Jack Adams o f  the Transport &General in those days: 
a much more enlightened view , much better recognition that w e needed to make a whole 
company before w e  fought about who had what share. Then w e did start to m ove forward 
quite radically and quite rapidly, and by the m id-1990s w e had made very positive  
progress, probably more progress in those five years than w e made in the ten years o f  the 
decade before. Som e o f  that, by the way, was because o f  the learning w e were trying to 
put in before Ford, in the last days o f  John Egan. Som e o f  the Dem ing stuff, and some o f  
the Total Quality M anagement stu ff w e tried to drive into the operation which Ford 
chopped o ff  and said “N o , w e ’ll run with these processes” and w e did. And then, because 
we had learned that w e understood what these processes were driving at and some o f  the 
tools and the techniques o f  the schem e o f  things, people were much more able and readily 
took o ff  and ran with them. In part I think it is w hy w e made so much progress so 
quickly, say, in the first h a lf o f  the decade.
When Ford came didn’t they write a damning Transition Report which John Egan 
had a bit of a problem accepting?
Some o f  it was to get our attention, and to make sure w e were listening. And it did that 
very effectively. N one o f  it was untrue. Som e o f  it had a lot o f  emphasis, som e o f  it less. 
We needed to change, particularly in the future w e were going to go, and that sort o f  
change was very necessary. And the Transition Report was one o f  the mechanisms to 
help us. To get our attention, and then focus us on changing. And it did that very 
effectively.
How effective was the management team in the 1980s?
I’d say that in some ways w e were naive. W e’d not understood the full magnitude o f  
some o f  the things w e were doing, and som etim es they came o f f  and som etim es they did 
not. But it wasn’t all bad by a long way. There were lots o f  good things that were done, 
and I’ve highlighted som e o f  the not so good things. There were lots o f  positive things 
that were done. I think the share ownership for em ployees, for example, was a very 
positive thing. At the tim e it was extrem ely positive and it generated a lot o f  goodwill in 
an environment which w as very conflict-orientated. The 1970s were awful. In the 1980s 
we started to m ove out o f  that, but nonetheless there was still very heavy conflict. 
Continuous disputes and strikes. B eing a quoted company gave us som e problems. In 
terms o f  our team there w as a level o f  naivety and som e difficulty because in our industry 
you need to look and plan for the long term, and lunchtime is a long time in the City, and
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that pressure w as there then, and it m ade for som e difficulties in som e o f  the things that 
w e wanted to do that w ould have a m uch longer term. For exam ple, it m eant w e could not 
sustain a dispute, and therefore ach ieving  discip line w as difficult in an environm ent 
where at the end o f  the day you had to concede. The biggest thing that Ford brought w as  
the know ledge that at the end o f  the day they w ere prepared to see us through in w age  
negotiation and up to then w e ’d had to d ev ise  m echanism s and one o f  the m echanism s  
was just talk to them , and in one o f  the w age rounds w e were still talking in March in an 
attempt to com e to a conclusion  w ithout a dispute.
Why wasn’t there that much Capital Expenditure incurred in 1984-89?
Because w e w ere low -volum e, and in order to maintain a credible balance sheet you  
cannot afford to put huge am ounts o f  capital investm ent in, which meant the X J40 was 
under-invested from a product engineering investm ent perspective. W e d idn’t have  
enough m an-hours or kit behind the product developm ent operation, even  
though w e  did create W hitley etc etc. And in term s o f  car manufacture the b iggest single  
cost is paint shop and body-in-w hite body construction, and w e w ere low  volum e, and 
therefore w ent largely for low  volum e m anufacturing techniques w hich are m anual and 
less automated. W e did put som e robotics in, w e  did put som e automation in, and w e did 
have a plan w hich said w e w ould put in a bodyshop with XJ40 w hich w ould  create all o f  
the bodies for Jaguar from then on. So, w e ’d put in what for Jaguar at the tim e w as a 
sizeable investm ent at Castle Brom w ich w ith a v iew  that w e w ould build it up to five or 
six different body sty les through the sam e facility, but in the event w e never m ade much 
more than one.
Why didn’t you have a Rights Issue? In 1986 before the XJ40 was launched you 
could have had a huge Rights Issue. Wasn’t the subject ever raised?
N o. What w as lacking w as the long term product v ision . W e w ere still m ending and 
getting the base right, and still hadn’t done so  by the end o f  the 1980s. So the long term  
vision o f  growth and product cyc les  w as not there. The c losest w e had w as the sports car, 
the X J41, and it w as not com ing good out o f  product developm ent. It w as too  w ide, too  
heavy, too expensive, and very late.
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Transcript of the telephone interview with Martin Bennett on 3rd July 2008 
What was your background with Jaguar?
I took control o f  a dealership in N ash v ille , T ennessee, at the beginning o f  1982 .12 It had 
been a Jaguar/British Leyland dealership sin ce 1 9 7 0 .1 cam e back to the States looking  
for a com pany to buy. I knew  the chap that ow ned it. H e was in trouble w ith it, so  I 
basically helped to get him out o f  trouble and then bought him out. W e w ere partners 
from 1982 to 1985 and then I bought him  out in 1985, and ow ned it until three m onths 
ago.
So you came in when Jaguar was on the up?
It w as just starting. In 1982 the old Series III w as ju st starting to becom e m arginally  
reliable I suppose one could  say. From 1982 to 1987, the last year o f  that car13, it 
improved significantly. W e m anaged to sell them  really in spite o f  them selves. They were 
still fairly unreliable in relative terms. T hey still scored pretty badly in the reliability  
surveys, but Jaguar’s brand im age w as so  strong w e sold  the cars regardless. It w as quite 
am azing.
Why do you think that the brand image was so strong at that time?
For the sam e reason it is now  to a degree. There w as alw ays som ething that w as a little 
bit different about Jaguar. It had a cachet. People dreamed o f  ow n ing  a Jaguar, especially  
wom en in the United States, and especia lly  back then. It w as m ore a lad ies’ car than a 
man’s car.14 And they saw  som ething romantic about it, quite frankly: the styling, the 
curvaceous styling, they saw  them as a little bit racy. The difference betw een the 
perception in the United States and the UK  w as that in the U S the sporting heritage w as  
alm ost ignored. It w as alm ost lost. M ike D ale tried m any tim es to do som ething about 
that in getting Jaguar involved  in racing but the A m ericans saw  Jaguar as a luxury car. In 
England, o f  course, it w as a luxury sports car, or a sports saloon . It w asn ’t sports over  
here, it w as luxury, and it w as its “Britishness” that peop le  w ere enam oured with. So they  
bought a car that w as far from perfect. A s a dealer w e used to have to do a lot to the car - 
what w as supposed to be a pre-delivery inspection w as actually a partial re-build. It w as  
quite am azing. I a lw ays rem em ber in the last year o f  the car, 1987, w e  w ere actually  
putting lead on the left rear door sill because the too ling  at that point w as so  worn out that 
you cou ldn’t get a rubber seal b ig enough to actually stop the w ind no ise  so w e  w ould  
build it up by putting a quarter o f  an inch o f  lead in there and paint it, and put a brand 
new carpet in to cover it. It w as constant. With the old Series III w ind noise w as a 
problem.
12 Martin Bennett, an Englishman, had been involved in the motor retailing industry in the UK before 
settling in the USA.
13 The Series III in the V I2 form continued in production until 1992.
14 Mike Dale confirmed this in an e-mail o f  8 July 2008 to the author: “On the sedan [saloon] over 50% of 
our customers were women. On the XJ-S it was more like 30%. At one point we had the highest 
percentage o f women buyers o f  any franchise in the US”.
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What about the XJ40?
The best Jaguar ever built? Five m illion  test m iles?  I rem em ber John [Egan] had all the 
US dealers dow n to Florida for the launch o f  that car. B ig , b ig  build  up. Everybody w as  
there. It actually cost m e, I can honestly  say, fifty  percent o f  m y  Jaguar custom ers. The 
car w as an absolute unm itigated disaster in term s o f  reliability, in  term s o f  its system s. It 
had a large readout -  it had a large m essage  centre and i f  anything w ent w rong with  
anything on the car it show ed in this b ig  m essage centre -  brake failure and anything you  
think about failed, and its light cam e on -  glaring, it w as so bright at night it w as hard to  
drive. The car w as an electronic nightm are. The reliability w as ju s t  aw ful. It had a 
shudder w hich w e first o f  all w ent for the drive shaft and so  forth, and it turned out it was 
the prop shaft. And w e  so lved  the problem  in the end -  it w as a  dealer innovation -  w e  
cam e up with the idea ourselves in the end o f  balancing the prop shaft and that w as the 
only w ay you could get the shudder out o f  the driveline o f  the car. The car w as aw ful. It 
was just aw ful. And it bankrupted a num ber o f  dealers because it cam e at a tim e w hen  
Jaguar w ere rather full o f  them selves -  the planned volum es for the United States were 
extrem ely am bitious. There w as an aggressive  programm e to force  dealers to im prove 
their facilities and build exp en sive  prem ises. Q uite a few  dealers fought it, other dealers 
went along with it and spent an awful lot o f  m oney based on th e  targeted vo lu m es they  
were given  w hich w ou ld n ’t have been obtainable even i f  the car had been one o f  the 
better cars on the market. But as it w as, the car w as a disaster and a number o f  very large 
dealers ended up bankrupt.
How do you explain that they launched the car in 1986 in the UK but it wasn’t until 
they launched the US model that these problems became apparent?
There are a few  things there. A m ericans had higher expectations than the British. I don’t 
know w hether it w as som ething to do w ith the conversion to left-hand drive. I really  
don’t know , and Jaguar could  never explain . R andle15 w as particularly arrogant w hen it 
came to that car. W e called  that “The R andle H andle”. Jim R an dle w as remarkably 
arrogant -  he w ould never d iscu ss the problem s w ith the car. I rea lly  don ’t know . I can’t 
give you an honest answ er other than to say  that the U S consum er at that tim e w as  
expecting far m ore because they w ere getting m uch higher quality  from Jaguar’s 
com petitors. The w h ole  industry at that point w as ramping up in  term s o f  m easuring for 
the first tim e consum er satisfaction, veh ic le  reliability and so  forth. It w as starting to 
becom e a focus. And Jaguar had a poor reputation anyw ay. T he o ld  jok es over here: “I f  
you’re go ing  to buy a Jaguar you have to  buy tw o because one is  go in g  to be in the repair 
shop”. It w as cocktail party conversation. “W hy do the E nglish  drink warm beer?
Because Lucas m akes their refrigerators” . T his w as cocktail conversation  jok es and 
Jaguar w as invariably part o f  it, and it w as som ething that took  them  an aw fu lly  long  
time, and a lot o f  Ford m oney, quite frankly, to get over.
15 James Randle. Jaguar’s Engineering Director, and a member o f the Executive Board.
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What was your opinion of John Egan? How did he react as far as you knew to the 
problems of the XJ40?
The w ay John reacts to m ost things. John is a super, super salesm an. And he sold the US  
dealers on the X J40, and on the things that Jaguar w as doing. Let’s face it, anybody that 
could get $2 .3b illion  out o f  Ford for Jaguar w hen B ill Hayden told m e they m anaged to 
identify about $300m illion  o f  assets, so  it turned out they paid about $2b illion  o f  
goodw ill for Jaguar. That’s selling! And John w as a salesm an -  he could sell an Arab a 
bucket o f  sand! But that’s what John did. H e talked his w ay around it.
I rem em ber the first D ealer C ouncil m eeting that I attended in Coventry. M ike D ale and 
the late G ene Fisher, w ho w as one o f  British L eyland’s original distributors over here, in 
D allas, T exas, had press-ganged m e onto the D ealer Council. I m et with the group o f  
dealers in N e w  York the night before w e  flew  to England and listened to them , what they  
were going  to do to the Jaguar m anagem ent w hen they got over there, how  they w ere 
going to rip them new  heads and so  forth because o f  the new  car.
W hen w e w ent into the m eeting, John got up and addressed the m eeting as usual - 1 like 
John, you cou ldn’t m eet a more charm ing man -  and none o f  the dealers said a word. I 
w as absolutely astounded. I said “John, I’m the n ew  boy, and I norm ally b e lieve  that the 
new  boy should basically  shut up, say nothing and listen. That’s what I fu lly  intended to 
do in this m eeting because in N ew  York last night all o f  m y colleagues assem bled  here 
w ere telling  each other what they w ere going  to do to you”, and, I said, look in g  at Jim 
Randle “especia lly  to you Jim. Y ou ’d be hanging upside dow n by now  i f  th ey ’d carried 
through what they w ere talking about” . And o f  course Randle, w ho had no humour, 
turned red. I said “T h ey’re not telling  you what they’re saying to one another, so  let me 
tell you. They b elieve  your com pany is totally out o f  control. They b e lieve  that you do  
not have control o f  the m anagem ent o f  your com pany because everything they hear from  
you is good, and everything they see  produced is bad. It’s aw ful. The car is dreadful. The 
reliability is terrible” .
I just laid the w h ole  thing out. There w as a deadly silence. Then all credit to John, he 
took it w ell, the rest o f  the Jaguar m anagem ent sitting up there did not, and he thanked 
m e for m y frankness and so  forth, and said “We w ill, o f  course, take this aw ay, and w e ’ll 
get back to you”, w hich  is the wonderful non-answ er that one gets. H e handled it quite 
w ell, but didn’t do very m uch about it, and that’s w hy i f  Ford hadn’t bought Jaguar there 
w ould have been no Jaguar today. The com pany w as an absolute b loody sham bles, but 
John created this non-existent contest betw een General M otors and Ford, and thank God  
Ford did get involved. M y point to John w as that “w ithout your dealer body y o u ’re dead 
because w e are rebuilding the car; w e  are doing w hatever w e have to do to try and hang 
on to the custom er” because John w as com plaining that the warranty costs w ere going  
through the roof. O f  course, w hen warranty costs are high it m eans dealers’ service  
departments are busy, w hich on a short term perspective is okay, but on a long term  
perspective it is not because i f  they [the custom ers] have to keep com in g  in to the service  
department th ey ’ll go  som ew here e lse  and buy another car. And that’s exactly  what 
happened with X J40. W e cou ld n ’t get our service department big enough, w e  couldn’t 
hire technicians fast enough to cope with the demand because the cars w ere just rolling  
back in tim e after tim e. Jaguar w ere buying cars back, trying to do it surreptitiously. In 
fact w e cam e up with a plan. I f  Jaguar bought a car back then it had to be declared a buy­
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back, and the title had to be branded as such before the car could be re-sold; w e said 
“ W hy don’t you let us trade for you so w e  w ill trade the custom ers out o f  the cars? Y ou  
provide the financial assistance to get that done and then the cars w on’t be branded as 
buy-backs, they w ill m erely be seen as trades and w e  can pass them back out through the 
auctions or resell them to the public as used cars” . That w ay Jaguar didn’t have to get 
caught w here other manufacturers had been caught in having to buy-back large num bers 
o f  cars and then try to market them with branded titles. M y legal counsel advised m e that 
this w as not illegal, rather it w as using the rules to o n e ’s ow n advantage.
I asked the question to one of the senior marketing guys in Jaguar in the 1980s as to 
why there were the problems in the States but not in the UK, because demand went 
down in the States but picked up in the UK in the late 1980s. What I was told was 
“The UK dealers were prepared to go the extra mile for the customer which the US 
dealers weren’t”. Any comment?
(Great laughter!!). I know  w ho that cam e from. That w as R oger [Putnum]. H e and I had 
discussions around that them e a number o f  tim es. It w as nothing to do with the English  
dealers being prepared to go the extra m ile. A t that tim e the Chairman o f  the English  
D ealer Council w as Trevor Finn o f  Pendragon and w e used to sw ap notes because Trevor 
used to com e over to the States to find out what w as go in g  on over here. It w as purely a 
question o f  what the consum er dem anded, and the consum er in the United States w as  
considerably more dem anding than the consum er in the U nited K ingdom  and what they  
were prepared to put up with w as considerably less. I w as Chairman o f  the National 
D ealers’ A dvisory C ouncil in 1989 to 1991 and M ike D ale  used to have us involved in all 
sorts o f  things -  looking at designs and so  forth. They w anted our input. I put a pretty 
good group o f  businessm en together and w e acted alm ost as a team  o f  unpaid consultants 
for Jaguar. M ike appreciated it very m uch because what w e w ere doing w as conveying  
back to the factory what the U S consum er w as looking for, what in fact they were  
dem anding, in a car. W e told them  “Y ou want to sell these cars in the U S. W e are your 
single b iggest market. Y ou should be listening to us”. W ell, this tended to be dism issed as 
a bunch o f  grum py dealers, w hen w e w eren’t grumpy dealers at all. What w e w ere trying 
to do w as to get the factory to understand what the U S consum er w as looking for. What 
they w ere com ing into our show room s on a daily basis and dem anding, and w hy Jaguar 
were not sellin g  m ore cars, because our com petitors were providing what the consum er  
w as looking for in term s o f  specification  in the car. Jaguar w as behind the curve in a lot 
o f  respects because they didn’t have the m oney to put into it. BM W , M ercedes etc were 
all getting ahead o f  Jaguar in term s o f  the technology they w ere offering. And Jaguar 
didn’t want to listen. It w as a m ixture o f  contem pt and indifference. R oger’s response  
w as typical -  he thought it w as ju st a bunch o f  grumpy dealers com ing  over; com plaining  
too much; m aking far too m uch m oney them selves, and not being prepared to plough it 
back in to keep custom ers happy. That w as roundly dispelled by D avid  Pow er w hen he 
started doing research because the custom ers reported them selves to be extrem ely pleased  
with the dealerships but extrem ely displeased with the car.16 So our case w as proven
,6 The 1989 J D Power Initial Quality Survey showed that Jaguar dealers came second in their abilities to 
fix customers problems, although Jaguar itself had fallen to 31st place out o f 37 marques (Automotive 
News, 3 July 1989).
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when an independent com pany started actually m easuring what the Am erican consum er  
w as thinking and saying. But R oger’s stuck his head out m any tim es on that.
How much of the downturn with the XJ40 was awful quality and how much of it 
was the economic downturn?
Initially it w as purely the awful product. W e got that car in July/August 1987 and for the  
next tw elve  m onths the econom y w as still doing extrem ely w ell, and did extrem ely w ell 
the year after that, but the car w as a disaster. Its reputation w as w ell known after tw e lv e  
m onths and people started leaving in droves, even  before the econom y started to turn 
dow n. If it had been a good car it w ould still have suffered when the econom y turned 
dow n in 1989/90, but it w ould have been in a far, far stronger position. A s it w as it w as  
already in freefall -  the econom y just com pounded that.
Why do you think Porsche declined so rapidly at that time?
They were overpricing their cars. Porsche goes through w onderful cycles. The Germans 
are am azingly arrogant. I had both Porsche and Audi franchises and their absolute b e lie f  
in them selves, their righteousness, w as quite astounding. Porsche’s reliability at that tim e  
w as not good. Their cars had started to fall behind the curve. T hey were squeezed  
econom ically . They w ere producing cars with V olksw agon  bits on them but charging 
inflated am ounts o f  m oney for them , and that gradually daw ned on the American 
consum er so  in the 1990-92 period Porsche w as nearly bankrupt. I actually bought the 
Porsche franchise from the chap here in N ashville  in 1994 and d idn’t pay very much 
m oney for it because he w as se llin g  very, very few  cars and had been for a couple o f  
years. T h ey’d really priced them selves out o f  the market and let their product becom e  
corrupted, ju st as Ford corrupted Jaguar with the X -T ype. Y ou w ere getting things like  
the 924  Porsche w hich w eren’t really Porsches at all -  they w ere out o f  the parts bucket 
o f  V o lk sw agon .17
John Edwards told me that Porsche was a different market from Jaguar. They 
weren’t the same markets.
T hey w eren’t really. They certainly w eren’t competitors.
17 In an e-mail o f 8 July 2008 to Mike Dale, and forwarded to the author, Joe Herson, a leading US Porsche 
dealer, based in Washington DC, stated, “Porsche’s strength was in populous areas in which there were 
folks with enough money to reward themselves with a Porsche. A very ego driven group. Any economic 
downturn in the 70s, 80s and 90s had a dramatic negative impact on our Porsche sales in the Washington 
market. Porsches were at the top o f  the chain o f  vehicles we sold for being purchased with extra funds, 
conspicuous consumption vehicles, and if  the customer felt threatened economically, the sales dropped 
sharply. O f course this was true with luxury segment vehicles in general, but the really selfish cars like 
Porsche suffered the most”.
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Who were Jaguar’s competitors in the 1980s?
M ercedes, BM W , and w hen Lexus cam e along w e w ere all surprised just how  good the 
car w as, just how  reliable it w as, just how  w ell engineered it w as, and the worst w e  could  
say w as “ It’s boring”, w hich it certainly w as -  getting in and turning the key and it starts 
every tim e, it never breaks dow n, and so on. Q uite a boring car! Cadillac w as a lso  a 
com petitor, it’s hard to think that now  but they certainly w ere then. M ercedes and BM W  
were the principal com petitors in terms o f  European groups. M ercedes had overpriced  
them selves. I w as astounded at the reputation M ercedes enjoyed in the United States -  
that it w as a prem ium , premium luxury brand, w hen I w as used to seeing them in 
Germ any as taxis -  the old 240D . They w ere utilitarian veh icles. Y es, they did make a 
good strong car, but their im age in the United States w as that o f  pure luxury. They were 
reckoned to be head and shoulders above anyone e lse . BM W  w as playing second fiddle 
to M ercedes, but w ere still doing rather w ell. Jaguar w as com petitive price-w ise but was 
having to struggle to overcom e a lousy service reputation, lousy reputation for reliability. 
People loved the car but it w as a part o f  every jo k e  in the book.
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Transcript of the interview with Bruce Blvthe on 5th January 1994 
What was your involvement with Jaguar?
Prior to 1985 I w as the Treasurer for Ford o f  Europe and John Grant replaced m e, and I 
went into a jo b  called  B usiness Strategy for Europe, or BS for short. In that period I 
thought that Ford o f  Europe ought to have a three-legged approach. There ought to be a 
m iddle leg that w as a bit o f  a com petitor to A lfa  R om eo or Saab or what R over is today, 
and then it ought to have a top end product, w hich ended up being Jaguar. The reason I 
thought that w as that I looked at our market share here and I saw  so m any people w ho  
were on a kind o f  an upward incom e curve, or an upward status curve, or the maturity 
curve w ho w ould buy Fords until they w ere in their 30s but then i f  they had a free choice, 
and w eren’t forced to have a com pany car in a fleet that w as exclusively  Ford, they’d 
leave the Ford fam ily. There w as now here to go  to stay with the Ford fam ily, whereas in 
the United States you had Fords, then you had M ercury, then you had Lincoln. So in the 
States Ford could  track the guy from the tim e he entered as a Securities A nalyst at 
Warburg or Paine W ebber or som eplace, all the w ay up until he w as Chairman o f  the 
Board, and you could still sell a product in that range and I thought that ought to be a 
good strategy for Ford Europe. So that w as the em bryo o f  the strategy, even without 
com panies being nam ed as w ho should fit into the m edium  car slot, or w ho should fit into 
the luxury car slot. So that w as the strategy. In the fall o f  1987 1 w ent to the United States 
to work for the Chairman as the Head o f  D iversification , and John Grant replaced me. 
John’s v iew  and m ine w ere alm ost identical on the need to broaden Ford’s appeal to the 
m arketplace i f  you w ere go in g  to keep peop le  throughout their socio-dem ographic  
growth curve. And i f  you looked at the m arketplace it w as abundantly clear that with  
great tracts o f  European population maturing and becom ing increasingly w ealthy that 
even i f  the Japanese did com e in there w as still room  for Jaguar because that portion o f  
the market w as grow ing faster than any other portion o f  the market, particularly i f  you  
looked at the segm ent that the Scorpio w as in. The Scorpio and its com petitors, Renault, 
GM etc, used to represent 80%  o f  that size  car market 15 years ago. N o w  it represents 
20% . And so , anyone w h o could  afford a car that b ig wanted m ore status, m ore stature, 
than they could  get from a Ford or a Renault 25 or a G M . So at that point w e  decided that 
w e ’d restrict it to Jaguar because w e  had a very active participation in this m iddle  
segm ent, but ultim ately concluded that even this three fish ing line approach w as still 
highly focused  and w e  really d idn’t have the m anagem ent stretch to take on tw o new  
com panies and m anage them  w ell i f  they w eren’t already stocked with outstanding  
managers. In other w ords, i f  you took  over Jaguar with all its problem s y o u ’d have to 
devote a lot o f  Ford resources to getting it to be a world class com pany in quality, in 
production, in productivity, purchasing. A ll the things in w hich it w as deficient. We 
didn’t think w e could do that and take on, say, A lfa  R om eo.
What about the Saab deal?
We would have had m ore control o f  the com pany than GM  has. W e’d have had 100%.
But at any rate, about that tim e, for a w h ole  variety o f  reasons, I cam e back to Europe and 
John and I just sw itched jo b s  and John w ent to the US to run D iversification and I cam e
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back here as V ice President o f  B usiness Strategy. And so, therefore, the theory w as still 
the sam e because John and I again still shared the sam e v iew s o f  Ford needing som eplace  
for people to go w hen they still wanted to be with the Ford fam ily but didn’t like the cars 
in the upper end. John therefore w as m ore responsible for getting the programme through 
the Board Approval Process and I w as m ore responsible over here for actually  
negotiating with Egan. So  that’s kinda the background up until the negotiations started. 
There w as high equanim ity w ithin Ford on that by the w ay. It w asn’t one o f  those things 
that w as cooked up in a sta ff activity and kinda forced through because it caught the eye  
o f  the Chairman only. The people in Europe, in particular, were very keen on the 
acquisition and then hoping to turn it around, and alm ost everyone in the U S  w as. There 
w as one exception , and that w as P olin g18 w h o w as not com fortable that w e  had enough  
m anagem ent to turn around Jaguar.
How much about Jaguar did you know before you actually bought it?
It w as a public com pany so you could  know  all about the financials. I think Ford w as  
very aware from industry survey data about quality, and hence the presumption o f  
manufacturing productivity. The biggest surprise w as their lack o f  experienced sta ff in 
car developm ent. M ore than anything e lse  that w as the single b iggest surprise. The 
secondary surprise, w hich ran throughout the organisation, w as an alm ost unbelievable  
lack o f  know ledge o f  the com petitive world. B ecause sa les had grown from what they  
were in 1982/83 to what they w ere in 1988/89 how  could  you then convince them  that 
they w ere ropey? Y ou know , sa les had tripled and yet I rem em ber the w ords John Egan 
used. H e said “I don ’t sell cars, I sell w ood , leather, and overall charm”. A nd so I think 
that John knew  that there w ere all these underlying problem s. But i f  he d idn’t get the 
volum e up to g ive  him  the cash flow  to  be able to m ake the investm ents to fix  the 
underlying problem s he cou ldn’t do it the other w ay round. So I’m a big believer that 
John Egan absolutely, alm ost on a personal basis, saved Jaguar. I think h is performance 
w as heroic, absolutely heroic, and I’m not sure it’s been recognised, and I think a lot o f  
people b elieve  that John didn’t know  what the problem s w ere at Jaguar but in m y ow n  
personal v iew  he did, absolutely. H e ju st had to generate the cash flow  before he could  
fix it. H e brought in a lot o f  bright young engineers, but, again, they w ere all hired in the 
1986/87/88  period after the last sedan w as launched, and therefore you have an awful lot 
o f  very good bright engineers there w ho have never launched a car. So that’s w hy I said 
“experienced s ta f f ’. I think th ey ’v e  got a lot o f  very good young talented, hard-working, 
engineers. But I think John knew  what the problem s w ere, and I think Ford recognised  
that those w ere what the problem s w ere, with the exception  o f  not recognising that there 
w asn’t m ore experience in the engineering department.
What w as John’s choice? To tell you “I’m running a w reck”? Y ou can’t do that. So you  
have to, particularly w hen y o u ’re a public com pany, drive that fine line betw een saying  
“There’s terrific s izz le  here, but there’s no steak at all” and on balance I think he got it 
about as right as he could given  the circum stances. T im e w ill tell. H e’s done a good job  
at B A A . I think h e’s a better m anager than people g ive  him  credit for. I think his strength 
is in m erchandising, in prom otion, in advertising, and the developm ent o f  a com pany
18 Harold (“Red”) Poling, President, Ford Motor Company 1985-87, Vice Chairman 1988-89, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer 1990-93.
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rather than the detailed running o f  it, but there again that’s what Chairmen and CEOs are 
supposed to do. T h ey’re not supposed to be able to fix  every m achine on every station on 
the assem bly line. He just d idn’t have the depth o f  talent to be able to im plem ent his  
w ishes. And m aybe you can say it’s his fault. He had plenty o f  tim e to go  hire.
Didn’t Ford have a shock with regard to the new model programme, particularly 
the F-Type?
The F-type I w ould have kept in but w hen w e got to the Board m eeting to  decide the fate 
o f  the F-type the on ly  tw o people w ho w ere for it were John Egan and m e. The criticism s  
that Ford had o f  it w ere appropriate. It w as too heavy, it w as too costly , and it probably 
w ouldn’t have m ade m uch m oney. H ow ever, it probably w ou ldn’t have lost m uch, but it 
w ouldn’t have made m uch m oney. But k illing it caused the com pany to kinda slum p, to 
kinda sit back and say they d on ’t have any confidence in us. To not have an exciting  
product to bring people into the show room  at a tim e when you needed all the show room  
traffic you could get because one o f  your tw o cars w as fifteen years old, and the other one 
w as already five years old and d idn’t have a very good quality im age com e to that. So 
much like GM  does a Corvette, m uch like BM W  does a Z1 as a traffic builder, I w ould  
have done the new  F-Type. It w as far enough along that I w ould have done it both for 
morale and spiritual reasons w ithin Jaguar but a lso for com m ercial reasons. I w ould  have 
said it’s going to be attractive. Y o u ’re go ing  to have people com ing in there concluding  
“terrifically beautiful car, I hope I can afford one som e day, let’s buy an X J6” . T o m e 
that’s the cheapest form o f  marketing: a new  product. To me all the advertising in the 
world can’t beat new  product. So I’d have done the new  product. It w ou ld  a lso  have been 
a statem ent that here’s Ford M otor C om pany taking over Jaguar w hat’s the first thing  
they do, they put a replacem ent on the road for probably the best recognised  sports car 
ever built. So for all those reasons I w ou ld  have done it. I think Ford w as too  
conservative and took the other line.
What do you think of the view that John Egan stayed too long at Jaguar, that he 
should have left when the new car was launched, when he was still a hero?
I don ’t know . It w ould be hard to be leaving w hen sales w ere up 1987 over 1986 by
10,000 units, then 1988 over 1987 by another 1 0 ,0 0 0 .19 It w ould have been easy  to 
conclude w e ’re still doing things right. Plus they w ere m aking an awful lot o f  m oney.
Plus the visib ility  provided by the product. It’s easy to w alk aw ay, I w ould think, from a 
product that w as C am pbell’s Soup, or diapers, or som ething. H ow  can you  get excited  
about that? But the car business is an exciting business. The product’s exciting, the 
com petition’s exciting, the public v isib ility  must have been excitin g  for him . So I’m not 
sure I could see any sign s that he felt he should be leaving although I do think that even  
in the best o f  tim es he and John Edwards really understood that the com pany w as not 
generating enough cash to be self-sustaining.
19 Jaguar total wholesales increased by some 8,000 units in 1987 compared to 1986 (as shown in Table 4.2. 
in main text), and the actual increase in Jaguar wholesales in 1988 compared to 1987 was 1,400 units 
(as shown in Table 4.3 in main text).
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Can we explore the talks Ford had with Jaguar in 1988.
John Grant did that. I w as in the US then and he w as here. I cam e back in January 1989. 
The talks had been broken o f f  late Fall 1988 because Ford did not want to do a hostile  
takeover. John Egan w as robust in his wanting to be independent and, therefore, when he 
got continued approaches from Ford he sim ply said he w ouldn’t talk about it, and he 
transmitted that to D on Petersen w ho w as Chairman o f  the Board. And so  the w hole  
project kinda went into lim bo. They were re-started again when Petersen decided that 
he’d rather have Jaguar than stick to the principle o f  “no hostile takeover” , and that was 
probably A ugust/Septem ber o f  1989. In June/July the concept had been approved by the 
Board, and then the actual face to face negotiations w ere in Septem ber/October.
What about the lifting of the Golden Share?
We did not know  it w as going to happen at all. W e thought the G olden Share w as going  
to stay and that w e w ere going  to take a pre-em ptive share-holding so that w hen the 
G olden Share w ent out by law  w e w ould be in a premier positive to m ake a bid. When 
Ridley actually took o f f  the G olden Share I assure you Ford w as as surprised as anyone  
else. W e had not lobbied him to do so, which I think John Egan didn’t b elieve. I think he 
thought w e w ere in there with the governm ent, but that w as not the case. H e didn’t like 
what they did but I think they acted honourably throughout the piece. H ow  did John Egan 
actually take it? The first tim e w e m et face to face he knew  what the outcom e w as going  
to be, and w e had had som e telephone conversations and som e written com m unications. I 
suppose John reacted the sam e w ay I w ould have: a feeling that y o u ’d taken this run­
dow n, unrespected, not independent com pany, m ade it a huge success - n ew  product, 
higher volum e than they’d ever had in their life, and just when you ’re hitting the peak  
som ebody takes them  over. Y ou ’d feel that som ebody’s stolen one o f  your children after 
you ’d spent all the trouble o f  raising it. But throughout the p iece, after I suppose that first 
tirade o f  real genuine personal annoyance that John exhibited, he w as an absolute  
gentlem an for the entire remainder o f  the negotiations and for the w hole transition. Once 
the gam e w as up, the m inute he knew  that, his w h ole  effort w as focused on m aking sure 
the transition w as good so  that Jaguar w ould be good, so  that there w as no dam age done  
in the transition, so  everyone w ho had worked with him and supported him all those years 
w ould be looked after as far as possib le. So, I thought he acted like a perfect gentlem en. 
And w as he tough? Y ou bet, because he wanted the highest share price for his 
shareholders and for his executives with their options, and w hy not? He w as a tough  
negotiator. He didn’t get Jaguar turned round by being otherw ise.
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By 1989 it had certainly become apparent that Jaguar was in real trouble. To what 
extent do you think Egan was totally aware of the realities of the situation?.
A s the realities turned out I d on ’t think John w as aware o f  them, but neither w as Ford. I 
don’t think Jaguar, or Ford, or M ercedes, or anybody else expected the U S  downturn to 
be as prolonged or as deep as it w as. I don’t think anybody expected the U K  downturn  
would be three and a h a lf  years long. And therefore when those tw o m arkets, w hich  
represented 70% o f  Jaguar’s vo lu m e20, both fell into the pit at the sam e tim e it spelled  big  
trouble. I think people knew  that the late 1980s boom  w as over, but I don ’t think they felt 
it w ould take three years to shake through the ex cesses in the system  and com e back to 
growth again. So w as John aware o f  it? Y es, I think he probably w as, but I w ou ld n ’t say 
Ford w as any w iser on the duration or the depth. I think Ford thought, I certainly did, that 
there w as going  to  be a downturn, but a kind o f  a normal downturn, one lasting 18 
months. S ix  to eight quarters o f  negative G N P, but not negative G NP by a point a quarter. 
Traditionally what had happened w as that the U S had gone down, and Europe w as up. 
What happened this tim e w as that the U S and UK  w ent down but Continental Europe 
stayed strong. But Jaguar d idn’t have a very good distribution network on the Continent 
so it couldn’t benefit from that strength. H aving said that, the Ford approval o f  the Jaguar 
purchase concluded that there w ould  be two/three years o f  losses and that the real value  
o f  ownership w ould com e in ten years’ tim e. N ow , having said that, the Board forgets 
after a year and a h a lf  o f  lo sses  that that w as the scenario.
What about the problems that Jaguar had started to experience from the end of 
1987 onwards -  that Jaguar was losing market share quite simply because word was 
getting around that the new car was worse than the old car had ever been?
I think John w as aware that those w ere problem s. I think he w as less able to figure out 
how  to fix  them . I think he could  get on the backs o f  his operating execu tives and say  
“B y G od Joe you ’ve  got to fix  this; Ian, you can’t let that go on” as opposed to saying  
“Ian, here’s exactly  what I w ant you  to do to fix  this problem”. So, I think that m ight be a 
distinction. But again, this w as a hostile  bid for Jaguar, so Ford couldn’t get inside and 
understand those issues in advance. I can only speculate on what d iscussions w ere like 
inside Jaguar prior to O ctober o f  1989.
When Egan left Jaguar was it on a friendly basis?
The very first face to face m eeting that w e  ever had with John, when he knew  he w as  
cornered, that he cou ldn’t get out, he m ade a bit o f  an opening statement, and then said 
“You understand I w ill not be able to stay with the com pany. A fter being independent, 
after being the Chairman and CEO  o f  a com pany it is im possible then to run a subsidiary 
o f  a great big com pany. I’ve  done that before. I didn’t enjoy it. Y ou ’re second-guessed  all 
the tim e, and w h ile  I’m perfectly  w illin g  to help with the transition, I w ill not 
permanently stay w ith the com pany”. So, from the very first face to face m eeting w e  
knew that John w ould not stay. There w as a m ixed bag inside Ford, after the acquisition
20 In the period 1982 to 1992, only in one year, 1991, did the combined UK and US sales fall below 70% of 
Jaguar’s total sales (as shown in Figure 5.7 in the main text).
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and during the transition, as to whether w e should try to convince John to stay, but I don’t 
think he w ould have. There w as no hidden agenda on his part at all, from the very first 
m eeting, probably w ithin the first fifteen m inutes. There were three o f  us there: Lyn 
Halstead, Chairman o f  Ford o f  Europe, John Egan, and m yself. A t all subsequent 
m eetings John Edwards w as there. H e w as on the firing line too. In any acquisition , o f  
course, you get the tw o heavyw eights, the tw o Chairmen, which were H alstead and Egan, 
but the real negotiations, the real financial deal, the real bid, is all done one layer down.
In this case, John Edwards and I plus any number o f  overpaid investm ent bankers.
One o f  the reasons that there w as a split cam p within Ford over John w as that w hen he 
w as trying to defend his independence, with great robustness, he really offended a couple  
o f  execu tives at Ford, Don Petersen being one o f  them, and so those aggressive remarks 
he m ade to try to keep Ford at bay, people remembered a long tim e after they w ere made, 
so that’s w hy there w as a split camp: a cam p that said “N o w  wait a m inute, here’s a guy  
w ho took the com pany from 12,000 units to 50 ,000  units, don’t you think w e  ought to  
capitalise on his good w ill”, w h ile  there w ere others w ho said “He w as so  rude, so  
aggressive to m e, that I’ll never be able to work with him ”.
What is Jaguar’s future now?
Over tim e I think the only  successfu l w ay to run Jaguar is to further integrate it into Ford, 
and I don ’t mean that in a negative w ay. But i f  Jaguar could have been independent 
entirely, it still w ould be; it w ou ld  still be profitable, it w ould still be show ing the cash  
flow , but there is no chance that independently Jaguar could have survived the last 
downturn, none w hatsoever. But it ju st seem s silly  to m e to have an accounting  
department in E ssex  and an accounting department in Coventry. The custom er d oesn ’t 
care about w ho pays the invo ices. W hy should you have a steel buyer in C ologne and a 
steel buyer in Coventry? So those things that are invisib le, that don’t matter, you get a 
huge econom y o f  scale by co-operating w ith Ford. That ought to be done. T hose things 
that are independent, like design , sa les, marketing, governm ent affairs, public face, that 
all ought to be still Jaguar. But to not take advantage o f  what Ford could offer w ould (a) 
deviate from the w h ole  reason for buying it in the first place and (b) w ould be silly; it 
w ould just perpetuate the reason Jaguar cou ldn’t be independent.
What about the issue of the commonality of components?
If you could actually take the Jaguar technical headcount and say to them  “L ook I’m not 
going to m ake you worry about air bags, I’m not going  to make you worry about door 
locks, I’m going to let you concentrate on the things that are sexy, that are fun, that are 
exciting. W e’re going  to take over w orrying about the greasy bits” then both sides w in, 
because these guys are then all charged up. And so, I think the w hole thing is m ore 
exciting, whereas other peop le say “Oh m y God it’s being polluted, and it’s not going to 
be a pure Jaguar any m ore” . The answ er to that is “Y ou ’re absolutely right, because i f  it 
was Jaguar w ou ldn’t ex ist” . So I think a deeper integration into Ford in the areas that 
make sense are all to the good. The new  engine is 100% designed by Jaguar. It’s their 
engine. N o w , i f  you w ere a sane man w ould  you build it at Radford, or w ould  you build it 
at Bridgend? What do they get? T hey get the best quality technicians anyw here in the
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world, they get inspectors w ho can inspect the Jaguar line w hilst at the sam e tim e they’re 
doing som ething e lse , so  they can be m uch more productive or their use o f  indirect 
labour. And yet they’ll still get their engine. Yet the fact that it’s being built at Bridgend  
people are saying “It’s not a Jaguar, it’s a Ford engine”. W ell, that w ill go  aw ay over  
tim e. For P ete’s sakes, the L exus com es dow n the same line as m ore basic m odels in 
Japan, the sam e line! Y et nobody thinks the Lexus is a second-hand product, or a hand- 
m e-dow n from a Toyota. So there’s a big mental block. Part o f  it is still in the com pany; 
it’s not just the external bias. The Jaguar ow ners w ho say “W ell, this is crim inal” . The 
answer is i f  w e ’re going  to crack another 100,000 Jaguar buyers in the next few  years in 
addition to what they have today Jaguar still w on ’t be viable as an independent. That’s 
the w hole point, the w h ole  rationale behind the purchase. Integrate the th ings that make 
sense to get your cost base dow n so you can be com petitive w ith the L exuses and the 
Infinitis o f  this world. Improve the quality, not only on the existing cars, but on the new  
ones which have to be absolutely w orld-class products. And then the Jaguar people do the 
enhancem ents that still make the car a Jaguar. It’s the only w ay forward.
If Jaguar had got the warranty problem down to Ford levels, and got productivity 
up, and other costs down, wouldn’t they have been able to weather the recession?
I think they w ere unable to do it, not because they resist the good idea, it’s ju st that they  
were so insular in Coventry, and doing so  w ell going into the recession , that there w as no 
forward thinking. Even i f  you d iscover “G osh w e ’re not m aking m oney”, i f  y o u ’d been  
that isolated for that long, w h o’d you then turn to to get a helping hand that says “Look  
w e ’ve been through all that before, these three w ays didn’t work very w ell for us, but this 
w ay w as terrific” so  they could put them on the right path rightaway. W hereas by  
them selves they m ight have tried tw o or three other things that just didn’t work.
What about the negotiations Jaguar had with GM in 1989?
That’s partially w h y Ford acted w hen it did and decided to go from  a non-hostile to a 
hostile approach. A  non-hostile  approach w ould have taken the possib ility  o f  any 
association with Jaguar right out the w indow  because they w ere go ing  to do a deal with  
GM . It w as a deal that w ould have given  Jaguar som e independence. It w as structured not 
unlike the Saab deal. G M  claim ed that it w asn ’t, and it w as because they d idn’t want to 
appear to have lost. But I am absolutely convinced that within 1 Op per share GM  had 
already put a bid on the table. W e w ere on ly  interested in a 100% takeover. O ver the 
years w e  had experience w ith jo in t ventures that were 50/50 whatever, and with the 
exception o f  the A uto Latina one in Brazil/Argentina, and the AutoEuropa one in Portugal 
with V olksw agen things didn’t work. W e had to be in control, and the w orse the 
com pany w as that you w ere taking over the more control you had to have, so  there w as  
indisputable control to sort it out. So the reason they liked GM w as that GM  w as m ore o f  
a co-operative deal that they could  grow  into. Perhaps starting w ith a big m inority  
shareholding in Jaguar, and then over tim e perhaps increase the shareholding, or increase 
the co-operation, or increase the product developm ent overall. A nd that appealed to  
Jaguar because th ey’d have the best o f  both worlds: (a) they’d stay independent and (b) 
they could call on a m uch larger range o f  parts. Rather than ev o lv e  their ow n air bags
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they could call on GM  and ask “D o you have an airbag unit that fits this profile?” . So  
that’s w hy I think GM looked very attractive to them.
The price Ford paid for Jaguar was, quite frankly, incredible. Why didn’t you come 
in with an offer below the share price in the market?
Ford w ould probably have done that, except w e had it on very good authority that GM  
had already put a bid in at pretty c lose  to the market price, so their Board w ould  have 
been justified  in saying “Y o u ’ve bid a couple o f  pounds under the market price and 
y o u ’v e  bid a couple o f  pounds under a competitor, w hy in the world w ould w e  take your 
bid?” So in present hindsight the price is much too high. It w ill take a long tim e to pay 
back. But again, it w as a lw ays thought to be a ten-year payback period, and, again, 
people forget that instantly w hen a com pany loses m oney, but there w as no deluding the 
Board that the decision they w ere m aking w as a ten year one, not a tw o year one.
Were you at all worried that you were going to get into a shooting match with GM?
Y es, and therefore w e  had lim its that w e w ould go to. W e never had a lim it that w as as 
high as the stockmarket price, because w e had a w hole set o f  calculations show ing that at 
such and such a price and such and such econom ic and volum e assum ptions over the next 
ten years here w ould be your return, including what investm ents you ’d have to m ake over 
tim e, and that price w as not as high as the stockmarket price. A s it w as it w as slightly  
higher than what w e believed  G M  had.
Wasn’t Egan trying to play you off against GM?
N ot that overtly, but m y guess is he w as. The minute it becam e clear that w e  w ere w illing  
to bid slightly higher than GM  it d idn’t matter how  big w as his ace in the hole, it had just 
been cooked. And that’s w hy I a lw ays admired John’s ability to then be co-operative  
after he knew  the gam e w as up. H e thought he had this careful defence w ith the G olden  
Share He had another defence with G M  standing behind him offering all this c o ­
operation. And so he thought h e ’d not only  built a good com pany but h e’d built a good  
restraining wall around it. W hen Ford cam e trampling over the restraining w all o f  course 
his original reaction w ould  be negative, but once he knew the gam e w as up his only  
interest w as in preserving Jaguar. I f  h e ’d really been out o f  sorts he’d have quit the day 
after the bid w as successfu l, but he didn’t; he was there for another five or six  m onths.
He worked hard at the integration, he worked hard at trying to make sure that the right 
things were integrated and the right things were locked into place. He worked hard at 
trying to inform the Ford people about the problems that Jaguar had. So it w asn ’t like he 
just sat there.
- 2 5 -
APPENDIX
Didn’t he have a very hard time accepting the Transition Report?
He did. Again I’ll use the analogy o f  you  raising a child and just as he starts to bloom  
som ebody e lse  w rites a report about it that’s dam ning in alm ost every w ay. A s a parent 
you ’d react pretty badly. And the report w as worded in a w ay as to be w h olly  insensitive.
I don’t know  i f  it w asn’t 100% accurate by the way. But it’s just hearing your faults 
called out in public in quite an abrasive w ay. H is successor, B ill Hayden, w as not very 
diplom atic. H aving said that, one o f  things B ill did w as start getting the quality better. 
Every com pany m easures its end o f  line quality as best it can. W hen w e took over, the 
XJ40 on our m easurem ents w as five tim es worst that the Scorpio. F ive tim es! Before B ill 
retired it w as better. That’s alm ost im possible because one o f  the things that w as an 
albatross around h is neck w as that supply quality w as lousy, and yet w hen you w ent to 
the suppliers and really started to raise the roof about them not building parts to 
specification it becam e pretty clear that i f  they built to specification you cou ldn’t put the 
car together. It w as engineered so  loosely  that they had accom m odated the engineering  
deficiencies by m odifying the parts on an informal basis, so that when you were trying to 
hammer them on the head saying you ’v e  got to have better quality, better prices, better 
productivity etc etc and y o u ’ve  got to build to specification they w ere saying “Y es, okay, 
I’ll do that, but what happens to your cost curves? You w on ’t be able to build anything”. 
D espite that, B ill got up the quality better than the Scorpio, and the Scorpio’s a pretty 
good quality car. So, w h ile his public statem ents were, I think, unfortunate, particularly in 
talking about things like Brow ns Lane being no better than Gorky, stu ff like that, which  
was meant for internal impact but w hich unfortunately w as said in public, the things he 
did had to be done i f  Jaguar w as ever to be a successful com pany. And, as you know , i f  
you w ent to Jaguar today com pared to 1986 you ’d see a lot o f  the sam e faces.
Of the senior people, only John Egan, Jim Randle, and Pat Audrain have gone. Is 
that correct?
Y es, other than the natural retirements: Kenneth Edwards21 and Graham W hitehead22. O f  
course M ike D ale w ho w as N um ber T w o to Graham in the U S replaced him . But I’m 
pretty pleased that the likes o f  B ob  D over23, M ike B easley, John Edwards, D avid B oo le24, 
and R oger Putnam are all still there. I f  Ford had been as bad as a lot o f  people m ade out 
in its stewardship they’d have all been gone. For starters they all made a hell o f  a lot o f  
m oney on the takeover, so they w eren’t econom ically  desperate. O f course M ike B easley  
used to work for Ford years ago, used to work for B ill Hayden specifically  years ago. Jim  
Randle w asn’t acrim onious either. Jim w as just at a different pace and with Lexus 
com ing out with new  cars every thirty-six m onths, and Jaguar thinking seventy-tw o  
months w as a big rush. Jim w as m ore academ ic, he was more theoretical, and he w as a 
perfectionist. You kinda admire guys w ho say “M y God, I’m never going to release this
21 Kenneth Edwards was a member o f the Jaguar Main Board, responsible for personnel, and was also 
Company Secretary.
22 Graham Whitehead CBE. President o f Jaguar Inc, Jaguar’s North American distribution company,
and a member o f the Jaguar Main Board.
23 Bob Dover joined Jaguar in 1987 as the Executive Board member responsible for manufacturing.
24 David Boole. Jaguar’s Director o f Communications and Public Affairs, and a member o f  the 
Executive Board.
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car until it’s good enough, until it’s perfect”. W ell you’ve got to have a com prom ise  
between som ething that’s perfect from a technical, engineering standpoint, and som ething  
that’s com m ercially  viable, and 1 think Ford pressure to try and speed up the w hole  
process sat uncom fortably with Jim, so that’s w hy he left. But Jim w as one o f  the few  
people that left directly because o f  the Ford takeover. The other people either adapted to 
the style or the Ford takeover had very little effect, like David B oole  or R oger Putnam.
Was it a relief for David Boole to have got the City out of his hair? I believed that 
Jaguar never really knew how to handle the City.
I could tell that in our m eetings, because again I w as in charge o f  Wall Street’s relations 
with Ford when I w as in the U S years ago. I knew how  I dealt with those people, and 
then I saw  the w ay that D avid B o o le  dealt with you guys at som e o f  these m eetings. It 
w as alm ost an arrogance that had built up because o f  the success o f  the com pany in the 
last few  years, and o f  course I found that uncom fortable, but that’s what had worked at 
Jaguar, and it w as going  to be irrelevant after w e bought Jaguar.
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Transcript of the interview with Bob Dale on 3rd May 2007
What was Lucas supplying to the Series III in the early 1980s?
Pretty w ell everything w e  m ade. But there w ere few  diesel cars in those days, so with the 
exception o f  C A V 25 it w as pretty w ell m ost everything else. Certainly you have the full 
range o f  electrical equipm ent, w ithout too m any exceptions. Starters, alternators, ignition  
system s, fuel injection system s, sw itchgear, relays, G irling disc brakes, RISTS wiring  
harnesses. I think it was the full range o f  Lucas equipm ent with the exception o f  CA V. 
And, o f  course, the aftermarket support before Unipart becam e responsible for that.
How much truth was there in Egan’s assertion in the early 1980s that 60% of the 
faults on the Series III could be attributed to suppliers?
(Great laughter!!) I’ve no idea about the 60% . That’s such a general figure. It sounds a bit 
like John Egan-speak to me. G iven that Jaguar w as largely an assem bler it w ould have 
been heavily  dependent on suppliers for everything it didn’t m ake for itself, naturally. So, 
i f  you include in suppliers sheet steel, nuts and bolts etc you can see that Jaguar’s added- 
value content m ight only have been 40%  o f  the total final value. So i f  h e ’s saying that 
60% o f  the problem s cam e from the suppliers w ho represented 60%  o f  the added value, 
I’m sure that’s not a correct figure. I think that what is true is that in the 1970s the 
com ponent supply industry had as poor a quality and reliability reputation as the British 
vehicle assem blers. W e w ere all tarred with the sam e brush, and w e w ere w ithout a doubt 
in the Am erican perception o f  British veh icles seen as being bloody unreliable. A s you  
know , the on ly  veh icles w e  w ere exporting to the U S in the late 1960s and early 1970s  
were sports cars, and prestige cars like the Jaguar. The sports cars, Triumph and M G, had 
a b loody awful reputation, including the electrical equipm ent. The electrical equipm ent 
w as notoriously unreliable in North Am erica. That w as partially dow n to the fact that it 
w as having to put up with temperature changes w hich were never experienced in Britain. 
Our temperatures in Britain rarely got dow n to OF or up to l 10F. People w ere used to 
working within a m uch m ore m odest temperature range, and som e o f  our electrical 
equipm ent w as temperature sensitive, or had water ingress problems.
Was this a specification problem rather than a component part problem?
Yes. Talking about industry generally, the British motor industry in the 1970s w as a total 
m ess. C om panies had been cobbled together. The w hole BLM C syndrom e. And it was 
driven by Leyland initially. The concept o f  having a nationalised m otor industry driven 
by a com pany that hadn’t had a great deal o f  success, ranging from trucks to production 
cars! If there w as one thing that w as required it w as focus. And, o f  course, in those days 
m ost veh icles being sold to the British were still British-made, so there w as an elem ent o f  
com placency, an elem ent o f  disorganisation, and that m ost certainly fed over into the 
com ponents industry. Lucas in the m id 1970s w as fat, a bit lazy, not too w ell organised, 
was carrying a lot o f  loss-m akers because it had to carry them , not producing anything  
that w as acceptable or adequate, and w as sym ptom atic o f  m any others in the com ponents
25 CAV was the Lucas subsidiary supplying components for diesel engines.
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industry, with one or tw o notable exceptions. Had it not been for the constant velocity  
joint, which w as developed in G erm any and w as a real winner, GKN w ould have been in 
serious trouble. They w ere carrying businesses. And this w hole attitude o f  industry in the 
1970s: poor m anagem ent, d ifficu lt trade unions, poor investm ent for the future, liv ing on 
a day-to-day basis. I don’t know  how  w e  got through. We wasted a lot o f  tim e on 
m eetings with trade unions and so  forth ju st to get through the next m onth. And this was 
happening in the m otor industry. It certainly happened at Jaguar. And it’s easy  to blame 
everybody e lse  because the blam e culture com es into it.
Any comment on Egan’s address to the Automotive News World Congress ’82 when 
he stated Jaguar was making suppliers pay for costs re defective parts?
I w asn’t actually dealing with Jaguar at that tim e. From 1981 to 1985 I w as running 
Lucas World Service w hich w ere the international service operations. 1 do rem em ber 
m eetings with Jaguar on service issu es w hich  included warranty and I do recall where w e  
had a contractual arrangement sitting. D idn’t w e honour our warranty obligations? I think 
there’s a bit o f  John Egan speak here: “I’ve  got the suppliers to take their responsibilities 
seriously” . W ell m y answer to that is that there w as never a tim e when w e  d idn’t take our 
warranty responsibilities seriously. I d on ’t ever recall us failing to do so, although w e  
w ould argue naturally about the lim its o f  certain warranty issues, especia lly  i f  there w as 
any suggestion o f  a recall because that’s w hen it w ould get truly expensive. N on e o f  our 
com ponents failed, particularly brakes, o f  course, where there w as a safety issue at stake. 
If there w as any suggestion o f  a recall being required where all veh icles had to taken back 
to the dealers and checked, a h igh ly  exp en sive  exercise, w e would certainly argue the 
toss. W e w ould want to be absolutely  sure that (a) it w as a com ponent problem  and it was 
ours, and had been fitted by the manufacturer or even by the dealer, depending on the 
com ponent, and (b) that a total recall w as necessary, because it w as very easy  to have a 
recall that som eone e lse  w as paying for. Under those circum stances w e w ou ld  take issue  
with a manufacturer. That aside, I don ’t remem ber there being any major issues with  
veh icle manufacturers about Lucas warranty in any w ay being reneged upon. W here it 
becam e a little bit m ore d ifficu lt w as w here warranties becam e extended to three years. 
W hen you m ake a m ove such as that you have to be sure that your suppliers are 
com petent, be confident that their products can survive the three year warranty. That 
becam e a bigger issue later. A utom ation in manufacturing techniques certainly allow ed  
us to improve our products so  that in the 1970s w e could underwrite 12 m on th /12,000  
m iles warranties, tw o year warranties by the 1980s, and three-year warranties by the 
1990s.
- 2 9 -
APPENDIX
What did Lucas supply to the XJ40?
It may not have been starters, and p ossib ly  not alternators, since in 1986 w e sold  our 
Starters and Alternators business to M agnetti M orelli. But, in any case, I think that 
Starters w as now  with som eone e lse  -  it m ight have been Bosch. The sw itchgear products 
w ould have been Lucas, and w iring harnesses w ould have been R1STS, and G irling disc  
brakes, but there m ight have a second  supplier here. I doubt very much i f  the d isc brakes 
gave any problem s. I’m fairly confident that the warranty issues on the X J40 w as not a 
Lucas problem, but som eone e ls e ’s problem . I w ould say that that w as m ore a Jaguar 
thing; either failure to specify  exactly , or a change in specification, w hich w as  
incidentally an on-goin g problem in Britain until the discipline brought by the Japanese. 
N issan, in particular, brought that into proper perspective. But w e, the com ponent 
industry, w ere constantly faced w ith post-production changes in specification . It w as a 
nightmare, especia lly  in the early 1980s. Talk about oops! Only three m onths into 
production and “w e  want this and that changed”. Generally you’d often find a re-spec, 
say, three m onths after launch; p ossib ly  a fitting, or an up-rating. W e w ere often faced  
with a re-spec after launch. It’s absolute turm oil, and often the assem blers w ou ldn’t pay 
for the new  products. I think that com ponent failure on the XJ40 was com pounded by  
arrogance on the part o f  Jaguar, seein g  it as a car that w ill never fail.
A good exam ple o f  a design fault w as the transverse engine on the M ini and the open  
grill. They put the electrics betw een the engine and the grill. It w as a low  slung car, so  in 
w et conditions water poured through the grill unto the electrics (distributor co il etc), 
leading to shorting. So it w as put dow n to being a problem with the electrics. T his is what 
happened in the 1960s. The ignition problem  w as obvious to everyone. Their answ er w as 
to shove a cover betw een the grill and the electrics -  but the radiator is supposed to cool 
the engine, so the engine now  w as overheating. The problem w as a design fault in putting 
the ignition on the wrong side o f  the engine, but it w as seen as another case o f  ‘B loody  
Lucas! This obvious exam ple repeats itself. The chances are that it’s go ing  to be an 
applications fault because o f  h ow  or w here it’s fitted.
You said you had a lot of contact with Egan in the late 1980s. What was it largely 
about?
It w as a com bination o f  things. Y ou  have to remember that the years 1986 to 1990 were 
very good years for the econom y. T hey w ere good years for exports. The m otor industry 
in Britain w as doing w e ll, w ith tw o  m illion  veh icles being produced per annum. Under 
those circum stances the British m otor com ponent suppliers were w ell p laced to do w ell. 
Coupled with the fact that a lot o f  those suppliers were exporting to Europe and North  
Am erica. So those w ere very good  years. I remember a number o f  m eetings that John 
Egan had with com ponent suppliers at Brow ns Lane, and it w as all about growth, 
expansion, new  markets. It w as very bullish. It w as all about building and building. The 
technical centre w as rumoured at one point to be a new  production plant. W e had quite a 
few  fish to fry. The Japanese w ere arriving. John w as looking for com m itm ent from  
suppliers given the expansion o f  the industry. Jaguar with its m easly 50 ,000  veh icles  
m ight have been put on the back burner. That was all good stuff.
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How tight were they on pricing?
They were quite professional. The industry had m oved on from what w as sloppy. Jaguar, 
like all manufacturers, w as into continuous im provem ent in a big way. Continuous 
improvement becam e a watchword. Y ou have to im prove on performance, you have to  
improve on product reliability, you  have to im prove on price. T hose w ere the m essages  
w e were getting from all the manufacturers, including Jaguar. So there w as nothing cosy  
at all. There w as a lot o f  European com petition. Jaguar w ere pretty hard-nosed, as they all 
were by then.
What about the reduction in prices demanded by Egan in 1988/89?
Com placency is an unfortunate British habit. The XJ40 w as a premature launch. “Just in 
tim e” was a w ay o f  reducing costs, w arehousing etc, but the Japanese had done that 
successfully in the past in the sense they had tied suppliers, ow ned by the manufacturers, 
or were directed by the manufacturer, w h ose  factories w ere next door to the assem bly  
plant. The discipline o f  “just in tim e” had becom e w ell established in Japan. The idea o f  
“just in tim e” w as adopted as a concept, but the practicality o f  “just in tim e” in Britain 
w as not seen as feasible, or w as seen as too risky. I can’t honestly  say that Jaguar 
implemented “just in tim e” with their suppliers in the w ay that it w as understood. It w as  
very much a T oyota system  in Japan. It w as all good stuff. There w ere lots o f  Japanese- 
style watchwords com ing through, som e o f  w hich w ere not entirely appropriate to a small 
specialist car manufacturer.
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Transcript of the interview with Mike Dale on 17th June 2007 
How would you describe the relationship between Jaguar Inc and Browns Lane?
Hostile in the sense that you had a bunch o f  people in Jaguar Cars Inc w h o ’d gone  
through the M G/Triumph situation. W e had consistently put dealer bodies together, 
which I did in the 1970s to sell M G and Triumph, w hich turned the US into one o f  the 
few profitable parts o f  the world for BL. It w as an enorm ous amount o f  hard work. Jaguar 
was a very sm all part o f  the business, on ly  about 3 ,000 -4 ,000  cars a year, out o f  a total o f  
60 ,000-70 ,000 , so it w as neither here nor there. It w as nice. It w as the cream  on the 
pudding as it were. But the cars steadily got w orse from a quality point o f  v iew . N obody  
in the UK listened. And I’m talking about Sir W illiam  [Lyons] and “L ofty” England.26 
We did studies o f  the problem . I rem em ber handing this book o f  a study that Guy  
Larkin27 had done at m y behest; a com parison with M ercedes B enz dealerships. W e’re 
talking 1970/71 here. It w as handed to Lofty England w ho just put it in h is briefcase.28 
We were enraged really by the fact that the Brits just didn’t understand w hat a savage  
marketplace the U S w as turning into, particularly with the advent o f  the Japanese, and o f  
course w e ’d gone through the TR 7 debacle, which w as horrendous.29 W hen John Egan 
came into the business m ost o f  us had other jobs on offer, and, I have to say this for John, 
he was the first British autom obile execu tive, bar none, w ho liked the U S. Sir W illiam  
didn’t like com ing here. The BL people had a very old boy, snobbish British attitude 
towards it. They thought it w as fick le. It w as, i f  you made crap, and w e certainly did.
John cam e as an absolutely trem endous breath o f  fresh air, and y o u ’ll see it reflected in 
the Fortune article in 1986,30 because he did make an honest attempt at fix in g  the quality. 
He w as listening, he w as straight up about the w hole thing, and he displayed considerable  
personal courage. There w as no doubt about that. And w e believed  him. T hey did m ake 
as good an effort as they could  to  change things. But for fundamental reasons John w as  
embarked on an im possib le task. N ob od y , nobody could have saved Jaguar in the 1980s, 
and I say that in retrospect having w orked for a professional com pany31 for ten years.
That w as an education in itself. John at that stage inherited a com pany in the U S that w as  
angry that M G and Triumph had just been thrown away, particularly as w e ’d built it into 
one o f  the m ost profitable franchises in the U S. W e have N A D A 32 input out o f  the 1970s
26 “Lofty” England was Jaguar Deputy Chairman and joint Managing Director at this time.
27 Guy Larkin at the time was one o f  the District Service Managers for Jaguar-Rover-Triumph Inc.
28 In an e-mail o f  7 August 2007 to the author, Mike Dale elaborated on this incident: “As soon as I took 
over US Sales and marketing for Jaguar in 1970 I was appalled by the quality level and tried to do 
something about it. Guy [Larkin] came up with the idea that he should take a Mercedes Jaguar dual 
dealer and examine its service records for both marques over a period o f three months. He did so and the 
comparison showed Jaguar to be in a hopelessly uncompetitive position. Sir William and Lofty England 
visited the States shortly afterwards and I made a presentation to them on the subject. Sir William took 
the book and without a word handed it to Lofty and that was the last we ever heard about it”.
29 Whisler notes that the build quality and reliability o f the Triumph TR7 sports car was harshly criticised 
by motoring and consumer testers, and that “a complete redesign o f the model in 1978 could not shake 
the initial negative image”. The model was discontinued in 1981. (Whisler, Timothy R. The British 
Motor Industry 1945-1994. A Case Study in Industrial Decline. (Oxford, 1999). p351).
30 Dale, Michael. “How we rebuilt Jaguar in the US”. Fortune. 28 April 1986.
31 Dale is referring here to the Ford Motor Company.
32 National Automobile Dealers Association.
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to show  that. And they just destroyed it. W e went to see M ichael Edwardes and w hen I 
explained to him what w as going on he got up and said “ W ell I think I’ll leave before I 
get depressed”, and that w as all the reaction w e got. Toyota offered m e a job , and it w as a 
really good one. It w ould have doubled m y salary, and I w as really seriously thinking 
about it when w e w ent through the M G situation, but based on John I stayed. John sold  
h im self very w ell, both inside and outside the com pany, and he did do a lot o f  good  
things to begin w ith, but the relationship between the U S com pany and Brow ns Lane 
w asn’t good. W e knew  they [Brow ns Lane] were incom petent, and they proved it over 
several decades. John w as trying to change that, but there’s no doubt about it that within  
Jaguar in the UK, and it probably existed all the w ay through the 1990s, the attitude was 
“the bloody-m inded Yanks com ing  and beating our heads in”.
But the [Egan] Board, early on, had the brilliant idea o f  handing the U S distribution over 
to Lincoln M ercury w hich w ould have taken us back to the dark ages o f  the distributors.33 
Ed M cC auley34 and I had spent ten years buying them out, and it w as one o f  the reasons 
w e w ere so profitable in the 1970s. The reason stated to us w as that Lincoln Mercury 
were prepared to offer sales o f  10,000 cars in the first year o f  business. T his w as a big 
temptation to a com pany desperate for sales and w ould have been a life  saver in the short 
term. H ow ever, it w ould have taken over the w orld’s largest market at the tim e and given  
away at least 5%  o f  the margin forever, plus losing control o f  h a lf the production line 
volum e. They w ould have had their hands around our necks and could have wrung all 
sorts o f  concessions from us in bad tim es just to keep the production lines going. In 
addition, when w e bought all the BL distributors w e literally took their m argin and, 
through the centralisation o f  buildings, computerisation etc, did not replace any o f  their 
overheads. It w as an enorm ously profitable deal and it left the factory, not an independent 
distributor, in direct touch w ith the dealers. K eeping the hard w on distribution rights 
within the factory m anagem ent w as the key to turning Jaguar around from both a profit 
and volum e point o f  v iew . It had taken ten years o f  hard work by Ed M cC auley and 
m y se lf  to buy the distributors, and w e w ere bloody angry that once again w e  w ere  
w orking for an inexperienced m anagem ent that didn’t understand how  to market in the 
US. It took us years to convince the BL lot to do it, and that they agreed show s that not 
everything they did w as bad. The negotiations w ith Lincoln M ercury w ere kept secret by 
the Board because they didn’t want us to desert ship, but w e had friends in Lincoln  
M ercury w ho told us about it. W e w ere enraged, and when I told Graham W hitehead that 
w e knew , he alm ost had a heart attack. W hy he hadn’t pointed out the problem s 
im m ediately the idea w as m ooted is a m ystery, but he certainly did after Ed M cC auley  
and I pointed out to him the error o f  the Board’s thinking! W e never trusted the Board 
from then on.
We had plenty o f  reason to shout at the factory when w e found ourselves on the receiving  
end o f  things like XJ40. W e had a tow ing policy  in the event o f  breakdowns. W e sold  
about 20 ,000  cars the first year and w e  tow ed 40 ,000  tim es. In theory w e tow ed  every  
single veh icle  tw ice. There w as a free tow ing service, and in the first year w e did 40 ,000  
tow s. W ell w e only sold 20 ,0 0 0  cars, and w e didn’t start the year with 20 ,000 . It w as
33 At this time Jaguar’s North American distribution was handled by Jaguar-Rover-Triumph Inc (JRT Inc), 
a wholly-owned subsidiary o f  BL. It was not until 1982 that the North American company came under 
Jaguar’s direct control and its name changed to Jaguar Inc.
34 Ed McCauley was the Treasurer o f  JRT Inc/Jaguar Inc.
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20 ,0 0 0  at the end o f  the year. X J40 w asn ’t just bad, it w as stunningly bad! I’ll g ive  you a 
nice statistic to sh ow  you how  bad it w as. We learned in 1995 when you looked at the 
five-year JD Pow er results it show ed that the Lexus 4 0 0  in its first five  years o f  life had 
the sam e num ber o f  d efects  that the X J40 had on the 1990 X J40 in three m onths. What is 
more the 1990 w as a far better veh icle  than the 1989 m odel. So, w e w ere on a licking to 
nothing. W e had about 2 0 0  engineers. W e had Jim Randle, and Jim, n ice man, had no 
training in producing a car for production. BM W  at that tim e w as sitting on 200  engineers 
just keep ing a m odel line going . Jim Randle w as trying to run tw o m odel lines, the XJ-S  
and the Series III, and w as trying to put the XJ40 together on 2 0 0  engineers. So he could  
have been a genius, but it w ou ld n ’t have worked.
What were the main problems with the XJ40?
You w ou ld n ’t know  w here to start. The on ly  good thing about the car w as the engine. It 
w as very sound, so  w as the gearbox, and the rear axle. Everything from door handles, 
door m otors, w indow s, the bodyw ork didn’t fit, the w ind noise w as horrendous, to the 
se lf-lev e llin g  suspension -  absolutely  b loody hopeless: it seized  up, it collapsed . The 
w indow s w ou ld n ’t work, the door locks gave up, the doors w ou ld n ’t shut because they  
didn’t fit, and w e w ere plagued w ith w ind noise and water leaks. It d idn’t overheat, which  
w as a first for a Jaguar.35 M alcolm  O liver, w ho worked for m e and w as the project 
engineer on the X J40, told m e in retrospect, in the 1990s, that there w ere over 2 5 0  things 
that w e knew  w ere w rong w ith the car that w e  sim ply cou ldn’t fix  because there just  
w asn’t tim e, there just w asn ’t the engineering ability. In other w ords the Jaguar 
m anagem ent, all o f  us, had tw o  th ings going  for us: w e  w ere on a licking for nothing, and 
w e didn’t know  it because w e  w ere enthusiastic, full o f  passion for Jaguar. Everybody, 
including the UK . Hard w orking people. I’m not talking about laziness here. Som e o f  
them survived B ill H ayden, w h ich  is saying som ething. John and I fell out over som e  
things as th ings changed, the X J40, for instance. W ith the XJ40 w e  had a system  by then 
that w hen they w ent through pre-delivery inspection at the port. W e could  tell 
im m ediately whether w e ’d got a problem  car because w e ’d got lots o f  com parable data 
with previous veh icles, so  w e  knew  w hether w e ’d have to rebuild the thing dow n there at 
the port. T h is w as shortly after the U S  launch in early 1987, so  th is w as before w e  got 
into the Fall o f  1987. W ithin a few  w eek s w e  knew  w e had a problem . A s  a result I went 
over and se e  John w ith all th is data and said “Y ou ’ve got a disaster on your hands”. John 
said to m e about a w eek  or tw o  later “Y o u ’ve put m e in a panic for absolutely nothing etc
35 Mike Dale added in an e-mail o f  13 July 2007 to the author: “Things like air conditioning and cruise 
control were standard on all the US models, and they did add to the quality problems. More parts always 
bring that risk, but it was not that sort o f  thing that brought the car to its knees. If you left the vehicle for 
more than a  few days the batteries went flat. The battery was good for thirty days even if  fully charged 
because o f  the drain from all the sleeping electrical devices. A lot o f  our vehicles were owned by people 
who travelled, and left their cars at airports and came back to find the car immobilised. The windows 
wouldn’t work, the door locks gave up, the self levelling suspension seized up. The doors wouldn’t shut 
because they didn’t fit, and we were plagued with wind noise and water leaks” .
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etc”, and he and I did not see  eye-to -eye  over the w h ole  thing at a ll.36 A few  m onths later 
he cam e to the US, and he w ent to the opening o f  the new  dealership dow n in T exas o f  
the Jaguar Dealer C ouncil Chairman, G ene Fisher, w ho really w as one o f  the heroes o f  
the w hole thing here. H e’s dead now . G ene had just put this trem endous dealership  
together. Q uite a number o f  the dealers here w ent bankrupt; quite a large percentage. We 
lost som e really good  dealers as a result o f  the X J40. There w as deep feelin g  o f  anger in 
the m anagem ent o f  Jaguar Cars Inc towards the UK  because once again they’d done it to 
us with X J40.37
Another thing that John and I could  not see  eye  to eye  over w as building a convertible  
from the XJ-S. It w as patently obviously  by 1981 or 1982 that the coupe market over here 
w asn’t go ing  to m ake it, 80%  o f  the E-types w e sold  w ere drop-heads anyw ay. W e 
needed a convertible. Jim Randle, w hen John cam e on board, had reputedly said “I have 
three w ishes to keep Jaguar perfect, and you must grant m e these three w ish es”. One o f  
these w as that Jaguar w ould not m ake a convertible out o f  the XJ-S. He d idn’t think it 
w as feasible. I w as m ore full o f  enthusiasm  than ability. K now ing that Chrysler had done 
a really good bunch o f  convertib les for this market through com panies like H ess and 
Eisenhardt, o f f  I w ent to H ess and Eisenhardt, and a couple o f  other com panies, and 
asked them i f  they could m ake a convertible out o f  this. Som e really funny things 
happened. First, w e sent them  drawings and w e sent them the car. They found that the 
drawings didn’t match the car. Our manufacturing m ethods w ere really out o f  the 1930s 
and 1940s! A nyw ay, w e  paid H ess and Eisenhardt to m ake a convertible, and it w as  
beautiful. So, w hen John cam e out w e  show ed it to him . John apparently had som e  
agreem ent that before the contract to build it w as signed there w ould be a quality s ig n -o ff  
by the factory, but 1 d on ’t know  what happened there. W e built 2 ,0 0 0  o f  them  and I think 
w e sold them three tim es because w e  bought every one o f  them  back tw ice . W hat had 
happened w as that they had to load up the back end o f  the car w ith so  m uch stu ff to m ake 
it strong again after th ey ’d taken the ro o f o f f  that the rear suspension co llapsed , and they  
had to keep jack ing it up. But in the m eantim e what had happened w as that w e ’d shipped  
it to England and o f  course the guys there, and there w ere a lot o f  good gu ys there, said 
“ W e can m ake it better than th is” . Jim w as not very happy w ith m e about this. I ruined 
H ess and Eisenhardt, w h o w ent bankrupt. The only really good thing that happened out o f  
it o f  course w as the XJ-S convertib le w hich w as really an elegant car. Jim did a really  
good job  on that. But w e ’re back into this business o f  nobody’s a v illain , nobod y’s pure 
either. There’s good, bad all over the place. Jim did a fine job  on m aking the XJ-S
36 Mike Dale added in an e-mail o f 13 July 2007 to the author: “I can only guess at why John had not been 
told o f the quality problems in the UK. There was an arrogance about the UK Board which may have 
blinded them, but I don’t think there was anyone in the senior management who had the data, or the 
courage, to tell John even if  they knew. British customers at that time were far more forgiving o f poor 
quality and in a small country a car is not the vital device that it is in the US where public transport 
outside o f the cities is not good. As one British engineer said wonderingly one day ‘A car in the US is 
just like a pair o f  shoes’. The US was easily the most brutal market in the world at that time because 
there were more manufacturers competing here than anywhere else in an unprotected market. The UK 
people were living in a protected universe. We weren’t. The Japanese had changed everything.”
37 Mike Dale added in an e-mail o f  7 August 2007 to the Author: “Nothing, absolutely nothing, decides an 
auto company’s profitability more than residuals. Over half Jaguar’s profit turnaround in the 1990s came 
from an increase in the XJ40/XJ8 residuals o f $9,000 per car. You cannot have good residuals without 
good quality. It is impossible.”
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convertible, and, o f  course, the sa les just took o ff.38 It kept the car going really for another 
ten years.
Didn't John Egan appreciate the real problem he had with the XJ40?
N o, not to begin w ith. He did after h e ’d been to the Gene Fisher opening. A t that point 
John flipped 180 degrees. The reason I know  that is that he arrived back on a Saturday 
m orning in the UK , and didn’t even  w ait to get out o f  the airport before he w as wringing  
Jim Randle’s ass. The reason I know  this is that an hour later I get a call from Jim Randle 
saying “ What have you done to m e? Y o u ’ve  shot m e in the back. I’ve  just had John on 
the phone telling m e that the X J40 is a disaster” . I said “ W ell, Jim, three m onths ago, i f  
you remember, you w ere telling  m e I w as panicking you all for no bloody reason”. It was 
John w ho had said it, but the penny hadn’t dropped with Jim either. A lthough John hadn’t 
accepted it at first, to his credit after h e ’d seen G ene Fisher, he w as quick to take action. 
G ene Fisher knew  the deep trouble he w as in.39 This guy w as a m ulti-m illionaire and he 
ended up as a $16 0 ,0 0 0  a year salesm an in a dealership dow n there. So you can see w hy  
there w as a certain am ount o f  anger with the UK . T hese w ere good friends o f  ours w ho  
laid their lives on the line. Jim Randle has got an eg o  that hides under a “I’m  a terribly, 
terribly hum ble man” m ask. Ford fired him. Jim w as not a realist, he lived in a little 
world all o f  his ow n.
What about the Series III? Were the improvements all illusion?
N ot all. The car defin itely  did im prove. I can’t g ive you faults per thousand o f f  the top o f  
m y head, but JD Pow er w ould still have the records.40 It did im prove, there’s no question  
about that, but som e things w e  never solved . For instance, the Borg Warner transm ission. 
It w as good for 30 ,000  m iles, but after that you were liv ing on borrowed tim e. There was 
no w ay w e  could have afforded to engineer a new  one. W e just didn’t have the m oney for 
a new  gear box. So w e  just handled that at the dealer level, and w e  did things w hich  w ere  
technically  illegal, but m orally absolutely correct. W e looked after the custom er. The 
V 12 had a rear bearings seal leak. A t the tim e I w as as naive and uneducated as the rest o f  
them on how  to run an autom obile business. W e’d done som e individually good  things 
over here, but, as I learned to m y cost, it w as a different world w ith Ford. W e didn’t 
know  that the crank w asn ’t straight. It w aggled! Som e o f  them w ould be straight, but the 
trouble w as that you didn’t know  w hich  ones w ould be straight. B ill H ayden w as just 
what Jaguar needed. The w h ole  com pany w as com placent. They sim ply w ere not
38 Mike Dale added in an e-mail o f  7 August 2007 to the author: “The explosion in XJ-S sales came from 
the convertible, and it would have been sooner if  Randle and Egan had listened to the US”.
39 Mike Dale added in an e-mail o f 7 August 2007 to the author: “Gene Fisher said that the 5.5 million 
miles testing o f the XJ40 had been accomplished by 5.5 million Englishmen driving one mile each.
There certainly was enough testing to show the middle management that there were tremendous faults in 
the vehicle, but there was no real avenue to get them actioned, and, even if  there had been, we did not 
have the engineering resources to fix them”.
40 The J D Power Company refused to allow the author access to these records. In an e-mail o f 30
November 2006 to the Author, the J D Power Corporate Communications Department stated that “We 
do not have a publicly-available archive for the kind o f information you are looking for regarding 
Jaguar” . Consequently the J D Power data used in this thesis are the summaries published in various 
editions o f Automotive News.
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prepared to respond to the m arketplace in a practical manner. I’d been fighting for 
cupholders, for instance, for fifteen years. N ick  Scheele walked in there and said “N o  
cupholders?” A ll o f  a sudden w e had cupholders. N ick  Scheele, in my opinion, w as the 
best leader Jaguar ever had, and I include the ow ner o f  the original com pany. It w as a 
total change in attitude and professionalism . Ford really were professionals. O ne o f  the 
great stories about B ill Hayden w as that he w alks into the Radford factory, and by now  
Bill had understood there’s som ething wrong with the V I 2 change, and com es across this 
great big m achine that’s there for checking V 12 cranks. So B ill walks around the thing, 
goes up to the guy w ho runs the place and says “H ow  often is this used?” “Oh, 100% o f  
them are checked” . W ell, he goes around all the m anagem ent, right dow n to the factory 
floor, and as he got closer to the floor it w as “w ell, w e check 10%”, “w e  check 5%”,
“w ell 1%”. Everybody’s getting a bit shifty, so he stopped work and got everybody  
around the m achine. “N o w ”, he said “you sons o f  bitches have all told m e different 
stories. This m achine runs on electricity and I want one o f  you to show  m e where you  
connect it to the electricity”. N ob od y knew! B ill just ripped into the com pany. H alf the 
Board went. People like B ob D over w ere just broken. XJ40? I told you what a lot o f  crap 
it was. W hen w e look at the J D  Pow er report in 1997 for the five years for the 1992  
m odel year, w hich starts in July 1991, it w as an average car in the U S. B ill H ayden had to 
change the production line, he had to change the suppliers, he had to change the design. 
He got in there and brought discip line and process to that veh icle  w hich nobody in the 
com pany before had had the ability to do. It’s interesting that y o u ’v e  got people like 
M ike B easley  w ho learned a lot from B ill Hayden in a short space o f  tim e under heavy  
pressure, and survived. H alf o f  the others didn’t. G oing back, John really w orked hard at 
healing the rift betw een North A m erica and the UK , and he did it by putting m e on the 
product com m ittee, I w as on the styling com m ittee. H e really did m ake an effort.
Did you have any input into the design of the XJ40?
In the sense o f  go ing  to England and arguing over trim, and that sort o f  thing, then yes, 
quite a lot. John gave us m ore freedom  than anyone one had before. O f  course, Jim  
Randle didn’t react very w ell to that; he regarded it as his territory. The interior o f  the 
XJ40 that Jim Randle had designed w as so  awful just to look at that w e  insisted upon a 
clin ic here in the U S, and at the sam e tim e got to dress up an interior a long the lines o f  
the Vanden Plas w hich had started o f f  as a Series III. The critique o f  the base m odel was 
so bad that it w as quite clear that the car w as unsaleable. It really w as that bad. The 
feedback on the interior o f  the Vanden Plas m odel said that i f  w e  did som e things to it 
then it w ould be OK. Jim, this w as in a product m eeting, w as appalled by the fact that the 
profitability w as trem endous on the Vanden Plas on the Series III, because i f  y o u ’ve got a 
base m odel that is really hot, there are people w ho w ill pay for the top tw enty per cent o f  
the line, they don ’t really care what it cost. We were charging about four tim es what it 
cost. This offended Jim w ho said it w as selling Jaguar’s soul, and that kind o f  thing. I 
said, “Jim you just don’t understand about the value o f  things” . M arketing is all about 
getting value out o f  the market p lace, about getting Dollars. He w as really offended about 
that sort o f  thing. He thought o f  h im se lf  as a purist. He had a trem endous opinion o f  
him self. I saw  a p iece in a m agazine a few  years ago that said “The XJ40 -  the car that 
saved Jaguar” on the front cover. I looked inside, and there w as a big picture o f  Jim.
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They’d gone to Jim, and Jim had told them  what a wonderful car it w as. But it w as a heap 
o f  crap! It bankrupted us!
Were there any particularly big problems that you had?
We had three recalls on the Series III V 12 in 1985. W hen w e put the fuel injection  
system s in, Jim took som ething that had five  pounds [psi] fuel pressure and took it up to 
thirty pounds, and they did it all with hand clam ps. W e had all these jo in ts with jubilee  
clips around them and the vibration w ould cause leaks, and the fuel w ould pull in 
between tw o o f  these. Sooner or later there w ould be som ething that w ould set the fuel 
off. O f  course the person going  dow n the road w ould  see tons o f  sm oke, “Oh m y G od!”, 
and put the brakes on. O f  course, by the tim e th ey ’d got out the fuel w as turned off, so  
you pulled the lever to open the hood and there w as overw helm ing sm oke but no flame. 
They becam e know n as “U T E s”, for “Underhood Thermal Events”. There were tw o or 
three recalls w h ile  they [Jaguar engineering] tried to fix  it all with the hose clam ps. In the 
end they had to bolt it together like everybody e lse  does it. Y ou can’t really, i f  you don’t 
have thirty or forty hose clam ps, run thirty pounds pressure. W e w ent through a period 
when fires in the V I 2s w ere not a daily occurrence, but a frequent enough occurrence.
But w e didn’t have a sin gle  law suit because w e handled it so  fast. Here w as another case  
where the UK naivety in the U S market w as stunning. There w as fire, the guy w as suing  
us, he had a non-standard radio telephone in his car, and the fire w as traced to som e sort 
o f  short with that. They [Jaguar in UK ] wanted to fight it, and it took a real fight to 
persuade them it w ould  be really stupid. You have to understand that in the US you had a 
m anagem ent that w as long in the tooth. W e’d been kicked by BL. Y ou had to  be quick on 
your feet. The Attorney General in Florida told us in the 1980s that w e had m ore lem on  
law41 cases than any other sin g le  franchise in the US. H ow ever, he told us that w e  had the 
best record in the industry because not one o f  them had ever com e to a law  suit. W e got 
so  good at handling bad custom ers. W e had an organisation here that really knew  how  to 
handle crap.42
Why did very little of the problems with the XJ40 get out into the media? There was 
nothing about it in the UK.
W ell, the UK  press w as so  pro-British that they were not going to be anti Jaguar. W e had 
around 270  Jaguar dealers in 1980 w hen MG/Triumph w ent under. Som e o f  them  were  
only sellin g  one car a m onth. T hey cou ldn’t handle a custom er even  i f  they wanted to. 
They didn’t have the m oney. W e w ere quite convinced that w e had to have profitable
41 “Lemon” in this context is the term in the USA referring to something, especially a manufactured good, 
that is defective or imperfect. In many US states “lemon law” legislation defines the maximum number 
o f times a car manufacturer or dealer may attempt to fix a significant problem before the customer can 
demand a full refund, or another vehicle o f  equal value.
42 Mike Dale added in an e-mail o f 7 August 2007 to the author: “Whoever thought up the name HE [for 
‘High Efficiency’] XJ-S was nuts! Whoever thought we could get 20mpg out o f a 5.31itre 12 cylinder 
motor was also nuts! We didn’t even explain what it meant to the dealers in the presentation because 
they would have burst out laughing. The AJ6 engine was awful until we got to the 41itre. It was rough 
and didn’t develop much torque. We simply refused to take it until it became a good Jaguar engine, 
which in the end it did” .
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dealerships and the on ly  smart w ay o f  doing it w as to reduce the num bers.43 England had 
never sent us more than h a lf the cars it had produced in the budget. BL budgets w ere like
130,000 cars a year and sell 65 ,000 . We were quite used to handling quite incredible  
strike situations and changes in volum es com ing through. So what w e did w as to say  
w e ’re just going to shrink the dealer body to what w e think the factory can build. Our 
view  was that the factory could  not build more than 30 ,000  cars [per annum] for the US, 
and they didn’t.44 So w e set up the dealer body based at around 20 ,000  cars, the idea 
being that there w ould be fluctuations up and dow n, and a dealer body that w as running 
at around 20 ,000  cars w ou ldn’t go  bankrupt i f  w e  hit hard tim es. W e w ere very  
suspicious o f  the UK  and w e  just d idn’t think they could sustain what they w ere doing.
A t first there w as so  much stu ff in A utom otive N ew s in 1980 that w e w ere going  
bankrupt and that w e w ere finished that quite a lot o f  the dealers panicked, and so  w e just 
encouraged dealers to leave. So by 1984 w e ’d actually got them dow n to about 180 
dealers w ithout spending a cent. But what w e really wanted to do w as get it dow n to 
about 120. To get rid o f  the next 30  or 40  w as probably one o f  the more skilful things w e  
did here. Our law  firm said it w as im possible. It led to a very d ifficu lt confrontation  
between m e and the lawyers. W hat happened w as that I got agreem ent to do a study, to 
spend $100 ,000  to see i f  there w as som e w ay to get around the law  by creating new  law. 
The new  law w ould be based upon it being for consum ers because it w as go in g  to 
increase com petition in the luxury car market by m aking Jaguar strong, and in the ten 
years that fo llow ed  the law  courts bought that in a big way. In fact, I fought m y last law  
suit on it in 1999 against a dreadful Cadillac dealer in Iowa. W e w on, and it w as taken all 
the w ay to the Suprem e Court and w e  w on there too. But nobody w ould b elieve this at 
the start.
W e got D ave Pow er to do a study o f  all the M ercedes dealers. In L os A n geles, for 
exam ple, the M ercedes dealers w ere sellin g  500 cars a year, w e  w ere sellin g  100. So what 
said “Okay, w e ’ll take two-thirds o f  the dealers out”. Graham w as against this, but John, 
happily, supported the w h ole  thing. What w e did with the dealers w as enorm ously  
important. W e’d com e to the conclusion  that w e could m ake them  an offer that w e could  
pay for com pletely  in eighteen m onths i f  w e  w ere right about our prediction re sales etc, 
and w e w ould be really roaring ahead after that. In fact, in turned out far better than w e  
ever dreamed. W e w on, or negotiated, all our cases. But, it took about eight years. The 
w ay w e had got there w as that w e  w orked out, by looking at dealer statem ents etc, what 
w ould be the am ount o f  m oney w here they w ould be 50 /50 , ie. they w ou ldn’t know  i f  
they should take it or not. W e knew  that politically w e  w ould  have to m ove fast. W e got 
the Dealer Council together in W ashington, and said to them  on the first day “Look, this 
is the problem. L et’s not kid ourselves, unless you guys m ake five, six , seven  per cent on 
sales then forget it, you ’re go in g  bankrupt, and w e ’re going  bankrupt as w ell. The only
43 Mike Dale elaborated in an e-mail o f  23 July 2007 to the author: “I became Sales and Marketing VP for 
all the BL marques in the US in the early 1970s, and set about rationalising the whole system. I think 
there were about 1,250 BL dealers then in the US, and only one had all the marques. By the mid-1970s 
we were down to 450 dealers, and all but a few were full line dealers, and it was the second most 
profitable franchise in the US based on percentage return on sales. What can be said about the 1970s is 
that we learned how to do something that nobody else in the US has managed to do, and how to make 
money from it” .
44 The maximum number o f Jaguar retail sales in a single year in the US during the Egan years was 24,464 
units, achieved in 1986 (as shown in Table 4.2 in the main text).
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w ay w e ’re going to make this work is by m aking you guys profitable. But there’s a snag, 
w e can’t m ake enough cars to do it even i f  w e could find anybody to buy them ”. N obody  
would buy them at that tim e anyw ay. We said “Look, w e ’re got to work out a deal with  
you which any one o f  you w ill take, and you ’ll stand up in front o f  A utom otive N ew s and 
say ‘I’ll take the deal’”. W e were not very smart building cars, but w e w ere very 
streetw ise, and w e ’d been working on this for w eeks. The second day the Dealer Council 
cam e up with this deal. W e im m ediately took the top people o f  the Dealer Council, 
chucked them  into three cars and w ent straight across to the N A D A  and explained it to 
the N A D A , and then w ent straight across to the A utom obile Importers and explained it to 
them. So w e ’d got the D ealer C ouncil, and the tw o dealer representatives in the US all 
saying “This is a good deal” . The follow ing morning, starting at dawn, w e  told one third 
o f  the dealers “y o u ’re staying”, w e told another third o f  them “y o u ’re staying, but you’re 
going have to m ove because y o u ’re in the wrong place” because w e ’d done this computer 
exercise show ing that w e ’d have to m ove all the dealers around. The third lot w e told  
“y o u ’re go in g”. A utom otive N ew s w ent nuts over the w hole thing. But gradually the dust 
began to settle. It took about eight years to get through the w h ole  thing. It cost us 
m illions.
We ran out o f  m oney in the end in L os A ngeles. W e couldn’t crack LA. So  w e had the 
idea o f  getting the dealers to pay for it, because the guys w ho were staying could see the 
grosses w ere going  up, the sa les w ere going up. The guys w h o’d agreed to go  out in 
tw elve m onths’ tim e, because part o f  the negotiation w as that instead o f  go in g  today  
they’d go  in tw elve  m onths’ tim e, sold  every car they could, so  the sales started going  up. 
So what happened then w as w e  got all the dealers together w ho were staying and told  
them “W e’re going  to take $500  a car o f f  you”. They said “W ell how  long for?” “Until 
w e ’ve finished the law  suit and until w e ’v e  finished paying o f f  the dealers” . Our lawyer 
had told us that the one thing w e  cou ldn’t do w as ask their agreement. I f  w e  did that w e ’d 
get done for conspiracy, and that w ould  have been treble charges. H e told us that what w e  
had to do w as provoke som eone in the audience into getting angry with you and saying  
“M ike, what happens i f  w e  don ’t agree with this?” because w e had to be on record saying  
“It d oesn ’t matter i f  you agree or not, this is what w e ’re doing”. Finally I did get one to 
get mad enough to ask that. There w as an enorm ous law  suit later on challenging us for 
conspiracy, w hich w e  w on. I f  our law yer hadn’t got us to do that w e ’d have lost the law  
suit, and it w ould have m eant a lot o f  m oney.
The average dealer gross w as $1 ,5 0 0  a car w hen w e started this in 1980. Peanuts! B y the 
tim e w e ’d gone to 1985 or so  it w as $6 ,500 . So you can see what had happened to the 
profitability o f  the dealers. Som e o f  the dealers were selling eight or nine tim es as m any 
cars, and at the sam e tim e th ey’d m ore than quadrupled the profit per car. The m oney was  
absolutely pouring out o f  the dealers. W hich meant o f  course that from our point o f  v iew  
w e had enorm ous m uscle w ith the quality. W e were able to m ask the quality. The answer  
to w hy people d idn’t know  about it is that there w as this tremendous agreem ent between  
ourselves and the dealers, and the D istrict Service Managers45, for instance, to fix  the 
custom er, even i f  h e ’s outside warranty. But the problems with the XJ40 w ere just 
overw helm ing.
45 The number o f District Service Managers varied between twelve and twenty, with assistants appointed at 
various times to help them on purely technical matters (e-mail on 17 September 2007 from Mike Dale to 
the author).
- 4 0 -
APPENDIX
But the problems with the XJ40 didn’t get a great deal of publicity?
N o, but it m ade m y jo b  in the 1990s incredibly difficu lt.
How did it get out that the XJ40 was awful? Was it word of mouth?
A bsolutely. We w ere cocktail party chatter. But because in 1980 w e sold on ly  3 ,5 0 0  or so  
cars46, som ething like on ly  0.8%  o f  the luxury car market, nobody [custom ers] had any 
real experience. Then all o f  a sudden our market penetration explodes and w e ’re selling  
alm ost as m any X J40s as they’re selling M ercedes 300E s. N ow , when w e  w ere sellin g
20 ,000  o f  these X J40s, in the cocktail party circuit it w as no longer legends it w as “You  
should see how  th ey’v e  screw ed m e!” What w e  had done was poison the m arket. B y the 
tim e w e got to 1991 som ething like 85%  o f  the luxury car market said they w ou ld n ’t even  
go into our show room s because o f  our quality reputation. It was why w e did the b ig lease  
programme, because nobody’d buy a car. W e w ere really heading to extinction then. This 
had all com e from us being too successfu l in se llin g  lousy cars in the 1980s.
Did the dealers actually make profits from warranty costs?
In a court o f  law  I’d have to say that I cou ldn’t say because I don’t have direct 
know ledge. But Jake W eidinger, our dealer on L ong Island, who was our top dealer, at 
one tim e w as sellin g  1,000 cars a year, had tw enty-four m echanics in three locations, he 
had so m uch work going  on. A s w e  started to fix  the cars in the 1990s he w ent dow n to 
eight m echanics. The dealers com plained bitterly about the loss o f  service profit.47 
N obody w ho had a Jaguar really w ent to the dealer after the warranty w as up. T h ey ’d go  
to their local guy w ho w as much cheaper. W ell, you  have to say to yourself “ W ere they  
m aking m oney?” O f  course they w ere m aking m oney from warranties, but I’ve  no w ay o f  
proving it. But in such a screw ed-up w orld as B L  that w asn’t the point. Y ou cou ld  get 
dealers, like Jake W eidinger, w ho really cared about their customers, and w e  had lots o f  
them , thankfully, but you knew  you had som ebod y in the UK who was com p letely  
incapable o f  actually responding to the m arketplace. Things like that w eren’t on ly  
forgiven they w ere actually encouraged. The com pany just didn’t have the resources, but 
neither did w e, from John dow nwards, understand that w e  didn’t have them because none  
o f  us had ever been in a car com pany before, not a real one anyway. Y es, w e ’d been in 
the autom obile business. W ayne B ooker, w h o w e  reported to in Ford in the 1990s, told  
m e w hen I retired that in the early 19 9 0 s  the on ly  thing that saved Jaguar w as the 
relationship I had with the dealers. But that relationship w as built up over decades o f  
being brutally honest with the dealers. W hen X J40, for instance, really ran into its 
troubles, John got his people to organise a w h o le  package o f  thirty or forty fixes w hich  
w e put into b oxes and I w ent round all the dealers and said “Look, you know  w hat a 
screw -up w e ’ve  got, now  w e ’ve  got to d ig  ourselves out with the customers. W e’re going
46 Jaguar’s US retail sales in 1980 totalled 3,029 cars (as shown in Table 4.1 in the main text).
47 Mike Dale added in an e-mail o f  7 August 2007 to the author: “Warranty costs have a little discussed 
aspect from a financial point o f  view. A fault that can be cured on the production line in an hour only 
cost the British hourly wage. Maybe $15 at the time. The same hour to fix the same warranty problem in 
San Francisco would cost $90!”
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to have to bring every single car back in, w e ’ve got to handle this thing right, w e ’ve  got 
to put the car right” . We had a very open relationship with the dealers. Martin Bennett, an 
Englishman w ho is a dealer in N ashville , didn’t have much tim e for John. He called him 
“John Ego”. I’m afraid it w as all about John in the end. If John could have controlled his 
ego it w ould have been som ething else, but o f  course when he m et B ill Hayden it was oil 
and water!
How much of that was down to David Boole, because he’s variously been described 
as Egan’s Svengali?
Oh he was! But when D avid died, John w as too busy to go  to the funeral! D avid B oole, 
believe you m e, dug John Egan out again and again. David and I had our differences, but 
w e alw ays got on very w ell. I alw ays liked David enorm ously. H e w as a man o f  
principle, and when he believed  som ething you could rely on him , and there w eren’t 
many on that Board that you could. In fact, M ike B easley w as the only other one. But 
David B oole  m ade John Egan in the press, there’s no doubt about that. D avid had a 
wonderful touch with the UK  press, and came over very w ell in Am erica because he was 
that sort o f  diffident Englishm an that the Yanks like.
Why did you oppose the deal to buy Land Rover?
That’s very sim ple. I didn’t believe that w e had the managerial ability to handle it, and 
what happened over the next tw elve months showed that to be the case. I’d had 
experience o f  Land Rover. M y first Jaguar responsibility w as in 1970 as VP Sales over 
here. At the tim e I w as doing M G, Austin etc. I knew Land R over w as a can o f  worm s. It 
was even a worst can o f  w orm s than Jaguar was at that time. Technically, looking back o f  
course, it w ould have been a neat thing from Ford’s point o f  v iew . The smart thing o f  
course w ould have been to have bought Land Rover and im m ediately sell the company. 
The com pany only just got sold  in tim e. I f  indeed w e had lasted another tw elve  months, 
either w e w ould have gone bankrupt, or w e could have been bought for a lot less m oney  
because the sales collapsed The 1990 m odel was the last hurrah. What w e  did with the 
1990 m odel w as to sell the dealers on reducing their margin by 2%, from 20%  to 18%, 
and at the sam e tim e talk the Board into putting a w hole bunch o f  things on the car that 
made it m ore com petitive, upgrading it etc, and holding the price. So all o f  a sudden the 
dealers saw  us fighting back, because Lexus was launched at the sam e tim e. That lasted 
tw elve m onths because the car w asn ’t any better than the 1989 m odel. I f  w e  had bought 
Land Rover then it m ight have been a good thing, but it might have pulled the house  
down.
How much impact did the Wall Street crash in 1987 have?
I don’t recall it having m uch effect at all. In fact, Ed M cCauley had a theory that when  
Wall Street went dow n our sales w ent up. The Crash had no effect at all. The things that 
made the sales grow  were: the dealership package, which was absolutely key to the w hole  
thing; the £/$  relationship; the enthusiasm  that John had set o f f  w hich really m ade us 
believe, and he really w as trying to change things from a quality point o f  view ; m ass
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m edia advertising, and w e had the best ten years o f  advertising that w e ’d done  
consistently.
Who did you regard as being your competitors?
In the 1980s it w as M ercedes Benz. The Japanese w eren’t there. BM W  sales w ere m ainly  
3 Series, perhaps 60% -70% , probably more, so they w eren’t in our price bracket, other 
than the 7 Series. N ot Porsche: they sold sports cars, and w e didn’t sell sports cars.
Did the Japanese pose a threat to you in the 1980s?
We saw it as being Arm ageddon. W e’d had experience o f  them. I’d been the factory rep 
in Latin Am erica in the early 1960s, and you could see already what w as happening. We 
knew just how  good the Lexus w as, and that w e’d be in big trouble.48
Didn’t John Egan, certainly in 1986, and possibly in 1987, refuse to believe that the 
Japanese could be a threat to Jaguar?
Neither did David B oole. That w as one o f  the things that David and I heatedly disagreed  
on. David just thought that w e  w ere like a Sw iss watch. You could m ake a $10  watch, but 
Sw iss watches, like Jaguars, w ould go on untouched. Roger Putnam w as very lofty about 
the w hole thing. The reason w as that they lived a protected life. They lived on an island, 
quite insular. They were much m ore like Europe than they were like the US. The cultural 
differences between the US and England are far greater than those betw een Germany and 
England. And, o f  course, y o u ’v e  got the spread across the US as w ell. There w ere m any 
heated arguments about that, and I w as accused by John o f  being defeatist, and all sorts o f  
things. John and I had som e real set-tos.49
What did you think of Egan as a manager?
A s a manager John w as a dead loss, and I say that with hindsight. But com pared with  
anything within BL, he w as a genius. The level o f  incom petence at the top in BL w as  
absolutely astonishing. And yet, even  within BL there were pools o f  com petence, really  
great people. Y ou look at M ike B easley . The crap that M ike turned out in 1980! In the 
end M ike B easley ’s crew  w ou ld  be given this bloody awful place in the north o f  
England50 and turned that factory around. M ike B easley, properly led, and g iven  the 
resources etc, didn’t turn out just good but did an outstanding job. If  he hadn’t, h e ’d 
never have survived B ill H ayden. N ob ody survived B ill Hayden unless they performed. 
Leadership dem ands ego, but controlling your ego is what matters. John cou ldn’t control
48 Whilst this statement might be regarded as having been made with the benefit o f hindsight, Dugdale 
relates how Dale in a speech given in October 1988 warned about the entry o f the Japanese, Dale being 
quoted as predicting that “The Japanese are going to come in here and reinvent the luxury car market”. 
(Dugale, John. Jaguar in America. (Otego, New York, 1993) p258).
49 In an e-mail o f 9 May 2008 to the author, Mike Dale pointed out that: “Lexus now outsells not only 
Jaguar but even the mighty Lincoln Mercury”.
50 Ford’s Halewood plant, turned over to Jaguar assembly following the Ford acquisition o f Jaguar.
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his ego. He absolutely deluded h im self.51 There is no question but that he believed he 
could turn Jaguar into another BM W . I wrote the Fortune article at the request o f  the 
m agazine.52 The editor had been in the audience at a talk I gave. He said afterwards that if  
I wrote it he’d print it. But I w as afterwards told that John hadn’t liked it and I was not to 
do any more writing o f  that sort.
Didn’t Egan have a reputation as a great motivator?
John a great motivator? God b less David Boole! If John called  m e right now  and said 
“ Would you jo in  m e in . . .? ” I don ’t care what the fee m ight be, the answ er’s N o! If Bill 
Hayden or N ick  Scheele called m e I’d say “What tim e do you want m e?” I have never in 
my life felt so appreciated as w hen working for the Ford M otor Com pany.
At Jaguar a bonus system  w as brought in. It w as 50% o f  our salary. The first year it was 
brought in w e blew  the budget out o f  the water by tens o f  m illions o f  dollars o f  profit, but 
John only paid a 35%  bonus. I remember Ed M cC auley com ing  to m e and saying “I’ve 
got a cheque for $100 ,000  here. It’s m ore m oney than I’v e  ever been paid in m y life but 
I’m so pissed o f f ’.
During the 1980s John got suddenly fascinated by D em ing. But it w as alw ays a surface 
thing; John had read the f ly le a f  and understood everything.
51 Mike Dale added in an e-mail o f  7 August 2007 to the author: “It became quite normal for John to adopt 
anything he heard as his own invention. At the dinner for the launch o f the XJ40 in his speech he 
reminded dealers o f  what he had said to get them this far, and dealer after dealer came up to me 
afterwards and pointed out that John had never said any o f these things. They were all stolen from 
previous speeches he had heard me make. I’m sure all his management had similar experiences. John 
was simply living in a world he had invented and now believed. Having said all this, you must remember 
that it was John who energized Jaguar in a way no one at BL was capable o f doing, and he had the 
courage to take the company away from BL. For a time he was an excellent leader but within a couple o f 
years he came to believe in the press clippings and thought himself omnipotent” .
52 The Fortune article attributes the turning point in US dealers’ attitudes towards Jaguar as being their visit 
to Browns lane in June 1981, and in particular the final dinner at which the speech by Dale fired up the 
dealers, with them shouting “9,000” as the target volume sales for the US in 1982, at which point the 
band o f the Royal Marines entered the room playing “America the Beautiful” . Wood ( Wheels o f  
Misfortune: The Rise and Fall o f  the British Motor Industry (London, 1988) pp232-3) presents a 
slightly different picture, citing Egan as recounting how he gave the dramatic speech and signalling the 
band o f the Grenadier Guards to enter the room. After reading Egan’s account, Dale in an e-mail to the 
author o f 7 August 2007 stated: “The Fortune version o f what happened in June o f ‘81 was stringently 
fact checked and, as I was not one o f  their regular writers, they really went to town! The piece was 
reprinted by dealer demand and used as a sales piece with Fortune’s blessing. It has never been 
challenged by anyone who was at that meeting from the US and I can give you many living witnesses 
who will tell you John’s version is just make believe. He couldn’t even get the band right! It was the 
Royal Marines that had been organised by Mike Jackling, my sales operations manager, through his 
brother Roger Jackling (now Sir Roger). All the speeches were over when I stood up to speak and the 
band, hidden behind the main doors, was primed to explode onto the scene the moment I said ‘9,000’ 
three times and got the dealers to join in. It was all very dramatic but John had nothing to do with the 
management o f it. One o f the dealers teased me afterwards that he came to Stratford for Shakespeare but 
didn’t expect to get it in the Hilton! The visit was not in the context that John put it [of further 
confidence-building]. It was a last gasp. Some dealers wouldn’t even come on the trip”.
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On what did you base your market demand forecasts for the U S?
At first they were guessed . In the first year John needed 4 ,000  cars, and even  that was 
bloody difficult. I needed som ething to tell everyone that w e w eren’t going bankrupt. I 
said to John, w ho w asn ’t then in charge, w e had to deal with BL International, “Why 
don’t w e go TransAm 53 racing? We can win the TransAm with the X J-S.” W e worked out 
it was going to cost about 500  cars to pay for the w hole thing, so  John wanted to do it. He 
was prepared to do anything. So, w e  set a target o f  4 ,500 . It w as a bit difficu lt because the 
head o f  BL International said in the m eeting w e had: “M ike, you m ustn’t get carried 
away by your enthusiasm . That’s a 50% increase” . John w ent nuts. He said “Oh no, don’t 
let our enthusiasm  carry us aw ay, let’s just let the com pany go  bust. M ike wants to do 
this that and the other, and i f  he thinks he can deliver the 500  then w e should do it”. And 
he bullied the guy into doing it. So, w e had to go for 4 ,500 , but w e  actually went sailing  
past it.54 W e did things in reverse. W e had this tight relationship with the dealers. We 
went round them saying “ W hat’s it going to take for you to do this?” W e had a 
trem endous feedback through the dealer system . The first num bers w eren’t that good, but 
then what w e brought in w as a back order situation where every month w hen w e looked 
at the forecast forward w e w ould  have a very good idea o f  how  m any unfilled orders 
w e ’d got. So w e started to have a m easure here. A s the unfilled orders grew , w e knew  
what w as taken o f f  the production line. So what w as happening w as that what w e were 
doing, the advertising, the PR, the m otor racing, w as creating a dem and w here w e  were 
watching a thermometer. W e never kept up with it, and you could  probably say that w e  
m issed som e sales, but w e  probably couldn’t run the production line fast enough to take 
care o f  it properly anyw ay. The D ealer Council one year said that for the fo llow ing year 
“ 15,000, and you w on ’t get an inch past that”. W e did 18,500! But w e  had other things. 
We w ould take polls w ith the dealers. Every sales review m eeting I w ould  have a review  
o f  all the things. W e did know  what the dealer grossage w ere in the last thirty days, so all 
o f  a sudden you started having a nice chart that says the dealer grosses w ere 3 ,500 , then 
3 ,800  this month: w e ’ve n ow  got a month and a h a lf unfilled orders, w e  can see the 
grosses going up. A ll o f  a sudden w e ’ve  got an idea o f  forward dem and. W e can see how  
the dealers are taking m oney out o f  the marketplace. And you soon becam e that adept at 
judging what that meant s ix  m onths’ out. So, it didn’t have som e great market research 
behind it, but what it did have w as a very careful every thirty day v iew  o f  what w as really 
happening in the m arketplace. B ecause M ike Jackling and I had som e experience o f  the 
retail business w e had an instinctive feel about what was important in the marketplace.
W e understood w hen things w ere failing, when they were succeeding, w hich  w e started 
to built som e sim ple num bers around. Those were the early days o f  com puters.
53 Sponsored by the Sports Car Club o f America (SCCA) the TransAm championship was a series o f races 
at different racing tracks across the US. It was intended primarily for modified versions o f production 
models, and included the Chevrolet Corvette, Ford Mustang, and Porsche 911. Races ranged from 200 
miles to 2,400, and ran from 2 hours to 24 hours. It was discontinued after the 2005 season. Jaguar won 
the series in 1977 and 1978 with the XJ-S, but then withdrew from the Series on cost grounds.
54 Jaguar’s US retail sales in 1981 were 4,695 cars, a year-on-year increase o f 55% (as shown in Table 4.1 
in the main text)
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You’ve said a number of times that you had all these problems, but they never came 
to a court of law. How did you get away with it?
Dealer relationships! It w as a question o f  facing up to the fact that you really had a 
problem. M ost factories just blam e the dealers, and the dealers g ive it to them back. We 
didn’t do that. Our D ealer C ouncil w as quite blunt. We handled it on the basis that w e’re 
all m aking m oney, and what w e ’ve  got to do is make sure that the custom er is looked 
after. The dealers were people with w hom  w e ’d lived through the TR7 debacle. That had 
been launched with about fifteen engineering defects which the c h ie f  engineer for the 
TR7 said “w e can’t possib ly fix  them . W e don’t know how  to fix  them ”. W e’d handled 
things like this so m any tim es before that the com pany was extrem ely adept at handling 
crisis.
Coming back to warranties, John Edwards told me you were just paying people to 
shut up
True! Let’s look at a specific  exam ple. The Borg-W am er transm ission. Y o u ’re living on 
borrowed tim e with 30 ,000  m iles on it. So som ebody com es to you and th ey ’ve done
31 ,000  m iles. T hey’re out o f  warranty and they’ve owned the car for tw o years. T hey’re 
faced with a bill for putting in a com pletely  new  transmission, w hich you know  is going  
to go as w ell in another 30 ,000  m iles. What are you going to do about that? O ne o f  the 
things w e did in the beginning with the Series III, because w e knew  w e had to improve 
the used car values so w e could  get leasing, w as w e invented this package. T his w as a 
used car programme whereby w e bought in Series I lls  that had got three or four years on 
them and started at the top o f  the package and put in new  shock absorbers, springs that 
had collapsed etc. W e’d just work our w ay through the entire car to rebuild it. It cost us 
$700  or $800 a car.
Mike Beasley told me Jaguar had no analysis of warranty costs.
He w as right about that. But w e  use this word warranty loosely. The warranty com es  
from one thing, the “out o f  warranty” w as som ething else, and cost us m any m illions o f  
Dollars. I’m not sure what good the analysis would have done us because som e o f  the 
things that w ere wrong with the car w e  couldn’t have afforded to fix. L ooking back on it 
analytically, the com pany w as finished really in 1983 or 1984. A t that point did they ever  
have the opportunity to get the engineering resources that they needed? The m oney  
w asn’t there. They couldn’t get the engineering resources they needed. It w ou ld  have 
meant tripling at least the size  o f  the engineering force, and to bring them on stream and 
actually do anything in tim e. The X J40 in the BL plan was supposed to be launched in 
1983. Every year it got put o f f  another year.
Was it components that was the problem because that should have been fairly easily 
fixed?
It w ould be i f  you could have gone to a world class supplier. But the people w e were  
dealing with w eren’t. The people w ho did our air conditioning/clim ate control, som e
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French com p an y , w ere learning as they w ent along. Y ou couldn’t go to world class 
suppliers w ith  a tiny com pany like Jaguar. I said to Lucas once that the windscreen  
m otors w ere  inadequate, and they said “Y es, they are, but you w on’t pay for the ones w e  
recom m end” . Lucas d idn’t know enough to stand up for them selves. They were in the 
sam e shape w e w ere in. D E N SO 55 came in in the 1990s and said “We w on’t put our 
equipm ent in unless you g o  through the fo llow ing redesign o f  the car”.
John Edwards told me that the XJ40 was a car that couldn’t be built.
But then you  have to ask w hat did Bill Hayden change? It w asn ’t just Jim Randle who 
decided  on  4  M ay that h e ’d finished the car, lobbed it over the fence and M ike B easley is 
landed w ith  this unbuildable car. That is not the w ay that a m odem  car com pany works. 
Y ou need sa les and m arketing, engineering, manufacturing, and quality and styling all 
w orking together. That is w hat N ick  Scheele really honed to a fine point. H e got all the 
people together on ce  a m onth for a w eek in the UK and in that m eeting there was 
everyb ody in that room  w h o  had to carry responsibility for it, whether it w as finance, 
engineering , quality, or w hatever. W e were responsible. W e had to com e up with a 
rounded, financially  accep tab le  quality driven solution. N ick  Scheele w as a leader and a 
m anager in another c lass altogether. If John had been N ick  Scheele he w ou ld  have gone  
in there in 1980, he w ou ld  have taken it [the company] private, he w ould have changed a 
lot o f  the m anagem ent im m ediately , and would have sold it long before he got to XJ40. 
You cou ld  probably have g o t the sam e amount o f  m oney for it long before XJ40.
B y the m id -1 9 8 0 s it w as b ecom in g  very obvious to som e o f  us that the com pany w asn ’t 
goin g  to m ake it. O ne o f  th e  things I w as somewhat unpopular for with John w as when  
the Ford/G M  thing cam e a lon g  m ade it known that I really wanted to work for a com pany  
like Ford. B ut John d idn’t think that w ay at all, and he w ould have done other things with  
the com p any. I rem em ber John saying “W ell, all those BL people were second-class  
b u sinessm en , w e ’re first c la ss  businessm en”. He actually said that. W ell, there must be 
som e other c lass because the know ledge o f  the car business that the Ford people had was 
dazzling! In one m eeting B ill Hayden said “There’s no substitute for hard work -  i f  there 
w as Jaguar w ou ld  have found  it by now ”. David B oole  really disliked B ill Hayden.
How did David Boole survive Bill Hayden?
D avid k n ew  the U K  press very  w ell. But David must have gotten really beaten up by B ill 
H ayden b ecau se  he w ou ld  m ake the kind o f  statement that BL w ould m ake. Y ou know, 
“ W ell, custom er satisfaction  is much easier to achieve when you sell lower-priced cars”. I 
rem em ber B ill saying “W hat data do you have to prove that?”, and David w as stumbling  
all over the p lace. Ford kn ew  they had to keep the scenery, and David B o o le  w as very  
m uch part o f  the scenery. W hen John ran the place there w asn ’t a single statistical 
process control chart in the factory. When I left there were 360 plus.
55 Japanese automotive components manufacturer, with large European presence. Main products are engine 
management and exhaust emission systems, and starters and alternators.
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Transcript of the interview with John Edwards on 29th November 2002
Other than John Egan and yourself, who were the main characters in the Jaguar 
story in the 1980s?
On the board at the tim e o f  the flotation there w as John and m yself, Ted B ond56, Ray 
H orrocks57, w ho w e thought o f  as the enem y because he was BL Cars, Graham  
W hitehead, and Ham ish Orr-Ewing w ho w e  got rid o f  w ithin a year. It w as exactly  the 
right th ing to do. Ted w as a big C ity man. H e could help me; that w as the idea. The 
ex ecu tiv e  directors w ere m e, John, and Graham W hitehead. But o f  the executive  
m anagem ent, the next layer dow n, there w as M ike B easley  w ho is now  the M anaging  
D irector. Jim R andle is now  a Professor at Birm ingham  University. N eil Johnson, the 
m arketing guy, w as Chairman o f  the RAC at one tim e; he didn’t stay very long, Roger 
Putnum  took over as Sales and M arketing Director straight aw ay, and now  Roger is 
Chairm an o f  Ford o f  Britain. Ken Edwards has died. D avid Fielden58 retired early in 
1992. H e w as good  on quality and stuff. Pat Audrain59 retired at the sam e tim e: Ford had 
a sw e e p  out. D avid B oole  died in 1996. D avid and I w ere the ones w ho used to say that 
probably w e w ere the only ones around John Egan that knew  what w as going on really. I 
supported the Ford take-over very m uch. That w h ole  ep isode is a m assive story in itself. 
In m y  v ie w  th ey ’ve been an excellen t steward o f  Jaguar Cars. They cam e in in 1990. 
T hey show ed  us their business plan. They wanted to create a new  BM W . W e had wanted 
to create another B M W  in terms o f  a 3 Series, a 5 Series etc, but ours w as more o f  a pipe- 
dream . Theirs w as a proper plan, and th ey’ve  done it: th ey’ve done exactly what they said 
th ey ’d do. I d idn’t know  w e ’d end up using Castle Brom w ich to build the S-type, a 5 
Series type car. I d idn’t know  w e ’d use H alew ood to do a sm all car, a 3 Series-type car, 
but th at’s what th ey ’ve  done. The plan w as to do exactly  what they said, and they’ve  
done it. N o w , the num bers aren’t so  good. W hen I left in 1995 they’d just turned the 
com p an y back into profit, and since then they’ve  generated quite a lot o f  cash, 
particularly from the m id car, and th ey ’ve  done very w ell on the sports car, and they’ve  
done pretty w ell on the S-type car. The S-type has sold fairly w ell in the UK .
W hat was your background with Jaguar?
I jo in e d  in 1980, John Egan jo in ed  in 1 9 8 0 .1 used to work w ith John in M assey Ferguson  
as w e ll. The reason I got the jo b  w a sn ’t because at 31 I w as the best finance director in 
the w orld . Probably there w eren’t m any people queuing up for the job  because it [Jaguar] 
w as seem in g ly  a lo ss maker. With M ichael Edwardes chopping everything out left, right, 
and centre there w eren’t m any peop le  queuing up for the job . M ichael Edwardes at that 
tim e had got a v iew  that a lot o f  peop le  after the Ryder Report had left British Leyland
56 Ted Bond. Finance Director o f The Beecham Group, was appointed a non-executive director o f 
Jaguar pic at the time o f the flotation in 1984, serving in that capacity until the Ford takeover at the end 
o f 1989.
57 Ray Horrocks CBE. Chief Executive, BL Cars, and Chairman o f Jaguar prior to the company’s 
privatisation in 1984.
58 David Fielden. Jaguar’s Quality Director, and a member o f the Executive Board.
59 Pat Audrain. Jaguar’s Purchasing Director, and a member o f the Executive Board.
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because they were d issatisfied  with the Ryder Report in 1977 and he had a v iew  that he 
wanted to get his arms around the tree, to break the problematical m anagem ent chokes.
He also wanted to get good m anagers back in to run the place. John w as listed as having  
been dissatisfied  with the Ryder Report and he w as targeted to com e in and run Jaguar 
from M assey Fergusson. I w as his financial controller at M assey Fergusson. H e got the 
job  in March and he asked m e to go  as his Finance Director. I said I w ould , but w hilst I 
had a lot o f  experience as a financial controller 1 had no experience as a finance director. 
So I w as inexperienced. But the rest o f  the team were all part o f  the JRT team , the Jaguar- 
Rover-Triumph part o f  British Leyland, and were all a bit dispirited. T h ey’d all been told  
“Our aim is to put it all back, and separate the identity o f  Jaguar Cars” and John w as the 
beacon. With all the doom  and g loom  and mushroom cloud around John knew  where he 
w as going. Where he w as go ing  w as h e ’d got these four things. First he a lw ays had his 
halo. The halo o f  som ething. The “halo o f  dem and” he used to call it. That is what w ould  
take us through. But when w e started in 1980 w e had no demand at all. W hen I did the 
first forecasting the losses forecast for the year were £5m  or som ething, but w e ’d lost 
about £ 15m on a year to date basis and w e  w ere halfw ay through the year, and I said how  
are w e going to get back with the volum e w e ’v e  got? N obody knew. W e d idn’t have a 
clue at this tim e. W e didn’t have a business plan, just w ish lists. W e had to d ig in. But w e  
had the four things that John used to get up and speak about. W hen I first heard this I 
thought it w as m agnificent, but what I’ve learnt about all his speeches is that they say the 
sam e thing all the tim e. First o f  all, get the quality right. Get the quality right because it 
w as absolutely dire. W e had the paint shop fiasco at Castle Brom wich. W e could  only  
paint in red, w hite, and yellow . Then w e had to get productivity back. Productivity was 
quite discouraging. Castle Brom w ich w asn ’t even part o f  the Jaguar operation, it w as  
ow ned by Pressed Steel Fisher. It w as a m assive sprawling plant that did all the pressings 
for a lot o f  cars, and w e just had one line in it. The paint shop w as a fantastically  
expensive project but w e  just cou ld n ’t get through the paint process. W e had to get the 
productivity right, w e had to get the processes right, and w e had to get the effic ien cy  
right. So, quality/reliability w as the first thing, productivity was the next thing, and then 
w e had to get market demand. John had got the vision. He knew  he could get the US  
market right, h e ’d got that so  clear in h is m ind. H e’d got the market positions right. And  
then it w as all part o f  the developm ent o f  the market, getting separate distribution, 
splitting aw ay from BL , identifying an identity.
So John in the years betw een 1980 and 1984 w as absolutely head and shoulders above  
everybody e lse . H e knew  exactly  what he w as doing. Dynam ic, energetic, a fantastic 
leader o f  m en. People thought he w alked on water because he w as that good  at that time. 
That first year w e lost £20m . W e recreated the accounts. 1981 w as a year o f  tw o halves: 
in the first h a lf o f  the year w e w ere still losing m oney, but by the second h a lf  w e ’d got 
som e o f  the efficiency  thing sorted out, and w e ’d got the productivity, and w e ’d got a bit 
better quality. In particular, w e ’d re-launched the XJ-S in a nice little trim package, and 
by that tim e the U S market had started to get a few . W e’d got the old stocks out o f  the 
market place and it started go in g  w ell. I remember that 1981 session because w e ’d had a 
big m eeting about March tim e and w e  knew  that things were getting better. W e felt that 
even though w e w ere losing m oney things were getting better. Dem and w as starting to 
pull through, the A m ericans w ere getting interested, and volum es w e thought just needed  
a big push. Then there w as this b ig thing with Ray Horrocks. H e w as still under a three-
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line whip from M ichael Edwardes. You know, “I f  you ’re not m aking any m oney, just 
chop it out, sack the lot” . Edwardes had been given his terms by M aggie60: “Sort it out, I 
hate British Ley land”. She hated Red Robbo61, she hated all this stuff. M ichael Edwardes 
was this pocket dynam ite w ho w as going to sort it. He w as a big influence. He w as good  
at it. He told us w e had to get back to profit or w e were gone, and that’s 1981. But w e had 
this big m eeting with Ray Horrocks and w e were talking about U S volum es o f  6 ,000  cars 
a year, and that w as our budget. The year before w e ’d done 3 ,000  cars in the States. Ray 
Horrocks and Peter Rainier, the BL Controller, w as saying “Y o u ’ll never get 6 ,000 , 
never” . But w e ’d had the U S dealers over, w e ’d taken them to W arwick C astle, w e ’d had 
the military bands there. So w e  thought w e could do it. We argued and argued. John did a 
m agnificent job. He said this is in the bag, and that was it. There w as som e talk o f  
transferring the w hole o f  the Jaguar range to Longbridge62 and c losing  dow n Brow ns 
Lane but John did this m agnificent presentation and they said “Okay, do it” . It w as so  
close. N obody really knew  that w e were so c lose  to the axe. On reflection w e  didn’t sell
6 ,000  cars, w e sold 5 ,000  cars,63 but it w as the catalyst. It started pushing th ings through. 
Instead o f  being a crusty old com pany sellin g  15,000 cars a year w e started seeing  
volum e w ell over that. W e started pushing the m echanics through. A t the sam e tim e that 
the volum es started to im prove, the exchange rate m oved on in our favour. So, from  
getting margins o f  m inus £5 ,000  w e  w ere suddenly getting margins o f  plus £ 1 0 ,000 . It 
w as m agic, it was absolutely fantastic. John couldn’t do anything wrong at that point in 
time.
What actually pushed the consumer? Was it advertising?
N o, w e didn’t really advertise at all. O ne thing w as that John galvanised the dealer 
network. They thought he really w as the new  Iococca64, and John believed th is as w ell. 
The point is that John w as fantastic during the early years, but then by 1987 he ran out o f  
ideas basically as far as Jaguar w as concerned. B y the m id-1980s he started to believe his 
ow n bullshit, and that’s w hen, in m y v iew , things w ent a bit wrong, and he didn’t know  
what to do. But during that period, the early 1980s, he w as fantastic, and he galvanised  
the Am erican dealers. The dealers started to believe in him , they started to b elieve  that 
the quality w as getting better. B efore John cam e along th ey’d started to get angry. M ost 
o f  the dealers w ere local businessm en w h o knew  the people w ho they sold the cars to, 
and i f  the car broke dow n they’d get peop le beating them  up, not literally, but they’d go  
out to a cocktail party or som ething and get m oaned at. But by m id 1982 the word w as  
getting round that the quality w as better, and the dealers w ere starting to see  the margins
60 “Maggie” the popular name for Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister.
61 “Red Robbo” was the pejorative sobriquet given by the media to Derek Robinson, militant Union 
Convenor at BL’s Longbridge plant, whose sacking resulted in industrial action, but which eventually 
improved industrial relations at BL. (Edwardes, Michael. Back from  the Brink. An Apocalyptic 
Experience (London, 1983) ppl 18-133).
62 Longbridge. The major BL car assembly plant, located in Birmingham.
63 The actual US retail sales figure for 1981 was 4,695 cars, but US wholesales totalled 5,154 cars. In 1982 
US retail sales totalled 10,349 cars, and US wholesales were 9,971 cars, (as shown in Table 4.1 in the 
main text).
64 Lee Iococca, accredited with restoring the fortunes o f the US Chrysler Corporation in the period after 
1978 when he joined as Chief Executive, and was Chairman and CEO 1979 to 1992.
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com e through. They w ere getting the volum e. If you sell a good car in the States at 
$30 ,000  a tim e you ’re getting good margins on it. The dealers did a lot o f  local 
advertising which w e supported. John spent a lot o f  tim e in the States. He w as like a god  
to the Am erican dealers because from being cranky old little dealers they started making 
big bucks. I think w e m ade m ore Am erican Dollar m illionaires in that period than anyone 
else. You know, their earnings w ent from nothing to a m illion Dollars [a year]. It w as 
fantastic. So, w e turned the com er in 1982. We m oved from being the dog in 1980 when  
Unipart and Land Rover w ere the only  tw o businesses that were going okay. W e were a 
dog as far as BL Cars w ere concerned and Rover w as an absolute no-hope (and is still no­
hope but is still going!). M aggie had said to M ichael Edwardes “I hate British Leyland, I 
hate it with a vengeance. I want you to privatise anything you can and the rest shut 
dow n”. In 1980 Land Rover looked like the only thing that w as going to work, but then 
they got into a bit o f  a m ess, and w e suddenly zoom ed in to becom e the star, and it was 
all John. John is this man, this halo man. He walks on water, he does anything right.
He got the reputation of being very close to Maggie. Was that in fact the case?
He w asn’t as c lose  to M aggie as people thought. There were the three o f  us, and w e  
alw ays discussed what w as go ing  on. David [Boole] did all the PR stuff, the papers stuff. 
John w as his ow n PR m achine. M ost C h ief E xecs com e into you and say “God what 
appalling sales. I want a £10m illion  advertising cam paign!” John was his ow n advertising 
campaign. He walked the press, and the press started to believe in him. W e started to get 
these fantastic articles. Therefore, all the publicity w e were getting w as free. It w as all 
John Egan. He w as actually, literally, a one-m an band prom oting everything, and 
obviously  it was the tim e w hen a privatisation started getting talked about. Rem ember, it 
w as a tim e when M aggie w as looking for success stories. It w as a tim e w hen em ploym ent 
w as crashing. But w e w ere getting m ore volum es through and w e were starting to recruit 
a few  more people. Norm an Tebbit65 got up on one programme on TV  and said “Look, 
great success story - Jaguar Cars!” O f  course, John had given him all the bullshit, 
although at that tim e it w as actually genuine! It w as actually fantastic progress, and w e  
becam e to be the sym bol o f  the only  people at the start o f  that year w ho w ere re- 
em ploying people in manufacturing. And so he cam e on the good list as far as M aggie  
w as concerned. He m et her a few  tim es. But the funny thing is that he w asn ’t that c lose  to 
her, but the BL Board, heading towards this privatisation, thought he w as, and he didn’t 
argue with that.
Who gave the impetus to the privatisation?
W ell, M aggie had said to M ichael Edwardes “Look, privatise what you can, because  
oth erw ise ... I hate them ” It w as like a red rag to a bull. She hated it. BL w as a bit o f  a 
joke. The Tw o R onnies66 used to do a parody o f  working in a BL factory. But by this time 
w e started to build up this m om entum . In 1983 w e could see the volum es com ing, with
65 Norman Tebbit served in the Thatcher cabinet as Secretary o f State for Employment 1981-83, and 
Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry 1983-85.
66 “The Two Ronnies” was a highly popular television comedy show starring Ronnie Barker and Ronnie
Corbett.
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16,000 in the States.67 At the end o f  1981 w e broke even. In 1982 w e started to make 
quite a lot o f  m oney, and in 1983 w e m ade a sackful because the exchange rate w as piling  
in at the sam e tim e and w e m oved US volum e to 15,000 from 2 ,500  in 1980. This was 
heroic stuff. W e were very pragmatic, quite young but w e all thought B loody Hell! 
A nyw ay, early 1983, General M otors cam e on the scene: “Could I buy Jaguar?” BM W  
cam e on the scene: “C ould I buy Jaguar?” And John said “N o! You can buy it, but I w ill 
not be the m anagem ent. Y ou can buy the com pany, but you can’t buy the m anagem ent”. 
And they were quite shocked. Som eone m aking 10 ,000/20 ,000  cars a year saying to the 
Chairman o f  General M otors that you can buy the com pany but you w on ’t buy me! By  
this tim e everyone believed  that John Egan did everything at Jaguar. H e m ade all the 
cars, he designed them all, he sold them all, he m ade the tea. H e did everything! So they  
w ouldn’t take the risk on it, but they were still interested, as w as Ford in a w ay at the 
tim e but they w eren’t quite sure how  to handle it. This w as the tim e w hen w e w ere going  
through the boom  o f  1983 and 1984. Dem and w as pulling things through. W e started on 
building a bigger, better network supply. I think this w as one o f  the strongest parts o f  the 
thing; the network developm ent all the w ay around Europe w as w orking a treat. The halo 
o f  demand pulled us through. But the finances were m assively  helped by the Dollar. The 
Dollar w as getting stronger and stronger. A t one tim e w e w ere going for parity! So, they  
said, the right candidate for privatisation is Jaguar.
So w e stormed into 1984, and again General M otors, in early 1984, cam e back on the 
scene, and John said the sam e thing: “Y ou can’t buy the m anagem ent” and they said 
“ Fair enough” and trampled off. So BL Cars didn’t know what to do really because it was 
a nice easy deal with General M otors, but John just used to say “N o , w e w o n ’t do it. We 
want privatisation. I’ve got M agg ie’s ear”, which I think he had, but not quite as much as 
everybody e lse  thought he had, and he played on it. So that’s how  privatisation cam e.
And it was good for M aggie at the tim e because, remember, it w as right in the m iddle o f  
the m iners’ strike. There’d been no successful privatisations for a couple o f  years.
There’d been no real su ccess stories, and then suddenly w e w ere it. And it w as fantastic! 
The issue w as m assively  oversubscribed. Everybody thought it w as the best thing since  
sliced bread, and at a 165p share price it was! I remember talking to B ob Barber68 very  
early on and I said, “ W hy did you support it so much?” and he said “W ell i f  you don’t do 
w ell one o f  the big guys w ill com e along and pick you up”. B y  1985 w e ’d started hedging  
foreign exchange. I’d got the exchange hedged at about $1.20 through to 1987, w hich  
w as a guaranteed £50m illion  a year. It tipped over in March 1985. March 1985 w as about 
the best exchange rate ever, and in the month o f  March I w as trying to stop it booking  
more than £20m illion  profit for the month. It was more to do with the exchange rate 
m ethod.691 thought this is a fantastic com pany where I’m working. It w as all fantastic. 
H alf the profit w as com ing from the exchange rate compared to the current exchange  
rate. W e’d got all the forward hedging in. W e’d decided w e could do anything. W e 
concentrated on the dealers; w e  concentrated on nice dealer showroom s; proper
67 Jaguar US retail sales in 1983 were 15,815 units (as shown in Table 4.2 in the main text).
68 Investment Analyst at stockbrokers Phillips and Drew.
69 In a telephone conversation on 5 December 2006 with the author, John Edwards added: “O f the 1985/86 
profits o f £120million and 1987 profits o f £94milIion, at least half was currency. For most o f that period 
we had a $1 billion hedge all the time. Our best month ever was March 1985 -  we made £25miIlion 
currency profit that month”.
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distribution; w e ’d got the network right. The m agic seem ed to work. T hey were lovely  
cars, and they were good enough. Q uality and reliability w as right, and by the tim e w e  
were there the old Series III and XJ-S w ere reasonable quality, not 1999 or 2000  quality, 
but fantastic compared to w here w e  w ere before. So, w e were starting to get the quality 
under reasonable control, not fantastic, but reasonable control, and everything w e  touched  
seem ed to work. W e started to b elieve our ow n bullshit in the m id-1980s. Y ou know , w e  
can’t do anything wrong. But I think anything w e did up to about 1987 w e w ere covered  
by the exchange rate hedging. A t that point the exchange rate w as on the m ove. The 
exchange rate after that w as an absolute disaster. W e’d believed our ow n bullshit. W e 
thought w e w ere the best m arketing people in the world, the best m anufacturing people, 
the best engineers. W e’d tested this car [the XJ40] around 24 hours a day, but w e  tried to 
do it all too quickly and that car w as a dog. So, from thinking w e could w alk on water w e  
were brought right dow n to total reality. W e’d taken a risk on 80% o f  our volum es. The 
car w as w ell received by the m otoring press, and this is what fooled m e, because w e  
virtually had no good cars when w e  tried to do the engineering stu ff and manufacturing 
stu ff in volum e. So, the warranty starts to get big. But w e were so shocked by it all. John 
really shook his head, but g ive  him  his due he stuck it, he dug in and said “I’m going to 
fix  this problem ”, but it took, in m y v iew , until the 1990 m odel year before w e  got 
som ew here back to the quality w e had w ith the Series III. And by the 1990 m odel year 
that car w as a good car again.
What were warranties running at?
They w ere m assive in 1980; that w as one o f  the problem s, running at over 8% at one  
tim e, but w e got it w ell dow n on that before 1985 on the Series III.70 On the new  car [the 
XJ40] it got out o f  control. W e w ere paying people o f f  to keep quiet in m y v iew .71 The 
car w as a dog. But w e still had this veneer outside. People still thought w e w ere w alking  
on water, but inside there were all these things go in g  on. I think it w as at this tim e that 
John lost his w ay a bit. H e w as fantastic during the early 1980s, but he then started to  
m ake too much o f  h im self. H e w as voted  the m ost popular businessm an in the UK  after 
H anson.72 We were getting fam e and w orldw ide recognition beyond our abilities, and 
beyond what w e really deserved, but it w as there. John thought he could do anything.
This w as really a chap w alk ing on water! Then he really grew up in 1987 w ith a m assive  
bang. H e got stuck in, he got the engineering sorted, he started working out w ith Jim  
Randle.73 But w e w ere really, really, struggling. John dug in very deeply. B y  1988 w e ’d
70 John Edwards in an e-mail to the author on 16 July 2007 provided the actual warranty costs for each of 
the years 1980 to 1990 inclusive, (as shown in Figure 7.1 and in Table 8.1 in the main text).
71 In a telephone conversation with the author on 5 December 2006, John Edwards re-emphasised this 
point: “Jaguar was certainly over-generous in its warranty payments. It made sure no one would shout 
and scream too much”.
72 Lord Hanson. Chairman, Hanson Trust PLC.
73 In a telephone conversation on 5 December 2006 with the author, John Edwards added: “Jim Randle 
called the XJ220 his Saturday morning project. We agreed he could have a limited amount o f money to 
play around with it, but we told him to get on with the XJ41. Jim is a very clever man, but he’s not much 
o f a practical engineer. The XJ40 nearly broke the company, and nearly broke him. Jim was out o f  his 
depth, but we didn’t realise it at the time” .
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had the Stockmarket crash, and the exchange rate starting working against us, but w e still 
thought that U S demand w ould keep going.
The XJ-S w as still selling w e ll, but it w as getting a bit old in the tooth, and the Saloon  
was getting much better. So, by the 1990 m odel year the XJ40 w as not too bad, so to give  
John his due he got stuck in and he got it item, item, item sorted out. He used the data 
extensively  to satisfy custom ers. H e w as just searching for a m anagem ent process. H is 
confidence had been shaken. But he still had a lot o f  personal confidence, he w asn ’t short 
o f  that. And along cam e General M otors again, and then up cam e Ford at the beginning  
o f  1988. W e had this m eeting with D on Petersen74 and A lex  Trotman75, and John w as 
aggressive with them. “I hate the Ford M otor Company, you can’t m ake cars like w e do” . 
This w as the Chairman o f  the Ford M otor Com pany he was talking to! I w as kicking him  
under the table. Shut up! There w as no need to be rude. He said ‘i ’m not go in g  to be part 
o f  the Ford M otor Com pany, I’m go in g  to be on m y ow n”, and I said, “W ell you can be 
courteous”. A nyw ay, that w as it. H e actually show ed them off.
Then w e got to 1989. W e knew  w e had to get som e sort o f  special relationship going. We 
were protected by the special share so  w e  knew  no one could be buying us. General 
M otors cam e back on the scene and w e started to have these discussions, and all this tim e 
Ford didn’t know  what w as going  on. John wanted to work with General M otors because 
their decentralised m anagem ent w ou ld  be better for him. W e started to work out these  
deals. In 1989 John w as favouring this relationship whereby they had, say, 40%  o f  the 
shares but the rest w as kept on the Stock Exchange. I was doing the negotiation in m id- 
1989, but talk about nasty aggressive m eetings! A t that tim e the share price w as about 
400p  and it should have gone dow n. W e were saying w e were going to break-even in 
1989. But the share price w ent up to 600p.
Ford cam e back on the scene and John said “N o !” They’d picked up that w e w ere talking 
to General M otors. So w e w ent through all June, July, and August. There w as tiny Jaguar 
Cars talking to all these b loody great people w ho wanted to buy us. And all this tim e our 
share price w as going  up, not because w e w ere doing anything but because people  
thought there w as activity there. Ford knew  what was going on, but John said “N o  I’m 
not having anything to do w ith Ford”, and w e got to the stage where Ford stepped in, 
bought the shares, but John said “N o , N o , still don’t want it”. So he w ent dow n to this 
m eeting with General M otors saying “Y o u ’ve got to step in, and buy the equivalent o f  
them ” But they w eren’t so keen about getting into a dog fight with Ford about the share 
price. John w as still trying to keep them  there, because that was his favoured deal, all the 
w ay through October. In the end I said to John “Y ou ’ve just got to sit dow n w ith the Ford 
people because (a) I can’t see  w h y y o u ’re so  vehem ent and (b) the General M otors deal 
isn ’t go ing  to work. It’s not going  to w ork from a management point o f  v iew , from a 
product point o f  v iew , and is certainly not going to work from a shareholders point o f  
v iew  because by g iv ing  them  that 40%  and with the joint venture setup y o u ’re g iv ing  
them the com pany. Y ou’re not m axim ising  shareholder value”. It was the closest I got to 
having a row with him because he and I w ere very close. We spent a lot o f  tim e together: 
travelling together, and he on ly  lived  around the com er from me. I said “This is 
absolutely stupid” and in the end he cracked. I phoned John Grant and I said “W e’re 
w illing  to talk”. H e said “Are you sure, because it’s very important”. I said “W e’re sure!”
74 Don Petersen was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Ford Motor Company, 1985 to 1990.
75 Alex Trotman was Chairman o f  Ford o f  Europe at this point.
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and w e agreed to m eet on the M onday. W e had a few  days’ m eetings and w e agreed the 
deal. But the reason for John Grant saying that it w as so important is that they w ere just 
about to sign the deal to buy Saab. So, what happened is that they went into an absolute  
panic after m y phone call because the board o f  Ford had authorised the deal to buy Saab 
or Jaguar. But th ey’d said that Jaguar w o n ’t happen so  let’s go for Saab. So they covered  
it up. They flew  out to Sw eden. They w ere go ing  to have dinner with the Saab people the 
night before sign ing the deal. Bruce Blythe and his team w ere just getting ready to go to 
dinner when the got the phone call. I didn’t know  this w as going on. We m et w ith Ford 
on the M onday m orning. That’s how  it was.
Did you know in advance that the government were going to pull the plug on the 
golden share?
N o. We were absolutely shocked. N ick  Ridley76 phoned up John on the Tuesday I think it 
was and said “I’m going to suspend the Golden Share” . I never got to the bottom  o f  it. I 
think M aggie did som e kind o f  deal. It was som ething to do w ith the developm ent o f  a 
plant, or not c losin g  one dow n. There was som e kind o f  deal because M aggie w as in 
Tokyo on the telev ision  w hen she said it was the right thing to do. W e had no idea it was 
going to happen. I talked to Bruce Blythe about it and he told m e they w ere as shocked as 
w e were. I believe him , but I’m not sure i f  he knew what happened betw een the 
Chairman o f  Ford and M aggie Thatcher.
Was Maggie disillusioned with Jaguar? The success story that was no longer a 
success story?
It w as the thought that it w as teetering on the edge, therefore let’s get it put down!
What about Land Rover?
It was 1986. Lord Y oung w as at the DTI. George Simpson77 cam e on. T hey needed help. 
At the tim e w e w ere really struggling. I said w e had to do it, but at the tim e w e  w ere in 
the b iggest crisis o f  our lives. So w e  actually turned the opportunity dow n. John ignored 
it because he w as so  absorbed in th is X J40 launch issue. He said w e didn’t have the 
m anagem ent to do it. W e sat dow n in E xecutive Management C om m ittee and voted  on it, 
and it w as about 7/4 not to do it. W e w ere just so thin on the surface. So that’s how  it 
happened.
Why didn’t you buy in the management?
We tried to. We w ere desperate over Jim Randle. We were so disillusioned. First w e  tried 
to buy Richard Parry-Jones78 w h o w as in the U S at the time. Then w e  tried to get Tom
76 Nicolas Ridley was Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry in the Thatcher Government from 1989 to 
1990.
77 George Simpson was Chief Executive Rover Group at this time.
78 Richard Parry-Jones: in 1985 he was Executive Engineer, Ford Technological Research in Europe, and in 
1988 became director o f Vehicle Concepts at Ford in the USA.
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W alkinshaw.79 We were trying to get som eone to run the Jaguar Engineering operation. 
We were desperate. W e w ere trying to buy in other things. W e knew everything about 
sales and marketing. W e knew  m ost things about manufacturing, or w e could  fix  it. We 
thought w e had an engineering set-up, but w e hadn’t.
Was the problem with the XJ40 a manufacturing problem?
It w as a w onderfully engineered car that couldn’t be built. It w as not developed  enough  
from a manufacturing point o f  v iew .
The company Jaguar was most frequently compared with because of its size and 
market position was Porsche.
We used to compare ourselves w ith M ercedes and BM W , but Porsche w as the sam e 
volum es.80
Did you ever think of doing a Rights Issue?
We did but it w as too late. It w as part o f  the General Motors thing to do a R ights Issue. 
We were going to have a R ights Issue and let them  buy the shares. The General M otors 
deal w ould have been a disaster for the shareholders, but I think John Egan has forgotten 
that. I liked John a lot, but he did get lost.
I had the impression that John Egan regarded himself as the true successor to Sir 
William Lyons
Lyons treated him like the son he d idn’t have.81 He died in 1985. He loved John. John 
used to go out and show  him  cars at h is hom e. Yeah, yeah, it w as that type o f  
relationship. It w as spiritual alm ost.
Did John Egan regard Jaguar as his personal fiefdom?
He tried to get quite a big stake in the privatisation. John’s v iew , and to a great extent I 
agree with him , w as that during the period 1980-84 he picked up Jaguar w hen M ichael 
Edwardes w ould have chopped it dow n. John picked it up and made som ething that was 
worth nothing, or negative m oney , worth £300m illion .82 A  lot o f  m oney. H e w as
79 Tom Walkinshaw. Head o f TWR (Tom Walkinshaw Racing), and JaguarSport, the joint venture 
company established by Jaguar and the TWR Group in 1988 to manufacture the Jaguar XJ220.
80 In a meeting with the author in October 1987, following the sharp falls on the world’s stock exchanges, 
Edwards had opined that the fall in share prices would have little impact on Jaguar sales, unlike the sales 
o f Porsche which he described as being a “Yuppie” car. (Author’s contemporaneous notes).
81 Lyons’ only son was killed in a motoring accident in France in 1955. (Whyte, Andrew Jaguar The 
definitive history o f  a great British car (Wellingborough, 1985). pi 43).
82 Jaguar market capitalisation at its flotation price o f 165p per share was £297million.
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embarrassed that he got a service contract which paid £56 ,000  a year83, and he thought 
that w as ridiculous. H e’d created £300m illion  from nothing, and he w as paid £56 ,000  for 
doing so. And he w as quite right. And w e did in 1983 think about doing an M BO . But his 
view  w as that he should have had a big chunk o f  the equity because he created the 
wealth. I think John’s case w as real. He was paid peanuts for creating £300m illion  o f  
wealth, and later on he sold  it for £ 1 .6billion . H e’s not a poor man by any m eans but he 
didn’t get that much out o f  Jaguar. H is v iew  w as that he single-handedly created all that 
wealth him self. I agree with him that he deserved a lot more than £56 ,000p a  for doing it.
At the time of the float who appointed your advisors?
We had a big row about it. W e w eren’t a llow ed our ow n bank. Hill Sam uel w as the 
merchant bank on behalf on BL. It ended up that Slaughter and May w ere B L ’s legal 
advisors. We had Clifford Chance. W e w eren’t allow ed to have our ow n financial 
advisor.
You kept Cazenove on as stockbrokers?
Y es w e did, and appointed M organ G renfell as soon as w e could. That’s w hen G eorge  
Magan cropped up.
Didn’t your advisers - didn’t Morgan Grenfell, didn’t Cazenove - turn round and 
say “You really ought to be doing a rights, you really ought to be building up a war 
chest”?
The answer is probably yes, but w e  w ere told by G eorge Magan that Orr-Ewing had all 
these great ideas o f  using the Jaguar brand name. I think he got the idea o f  having a 
m assive rights issue. The problem  w as that w h ile  he w as having these d iscu ssions w ith  
G eorge Magan he hadn’t told John Egan what he w as doing, so w e had a coup and w e  
sacked him. And w e did it w ith G eorge M agan’s help when Ray Horrocks w as aw ay on a 
trip to the Far East. W e voted  him out as Chairman. That w as a good day. W e sacked  
him. He even described h im se lf  as a second division Chairman. John Egan said “W e 
don’t want a fucking second d iv ision  man, I want the best in the world! I’m not having a 
fucking second d ivision  Chairman”. It w as funny at the tim e because H am ish Orr-Ewing  
w as Trotman’s first boss at Ford. That w as w hy he got the Chairman’s job , because they  
thought h e’d got som e m otor industry experience. John hated him. Talk about tension  
between the two! A nyw ay, w e  felt w e w ere doing the right thing because it w as reported 
he w as having secret talks behind our back. John and I often talk about it. It w as one o f  
the best days o f  our lives. W e cou ldn’t sack him as a director, but w e could vote  him  out 
as Chairman i f  w e had a board m ajority, which w e had. The next thing w e did w as to vote
83 The Offer for Sale document (p36) reveals Egan had entered into a Service Agreement with Jaguar at an 
annual salary o f £56,477. In 1985, Jaguar’s first full year as a quoted company, Egan received 
emoluments o f  £172,959 and by the year-end had been awarded options over 245,812 shares under the 
Senior ExecutiveShare Option Scheme (Jaguar 1985 Annual Report and Accounts)
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M ike B easley and Ken Edwards as directors. But Orr-Ewing and Ray Horrocks were still 
directors.84
Hamish was imposed on you wasn’t he? By whom?
By BL. They said John’s too inexperienced. He hasn’t got any City experience.
John becoming both Chairman and Chief Executive was really contrary to City 
informal guidelines, wasn’t it?
It w as, but at that tim e w e  cou ldn’t do anything wrong, could we?
Jaguar had a pretty ropy time with industrial relations, didn’t it?
I think one o f  the problem s w as the w ay the BL guys had been. They had to be tougher. 
John w as on this m ission for recovery and he still thought he w as a man o f  the people. 
John used to sort o f  lecture them . John w asn’t that tough on the issues. H e cou ldn’t 
understand w hy anyone w ou ldn’t support him, because he w as so good, and he w as doing  
so w ell. H aving said that you  want to talk to Bob Ainsworth, one o f  the c h ie f  shop  
stewards at the tim e, w h o ’s now  one o f  the Coventry M Ps - I offered him  a jo b  in the 
finance dept, but he said “John, I’m far more am bitious than that” . He sw ears by John.
So, I don’t know  i f  he [Egan] did have a bad track record. He did a m assive am ount o f  
good com m unications. Fantastic em p loyee com m unications. W e had a very successful 
em ployee share schem e. But industrial relations were dead hard. W e didn’t bang the 
drum about productivity as m uch as w e should have done.
But you had a fair number o f man-days lost on strikes?
Y es w e did. W e had the first strike in 1984. John couldn’t believe how  they could do this 
to him. W e lost a few  days but it w orked out alright. But lets get a perspective. What did 
w e achieve? B y m id -1985 w e  had started to get a fantastic dealer network in the UK  and 
U SA . W e raised the output. W e’d got fantastic com m unications, although w e ended up 
turning our back on it to som e extent. W e did a lot in terms o f  video-conferencing. John 
turned h im se lf into a bit o f  a v id eo  pop star. W e used to start early in the m orning. W e’d 
g ive  them the v ideo  and then answ er the questions, and go on all day. F ive hundred a 
session , answering any questions anybody wanted. I think this w as pretty radical.
84 Horrocks and Orr-Ewing remained on the Board o f Jaguar pic until April 1985. Jaguar’s 1985 Annual 
Report and Accounts pi 8 notes their resignations from the Board, but there is no acknowledgment of, or 
appreciation shown for, the contribution either had made as directors. As noted earlier, Horrocks had 
been Chairman o f Jaguar prior to its privatisation in 1984. However, in Jaguar’s 1984 Annual Report and 
Accounts Egan’s Chairman’s Statement did conclude with the statement “Finally I would like to thank 
Hamish Orr-Ewing for his contribution as Chairman through the period following our privatisation”.
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N obody e lse  w as doing this at the tim e.85 We were talking to all the labour force in one  
day. In one day w e were talking to eight thousand people. W e’d answer any questions 
they wanted. There’d be a director there. W e’d explain what w e needed to do in terms o f  
the exchange rate. And w e  used to have a lot o f  d o ’s. In the developm ent o f  the marque it 
w as fantastic. This w as John. He drove it all. In the early 1980s he m ade the com pany  
what it is. If it hadn’t been for him it w ould have gone under. H e personally saved the 
com pany. He purposefully privatised it, and he purposefully made it worth tw o and a ha lf  
billion dollars. H is w eakn esses in manufacturing, his w eaknesses in engineering were  
exposed. He struggled very hard to try to improve the situation, but g ive  him  his due he 
stuck it out. I think m ost peop le w h o worked for Jaguar w ould say it w as nice com ing to 
work. G ood product, very proud to work for Jaguar. He left a heritage. But I don ’t think 
the cars in our tim e were very good. The XJ40 in my v iew  w as bad. But the XJ-S w as a 
very good car. The engineering w as good, but they were screw ed together in such a w ay  
that they couldn’t pull the p ieces together. On a com m ercial basis, on a m arketing basis, 
on a com m unication basis you  could  argue that John w as top class. H e w as good with the 
m anagem ent team; he kept the team  together, good m anagement focused  team . People  
believed  in him. H e w asn ’t very ruthless on a personal basis, in terms o f  sacking people. 
He w ou ldn’t do it h im self. H e w as deficient in engineering and m anufacturing 
experience, but he w as a good  project manager. But he started to b elieve in his ow n  
bullshit. He started to b elieve  that he w as the best person in Britain.
Why wasn’t he on top o f the XJ40 problems?
I think he trusted. He thought that Jim Randle in particular let him dow n. A nd he had a 
very d icey  period with M ike B easley , the manufacturing guy. I think Jaguar’s good  
enough now , and a lot o f  the peop le w h o ’ve  done it were at Jaguar then. T hey n ow  know  
how  to do it. But at that point in tim e w e ’d not launched a new  car for fifteen/tw enty  
years. So it w as a lack o f  experience, and none o f  us realising it at the tim e. There hadn’t 
been a new  product launch for tw enty years. W e did a refinement on the X J-S. Jaguar 
engineering w ere good at refinem ent, even  in B ill L yons’ day, but w ere never good  at 
launching cars. W illiam  L yons w as never good at launching cars and getting the quality  
right in the first instance. W hat he a lw ays did w as offer value for m oney. W hen it cam e  
to the XJ40 w e felt w e ’d done a m assive amount o f  testing, but those cars w ere virtually  
hand-built. But w e hadn’t done an engineering/m anufacturing launch o f  a n ew  car for 
tw enty-five years, and it d idn’t work. W e did say in the privatisation docum ent how  risky
85 Edwards is being somewhat disingenuous here. Michael Edwardes describes how BL from 1978 onwards 
pursued a policy o f communicating directly with employees, and how at Austin Rover in 1979 Harold 
Musgrove, the Managing Director, and his team “put the product strategy across to some 18,000 
employees -  on day and night shifts -  talking virtually continuously to groups o f 1,000 people at a time” 
(Edwardes. Back from  the Brink, p p l  72,271)
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it w as with the X J40.86 O ne o f  the big debates w e had with Hill Samuel w as that w e ’d 
originally planned to launch the XJ40 in 1983, but Hill Samuel said you can’t do the 
launch and privatise at the sam e tim e, and John knew he couldn’t do the car in 1983. 
Launch it later and do the privatisation first. And then the launch w ent back and back. In 
fact it w as launched in 1986/87. W hen I started there it was in the new  product plans to 
be launched in 1983. From that unsuccessful XJ40 launch it w as only a matter o f  tim e 
really before w e got taken over. The cars were still selling, and w e thought w e  could sort 
it, and w e did, but not w ithout a lot o f  grief.
Whom did Jaguar regard as competing with it?
John in the early 1980s used to see  Jaguar as being the British equivalent o f  BM W . 
BM W  w ere doing 500 ,000  cars a year87, but in 1960 BM W  were doing 2 0 ,0 0 0  cars a 
year, which is what Jaguar w ere doing in I9 6 0 .88 So, w e said “W e’ve got to catch up”, 
and that’s what w e w ere trying to do. In aspiration terms it was Daim ler B en z I guess. In 
m odel terms it w as BM W  7 Series and Daim ler B enz S C lass that w e saw  as the 
com petition. The concept w e  had o f  a 3 Series, a 5 Series, a 7 Series, Ford had the same 
concept. Our next aim w ou ld  have been a 5 Series - w e called it the X J80. So w e  had it 
all there. We thought w e could  do it all ourselves - w e could be like BM W  and get
100,000 volum e. That’s what w e  w ere aim ing for. But w e  pushed the volum e too much.
Transcript of the interview with John Edwards on 27th October 2003
[ Comment following Author mentioning some of those interviewed for this study ]:
John Grant and A lex  Trotman can on ly  tell you what w as there when they arrived at 
Jaguar, they can’t tell you what w as there in 1 9 8 4 /8 5 .1 never saw  a finance director w ho  
could do m ore than help other directors achieve their jobs. I w as very c lo se  to John Egan, 
so I knew  what he w as thinking, but that w as on strategic issues.
86 Far from spelling out the risks associated with the XJ40, the Offer for Sale document was highly positive. 
Page 17 stated the following: “The continued financial success o f Jaguar will depend on several factors, 
a key one being the successful launch o f the XJ40 model range. There is no immediate commercial 
pressure to introduce this new car. The car is undergoing an extensive and exhaustive development and 
testing programme and the Directors are confident that, when launched, it will enhance the ability o f
Jaguar to strengthen its market position Jaguar has a famous name in all the major car markets o f
the world. It has the potential to produce and sell more cars and the Directors are confident that future 
prospects are good and will be enhanced by the XJ40”.
Again, in the information video Jaguar ‘Risk and Opportunity’, produced ahead o f the privatisation, the 
XJ40 is not cited as a risk factor by Egan, and Jim Randle is shown as stating “There can be no way we 
can launch a new car that is not at least as good as that going out”.
87 BMW total worldwide sales (all models) exceeded 400,000 units for the first time in 1983, and exceeded 
500,000 units for the first time in 1989 (Source: e-mail from BMW Business and Finance 
Communication Department to the author. 25 September 2008).
88 Jaguar deliveries in 1960 totalled 19,341 units (as shown in Figure 3.3 in the main text).
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Can we revisit the issue of Labour Relations.
A problem w as that John Egan thought that everyone at Jaguar should love him because  
he’d done such w onderful things for Jaguar, and he couldn’t understand the blue collar  
m entality. B ill H ayden sorted out manufacturing without a doubt. Scheele  got rid o f  a lot 
o f  the foreman level, the chargehands w ho were part o f  the problem.
What about the problems with Manufacturing?
There were the three boxes o f  engineering, manufacturing, and the com m ercial aspects o f  
it. The demand for luxury products existed  and w e re-established that. W e re-established  
products that people w ere interested in buying. In the 1980s compared to the crap o f  the 
1970s the manufacturing quality im proved. The Series III w as very good. Right up to the 
XJ40 launch the quality o f  the Series III got m uch, much better. So that part o f  
manufacturing w as stabilised. W here w e failed m iserably w as that the engineering on the 
car w as now here near ready for launch on tim e, and it was launching it into a 
manufacturing organisation that cou ldn’t cope with it that caused the problem s o f  the first 
tw o years o f  XJ40, and that w as a m ess.
We had a huge problem  with m anufacturing in the early 1980s. But manufacturing  
improved, and improved im m ensely  under B ill Hayden. N ick  Scheele got the assem bly  
factory sorted out, and Jim Portillo sorted out the engineering. But until then, from the 
early 80s, Jim Randle put h is efforts into engineering cars that didn’t b loody work. 
M anufacturing got a lot better, w ithout a doubt, but not with Series III. The X J40 w as  
prematurely launched. It took us three years again to sort it out. It w as not correct to say 
that people w eren’t that interested in quality. It took a long tim e to rectify the situation  
w e found ourselves in. The problem  w as the launch o f  the XJ40. The 1990 m odel year 
car, the XJ40 saloon, w as the car w e  should have launched in 1986, so it took us three 
years to get things sorted.
From w here I w as sitting there w as a m assive em phasis on quality. I’ve  seen  John pin  
M ike B easley  up against the w all over quality problems. He w as very brutal at tim es, was 
John, and he put a lot o f  effort into trying to resolve the quality problem s. Q uality Circles 
were a load o f  bullshit, as w ere the Total Quality M anagement people. Som e o f  the actual 
quality im provem ent groups w ere very focused. John actually ran one h im se lf  on the AJ6 
engine, and he actually sorted it out over a period o f  time. H e w as dedicated to doing that. 
The fundamental fault w as that B row ns Lane w as a poor assem bly plant in 1980. The 
bodyw ork w as crap in C astle B rom w ich, the paintshop ditto. Every car w as sort o f  hand- 
built. That w as the Jaguar way; resolve the issues on the shopfloor. But still engineering  
had not ensured that everything had been done, and that the prototype worked properly 
before you cut m etal. So w e  w ent on this m assive prototype launch o f  the XJ40. They  
were all fantastic cars. T hey did a m illion m iles on the road trying to prove them out. But 
they w eren’t product line cars. M ike [B easley] improved im m ensely under B ill. But it 
w asn’t until C live Ennos cam e along for engineering that it w as sorted. Jim [Randle] was 
bitterly upset when he got fired. W e improved trem endously during the 1990s, but w e  
were ten years behind everyone e lse . In the 1980s w e were improving, but it’s just that 
w e w ere behind other people and it ju st w asn’t good enough to sustain our long term  
position. W e w ere m aking im provem ents all the tim e, but then w e went into this great big
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dive; th e  X J40 w h en  en g in eerin g  ju st created a nightmare! The engineering  
im provem en ts d id n ’t start to c o m e  through until the 1990 m odel year.
It is difficult to see how Jaguar could have survived into the 1990s as an 
independent company.
W e c a m e  to  that co n clu sion  as w e ll, that’s w hy w e  sold out. But i f  w e had started twenty  
years earlier  w e  c o u ld  have d o n e , because BM W  only made 2 0 ,0 0 0  v eh ic les  in 1960, 
com pared  w ith Jaguar’s 2 0 ,0 0 0  veh ic les. O bviously BM W  did m agnificently  w ell. They  
got to  3 0 0 ,0 0 0  v e h ic le s  qu ick ly . That w as the log ic  Ford used on the Jaguar acquisition. 
W ith F ord ’s help  th ese  3 Series, 5 Series, 7 Series, that is, the X  Type, S T ype, the  
S aloon , and the X JL  w ere the b asis  o f  a 300 ,000  volum e w hich w ould m ake everything  
w orth w h ile , that w o u ld  work in term s o f  the numbers. W e had a v iew  o f  trying to expand 
the v o lu m e  on the Saloon  and th e  S T ype, but w e couldn’t get the costs to m ake it work; 
w e c o u ld n ’t get th e  m argins. W e ’d have ended up with a 50 ,000  m axim um  type car. So I 
gu ess th e  PLC th in g  w asn ’t g o in g  to  work.
W e first rea lised  that in O ctober 1987 with the Stockmarket crash. The exchange rate 
started to  g o  adverse again and the A m erican dem and w ent dow n. They w eren’t 
d isco u n tin g  m a ssiv e ly . Prior to  the crash, dealers were asking $4 ,0 0 0 /$ 5 ,0 0 0  premium. It 
is that th at d isappeared after the crash. That halo o f  demand disappeared after October. 
The A m erican  dem and disappeared; not necessarily  straight aw ay, but it did disappear. 
W e w e r e  right in th e  m iddle o f  struggling with X J40 quality.
A t that p o in t Ford ca m e on the scen e. Ford cam e and talked to us. W e w ere trying to 
m aintain so m e  sem b lan ce  o f  independence but I think that John and I knew  it couldn’t go  
on for e v e r . It w as ju s t  a q u estion  o f  tim e. But w e  thought w e ’d get to 1990 w hen the 
Special Share ran out. From 1 9 8 8  onw ards I knew  that som ehow  or other w e ’d lose  our 
in d ep en d en ce, there w as so  m uch  interest from the other b ig car com panies, and w e were 
so  sm all w ith ou t a great capacity  to  g o  anyw here. That is, w ithout a 5 Series type car or a 
3 Series ty p e  car to  expand the m od el range. W e w ere trying to find another w ay o f  
getting  round th in gs. The X J40 launch problem  gave us a problem  because i f  it had gone  
sm ooth ly  w e ’d h ave  been able to  w ork w ith the British governm ent to buy Land Rover. 
That w o u ld  have g iv e n  us a m u ch  b igger volum e. But that didn’t work. Then in the late 
19 8 0 s  Ford cam e on  the scen e and said  they w ere interested in buying us, then General 
M otors c a m e  on th e  scen e. T he fate o f  Jaguar w as determined in Detroit, not at Brow ns 
Lane.
So how much o f the effort in 1988 and 1989 was directed at getting the best price for 
the com pany?
W e n ev er  thought o f  it that w a y . N ever! W e just worked on our instincts. It w asn’t a 
question  o f  en tic in g  p eo p le  in. O n e  o f  our log ics w as based on trying still to make 
som eth in g  o f  an independent Jaguar, w h ich  w as our gut instinct, m aybe a naive instinct, 
since b e fo re  the 1 984  privatisation . W e wanted to build all the w ay through the 1980s a 
com p any w h ich  w o u ld  be the n e w  B M W , the English BM W . It w as that that drove us on, 
and I th in k  to  a greater extent it w a s  on ly  the realisation that the shareholders were only  
interested in the share price g o in g  up, because w e ’d be acquired by either Ford or GM,
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that m ade us realise the fact o f  life that there were certain prices you can’t say no to. A s a 
board o f  directors you just can’t say no just because you like being independent.
What about cash flow?
We didn’t run out o f  cash until the 1990s. We were still m aking a good profit. W e broke 
even in 1989/90.89 In 1992 w e ’d have got w iped out in a few  m onths. The market 
collapsed. In that year the market halved. The budget for that year w as based on 50 ,000  
cars, but w e produced 2 5 ,0 0 0  cars.90 W e had to produce 4 0 ,0 00 /45 ,000  cars at that tim e 
just to break even. We should have gone bankrupt in 1980/81, but w hen the exchange  
rate w as $1 .10  w e could have produced only  10,000 cars and still have m ade m oney.
Mike Beasley said that being a quoted company put massive constraints on the 
company. Was that true?
In terms o f  building cars it d idn’t. It gave us a m assive profile. And it gave us another 
dim ension to the marketing programm e: “B uy the car and buy som e shares” , w hich is 
what w e used to do in the U S . T his becam e the big story o f  N A S D A Q .91 W hich is w hy  
w e becam e a N A S D A Q  com pany. Certainly it raised that kind o f  dim ension, and enabled  
us to get a much bigger nam e and reputation as a com pany than it w as in reality. There 
was the m otor racing program m e w hich  w as another part o f  the hype that w e  got. But 
there w as nothing that constrained m anufacturing because w e spent as m uch m oney as 
manufacturing could spend to im prove it. W e built an engineering centre. N o  w onder  
engineering cou ldn’t work; they w ere w orking in tin sheds at the bottom o f  Brow ns Lane! 
N o w onder they cou ldn’t do things properly! I don’t think that anyone w ou ld  say that 
being a PLC w as a constraint at all. W e had to g ive  a talk about our results every six  
m onths, but that w asn ’t a constraint. Capital expenditure was never constrained by being  
a PLC. I gave him [M ike B easley] loads o f  m oney. H e did far better than before. There 
w asn’t anything I can think o f  that w as a constraint. One good thing that cam e out o f  
privatisation w as that w e  had to  delay the XJ40. I f  w e ’d launched it in 1984 it w ould have  
been even  more o f  a disaster. W e never had a problem with paying dividends, and there 
w as never any pressure to increase dividends. W e w ere able to do a lot o f  the things w e  
wanted to do, such as the V enture Pressings jo in t venture with G KN. So, I don ’t see that 
the City caused too m any problem s.
89 At the pre-tax level in 1989 Jaguar reported a loss o f £58.3million, and in 1990 reported a loss o f 
£66.2million (as shown in Table 4.3 in the main text).
90 The actual 1992 production figure was 20,337 cars, (as stated in the Jaguar Ltd 1993 Accounts filed at 
Companies House)
91 National Association o f Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system, the junior New York share 
trading operation.
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T ra n scr ip t o f  th e  in terv iew  w ith  Joh n  E gan . 3 0 th O ctob er 2007
Was the poor state that Jaguar was in when you took over more because of BL, or 
because o f the Lyons heritage?
I think it w as m ostly  because o f  British Leyland, but there were all kinds o f  other things 
that w ere w rong w ith  Jaguar because of, le t’s call it, the nature o f  the inheritance. So, for 
exam ple, I think they  [the Lyons m anagem ent] were very interested in design ing and 
d evelop ing  new  cars, but 1 d on ’t think manufacturing was ever a w ell thought o f  
discip line. The serv ice  department w as very important, and the offshoot o f  that w as the 
racing, that w as all very important, w ith “Lofty” England92 and so on, but I don ’t think 
m anufacturing w as ever a h igh ly  thought o f  discipline.
The fact that they actually bought an assem bly line second hand from Triumph didn’t 
m ake you have a lot o f  respect for the manufacturing discipline, and there w as no 
discip line betw een m anufacturing and engineering. For exam ple, I inherited the parts 
division  o f  Jaguar, and I put them  together into Jaguar Rover Triumph Parts in the 1970s 
and I d on ’t think that Jaguar Parts ever m ade any m oney until w e got our hands on it. 
They w ere constantly changing part num bers and this made it very difficult, so the 
ob so lescen ce  in the parts department w as varying huge.931 think that the lim ited  
m anagerial talent that Jaguar had concentrated on what they were good at, w hich was 
design ing fine cars, but the m anufacturing d iscip lines and the orderly d iscip lines were not 
w ell established . It w as a pity in a w ay since the com pany w ould have got further along  
its route before Leyland took it over i f  th ey ’d had som e highly disciplined person in there 
with B ill L yons as w e ll as good  engineers, because he had som e very fine engineers, 
there’s no question about that, and his eye  for design w as really excellent; there’s no 
question about that either. But there w ere d ifficu lties with the heritage I agree.
The only book that really talks about the Jaguar management per se is 
Underwood’s book.94 He does seem to have had the full co-operation of Jaguar in 
researching it, and been able to talk to everyone. Is that correct?
Y es.
Underwood mentions that you did have some misgivings about the Lyons days.
Y es, it sounds alm ost sacrileg ious to say  that, but there were things that w eren’t entirely 
perfect But there w ere ob viou sly  very great strengths. O f course, i f  they’d had that very  
disciplined approach and probably a m uch m ore disciplined approach to sales and 
marketing it w ould  have grow n beyond its thirty-odd thousand units w hich it never
92 “Lofty” England, who succeeded Lyons as Chairman o f Jaguar, was a one-time racing/rally driver who 
started with Jaguar in 1946 as Service Manager, and managed the Jaguar racing team in the late
1940s/early 1950s (Whyte, Andrew. Jaguar. The definitive history o f  a great British car. Second Edition. 
(Wellingborough, 1985). pp9,120).
93 Detailed in Whisler. The British M otor Industry 1945-1994. p99
94 Underwood, John. The Will to Win. John Egan and Jaguar. (London, 1989)
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actually grew  beyond in the Lyons days. Som ething w ould a lw ays stop it getting beyond  
thirty-odd thousand cars a year.
How would you describe your own management style when you were at Jaguar?
It w as one o f  evolvem en t o f  course. I’d never run a car plant before. I’d run fairly big  
organisations, but never a car plant, so  I had to learn very much about running a 
m anufacturing operation and an integrated car com pany as w e w ent along. The speed at 
w hich w e had to do everything w as one thing you ’d have to remark on. So, for exam ple, 
w hen I arrived there w as on ly  a m anufacturing and an engineering operation called  
Jaguar. So, to m ake up a com pany w e  had to bring in a personnel department, a finance 
department, and purchasing, and sa les and marketing, and eventually create a com plete  
car com pany. So, I w ou ld  have said that the first couple o f  years w ere spent in pulling  
together the various d iscip lin es required to  make a com plete com pany, and also pulling in 
the parts o f  the com pany w e  didn’t m anage. So, w e  had to take in C astle Brom w ich, 
w hich w as the body-in-w hite and paint plant. It w as a huge plant, and w e  w ere using only  
a sm all part o f  it, but w e had to take on the w h ole  lot because A ustin M orris were 
w alking aw ay from it all. And then w e  had our quality problem s to overcom e. W e started 
up a system  o f  telephone interview s w ith custom ers, and w e basically  identified about 
150 key faults that w e  had to overcom e i f  w e  w ere go in g  to create saleable cars. And I 
rem em ber w e  handed them  out ten each to a load o f  people. I had m y ten. M y ten were  
m ostly associated with external things. M ost o f  our problem s w ere actually external, 
except for the body-in -w hite,95 and paint, w hich w as a huge problem  w hich  M ike B easley  
fixed. But m ost o f  m y problem s w ere associated with com ponent problem s that w e  
bought in, and 1 had to go  and fix  them  all. And w e fixed  them. A nd w ithin about 
eighteen m onths w e  w ere beginning to create saleable cars, and they w ere beginning to 
sell. A t the sam e tim e w e  took  over the North A m erican operation o f  British Leyland. 
T h ey’d stopped doing all the other cars, M G  and Triumph, so  w e  inherited a com plete  
sales network with on ly  Jaguars to se ll, although they w ere on ly  sellin g  3 ,0 0 0  a year at 
the tim e. A s they becam e saleable w e  began to turn on the sales effort. B ut in terms o f  
how  unsaleable they w ere, the sin g le  b iggest problem  w e  had w as our body-in-w hite  
quality, and also  paint. T hese w ere dreadful problem s. W e w ere rew orking all o f  the cars 
when they cam e from C astle B rom w ich to B row ns Lane. W e had som ething like six  
hundred people in som ething called  “The Snakepit” reworking the b od ies that cam e in 
from C astle Brom w ich, and repainting every one. Every single on e w as repainted fully.
So to  get rid o f  that problem  w ith s ix  hundred people, and do it right first tim e, required 
an im m ense am ount o f  patience and hard work.
But as soon as the cars w ere saleable they started to sell. It w as really quite dramatic. The 
Series III had been extrem ely successfu l, and w as a very beautiful car. It fu lly  matched  
up to the long-term  heritage o f  beautiful cars from Jaguar. A s soon  as w e  got it saleable  
the A m erican dealers responded. W e brought them over to see us. T hey responded  
im m ediately. And the final trick to turn into profit w as the fact that w e w ere running out
95 Until the Castle Bromwich plant was taken over by Jaguar the body-in-white was regarded as an external 
supply, and included in the 60% o f  the faults attributed to suppliers. In an e-mail o f 18 July 2007 to the 
author, John Edwards stated: “The body was a big part o f the imported cost. It came under Jaguar 
control in 1980. As a percentage it was something like £800 out o f  £5,000. That is, 16%”.
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o f  cash. At one stage I w as having to report to the board o f  BL on a m onthly basis on our 
cash position, and w e really had to take dramatic steps. Once w e  got the quality going, 
and once the sales lifting up w e w ere still running out o f  m oney so quickly that w e  had to 
make changes to our productivity. 1 rem em ber saying to John Edwards “W ell, how  m any 
people can w e afford to pay?” W e had 10,000 people working for us and John reckoned  
we could afford to pay 6 ,000 , and that meant w e had to make 4 ,000  people redundant, 
which w e did across a period o f  about four m onths.96 Three things happened all at the 
same time: (a) the cars w ere saleable again (b) w e now  had 6 ,000  people on ly , and (c) 
sales volum es w ere going up. And all that happened at the sam e tim e. B y  1983 w e  w ere  
profitable. So the turnaround w as basically  from m idway through 1980 to m idw ay  
through 1983. So all that happened about the sam e time, having started m idw ay through 
1980. So it w as quite dramatic, but the first tw o years were really spent in curing the 
quality problem s, putting the organisation together, and then finally getting the 
productivity right to the point where w e  could actually make som e m oney out o f  it. So, I 
would have said that what typified  the m anagem ent style. It w as really getting with the 
next major job  and doing it. I had a very capable board o f  directors o f  peop le w ho were 
working with m e, the likes o f  John Edwards and M ike B easley and so on, and R oger  
Putnam and so on, but I a lso  used to  have a regular m eeting, about every tw o  m onths, 
might even have been every m onth, w ith the senior one hundred people w here they all 
got to understand the problem s w e  had to face. They were able to  contribute to the 
solutions, and w e able to w ork together as a group. And, finally, w e did com m unicate  
very w ell with the w orkforce. T hey w ere told what was going on. E verybody knew  what 
we were doing. There w as no question, everybody knew. And all o f  the m anagers got 
used to doing public speaking. E verybody had to get out and talk to all o f  their people  
and tell them w here w e  w ere. So, w e  got out there and com m unicated. W e listened and 
w e got on with it. W e com m unicated w ell, everybody knew what our priorities were. 
Quality w as the number one priority o f  the com pany all the w ay through th is story. We 
did other things as they cam e along, but quality w as absolutely paramount.
H ow  do  you  resp ond  to  th e  a ccu sa tion  th at you  w ere  au tocratic?
I m ight have appeared autocratic because w e had a plan that w as absolutely developed by  
everybody, but once w e  got the plan I turned into the autocrat to get it carried out. And I 
would help people to do their p iece  o f  it, but basically w e all got on w ith the thing w e ’d 
decided w e  w ere doing, but that w as developed as a group.
Did you  ev er  h ave a lo n g -term  stra tegy  as such?
W ell, o f  course, in the first tw o  or three years there w as nothing called  a long-term  plan. I 
think w e w ere punting the ball dow n the field as far as w e could go. W e allow ed  Jim  
Randle to build up his engineering operation. Incidentally, w hen w e  started w e  had only
96 The Jaguar Offer for Sale Document, 1984, plO, shows total employee numbers o f 9,725 as at 31st 
December 1980 o f which 7,554 were in manufacturing. A year later total numbers had fallen to 8,286, 
and by 31st December 1982 they had fallen to a 1980s low o f 7,832, o f  which 6,175 were in 
manufacturing. Thereafter, employee numbers climbed rapidly (as shown in Figure 6.5 in the main text).
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seventy-eight peop le out o f  the w hole 10,000 with university degrees.971 can remember 
the numbers absolutely clearly. If  w e ’d been a Japanese or a German car company w e ’d 
have had 3 ,000  people, so w e set up the open learning centre. Basically the concept was 
to enable our education level to rise to the level o f  the task. We decided to educate 
everybody w ho wanted an education. That tradition has continued in Jaguar. We did that 
as a survival tool. A nyw ay, in the meantime Jim started building up his capability. There 
only 230 people in the engineering operation, and w e reckoned you needed at least a 
thousand per car line. W e needed at least 1,500 or 2,000 to do tw o cars. So the first thing 
we did was to get the saloon up and running, and then w e decided to try and resuscitate 
the XJ-S which w e ’d stopped making. So the XJ-S w e salvaged and got back into sale, 
and w e developed a very high performance HE model; it had a 15 to 1 compression ratio. 
And w e developed this in an attempt to beat the gas guzzler legislation in the US, which  
we did. We just barely got it through: this 5.3 litre engine was a non-gas guzzler, so that 
was quite som ething. So, out o f  all this w e began to see that w e had the capability o f  
perhaps designing a new  car. W ell into the entrails was the XJ40 com ing through, but 
apart from Jim Randall nobody’d had any tim e for it at all because w e were really 
involved with the survival o f  the company. But the XJ40 project started to emerge as a 
future model programme, and then for a replacement to the XJ-S as a secondary model. 
And then for face-1 ifts in-between w e started bringing in the discipline o f  a model year 
programme so there w as som ething happening to the cars every year. And, o f  course, w e  
were expanding our sales network all the time.
We, generally speaking, separated from British Leyland whatever w e were doing. British 
Leyland franchises had been scattered around. Anybody who wanted one could have one, 
so we had hundreds o f  dealers in the UK. I remember inviting all o f  the dealers to a sales 
conference to basically  tell them that w e now  wanted much higher standards than British 
Leyland had asked them  to achieve. And I remember at the end o f  it all I said to them that 
“N ow  I want you to look to the dealer to right and to the dealer to the left and I want you  
to understand that the next tim e w e m eet only one o f  the three o f  you will be here because 
we are in the process now  o f  improving our dealer network”.981 remember that one o f  the 
grandees o f  the dealer network, Wadham Stringer, which later ended up as part o f  
Inchcape, came to see m e. H e said he w asn’t going to achieve these standards; he wasn’t 
going to do them; he w as going to have nothing to do with them. British Leyland had told 
him what to do and those were the standards he was going to live by, and as far as he was 
concerned he had spent the m oney, and that was it. So I said to him “H ow many o f  our 
dealerships have you got?” H e said “W e’ve got eight”. So I said “W ell, I’m going to ask 
for all eight o f  them  back again because you’re terminated”. You know the dealer 
contracts were m ost curious. Y ou could terminate them within a month. There was very 
little time they’d got. So it w as very easy getting down to our target number. The average 
dealer had been sellin g  twenty or thirty cars, and w e wanted the average dealer to sell
97 Of the eleven members o f the Executive Board under Egan, only two (Egan and Edwards) had university 
degrees, although some others held professional qualifications. In an e-mail on 28 August 2008 to the 
author, Mike Dale related that the surviving members o f Egan’s Executive were sent on an MBA course 
in management by Bill Hayden and Nick Scheele.
98 Whyte (Jaguar. p i 79) states that it was Neil Johnson, Jaguar’s new Sales and Marketing Director, who 
announced, at a BL dealer council meeting in March 1982, that there would be a drastic reduction in the 
number o f dealers. (Jaguar still came under BL at that time).
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about a hundred so he actually got som e m oney out o f  it, and he was organised and 
disciplined.
We did the same in the US. The average car was only grossing about a thousand Dollars, 
and there were three thousand cars being sold, so the w hole o f  the network was only  
getting £3m illion out o f  its sales o f  Jaguar cars. Within five years w e were selling 25,000  
cars and they were grossing, I think, $7,000."  So, they had gone from $3m illion to, I 
don’t know, $300m illion100 all in the space o f  five years. It had becom e a very valuable 
franchise.
So, “Was there any long-term planning?” W ell, new m odels were long-term planning. A 
new car was a long-term plan. But w e were putting into place things like dollar hedging, 
which BL had not done. At the time I was running Jaguar the dollar varied between $1 
and $2 [to the £]. So it started at about $1.80, went up to $2.10, and then went back down 
to $1, and ended up at something like $1 .50 .101 We became a very efficient hedger. We 
were okay at about $1.60; anything better than that was just magnificent.
Why did you focus purely on Jaguar, and didn’t do what many other companies at 
the time were doing and using your paper to expand into related areas, or even 
different areas?
There were tw o issues. First, I was very anxious to have a very conservative funding 
strategy so w e never had any debt. Once w e got into profit w e basically stayed cash 
positive, and w e also tried to make sure that w e did not deplete our reserves. A lso, w e  
had committed facilities o f  £300m illion or £400m illion. I knew that w e needed a huge 
resource to get this job  done. I knew it was very difficult. And I knew that w e needed a 
strong balance sheet i f  w e were going to see our way through difficult periods o f  time. 
And the reasons, o f  course, that w e got such a good price in the end were that (a) w e still 
had cash in the bank (b) w e had som e o f  the hedging left, and (c) w e had three or four 
hundred m illion pounds worth o f  committed facilities. We could have worked our way  
through the next recession. It would have been very tough, and the new  m odel 
programmes would have had to slow  down, but w e could have stayed in business. One o f  
m y difficulties was that I could see that the terrible confluence o f  everything going wrong 
was going to happen at the same time: (a) a weak Dollar, and it was flying back up to 
$1.80 or something; (b) w e had inflation in the UK. W e’re now talking about 1990, w e ’re 
talking about 10% inflation again;102 (c) w e’re talking about a relatively weak market in 
the US. N ow  all that was happening at about the same time. And w e ’d preceded som e o f  
that and started to have discussions with Toyota. We thought w e ’d might as w ell try and 
get help or work with the best company in the world. They were quite interested but then 
eventually decided not to work with us. I think that i f  w e ’d gone to N issan w e ’d have had 
a different story. I’ve since heard that. So, let’s go through the w hole issue. Financially
"  The more generally accepted figures, as per the Mike Dale interview, and comments in Automotive News, 
is that the average dealer gross in 1980 was $1,500 per car, and $6,500 per car in 1985.
100 This figure calculated on the quantities stated here should be $175million.
101 The range was $2.41/£ in November 1980, to $1.06/£ in March 1985. In 1986 the rate fluctuated 
between $1.39/£ and $1.56/£., and thereafter, to end 1989, the rate fluctuated between $1.50/£ and 
$1.90/£.
102 Year-on-year change in RPI: 1988 +4.9%, 1989 +8.9%, 1990 +9.5%, 1991 +5.9% (House of Commons 
Research Paper 99/20. 23 February 1999).
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w e were very conservative; w e saw it as a really difficult thing to survive in the UK  
which w as a pretty harsh environment for a sm all m otor manufacturer; w e didn’t have a 
single w orld-class supplier from the UK ( nobody could m ake/design us anything in the 
UK o f  any great quality or worth ), so w e were increasingly going to Japan or Germany 
to have everything designed for us, and that w as a really big struggle, especially since  
they were alw ays trying to  make more m oney out o f  us than they w ould try to make out 
o f  Porsche or BM W . So one felt it was a pretty alien environm ent. So, I thought there 
was no room for any margin o f  error. However, w e could have bought Land Rover if  
w e ’d had wanted to, and w e  had a very big debate about it, and then w e decided that it 
w ould have sim ply have m ade our risks too big. N or did w e see much in the w ay o f  
synergy between the tw o com panies.
Do you still hold that view?
W ell, there’s not much in the w ay o f  synergy. Probably Land R over theoretically was a 
better business than I thought it w as. Certainly I think that Ford and BM W  did a pretty 
good job  with Land Rover. But I don’t think it was going to m ake our task o f  survival 
with Jaguar any easier. So, yes.
Why didn’t you have a Rights Issue at the time of the XJ40 launch to fund the 
investment you needed to put in?
W ell, you see, w e  didn’t think a Rights Issue was feasible i f  w e  w eren’t going to make 
substantially more m oney, and the risks o f  things like this w ere m uch b igger than 
anything to do with our profit margin. W e said to ourselves that i f  w e  ever had the 
courage to go into another n ew  m odel w e would. So if, for exam ple, one o f  the things w e  
w ould have done i f  w e ’d jo ined  up with General M otors w e ’d have had to have a Rights 
Issue to fund, let’s call it, an S-type Mark Two size car. So that w ould have happened, 
yes.
Why didn’t you put in a modern assembly line. Wasn’t that a lost opportunity?
We thought body-in-w hite w as m ore important. And that took all the m oney w e had, 
more or less, to get the body-in-w hite right. Yes, you m ight w ell be right, but w e had an 
even more pressing requirement for our cash for the new  m odels. Y es, w e  w ould have got 
around to a new  assem bly line. W e’d done the engine; w e ’d got som e pretty good kit for 
the engines, pretty good kit for the body-in-w hite and the paint, and w e w ould  have got 
round to the final assem bly. And I guess w e should have done that for the XJ40, there’s 
no question about that.
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Wasn’t a big part of the problems on the shop floor the shop floor managers, junior 
in the Jaguar hierarchy who were often not reporting things back, were not putting 
into effect things that senior managers wanted? Did you have any understanding of 
that at the time?
W ell, obviously  w e  had com m unication programmes and w e knew  that w e  had basically  
a supervision that w ere not terrific comm unicators. But w e thought that they were 
practical men and they w ere w illing  to talk with their people. W e were probably trying to 
do too much o f  the com m unication and the listening from a higher level. That’s probably 
true. But w e did our best. W e did actually try to do our leadership programmes and our 
training programmes for them . I’ve since put in training programmes for that first line o f  
supervision when I w as running B A A  that were far more successfu l.103 That was one o f  
the things that I had learned. The first line o f  supervision w as absolutely the crucial level, 
and you ’ve got to get them involved. And w e did that [at B A A ] by creating som ething  
called “Creating Successful T eam s”. But, no, w e didn’t have as equally a powerful 
programme at Jaguar.
I heard that you’d had these communications meetings. Feedback from the shop 
floor was invited, but when that happened the guys would be taken aside later by 
their supervisors and told ‘Don’t rock the boat’. Any comment?
I don’t know  whether that w as happening. Certainly, the trade unions were not very 
positive either. One alw ays got the feelin g  that the only w eapon w e had, apart from all 
the leadership things, w as pointing back at ourselves, and I noticed that as soon as Ford 
got there they w ere very, very straightforward. Ford said to them “W ell, i f  you don’t want 
to make the cars that’s fine, w e ’ll m ake them  som ew here else. Y ou don’t need to make 
them ”. That rather threw the shop stewards. W e tried, and yet I feared that w e ’d got too  
much history to overcom e. I feared it w as very difficult. And other people did do w ell by 
starting from scratch. W e had m ade huge progress o f  course, but it still w asn’t enough. 
The thing about com peting w ith  the w orld car industry is that you can’t just do 7% 
im provem ent for one or tw o years, y o u ’v e  got to do it every year, otherw ise you ’re not in 
business. W e m ade som e very b ig  strides, but they w eren’t enough.
You had the reputation of being very anti-union. To what extent was this play­
acting?
W ell, they’d been very useful to us when w e ’d been creating our separation from British  
Leyland because they wanted to get separate from British Leyland, but once w e ’d got 
into profit and once w e ’d got a future in front o f  us they w eren’t the sam e pow er for 
good. They didn’t actually help us much.
103 Following his departure from Jaguar, Egan became Chief Executive o f BAA, the publicly quoted owner 
and operator o f major British airports, including Heathrow and Gatwick, and Edinburgh.
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You had a fair number of silly disputes didn’t you? Disputes that didn’t hit the 
press or anything, but were the odd day here and there.
Y es w e did. It w as very distressing to m e. A s far as I could see w e ’d done everything w e  
could do in our pow er to m ake this relationship positive, but it never seem ed to be 
enough. It w as unnerving. Y ou ’d be m aking huge progress, and y e t....O n e  o f  the things 
that alw ays distressed m e too w as that I could never get them to work beyond 3 .30 in the 
afternoon. I used to w alk around at 3 .30  and talking to people, asking w hy w e can’t get 
this extra car finished. It w as “W e’ve finished our stint, and that’s it” . T hey’d organised 
things, and they’d work a bit harder so they could always finish and have a rest for the 
last half hour. It w as som ething I alw ays found pretty unnerving.
You seem to have had some sort of animus towards British Leyland. I can 
understand you wanting to get rid of the shackles and so on, and I’ve heard various 
comments of just how bad they were, but was this a real problem for you?
It w as really very, very unsatisfactory. When w e were privatised w e  had to have a non­
executive Chairman, and that w as within the gift o f  British Leyland to appoint this person 
before w e were floated. And, anyw ay, w e got floated, and w e got our non-executive  
Chairman, but unknown to us he w as having m eetings with the non-executive directors, 
including Ray Horrocks, w ho w as the C h ief Executive o f  BL, about creating a 
conglom erate out o f  Jaguar; to use our increasing cash resource to buy other com panies 
or businesses. H e particularly wanted to buy, because he had one h im self, the Hawker 
Siddeley 125 production lin e .104 H e w as also looking at a yacht-builder in Italy, and other 
luxury goods. Luckily, the merchant bank that had been appointed, fortunately jointly by 
us and the Chairman, cam e to us and said “We think your Chairman is behaving in a very 
strange way, and som ething that w e  believe is entirely inappropriate for your com pany”. 
So, I w ent along to our law yers and said “What should I do?” They said “Y ou have no 
choice, you must sack him ”. So I sacked the Chairman at a board m eeting, and w e also  
m ade it clear that w e ’d like to see Ray Horrocks also leave the board. The lawyers said 
“D on ’t g ive any explanation o f  it, just tell them that they’ve got to go”, w hich is what w e  
did. The third non-executive director, Ted Bond, imm ediately threw his hand in with us. 
H e said “I thought they w ere crackers, but I just went along with it. I on ly  attended three 
o f  these m eetings and I thought it odd that you never knew. I assum ed that you had som e  
input into it” But o f  course I hadn’t. That is one o f  the reasons w hy the relationship was 
so  bad. It w as a very bad relationship and it was entirely their fault. A ll I did w as to do 
what m y lawyers suggested I had to do. I had no choice. They said “Y ou can’t have your 
Chairman spending all your m oney. Y ou can’t have your Chairman creating a split board 
like that. Y ou ’re supposed to have a unitary board. Y ou’re supposed to all agree on what 
y o u ’re doing”.
104 Hawker Siddeley 125 was an executive jet aircraft.
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How were BL as suppliers?
They w ere very poor. The body-in-w hite w as a disgrace. Even when w e on ly  getting  
panels from  them w e w ere having to rework the panels even before w e  put them  into a 
body-in-w hite. O nce w e ’d actually got body-in-w hite under control w e w ere even having  
to rework panels com ing from Sw indon. So, w e created our ow n panel supply; a jo in t 
venture w ith G KN.
Why did you feel you had to do all the engineering yourself when more and more 
manufacturers were going outside for some engineering? For example, General 
Motors had several of their cars in the U S designed/engineered by the U K  company 
Hawtal Whiting. Why, apart from some styling, did you try to keep it all in-house?
We built up a capability to  do what other car com panies did, which w as to fu lly  engineer  
their ow n  car. W e needed a big capability because none o f  our ow n suppliers w ere  
capable o f  doing their part o f  the job . W e w ere w orking with other people, but certainly 
w e w ere pretty adamant that w e  should build up a capability strong enough to do our ow n  
engineering o f  our ow n car fundam entally.
I’ve heard a lot of criticism of Jim Randle. How much of an issue was there?
The X J40 w asn ’t part o f  our survival programme but w e kept it going and w e  built up our 
engineering department, and everybody hoped the XJ40 w as in good shape w hen w e got 
around to  it. And at one stage I started chairing the XJ40 developm ent program m e, 
including putting it back for a year w hen I got hold o f  it. I suppose that Jim did not have a 
m odem  m anagerial style. H e’d been extrem ely useful throughout the turnaround 
program m e w here h e’d had to put huge resources into re-engineering the Series III and 
the X J-S. O bviously  he d idn’t have all the resource to do it all, and I think he w as alw ays  
very optim istic  about what he could  do. And I don’t think he listened very carefully  to the 
feedback from  all the testing w e  did on X J40, for exam ple. Perhaps w e ’d g iven  him  a job  
that w as im possib le to do w ith the resources he had. H e certainly pulled his w eight in the 
turnaround programme, but as it turned out in the end the X J40 programme w as not as 
w ell advanced as it should have been. I’d alw ays assum ed it w as fundam entally because  
h e’d never had anything like the right kind o f  resource at the critical part o f  it. I probably 
should have killed the X J40 and started again when w e had the resource available to it 
because I think w e w ere a lw ays feed ing in resource into the programm e after it w as 
required.
Do you think you could have realistically killed the XJ40?
N o, not in term s o f  market perception. W e were floated because w e had a new  car 
project. Incidentally, before w e  get too harsh about the XJ40 let m e say these things:
W e’d c o m e  from a stable called  British Leyland that didn’t actually launch any  
successfu l cars at all. N on e o f  them  w ere a success. The only cars that w ere successful
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were those that pre-dated BL, the Range Rover for exam ple.105 So you couldn’t say that 
they actually launched a new car. So w e com e from a stable that didn’t know how  to do 
it. That’s point number one. And number two, w e didn’t really have the resource there in 
time to do it. And third, however, the car eventually was actually quite a success because 
the rework that w e were doing, and that Ford finished off, actually made it into a very 
good car, a more successful car than the XJK which replaced it. So, actually w e didn’t do 
a bad job. And, by the way, B ill Lyons never got his cars right the first time; they were, 
generally speaking, got right the second time. The facelift usually w as the one that got it 
correct. So by the standards o f  Jaguar w e probably didn’t do a bad job, strangely enough. 
And those were the only standards Jim knew. He didn’t know any other standards.
How much of a difference did becoming a quoted company make to you?
Not much really. W e’d earned a huge amount o f  independence from BL, but I think it 
might have been better. In one o f  the big shoot-outs that M ichael Edwardes had, which 
looked as i f  it was going to be a shoot-out to the death, I started to look to see i f  I could 
get any funding for the management to buy the company. Ian MacGregor106 was helping 
me, and w e’d have got the m oney. In a w ay I was disappointed when the unions backed 
down and BL w asn’t broken up. It might have been better i f  it had been a private 
company. It might have been easier. We probably would have taken longer over the XJ40 
and we might have got it right first tim e i f  w e ’d have had longer with it. And the constant 
urge to be more profitable next year actually did lead one into making mistakes.
But there were lots of quoted companies at the time that had gone to the City and 
said “It’s a five year plan, we’re not going to make increases every year because 
of...” and had not been marked down [suffered a fall in their share price] for it?
Yes, but I think w e were too immature for that
When did you become aware of the extent of the quality problems with the XJ40?
W ell, w e’d got all this feedback from the field, from the testing programme. W e’d built 
two hundred prototypes and w e thought w e had cures for everything, but actually the 
strange thing was the real problems w e got were things w e didn’t know about. The 
biggest single problem w e had w as the battery. We were totally unaware o f  how big a 
problem it was. The second issue was, for example, the air conditioning, which had 
internal leaks in it. A gain, that was another com pletely unknown. And a lot o f  it was our 
suppliers. When they geared up their volum es w e went through horrible quality problems. 
We tried to keep it under control, but it w asn’t until the cars got to the United States that 
we really found, six  months into the launch, that w e had big problems. I personally found
105 However, Edwardes states that BL’s Metro, launched in 1980, “set new records. After its launch it went 
on to win numerous awards and prizes. It is currently the best selling smaller car in Britain” (Edwardes. 
Back from the Brink, p i 95).
106 Sir Ian MacGregor. Director, Lazard Freres (merchant bank), 1977-80; Non-executive Deputy 
Chairman, BL, 1977-80; Chairman, British Steel, 1980-83; Chairman, National Coal Board, 1983-86. 
Returned to Lazard Freres 1986.
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out when I went to the States for m y normal m onthly m eeting, and w e had a month or 
tw o m onths’ feedback from the cars. I remember it w as the m ost awful m onth’s sleep I 
ever had when I realised the enormity o f  what I would have to do. It w as alm ost like 
going through the Series III thing all over again.
Was this because it was a higher specification car in the States?
N o, generally speaking I think our UK dealers were much better at looking after the 
customer. The US dealers didn’t really expect to do very much to the car, and they 
didn’t!107 So I don’t know  why. There’s nothing too harsh about conditions in the US  
other than it gets a bit hot now  and again and a bit cold now  and again.1081 personally did 
not feel as i f  w e had a Grade A  problem here until I got feedback from the U S, and then 
what w e did w as to put in place exactly the same programme that w e ’d done for Series 
III. And I have to say that quite quickly the cars were saleable again, but by God w e  
didn’t ha lf have a fright. It w as a shock! Frightening!
So there wasn’t a problem with the UK launch?
There didn’t appear to be, certainly not from my perception. There w ere problems that 
seem ed to be containable. M aybe people were m aking cooing noises to m e. M aybe 
people w eren’t used to telling  the absolute truth. But certainly when I got to talk to 
dealers in the US they left m e absolutely no room to w iggle  out o f  that one. I had to com e  
back and fix  it.
Some commentators have suggested that your intention all along was to sell the 
company. What is your reaction to that?
N o. It was to punt the ball dow n the field for as long as w e could. I w as aware, however, 
that there were tim es w hen running the company as an independent w as not going to be 
possib le. W hen w e had w orse than $1.80  to the £, and w e had inflation in the UK , our 
profit margin w as w iped out in any event. And unless w e could becom e absolutely, 
absolutely world class in everything w e did I couldn’t see any other solution to it. So I 
always thought there w ould be tim es when our survival w ould be difficult. I wondered i f  
w e could becom e so rich w e  could buy our w ay through those problem s, but I realised  
that having a big cash mountain o f  £200m illion/£300m illion just m ade you prey to any 
Tom , Dick, or Harry w ho w ould com e and buy you. Did you know that James Hanson
107 Mike Dale strongly rejects this view, and in an e-mail to the author on 9 May 2008 he pointed out that: 
“The J D Power report showed that the US dealers were doing an above average job o f satisfying the 
customer. J D Power also showed that we had as many faults per car in three months as the first Lexus 
had in five years. No dealer body could cope with that onslaught in the most brutally competitive market 
in the world” . See also Appendix footnote 130 page 119.
108 Mike Dale again strongly disagrees, pointing out in an e-mail o f 9 May 2008 to the author that: 
“Temperature and weather in the US are far more extreme than in the UK, both hot and cold. This 
certainly had an effect on everything from the windscreen wipers to the self-levelling suspension (for 
which they never found a fix, and we abandoned it). A break down in the US was potentially much 
more serious than in the UK because o f the weather and the distances. We were so desperate about this 
that we even considered a helicopter service to help travellers in need”.
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and Gordon White were once interested in buying the com pany?109 James rang m e up and 
said he was thinking o f  it. I said “w hy don’t you com e along and have a look at it, give  
you an idea o f  what w e ’re about”. “Great” he said “I tell you what, I’ll send up Gordon. 
You can have a good chat. Tell Gordon everything, and then w e ’ll talk”. A nyw ay,
Gordon cam e up, and I show ed him round, and then I said “Gordon, how  much m oney  
does the w hole o f  H anson spend on R & D?” He said “G osh, I don’t know. £8m illion?” 
“W ell”, I said, “you’re go in g  to have to get used to som e different numbers here. Our 
R&D is new  m odels, and w e ’re going spend £50m illion  this year on our new  m odel 
programme, and w e ’re a lso  going to be spending £100m illion  on new  equipm ent and new  
investment, so  there’s £150m illion  worth o f  new  investm ent this year that w o n ’t make 
anything for us this year, but w ill g ive you a return later on. This isn’t your kind o f  
business. This is just too com plicated for you .” They rang m e up later on and said “W e’re 
not going to go forward with the project”.
A nyw ay, once Hanson had been at us I thought “Jesus, it w on ’t be long before som eone  
else com es along”. So w e  then started to look at whether there w as som e kind o f  
relationship with an excellen t car com pany that w e could control, and w e ’d hoped that 
w ould be with a Japanese com pany, and that is w hy w e w ent to Toyota. W e thought 
they’d be clever enough to work out som e kind o f  relationship. In reality, what I learned 
later on, what w e should have done w as to form som e sort o f  jo int venture with N issan to 
make luxury cars. That probably w ould have worked. But I don’t know  whether I was 
clever enough to have seen any other alternative to what happened. I don’t think I was.
I personally thought that the recession o f  the 1990s w ould have made life  very, very  
difficult for us. Certainly it would have m ade it very, very difficult to have continued the 
new  m odel programmes. W hat kind o f  relationship w ould have worked? I really don’t 
know now . W e had everyone com e in to see us. I remember L ee Iococca110 rang m e up 
and said “What do you think? Shall I throw m y hat in the ring?” I said “Lee, this is too  
heavy for you now ”. BM W  and M ercedes B enz w ere both interested. Fiat, by the way, 
were in at the final round w ith General M otors and Ford.111
Do you think you were too focused on wanting to create the best car company in the 
world?
Yes. That’s what I wanted to do, but I didn’t quite make it.
With the benefit of hindsight what do you think you might have done differently?
I w ould have had to understood earlier than I did the enormity o f  a new  car launch and I 
w ould have had to find som ebody w ho could have run that; som ebody w ho w ould have 
been tougher than Jim and w ould have told m e earlier that w e couldn’t do it, and told me 
that w e either had to start again or put it back. Y ou see, inherently the XJ40 had been
109 Lord Hanson was Chairman, and Sir Gordon White the Chief Executive, o f Hanson Trust PLC, the 
leading UK conglomerate, and corporate predator, o f the 1980s.
110 Lee Iococca was Chairman o f  the US Chrysler Corporation at this point.
111 John Edwards sees this as being an exaggeration. In an e-mail to the author on 30 July 2008 he stated: 
“There was one meeting with Fiat in around the September o f 1989. As I remember it, it was merely an 
expression o f general interest. There was never anything o f substance. After Ford bought their 15% o f  
the shares in September, the only players were Ford and GM”
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designed by BL and there w ere ail kinds o f  d ifficu lties associated with the fact that the 
body itse lf w asn ’t really fantastic. Som e o f  the shutlines112 w ere in the w rong place. They 
hadn’t really done a good job  for us. W e’d made som e m istakes on instrumentation. We 
could have got the car to the level that finally the second series o f  it did. W e should have 
got that right first tim e. I f  w e ’d have done that w e  m ight have m ade it. So I think it was 
associated with the developm ent o f  the X J40.1  alw ays said there w ere tw o  tricks. One 
w as learning how  to run a car com pany, the other w as develop ing a new  car, and 
develop ing a new  car w as m uch m ore difficult than turning around the old one, and our 
luck w as running out w hen w e got around to that. W e alm ost did it, but it w asn ’t good  
enough.
In his book “The Jaguar File” Dymock stated that Jaguar’s involvement in racing 
was to enable you to sell the company. Was there any truth in that?
Oh no! The racing w as to sell cars, and w e did very w ell on  a very lim ited budget that 
didn’t cost us much at all. W e set o f f  know ing that w e had to  spend about £12m illion , but 
generally speaking w e covered m ost o f  it with sponsors’ m oney . R oger [Putnam] did a 
very good job  on getting sponsors m oney .113
112 “Shutlines” are the gaps between the body and ancillary panels (doors, boot, and bonnet) and are totally 
dependent on the trueness o f the dimensions o f  the original buck that the pressings are taken from. In an 
e-mail o f 12 May 2008 to the author, Roger Putnam stated that shutlines were “the curse on the XJ 
Coupe and XJ-S. In the BL era, and before, the bucks were taken from the original clays which were 
styled by hand and eye. In the case o f the XJ Coupe the car was delayed for months as the engineers 
chased the shutlines round the car to get some fit with pillarless windows. This was a major leak issue. 
In the case o f  the XJ-S the right and left hand sides o f the car bore no relationship dimensionally to each 
other”.
113 In an e-mail o f  7 June 2007 to the author, Roger Putnam stated: “Motor racing was funded out o f the 
marketing budget, but the cost to Jaguar was relatively modest, and for two years was zero, as we tried 
to cover off almost all TW R’s costs out o f  sponsors’ revenues. Gallaher and Castrol were the main 
contributors.
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Transcript of the interview with Trevor Finn on 23rd July 2008.
What was your background with Jaguar?
In 1983 w e [Pendragon] first approached Jaguar to take on a franchise. A t that tim e it was 
generally still perceived in the marketplace as a bolt-on part o f  British Leyland from a 
consum er point o f  v iew . So, quite often customers were going to a Jaguar dealership and 
getting in line behind som eone w ho had a Mini going in for service, or whatever other 
product that w as being dropped in at the time. W e met a guy called J e ff  Robinson who 
w ent on to do som e other jo b s  around the globe for Jaguar. W e pitched to Jaguar on the 
basis that w e were a BM W  dealer and also a M ercedes B enz dealer. W e were selling  
B M W  and M ercedes B enz, and they had exclusive representation. They didn’t share their 
representation with people w ho drove M inis or whatever. W e’d done quite a lot o f  
research on what Jaguar w as, and talked to people who ow ned the cars. There w as still an 
awful lot o f  em otion and loyalty am ongst customers, notwithstanding what they’d all 
been through in the sense o f  product quality and all that kind o f  stuff. It w as a quite 
distinctly different thing to the BM W  and M ercedes offer. The custom ers were, generally 
speaking, really enthusiastic about the product, but the retail experience they got w asn’t 
in tune with the fond m em ory o f  what Jaguar was about. So w e pitched to Jaguar based 
on the idea that w e w ould g ive them  exclusive representation, w ithout com peting brands 
in the sam e showroom , or even  m ore volum e orientated brands, i f  they could create som e  
geography that w ould a llow  us a business opportunity that w ould work in the sense o f  
getting rid o f  four or five dealers because they were still pretty m uch like the BL network 
w ith a dealer on every street com er.
W e basically got an agreem ent to open a location in Derby, and w e  still ow n that 
dealership today, and what w e  said w as that w e ’d put together a stand alone Jaguar 
dealership and on that basis w e ’d like you obviously to support the idea but in dealer 
term s create an area w hich w ou ld  g ive  us breathing space to have an exclu sive  
dealership. The tim ing w as perfect from our point o f  v iew  because I think w e w ere going  
dow n the sam e route, thinking the sam e route [as Jaguar], but really they hadn’t 
convinced  som e o f  the big groups o f  the day, the Kennings o f  this world, w h o ’d enjoyed  
it as a little bolt-on, that it could  ever be viable. I remember at the tim e speaking to som e 
o f  the people in the big groups w ho said “Y ou’re crazy. It’ll never work. Y o u ’ll never sell 
enough cars, and custom ers are used to  it being part o f  a BL dealership, and th ey’ll live  
with that” . We then started what w as a greenfield dealership, or m ore accurately a 
brow nfield dealership -  w e  converted a facility in Derby and opened our doors as a 
Jaguar dealer. A t the tim e things like corporate identity had to be alm ost collaboratively  
put together. So, w e  put the signage together. We actually had a lot o f  discretionary input 
into what the thing looked like. But it w as credible as a facility compared to pretty w ell 
anything else in the country. W e got a lot o f  kudos, and had a lot o f  people from all over 
the world com e in and see  that location in the follow ing tw o or three years -  dealers from  
Japan, and all sorts o f  groups o f  dealers because it was “This is where w e  want to take 
Jaguar” and so the Jaguar guys w ere pushing that quite aggressively as “This is the 
future”. This w as very early in.
W hat w e found, though, w as that the catchment o f  the business relative to the other 
dealers w asn’t that large, but our ability to draw customers to us from a greater distance
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was a surprise so w e literally had customers driving past tw o or three dealers who could 
service their cars to com e to us because they were com ing to a place that w as just Jaguar. 
We had a fantastic launch o f  the site. It was a three-storey building and the top two  
storeys were offices. W e bought the site, refurbished it and everything, and Egan and his 
crowd all came to this fantastic launch -  w e had George M elly  and his jazz band there. It 
was a fantastic night.
The business was highly successful. Historically our market place w as worth about 35 
cars, but in the first year w e sold 146 new  cars. N ow  w e ’d sold those cars beyond the 
market place, so w e ’d sold them to the north side o f  Birmingham . W e swamped the 
dealership in Nottingham  which w as the nearest conurbation next to us. N eil Johnson, 
who was with Jaguar at the tim e, cam e to a lunch w e ’d laid on for Jaguar owners, and 
told us that w e’d got som ething like 0.6% market share in the territory w e were 
representing, which w as som ething like five-, six-, seven-fold  what the market potential 
was. There was a buzz going around that this was som ething a little bit new. Financially 
it worked very w ell also. W e latched on to that and they show cased us. It’s fair to say that 
w e were unpopular with m ost o f  the other dealers at the tim e because w e were being used 
to beat them up. From there on in w e established a relationship with the company that 
because they had a good stability o f  people allow ed us to grow  the business together, and 
today w e’re the biggest Jaguar dealer in the UK, and the biggest Jaguar dealer in the 
States. O f all the car manufacturers w e dealt with it’s been the best relationship o f  any o f  
them over a long period o f  tim e, and that in part has been because o f  the continuity o f  
people like Roger Putnam. In the early days it w as Egan and N eil Johnson. We still keep 
in touch with a lot o f  people from that era o f  Jaguar notwithstanding the fact that many o f  
them have retired, or left. A s a business there was a w hole cohort o f  new dealers that 
came into the franchise, m any o f  w ho w e still maintain a relationship with. We have 
friends who are Jaguar dealers, more so than any other brand because they drew in a 
whole bunch o f  people w ho bought som e o f  the dream.
By the time you came on the scene in 1983 had they started sorting out their UK 
dealerships? Had they been getting rid of some?
They had! But it had led to a crisis o f  confidence because whatever som eone tells you, 
you’re wrong! I think what they were struggling with w as dealing with a lot o f  the old 
groups that were BL-centred, you know, big chains, probably Wadham Stringer, 
Kennings, Hartwells, H ow ells and so on. A  lot o f  those groups were big groups that had 
been shrinking with those brands, particularly those with a BL connection. W e went to a 
dealer conference just prior to opening, which w ould have been in 1983, in Coventry, and 
Roger got up and gave a presentation about how  they wanted to grow the franchise, and 
imploring people to make the investm ents, and w e did feel at that particular moment in 
time that w e ’d stepped into som ething that could have gone either way. It’s fair to say 
that there w asn’t a historic case for it, but intuitively everybody knew that as a brand, 
particularly in this market, it had enough latent value hidden in there that, given the 
opportunity, could fire up everybody’s imaginations. About the time that w e started they 
ran a programme all about “The Legend Returns”, and follow ed  on with “The Legend 
Grows”, and I recall thinking that it was a very em otive appeal, because at the time in 
product terms w e didn’t have the best product, but it was a very em otive appeal, and, o f
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course, the prospect w as on the horizon o f  a Jaguar XJ40 that w ill save the day and it’s 
all going to be about new  product. At that time it was quite a long w ay away -  it was 
1986 when that car started to hit the streets, so w e had a little bit o f  tim e w ith the old 
product, but w e w ere doing som e things with the Series III. W e were putting big w heels  
on the cars, trying to m ake them appeal to .. . ,  you know, just get back on the radar. At the 
time the W alkinshaw discussion w as on, they’d just launched the Cabriolet 3.6 which  
was quite a sexy  looking car, so all that kind o f  stu ff fed the market, and made us think 
that m aybe it’s got a chance.
T he Series III w as recoverin g  by then , w a sn ’t it?
In product terms the V 12 w as alm ost a collectable car as new. The lifespans o f  the 
products had gone on for so long that they alm ost came back into fashion because o f  their 
unusual nature. W hen the Series III ended it kept running longer in Germany, and w e  
were a dealer in Germany, in Frankfurt, at the tim e.114 W e bought the last 100 Daimler 
VI 2s because they continued the Daim ler line right to the end, and all those cars sold at 
list price and they pretty m uch w ent into the hands o f  people who wanted a V I 2 Daimler 
in Germany. It w as a real enthusiasts’ car. W e pitched to Jaguar, w e  did a presentation to 
Roger and Egan, when w e  were looking at Germany, and did a comparator between 
Porsche and Jaguar. A t the tim e, probably 1987 this was, they were producing a similar 
volum e o f  cars, and they both had a design and developm ent capability because Jaguar 
had recently opened W hitley. I f  you ’d looked at them from the outside you’d probably 
have said they were probably trying to m odel them selves on Porsche because Whitley, 
relative to the size o f  the com pany, w as too large. W e told them i f  you look where you 
are, look at your volum es -  you ’re very strong in the UK , big in Am erica, but actually 
insignificant in m ost o f  the other markets. I f  you then looked at Porsche it had the same 
situation -  very strong in Germany and strong in the U S, but struggling in som e o f  the 
other markets. They w ere a niche product. W e paralleled it in Germany. I f  you were to 
buy a Jaguar in Germany you w ere probably the same type o f  person w ho would buy a 
Porsche in the UK. Forget the product differences, but the psychological decision is to go 
against what people say, to go against what people think, and to have a product that is 
different in the market place, and bear in mind that in the hom e market it w as BM W  and 
M ercedes. To drive a Jaguar in Germany you’d probably have to be your own decision­
maker, and to  drive a Porsche in the UK  you’d probably have to be your ow n decision­
maker. We did a little bit o f  business in Germany -  w e got about 10% o f  Jaguar’s sales 
there, but they never cracked it in Germany all through that period, and subsequently, 
because they didn’t have continuity o f  dealers.
114 Pendragon entered the German market in 1991 with the acquisition o f the Jaguar dealer Autohaus 
Avalon in Frankfurt. By 2000 Pendragon had five Jaguar dealerships in Germany, but disposed o f all of 
them in 2007/2008.
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Who were the main competitors to Jaguar in the late 1980s?
It was the M ercedes S Class, and the 7 Series BM W . In the recession o f  the early 1990s 
Jaguar held its own against these, but the sales m ix changed for both M ercedes and 
BMW. BM W ’s sales overall held up because they had the smaller 5 Series and 3 Series, 
and Mercedes because it had the smaller 190E.
Who was the driving force behind the changes in the early and mid 1980s? Was it 
Johnson, was it Putnam, was it Egan?
The initial briefing for the team when w e had the original dealership was great. 
Everybody, the car cleaners, the lot, went along. We thought they could have the factory 
tour, and get them all excited. W e took about twenty people. They gave us a briefing in a 
training room, and they were going to do the tour after that. Egan breezed in, giving  
everyone a bit o f  a “rah rah”, and after that the Head o f  Training, w h o’s name escapes 
me, said after Egan had left “That’s the man w e ’re all working for”, and I thought 
“Crikey, this guy’s really got everybody h ere ...”. You know, at that level the people in 
the set-up were in aw e o f  him. Y ou wonder how  much o f  it w as “Talk it and it w ill 
happen” as opposed to know ing how  it’s going to happen. I think a lot o f  the things that 
happened, happened because everybody intuitively thought it was right as opposed to it 
necessarily being the big strategic plan. M aybe there w as a big strategic plan that 
someone had in a bottom drawer, but you tended not to think so. It was never rolled out 
to me. It was quite entrepreneurial I think for the size o f  business. They would have 
exchanges and certainly in the early days w e were involved with them; they would make 
policy decisions around the table. It w asn’t so much “w e ’ll be back to in three months’ 
time when w e’ve done the research”, it w as actually “Y es, that makes sense, can w e do 
it?”. From our point o f  v iew  as a retailer they used to relate to us with the Dealer Council. 
James Sm illie115 w as the Chairman during m ost o f  the 1980s, and I took over from him. I 
remember one particular m eeting where w e talking about the XJ40. W e were running out 
o f  steam on the thing -  w e ’d got all sorts o f  product problems and things -  and we talked 
about making a particular m odel. W e were discussing could w e have this specification, or 
that specification, and literally w ithin tw o or three months the car w as being sold. So, 
from an input point o f  v iew  the factory w as there listening to us, saying “What do you 
think will sell?”, and that w as totally different from what it had been before when you 
could have a red one, a blue one etc. There was an appetite there to listen to the retailers, 
which I must say is quite rare.
1,5 James Smillie was Chairman o f Stratstone, the leading Jaguar and Land Rover dealer, based in central 
London, acquired by Pendragon in 1992.
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That is an entirely different story from the one I got from the States, where the 
factory didn’t listen at all.
I think that right. W e’ve got business out in the States and know a lot o f  the long-standing 
Jaguar dealers.1161 think that’s right. I think what you had, and you still have it today, in 
terms o f  Jaguar and Land Rover certainly, is that the American dealers are the most 
important dealers in the world, in their minds anyway. It’s the biggest volume. It’s not 
always been the m ost profitable place to sell cars, but they don’t necessarily weigh that 
into their equation. They sell volume; therefore, that market is the most important. And I 
think it’s fair to say that the products weren’t tailored to the US market in the way that 
the US dealers, or the consumers, would have probably liked. The classic is cupholders - 
it took so long to get one designed in. It was “What do you mean by cupholders? Where 
do you put your saucer?” Culturally there was a difference. Having said that, product- 
wise it wasn’t a bad fit for the States because o f  the natural characteristics o f  saloon cars 
in particular. It was a soft ride. They weren’t fighting the same problems they could have 
been fighting with i f  it was a hard ride European product. So the product was a little bit 
more naturally tuned to the US market. Having said that, I do think it’s probably right 
that the UK market did have a greater shout than the US market, and the US did more 
volume.
Can we talk about the XJ40, because this to me was the watershed for Jaguar in the 
1980s.
Definitely, and for the retailers also. Absolutely! The car was launched, and everybody 
liked the look o f  the car: “Crikey, a great looking car! W e’ll have one”. There were two 
engines -  2.9 litre and 3.6 litre. The 2.9 litre wouldn’t really pull your hat off, and it had a 
few problems technically. The 3.6 litre was a good engine. Basically the car was 
reasonably sound, but you had a few  problems again -  technical problems. So from the 
quality point o f  v iew  you look back, twenty years later, and wonder “Crikey, how did we  
used to get away with selling cars that weren’t perfect?” But it was a rip-roaring success. 
In the early days in our dealerships, and by then w e had got ourselves a big footprint in 
Jaguar, relatively w e were the biggest dealer, but nowhere near as big as w e got in 
subsequent tim es, w e had more customers than w e had cars, to the extent that w e’d be 
buying cars from other dealers. So w e’d place orders with other dealers for a brand new  
car. W e’d buy the car at full list price and sell it as a used car at more than list price. That 
went on for about tw o and a half years. For two and a half years w e didn’t discount a car 
and in many respects i f  you wanted a car and were prepared to pay a £1,000 premium 
then you’d get one. So from a retailer point o f  view  w e had a situation where the demand 
just outstripped supply. And no matter what they did, because they were just a little 
factory, they couldn’t spoil that. They couldn’t spoil it for the retailers because they were 
making huge margins. They were making a huge margin because they didn’t have to 
discount the car in the way manufacturers do today (by putting bonuses in). The 
customers loved it because they had a car that after a year they’d get their money back
116 In 2000 Pendragon entered the US market when it acquired Bauer Jaguar, the third largest Jaguar dealer 
in the USA, located in California. At the time of this interview Pendragon had eight Jaguar dealerships 
in the USA, all located in southern California.
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on. So everybody was w inning in the sense that it was like a bubble-type market where, 
o f  course, it doesn’t matter what you pay m e as long as you get your m oney back you 
don’t care. And that went on because the Americans came on tilt as w ell -  it was a big 
success in the States. It’s fair to say that they were probably the three m ost profitable 
years, relatively speaking, for the investment everybody had in in the history o f  the 
franchise. And it’s never been as good since.
What about all the problems with the XJ40 though?
It was great, absolutely great because the customers loved you. The cars used to come in, 
particularly in the first winter, with their back ends literally stuck up in the air -  a shock 
absorber problem. The shock absorbers would lock and the suspension would be up. The 
Jaguar dealers in the UK through the 1980s on the various surveys had the best customer 
service scores o f  any dealer network in the UK. The reason was that you had the 
opportunity to demonstrate how  good you were. So when a customer came in with the 
car’s back end stuck up, w e ’d seen it so many tim es before w e knew exactly what it was. 
The service adviser w ould say “Crikey! Leave it with us and w e’ll see what w e can do”. 
They knew full w ell what it was. T hey’d fix  it, turn it round, and the customer would 
think you’re m arvellous because you ’d fixed this big problem. Problems are absolutely 
fantastic on cars, and as a car retailer w e ’d like the car manufacturers to put a problem in 
every car. Just tell us where it is and when it’s going to go wrong and w e ’ll give a 
customer service where the retention o f  those customers w ill be significantly greater than 
the m ost reliable product in the market because customers love som ebody looking after 
them.
And you were getting all these revenues from warranties?
The warranty w as huge, yes, but from their [Jaguar’s] point o f  v iew  a lot o f  that did back 
up on their supply base as w ell, because the days o f  the component manufacturers not 
being accountable had long gone, so I’m sure the shock absorber manufacturer, and 
people like that, would be getting those things back by the box load. But there were also 
technical fixes that w ere going on at the time. Som e were recalls or retrofits, but from a 
customer point o f  v iew  it didn’t do as much damage as you’d believe because o f  the 
actual relationship with the dealers and the w ay the dealers were engaged in the whole 
process. Because w e w ere m aking great m oney w e could afford to spoil customers. I f  a 
customer cam e in with a problem on his car w e ’d give him a Jaguar to drive. When 
everybody w as making lots o f  m oney you could afford to put it back into circulation. And 
so, a customer w ho had a problem with his car would go to the g o lf  club and say “I’ve  
had a problem, but so-and-so have given m e another Jaguar to drive”.
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Why did the problems with the XJ40 never get into the press?
I think they [Jaguar] were reactive in a positive sense. They did react to something when 
it went wrong. They were proactive in fixing stuff. So, i f  w e had a list o f  vehicles, w e’d 
have the vehicles in and they’d be sorted. I think they collaborated really w ell with the 
dealers. It was a collaborative effort because the more the reputation o f  the vehicle as an 
acceptable piece o f  kit went on everybody was going to win, including the customers.
So why didn’t it work in the States?
I think the difference there would be that consumerism in America was ten years in 
advance o f  the UK, so you’d got things like lemon laws in the States which they have 
now which were all evolv ing  at that period o f  time. Customers were very quality 
orientated, and w eren’t used to products that were more quirky. Y ou’re also talking about 
people [customers] in this market [the UK] who wanted Jaguar to win. There was a 
nationalistic aspect to it -  customers wanted it to win. At the time i f  you think about the 
business profile o f  the business it was seen as a “Britain can compete, and, by the way, it 
can make som e nice cars as w ell, and, by the way, it can export because the Queen said 
there’s an award for exports”. There was an air o f  optimism that the British car industry 
wasn’t finished. And a lot o f  customers w h o’d been absolutely loyal had the opportunity 
to go down to the g o lf  club and tell people. And from the business point o f  view , Egan 
was highly regarded as a business leader at the time, and his reputation was at its peak in 
that arena. So everybody wanted it to win. The Press wanted it to win. Customers wanted 
it to win. The dealers wanted it to win. You go to America and it was competing directly 
with everyone else. The fact that it was British would only appeal to a minority o f  
consumers because, m aybe, there was som e connection in heritage terms, or something 
like that. But other than that, the car had to face up to the test in the same way as it would 
for everyone else, so i f  the air conditioning system didn’t function properly in Arizona, 
the fact that you didn’t need it in N ew  York State didn’t matter, the guy in Arizona 
screamed. So you had a situation whereby America has got everything -  weather, good 
road, bad roads, you name it -  and they stress tested it. I think the dealers did a good job  
at the time, from what I can gather -  w e subsequently bought some dealers who were 
there at the time. Notwithstanding the fact that the product wasn’t as robust as American 
dealers would have liked, and notwithstanding the fact that the American dealers weren’t 
listened to, there was a huge amount o f  brand empathy amongst those dealers, even  
today.
Would it surprise to learn, or were you aware, that by 1989 Egan was at his wit’s 
end, and didn’t know which way to turn?
Yeah. I would think that they would see that as external forces maybe. Was it currency 
orientated? Was it that they couldn’t build cars at the right price to sell in America 
anymore?
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The main problem seems to have been that the story about the quality had got out in 
the States and they lost their market. Talking about the XJ40, Martin Bennett told 
me “It actually cost me, I can honestly say, fifty percent of my Jaguar customers. 
The car was an absolute unmitigated disaster in terms of reliability, in terms of its 
systems”, and Mike Beasley told me that “It had lots of design issues, and we spent a 
lot of time and effort in the late 1980s and early 1990s correcting those...We did not 
protect the customer well enough with XJ40, there’s no question about that”.
I think that’s true. But I think that in this market place [the UK] they had the benefit o f  a 
retail network that w as in much better shape to handle it. W e’d been used to it. The other 
feature o f  the distribution network in the 1980s was that Land Rover was following a 
similar model in the sense o f  separation, and during the 1980s a lot o f  the dealers were 
Land Rover and Jaguar dealers, and that was true also in the USA. So again the dealers 
were dealing with a high stress product. But from a capability point o f  v iew  
disproportionately the back end o f  the business, service and parts, would be much bigger 
than the front end volum e would justify. It must have cost them a fortune in warranties, 
but in fairness, they stood up to the problems and paid. But i f  they were making enough 
money, which they probably weren’t, they couldn’t get it back in product quick enough.
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Transcript of the interview with John Grant on 19th January 1993.
What were the main issues for Ford when it arrived at Jaguar?
All the things that came together in Jaguar were a serious disappointment to Ford, but in 
terms o f  the physicals o f  the business everybody knew that Jaguar quality was crummy. 
The JD Power surveys in the States were already being published on the XJ40, current 
model XJ6, and that information was already available, and it was very bad. So we knew 
that the quality w as bad. But there was a lot o f  anecdotal evidence that w e had about 
Jaguar’s manufacturing facilities which w e got, for example, from the investment 
analysts that w e spoke to in Ford. On one particular trip, US investment analysts were 
touring around Europe, and were visiting Ford o f  Europe as their last stop. We picked 
them up in the Ford o f  Europe plane from Birmingham airport where they had visited 
Jaguar the previous day, and all the way down in the aeroplane they were talking about 
the ‘Dark A ges’ that they had just witnessed the day before, and how astounding it was, 
and how they were all going to downgrade Jaguar as a result. Equally, there were a 
number o f  Ford people that had been into the Jaguar plants over the years and knew what 
they were like, so w e knew that the manufacturing was awful, w e knew the quality was 
awful, and those were m ost o f  the things that were talked about in the press thereafter.
To be com pletely frank, I think there were really tw o surprises. We at Ford had assumed 
that Jaguar had a product plan. That was the one they had talked to the investment 
analysts about, and which got written up in the analysts’ reports, and which was the 
whole underpinning o f  the share price. That product plan was that the F-type, so-called 
Sports Car, was going to be introduced in late 1994 (it was a 1995 model year car), and 
thereafter that they w ould be doing a derivative o f  that sports car also to be a grand 
touring car, a replacement for the XJ-S. And that they would then be doing an updating a 
V I2 version o f  the luxury saloon which was imminently about to be introduced in 1990, 
or 1991, and that they w ould presumably be doing a replacement o f  the saloon car in, we 
thought, probably about 1996. That is what w e predicated our w hole plan on; that they 
had the capability in place to deliver those products.
When w e got there w e found tw o things. First o f  all that the product plan didn’t exist, and 
secondly that the management disciplines within Jaguar were appalling. There was no 
management system. There w as the company, which by automotive company standards 
was a small, one w ould hope cohesive, centrally located, all in the same area, fairly 
simple company. Tw o products, all English speaking people, all based within a radius o f  
about five m iles o f  one another. It should have been a very cohesive management team, 
but it just w asn’t . It was very divided. There had been very poor direction o f  it. There 
were all kinds o f  factions within the company, and there was no mechanism for bringing 
those factions together, and so there was no consensus about the directions they were 
going in. That was the second shock, that the management was really poor. But that was 
something that Ford know s how  to fix, and that w asn’t such a big problem.
The big problem, com ing back to it, was the product. To be specific about that, the F- 
type, which analysts had been informed was going to be introduced in the 1994 calendar 
year, had been originally designed in 1981 for introduction, the original scheduled Job 1 
date, in 1986. M aybe it was 1980 for introduction in 1986. Certainly the original Job 1 
date was 1986. W e arrived at the beginning o f  1990 and the externally announced Job 1
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date was 1994 but in fact everybody internally knew it hadn’t a prayer o f  making it by 
1994. It w asn’t going to make it until 1995. So, there was a car that already had been on 
the drawing boards for ten years, and had got to the stage o f  having prototypes driving 
around, but no production engineering had been done. There was no team in place to 
deliver it. There was a little skunk works operation which had developed it to the 
prototype stage but it was not resourced to do the mainstream engineering. Jaguar had 
never done a product in less than eight years before, so, generously, it was at least five 
years away from production. The car was beautiful looking but it was already getting a 
bit old looking. Oh it was beautiful, but it was far too heavy as a result o f  which the 
performance w asn’t good enough. The w hole thing was based around the straight six  
engine and yet there was a new  generation V8 engine on the stocks for introduction about 
a year after this car w as first to be introduced, so it was going to be designed around a 
straight six engine and no work had been done at all on how the V8 would fit into it. A ll 
the resources the company had were going to have to be diverted to this programme to 
deliver it which means there w as going to be no work done at all on the replacement for 
the saloon car which was the bread and butter o f  the company. So, in pursuit o f  this 
outdated sports car which was not going to be competitive, all the other programmes 
were going to die by neglect. So, it was a nonsense product programme, and the whole  
Jaguar strategy was built around this product plan. It was absolutely nuts! So w e really 
had no option but to question whether or not the F-type could be made into an acceptable 
product. There were som e serious reservations about whether it was the right product, 
and even i f  it was the right product whether it could be made into a competitive product. 
We couldn’t afford to go in that direction because w e had to look after the bread and 
butter business first, and the bread and butter business was that o f  keeping the luxury 
saloon car competitive, and it was rapidly getting to the point where it was not 
competitive, never mind the fact that its quality still stank. So a stop was put on all that. It 
took a couple o f  months to get at the truth o f  this, so it w asn’t actually stopped until, 
having arrived in mid-January 1990, the end o f  March. We started a complete reinvention 
o f  the product plan, which is not the sort o f  thing you do overnight. In fact, the first 
iteration o f  the new product plan which w e came up with was done by June 1990 
following a record first quarter in that year for Jaguar, funnily enough.
The first three months that w e got there was terrific because o f  record sales. Things were 
going really w ell. Then w e had a succession o f  crises. A ll the external factors went sour: 
the Dollar collapsed; the G ulf War; the luxury tax was introduced in the States; benefit in 
kind tax in the UK w as getting increasingly penal; the UK market fell o f f  a cliff. All these 
things happened over the space o f  a few  months. So w e went from having a terrific first 
three months, when everything was going swim m ingly, to an absolutely catastrophic set 
o f  external circumstances which were w ay beyond, certainly in total, anything w e thought 
possible because w e had com e into this thing agreeing with the general economic 
consensus that there was going to be a very slight and short-lived recession in the world 
economies, and that w ould last about eighteen months, and everybody would resume 
trend and o ff  w e would go. So at this stage w e were at the point o f  having a product plan 
that was a nonsense, and nothing to put in its place for the time being, world economies 
that were falling apart, and an exchange rate that had gone to hell. It all added up to a 
rather seriously lower set o f  financial results than we had been anticipating. Because the 
financial results were deteriorating the first product plan that w e put together in June
- 8 6 -
APPENDIX
1990 didn’t look achievable six  months later because it required too much m oney, and 
the cash flow  w as just not there to support it. So, w e had to revisit that product plan and 
one year later cam e up with a heavily revised plan, one which probably in som e respects 
was better. More tough decisions, but it was still a good product plan and the only trouble 
was it had taken a year and a h a lf to get there. This was the m iddle o f  1991. An awful lot 
o f  investigation o f  alternatives had gone on during that period. But where w e ended up 
was with a product plan that had the right priorities. We had an affordable product plan 
rather than affordable with quotes around it because Jaguar on its ow n couldn’t have 
afforded anything at this stage. I f  Jaguar had been independent everything would have 
had to stop since it w as haemorrhaging cash by this point, and it could not have afforded 
to spend a brass ha’penny on anything. The Ford management interrogated this pretty 
heavily because they w ere not about to throw a billion pounds into something, or commit 
to a product plan that w as going to require a billion pounds o f  investment, unless they 
had a reasonable com fort that w e were going to be able to dig ourselves out o f  this hole 
and have a profitable future. So there were a series o f  review s with ourselves within 
Jaguar, and, obviously, then with the Ford management to com e up with a plan that 
everybody thought w as a sensible plan for Jaguar. Unfortunately, each tim e w e did it the 
world got worst and so it got tougher and tougher each time. So, all that was going on. 
The product plan that w e  ended up with is the one that has been fairly w ell publicised in 
the automotive press w hich involves first o f  all the much delayed introduction o f  the V12 
in the saloon.
But first I should go back to the m ost important short term thing when w e arrived at 
Jaguar, which was to fix  the quality, because without fixing the quality there was never 
going to be any future at all. The future, in fact, w as rapidly disappearing in a cloud o f  
warranty claim s because the quality had just been catastrophic. So, fixing the quality was 
the absolute prerequisite for any new  product programmes, but on the assumptions that 
we were going to make a lot o f  progress with that, the product plan w e came up with was: 
implement the face lift on the XJ-S, which has been done, and that w as a Jaguar 
programme that it w as too late to make any significant changes to except to make sure it 
was executed properly, and in fact it got delayed by six  months to make sure it was 
executed properly, and w as done much better than Jaguar would have been able to do on 
its own; make som e minor changes to the XJ40 which have just been introduced in the 
1993 model year and w hich included, very importantly for the US, a year’s acceleration, 
in fact two years’ acceleration o f  the introduction o f  air bags by Jaguar. They were miles 
behind on that, and that w as accelerated by tw o years; an eighteen month acceleration 
putting the six cylinder engine into the XJ-S convertible because w e were convinced by 
time we arrived the V 12 w as going to die and the XJ-S in the States w as com pletely 
dependent on the V I 2. A ll convertible XJ-Ss, which was the big m oney spinner, believe 
it or not, were all VI 2s. There w as no straight six  convertible, it had never been 
engineered, so w e accelerated the six  cylinder engine into the convertible. That was done 
as a crash programme, very successfully . W e launched the four litre XJ-S coupe as well 
in the States. The V 12 has now  been withdrawn from the States for the tim e being. So all 
those things have now  been done. The V 12 going into the saloon car w as again, like all 
Jaguar programmes, slipping and slipping and slipping, and slipped for about five  
successive years, and had never got there. A  lot o f  work had been done on it but the 
refinement targets just had not been m et and the performance targets really had not been
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met either, as a result o f  which was decided on a very late change o f  direction because the 
product with the old 5.3 litre V 12 was not saleable at the sort o f  price premium that it 
should have comm anded, and needed to command, over the four litre. So, the late change 
was to use the experience o f  having had the Jaguar Sport six litre V 12 which was a much 
more attractive proposition and having evaluated the XJ40 with the Jaguar Sport six  litre 
engine in it w e said this is really what w e need. Unfortunately, the Jaguar Sport engine 
for various reasons w as not suitable for even relatively high volum e production and it had 
to be re-engineered to make it suitable for high volum e production, or high volum e by 
Jaguar standards, and so that meant another rush programme to switch from the 5.3 litre 
to a new six litre V 12 engine. That is going to be introduced in March 1993 at Geneva 
and is a stunning proposition. It’s a terrific product, and really is a legitimate competitor 
for the 500SE M ercedes for exam ple, not the 600SE, but certainly the 500SE Mercedes 
and is just a very, very attractive vehicle, m aybe not terribly socially acceptable, but for 
som ebody who wants that kind o f  vehicle it’s a terrific car to drive. So that was an 
improvement there. The six  litre V 12 engine w ill be going into the XJ-S too about three 
months later, and that w ill g ive the XJ-S V 12 another lease o f  life. So, the XJS range will 
be greatly strengthened with the four litre being generally recognised as a pretty good 
iteration o f  the XJ-S, and this new  V I 2 giving it another lease o f  life at the top end even 
though it may not be the best econom ic clim ate for that kind o f  car. So those are all the 
minor things.
The real guts o f  the product programme com es in thereafter with a re-skin basically of, 
and a very heavy revision over everything else in, the XJ40, so the XJ40 w ill be 
presented as the X 300 as a com pletely new  vehicle to all intents and purposes. It w ill 
have a new  skin, new  interior, new  air conditioning, new  seats, new  features, heavily  
revised engine for more performance and econom y, better em issions, and improvement 
throughout the car. It w ill virtually be a new  car and with much better fits and finishes in 
the body as w ell. So that’s step one in the new  product programme. O f the new  
generation product the X 300  is the first one with the revised version o f  the AJ6 engine. 
Eighteen months later there w ill be a single car that w ill replace both the XJ-S and the 
stillborn F-type. In other words it w ill be a car that w ill have the XJ-S attraction o f  
refinement, sophistication and elegance, com bined with sex appeal. I don’t think I’d go  
that far, but that’s the idea. That car w ill be the first to have the new  V8 engine. That will 
be an all-new car. There w ill be a fair amount o f  comm onality with the X 300 in terms o f  
components and so on, and that should be very stunning and do a lot for Jaguar’s image. 
And having refreshed the core business o f  this luxury car, Jaguar can turn its attention to 
doing the smaller car that everybody wants it to do, and which is the real thing that Jaguar 
needs to give it a more sustainable volum e base. That smaller car is the X 200. At the time 
I left there had been a lot o f  work done on defining what it should be, but not really on 
defining how  to get there, and that’s a major task. Jaguar doesn’t really have the 
resources itse lf to support three independent product lines. It doesn’t have the 
engineering resources, doesn’t really have the financial resources. So there is likely to be 
a fairly high degree o f  sharing o f  com ponents with Ford on that smaller car, but 
everybody from the top down in Ford M otor Company, down to the bottom o f  Jaguar is 
absolutely convinced that there must be no comprom ise in the Jaguariness o f  that 
product. That’s going to be a difficult balancing act to com e up with that in a way that
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d oesn ’t com prom ise Jaguar values, is supportable, is cost com petitive and all that stuff, 
and very few  decisions have been taken on that yet.
What sort of volumes would one be looking at? There have been comments by Ford 
about getting it up to 100,000 or 200,000 a year.
Ford cam e in at a tim e when Jaguar was com ing o f f  a sort o f  50,000ish  level o f  
production. It was thought Jaguar had the potential to be in the range o f  about 150,000 to 
180,000. Those aspirations have been cut back very severely in the light o f  what has 
happened in the market place, and have gone down from 50,000 to 24 ,000  or even less 
this year, which is terrible. But they’re still talking in terms o f  getting back up to about 
100,000 when they get that product range fully introduced.
Could Ford continue at Browns Lane if it’s going to make any meaningful increase 
in production?
Y ou could actually because early on w e did som e capacity analysis o f  what could be 
done with the existing plants and it w as felt that with the existing plants you could  
actually get 180,000 out o f  those existing plants. It might not be the w ay you would chose 
to do it but it was possib le to do it. Certainly it is possible to double the production at 
Brow ns Lane by a little bit o f  reprocessing o f  plant and changing the shift patterns. 
A m azingly, there’s actually a lot o f  space at Browns Lane; it’s just not used very well.
But aren’t there access problems?
Y es, that’s right, there are, w hich is one o f  the reasons a new  road was built at the back o f  
it which has improved the access greatly which means the access problem has gone away 
really. That’s really an open book. O f course what has happened is that there was a 
debate on where the new  engine should be made. It was very clear it shouldn’t be made at 
Radford, which w as an antique plant in the m iddle o f  a housing estate and not a very 
good plant. That it should be built at a new  plant really was pretty clear and the major 
options were either a greenfield site, or a greenfield plant, more accurately, on the same 
site as the W hitley engineering centre which could have used the Radford workforce 
because they’re only tw o or three m iles away, or manufacturing at Bridgend. At the end 
o f  the day Bridgend w on because there was the space available, there w as the expertise, 
and there were all the support functions available. It w as lower investment, and a plant 
that had a proven capability to deliver high quality. It w ill be done in a dedicated facility 
at Bridgend with all the Ford manufacturing disciplines on it. But the design o f  the engine 
is being controlled by Jaguar. It is being done by Jaguar. It’s not being comprom ised in 
any way. It w ill be done to Jaguar specified tolerances which w ill be tighter than any o f  
the tolerances specified  by a Ford engine as part o f  getting the refinement in it. So, I think 
that’s com e up with the right answer. It’s an uncompromised product made in a first class 
plant in the UK . The engines w ill start com ing out o f  Bridgend at the end o f  1995, but 
Radford w ill keep going beyond then because it w ill carry on making som e AJ6s, and we  
don’t know  whether the V I 2 w ill still be alive then or not, maybe not. And Radford also 
m akes a lot o f  chassis com ponents as w ell
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From what you know was it true that they actually did get the quality right on the 
Series III, and what went wrong on the XJ40?
Y ou’ve got to go back to the early 1980s, to about 1980-81, which was when Jaguar was 
struggling with things like they couldn’t paint cars because they’d relocated. They’d 
established a new paint facility which didn’t work, and that was at the body plant at 
Castle Bromwich. They had this fancy new paint facility which didn’t work. The paint 
would fall o f f  the cars. You couldn’t get the paint to stick so they had to ship, as a 
temporary expedient to get cars into production, the bodies from Castle Bromwich back 
to Browns Lane to put them through the repair paint facility they had at Browns Lane 
where they could only paint them in three colours which was red, yellow , and something 
else. That was the shape Jaguar was in in the early 1980s. It was just an absolute 
nightmare. Everything was wrong with the cars. Nothing would fit. It was terrible. They 
did make a lot o f  progress from those times. They got the paint facility up and working. 
They actually got to the point o f  having very good paint quality. A  very good paint finish. 
But most o f  the rest o f  it was bullshit.
The quality o f  the old Series III was never very good but also when they introduced the 
XJ40, the new generation XJ6, the quality went sharply downwards having got to a point 
where by British standards the Series III was acceptable. By international standards it 
really w asn’t a strong competitor, but because it was so beautiful-looking people forgave 
it. It was a very unique car. It had this fantastic ride, it had this lovely silky engine, 
particularly in the V I 2, and the car looked fabulous. It was unique and everybody fell in 
love with it so they forgave its quirks. But it had lots o f  quality problems when you look. 
They didn’t have very good data so they didn’t really know what had happened, but it 
was not very good.
When the XJ40 w as introduced it was unbelievable. N ow  there are good reasons for that. 
It’s easy to be critical, but when Jaguar started engineering the XJ40 at the same time it 
was doing the XJ41, the F-type. It had 230 engineers back in the early 1980s. By the time 
the XJ40 was launched the company had 430 engineers; that was in the Autumn o f  1986. 
By the tim e Ford arrived, say at the end o f  1989, it had 830 engineers, and one year later 
it had 1,030 engineers. To cut a long story short, 230 or 430 engineers are not enough to 
be able to do a car with the sophistication o f  the XJ40. It can’t be done, never mind 
looking after sustaining the existing products that always require som e on-going  
engineering work as w ell. So Jaguar actually performed a miracle by getting the XJ40 
into production with the resources that it had available. It was inevitable with those 
resources that there were going to be certain quaint aspects to the car which manifested 
them selves in just appalling quality. It was terrible in virtually every respect.
The disappointing thing was that three years later very little had been done to address 
those quality problems. Ford had thought they knew, based on the quality statistics that 
were available, that the quality o f  the XJ40 was awful. They had expected that some 
progress would have been made in resolving it three years after launch. But, in fact, very 
little had been accomplished. The good new s though is that the basic design o f  the car 
was very competent, and it is very sophisticated in a number o f  ways. The body design 
was done by British Leyland, but the overall suspension and vehicular engineering was 
done by Jaguar, and it’s actually a very competent vehicle i f  you can sort out the 
irritations that have destroyed its reputation. There were som e horror stories, though,
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from customers who had cars. One car in the States had been into the dealership on 50 or 
60 separate occasions for quality problems in the space o f  a couple o f  years, and there 
were cars that were going in virtually every w eek to have something fixed. Som e o f  the 
customers were a little pissed off. So quality was without question the number one issue. 
Great expectations had been built up with the dealer body, and therefore with the 
customers that, riding on this improved image during the mid 1980s, this new Jaguar was 
going to be wonderful. It w as going to be the quality Jaguar, quality designed, from the 
start tested to the M oon and back. It was going to be wonderful. So, expectations had 
been built up, and the car was awful. Word really started to get around that Jaguar was 
bad news. So, that w as a terrible mountain for Jaguar to have to clim b to recover its 
image: first o f  all to fix  the reality, secondly to change the perception o f  quality which 
had really collapsed, particularly in the States, also in som e other markets, less so in the 
UK where people are not so fussy. They don’t have the statistics available in the UK, 
either, that are available in the States. So, quality was absolutely the number one most 
urgent priority fix.
The first thing Ford, or the Ford people, did was to introduce proper measurement 
disciplines to find out, to get som e reliable quantitative measurement o f  what the 
problems were, and som e analysis o f  what the problems were, so that the engineers and 
the manufacturing people could start working on what it was they had to fix, and focus on 
the priorities. There w as som e information available that w asn’t very good, and it w asn’t 
helpful to the engineers because it didn’t break it down into component detail. So, the 
first thing that was put in place m ost quickly was a new  end o f  production line quality 
assessment system . Jaguar had one, but it was not honest. Things they didn’t know how  
to fix they didn’t count. So there was a new  Ford system  o f  quality measurement put in 
which is consistent in all Ford plants around the world, and it also gave them a 
benchmark to compare against Lincoln Continentals, Ford Scorpios or other things. 
Benchmarking is a great tool to beat people with or to measure yourself against. This 
thing, the Uniform Product A ssessm ent System , UPAS as it’s com m only known, is a 
system Ford uses around the world. Jaguar established new thresholds for how  high the 
numbers could be. Adm ittedly the Jaguar product is more com plex, therefore there are 
more things that can go wrong, so you w ould expect scores to be higher than they are 
with a Fiesta, for exam ple, which has very few  parts. Nevertheless, on a Ford Scorpio 
built in Germany you w ould expect a UPAS score, which measures the demerit points 
expressed in terms o f  per 100 vehicles, in the range o f  250-300 points. The problems are 
rated according to severity on a scale o f  not much for insignificant problems, a modest 
score for things that are not important but that the customer would notice, and a bigger 
weighting for things that the customer would complain about, measured in terms o f  
customer perception. So, a Ford Scorpio would be 250-300, a Lincoln Continental maybe 
300-350. Jaguar w as com ing out with scores o f  about 2,500, whether it was an XJ-S or an 
XJ40. The old Series III, which w as still being manufactured, was the best, it was better 
quality than the other tw o cars, but it was still up around the 2,000 mark. It was not very 
good. But this w as just a measure o f  quality as perceived by the customer in the 
showroom i f  you like, nothing to do with durability which is measured on a different 
basis. But just in terms o f  v isib le items, things you would determine on a test drive like 
squeaks and rattles, things that are working or not working; on those measures the quality 
was ten tim es worst than it should have been and about ten tim es worst than the best in
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class. M ercedes w as the best in class, and it was about ten tim es worst than a comparable 
M ercedes, eight to ten times! So it w asn’t very good I think you could sum that up by 
saying. Tw o years later, which was about the time I left Jaguar, it had got down to about 
450 and it’s now  dow n to about 400 I’m told. So, it has been improved by 80% roughly. 
The number o f  problem s have reduced by 80% so they are four fifths o f  the way to 
eliminating them com pletely. O bviously, the lower you get, the more difficult it gets, but 
they’ve made huge progress and it’s now  at the level at around 400. It is at a level that is 
comparable to BM W , for exam ple, comparable to Lexus in terms o f  the quality as I’ve  
just described it, and it is no longer a discriminator in reality. At the same time, other 
quality measures w ere being developed, warranty being an important one. The warranty 
system didn’t do any analysis, so a new  warranty system  had to be put in place. There 
were som e customer satisfaction surveys going on and those were tightened up. So 
there’s a lot o f  feedback now  that Jaguar has available. Warranty numbers were 
horrendous. They are now  m aking quite dramatic improvements are being experienced in 
warranty as well.
What sort of warranty numbers are we talking about when Ford took over?
Lets just say they w ere very high. There w as an inversion w e used to make fun o f  
between warranty costs and marketing costs at Ford. Warranty costs at Ford would  
typically run at, say, 2% o f  revenue and marketing costs at closer to 9 or 10% o f  revenue 
broadly across Europe. Jaguar got it the other w ay round. O f course, the evidence o f  how  
far Jaguar has progressed on that is that they’ve  now  been forced to go to four years 
warranty in the States. A t the tim e they introduced the XJ40 they went from one year 
warranty in the States to three years, which was actually leading the charge on that at the 
time. It was very radical, and very expensive as it turned out. They’ve now  gone to four 
years in the States to be fully com petitive, to catch up. They did that a year ago. I think it 
was for the 1992 m odel year, but elsew here, and in all the European markets, they again 
decided to lead the charge and go from one to three years as standard warranty, which is 
part o f  having improved the realities, and to (a) improve the perception (b) relieve the 
customers o f  the worry about unreliability and (c) to do really what is right to say that 
there is no reason for the custom er to have to pay for things that shouldn’t go wrong 
anyway. So that’s been a big com m itm ent by Jaguar to do that, but they feel they can 
now afford to do it.
On quality, where was the main problem?
It was lack o f  discipline throughout the w hole process, from the engineering process, 
from the integration o f  manufacturing and engineering, from the quality disciplines on 
the supplier, from the launch disciplines o f  actually launching the product, and all the 
planning, and the planning that goes behind the launch process. It w as all o f  that plus it 
was lousy discipline on the shop floor. It w asn’t lack o f  skill or comm itm ent by the 
people on the shop floor, it w as lack o f  manufacturing discipline. It was paying lip 
service to som ething as sim ple as statistical process control. People said they were doing 
it but you’d walk around the factory and you’d find a statistical process control chart that 
hadn’t been filled in for three months. The quality measurement tools were not there, or i f
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they were there they were not being applied. There w as just a total lack o f  discipline 
throughout every level you looked at. Lousy housekeeping in the plants. The plants were 
dirty, disorganised, poor materials handling, everything. Every possible thing you could 
do wrong w as done wrong. The quality w as wrong. So, the basic attack w as (a) to do the 
measurement (b) to get the disciplines into the manufacturing (c) to get the engineering 
people recognising that quality w as their first priority. We had to get the numbers to 
analyse what the issues were and then to assign responsibilities for fixing those issues to 
specific individuals or task forces. It required big organisational change to make that 
happen, setting up both quality team s with responsibility for eighteen different systems 
around a vehicle so that there w ere eighteen quality teams; one responsible for steering, 
for exam ple, one responsible for squeaks and rattles, etc. Those task forces were given 
the responsibility for addressing each o f  those issues, and it started to work, and actually 
started to yield enorm ous results quite quickly.
But what about the Quality Circles that the old management had introduced and 
which they claimed were working effectively?
That is sheer nonsense. There w ere oodles o f  anecdotes from the shop floor. B ill Hayden, 
who had an awful lot to do with introducing these quality disciplines, was very good at 
going around the shop floor and talking to the guys on the shopfloor. There had been one 
o f  the com m unication sessions given to all the em ployees which all the directors 
participated in, and B ill Hayden w as standing up talking about what things w e were 
going to fix  on quality and how  bad it had been and w hy it had been so bad and what we  
were going to do to fix  it, and som e chap stood up afterwards and said “I’ve  heard all this 
before. I bet you w o n ’t com e and see m y problem s on the production line. I’m being 
asked to fit parts that w o n ’t fit”. The next m orning, first thing, B ill Hayden was down in 
the line with manufacturing m anagem ent at this guy’s station saying “You told me last 
night I w ouldn’t com e and see what your problem was. Could you show  me please?” This 
guy was putting a plastic w heel arch w ire w hich w as pre-drilled to match up with the pre­
drilled holes in the bodyw ork. But they didn’t match up, and the part w as too big, so he 
had to bend it in a w ay that it w as not designed to be bent to make it fit, and then he had 
to get a drill and drill holes through the painted bodywork, which w as an absolute 
criminal act - you don’t drill holes through painted bodywork because it’s a guaranteed 
rust problem. And, he w as not only drilling holes through painted bodywork, he was 
having to drill them blind - up through the w heel arch, and he knew that there were wires 
on the other side. And he said ‘I can’t see, I can’t see i f  I’m drilling through the wires but 
I have to drill the thing to m ake it fit. I’ve been com plaining about this since the car was 
introduced in 1986, but nothing’s been done about it. I’ve complained ’til I’m blue in the 
face. N obody w ill pay any attention’. He hated having to do it, he knew he was doing the 
wrong thing, but h e’d been given no option. There were countless issues like that. Quality 
Circles my ass!
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Jaguar had a reputation for marketing. That is where the effort went. That is where 
the great success was. Yet, you’ve said that as a proportion their marketing 
expenditure was a fraction of what you’d find in Ford. Why was there so little 
expenditure at Jaguar?
Because it didn’t have to be as high as in Ford. This is som ething I w ould give Jaguar a 
lot o f  credit for. I think they’ve  done an outstanding job  on their marketing, on their 
image, and they’v e  been in the forefront on a number o f  things that the volum e  
manufacturers have now  picked up on. In particular, particularly in the States, 
particularly in the UK , and increasingly in the European countries as w ell, they adopted a 
radical approach to dealer representation and done a hell o f  a job  on it. It w as very bold. 
They started in the United States where all their dealerships used to be shared. There 
were far too m any o f  them . It w as very low  throughput per dealership and they decided in 
the mid 1980s that they had to aim for solus representation, dedicated Jaguar outlets, and 
to do that they had to have m any few er o f  them because otherwise they w ouldn’t be 
viable. So they reduced the number o f  dealerships in a legal clim ate w hich w as virtually 
im possible to do. They did it, just railroaded it through, reduced the number o f  dealer 
outlets to about a quarter o f  what they had been, and persuaded the dealers to invest 
enormous am ounts o f  m oney in new  facilities which in m ost cases were pretty smart 
facilities. So this w as a trem endous upgrading o f  the dealer image. They ended up with 
very good quality dealers. They got rid o f  all the bad ones, ended up with the good ones, 
and actually had a trem endously strong dealer network in the States. They did the same 
thing in the UK . They got a very strong dealer network in the UK, and have even done it 
in som e o f  the very sm all countries in Europe. B elgium  and the Netherlands, for example, 
were superb. Germany w as still in the Dark A ges, they hadn’t done anything there.
France w as som ew here in-betw een. So, in general their distribution, their marketing at 
the sharp end, had w orked pretty w ell. They had the foresight to set up in Japan through a 
jo int venture. They did that very w ell, and that had started to work successfu lly  as well.
So they had done som e good  things on having a high im age and high quality dealerships, 
and those dealerships in fact had helped Jaguar survive and com pensated to som e extent 
for this awful veh icle  quality. The dealers had done an outstanding job  in compensating  
for that. The other thing they had done extrem ely w ell w as that they had a tremendous 
high quality parts distribution capability - very good performance on that. In the UK they 
were the best o f  any veh icle  manufacturer by far. They had guaranteed overnight delivery  
for any parts ordered by up to six  o ’clock  in the evening. They guaranteed they’d be there 
by the start o f  business the next m orning, which w as pretty stunning. It worked pretty 
w ell.
But they seem to have fallen down quite a few times regarding market intelligence 
and marketing planning.
Y es, they w ere very introverted. There w as very little awareness o f  what the competition  
w as up to. When w e, Ford, first w ent to talk to them back in 1988, Ford w as clearly 
aware that the Japanese w ere com ing into the luxury segm ent. W e knew they were going  
to do it w ell and Ford’s v iew  w as that Jaguar couldn’t tackle it on their ow n and they 
needed help. That w as the opening thrust. John Egan was either a very good actor or very
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naive, w e thought at the tim e, because he just refused to recognise that the Japanese could  
in any way challenge Jaguar. With hindsight I think it was not so much the fact that he 
was a good actor but that Jaguar really had not recognised what could happen. They had 
very little analysis capability. They didn’t have an attitude that w as receptive to analysing 
things. When w e got there, there was a lot o f  opinion being expressed by management 
but virtually no analysis to back up the opinion. When the analysis was asked for and 
subsequently delivered fifty per cent o f  the tim e the opinions were dead wrong.
How accurate was the accounting in the 1980s? Did costs get out of control?
I don’t know, because by the tim e w e got there the accounting was actually in reasonably 
good shape. The technical book-keeping w as in good shape. The control over costs was 
not, the planning o f  costs w as absolutely not, the ability to control the costs o f  the new  
model programme w as non existent. In fact, the ability to control anything on the new  
model programme w as virtually non existent, whether it was cost, or investment, or 
timing, or content, or achievem ent o f  objectives, or whatever. That’s all been fixed, 
hopefully. I think the one thing they probably did have a good handle on was what the 
impact o f  Dollar fluctuations was. They certainly did have a very good feel for it by the 
time w e arrived and in fact that’s very easily  calculated, so they should have been able to 
analyse that very easily. I think that probably costs had got out o f  control. It always 
surprised me that the share price had ever got up to the heights it went up to because it 
seemed to me the w hole lot w as built at that particular time on currency. I guess it was 
February 1987 when the share price peaked at over 600p117, and it actually started to go 
down before you got to October 1987. It never had any right to be up at 600p because all 
that was built on Dollar strength. Profits were built to a large extent on Dollar strength 
during the mid 1980s, and a bit o f  volum e recovery. The Dollar strength certainly was not 
sustainable and there w as nothing else going on I didn’t analyse in detail at the time at a 
fairly superficial level, but it never seem ed to m e that there was a sustainable strong 
business underneath. It didn’t take a lot o f  science to look at Jaguar’s volum e and 
facilities, and the w ay they did business, and their productivity, to conclude that they 
were not com petitive in cost terms, and anybody com ing from a Ford background would 
say that i f  you’re not com petitive in cost terms then watch out. And that was certainly the 
situation. Productivity w as another w hole issue. At the end o f  1989 Jaguar was still 
producing about four cars per man i f  you take the total workforce, which by any measure 
you care to use was in the Dark A ges, and o f  course it got worse before it got better. It 
does have plans in place w hich are being gradually executed to get that up to a 
competitive level, and even with the volum e collapsing during 1991 labour productivity 
improved by 23% and the plan for 1992 w as for 25% on top o f  that. So that was a 50% 
productivity improvement in tw o years in a period o f  declining volum e.118 I’m talking 
about factory productivity now  for those improvements. A  lot o f  people were being taken 
out, unfortunately, to make that happen, but that was very necessary, and even with a 
50% improvement they’re still w ay behind where they need to get to.
117 The Jaguar share price was 627p on 27 February 1987.
118 Section 6.6 in the main text reveals productivity at 3.89 vehicles in 1989 (based on the total numbers 
employed), falling to 3.42 vehicles in 1990, and 1.87 vehicles in 1991, but the significant reductions in 
manpower enabled an improvement to 2.77 vehicles in 1992 despite a further fall in output.
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There didn’t seem to be much Capital Expenditure put into Browns Lane.
There was nothing major. There were bits and pieces. There were som e new testing 
facilities, testing the electrical stuff, but there was no major expenditure at Browns Lane 
that I can think of. There was obviously expenditure put in to actually launch the XJ40 
there but there was no substantial investment in new equipment, or substantial 
rearrangement o f  the plant, or anything o f  that nature, that com es to mind.
So where was the Capital Expenditure applied?
A lot went into the engineering centre. There was a chunk that went into Castle 
Bromwich, in particular for the Robogate which was a bit o f  new-fangled technology that 
was, unfortunately, com pletely misguided because the Robogate was something that was 
designed to provide flexibility so you could do a lot o f  body styles through one fixture, 
through one piece o f  kit, and the sad thing was they ended up with only one body style, 
so they didn’t need any flexibility at all. So all the m oney they spent for flexibility was a 
waste. It was done when they had the long wheel base car, for example, in the product 
plan which got axed by the w ay to make room for the XJ41 (the F-type). I really don’t 
know where all the rest o f  it went. I never bothered to look back to see.
What was the labour relations situation like when Ford got there?
There was a fair amount o f  communication going on but labour relations were appalling. 
Jaguar when it was privatised had inherited a fairly good agreement from British 
Leyland, you w ill recall. Follow ing its “Red Robbo days” British Leyland had negotiated 
its Blue Newspaper agreement which was pretty good. It was in the forefront o f  the 
automotive manufacturing industry at the time, and had a lot o f  good things in it. But 
Jaguar, having been privatised, never had the m uscle to stand up to the unions and 
enforce it because at the tim e they needed the volume, their sales were going up, and they 
couldn’t jeopardise their production, so they had to roll over on that one. Later on, they 
were trying to introduce the new car and they couldn’t jeopardise the new launch so they 
had to roll over there also. Gradually Jaguar had gone backwards, and backwards, and 
backwards. Every tim e they were tested they gave way. They were being tested all the 
time, giving way all the time. So, by the end o f  1989 labour relations were at the stage 
that basically reflected the worst days o f  the 1960s. Everything that was bad about 
working practices w as in place at Jaguar. Things like working up the line to get your 
quota finished before the end o f  the shift so you could knock o f f  early, and that is terrible, 
it has a terrible impact on quality and productivity and everything. Total demarcations. 
There were appalling demarcations. Management had no control over overtime. The 
overtime rota w as determined by the shop stewards. There was a w hole list o f  labour 
relations practices that were in the Dark A ges, and the strike record was appalling. I can’t 
remember the numbers but there were very few  days that were strike free, and that had to 
tackled up front. It w as taken head-on. Fortunately there was a labour contract, two year 
contract com ing up for renewal in Novem ber 1990, and Jaguar as its negotiating 
objective decided there were 12 or 13 working practices that had to be eliminated. It was 
essential for Jaguar’s survival that they were eliminated, they were not negotiable, so we
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had to go in on the premise that w e were going to clean all that up and w e were going to 
do it all at once because there really was no alternative. So it was a question o f  what w e  
had to do to get agreement for that. What the unions wanted was a shorter working week, 
what the workers wanted was more m oney. The shorter working w eek was topical at the 
time. The major manufacturers had volunteered to talk about it, but hadn’t. A  shorter 
working w eek didn’t actually cost Jaguar anything because w e had capacity com ing out 
o f  our ears anyway. W e didn’t need it near term, and in the long term it was going to get 
dragged in at the tail end, so it would be better to use it as a bargaining counter. It was a 
question o f  balancing those three things. The unions were very co-operative, agreed that 
Jaguar needed all these things, accepted that they were in the Dark A ges, and were quite 
co-operative in getting the agreement o f  everybody in the workforce to those working 
practice changes. They got a shorter working w eek in exchange, and the workforce got an 
eight per cent settlement, I think, which was about the going rate at the time and on top o f  
that got a four per cent productivity allowance which was to be payable on a signed 
agreement by every member o f  the workforce. At every plant they accepted these 
working practice changes. The general principles were agreed at national level, the 
application o f  those principles to each plant was worked through in detail and there was a 
47-page document or som ething that was issued to every member o f  the workforce which 
was the basis o f  the agreement. Only when every, literally every, member o f  the 
workforce had signed up w as that four per cent payable. That was scheduled to happen by 
the end o f  March but it happened one month earlier and that was the w hole basis o f  the 
productivity improvements w e talked about earlier. The strike record in the previous 
twelve months having been single figures o f  days that were free o f  disruption, in the next 
twelve months there w as no production lost due to disruption at all. It absolutely 
transformed the labour relations, underpinned o f  course by the fact that it was a pretty 
gloom y time when people were getting made redundant and all the rest o f  it, but the 
labour relations had been absolutely transformed by those actions.
How much of the labour relations problem was that Jaguar had become subjugated 
to British Leyland?
Our perception was that Jaguar had gone backwards subsequent to privatisation.
Actually, one o f  the curious things was the personal relationships with the people in 
Jaguar. It was a very friendly company. There was a very open dialogue with the people 
on the shop floor, even though there was all this disruption going on. Individual 
relationships were fine. It w as a very nice company to work in from that respect. There 
was a great spirit about the company, but it was all being channelled in the wrong 
direction. There was a great desire actually for the company to perform better but the 
people on the shopfloor were very frustrated because they were not being given the tools 
to do the job they wanted to do.
- 9 7 -
APPENDIX
How good was the management/worker relationship?
There w as a lack o f  trust, there was a lack o f  b e lie f in the management because they 
w ouldn’t listen, they w ouldn’t respond when people complained. W hen they complained  
about legitim ate concerns they had they didn’t get any reaction; this prejudices the v iew  
about the m anagem ent. I think that w as rampant.
Were the directors of Jaguar, particularly from the beginning of 1988 onwards, not 
living in the real world?
You have to assum e that that’s the case, yes. There was an interesting post mortem that 
we had on the XJ41, the F-type, and w e had it eighteen months after Ford had taken over 
the business. The reason w e had it was that w e were exam ining the processes o f  how  w e  
developed new  products and how  do w e make sure w e don’t do the things that Jaguar had 
done with the XJ41 in terms o f  the factions, in terms o f  a lot o f  people in the company 
knowing it w as going in the wrong direction but yet the management continued down that 
direction, apparently blinded. Was information getting fed up to the management, and if  
it was getting fed through w hy w eren’t the management responding to it? It actually 
became clear from that post mortem that the information had been fed through to the 
board o f  directors, at least to the executive group, that they were being told at regular 
intervals that the objectives that w ere being set could not be met; that there were not 
resources in place to achieve those objectives; that the project w as im possible. But the 
m essage was basically ‘Go away and try harder!’ They were being told by the guy w ho  
was running the project that he couldn’t deliver it. They were being told that. There were 
no secrets. We saw the reports that had been presented that said it can’t be done, that 
w e ’re m issing all the targets, and here’s the reasons why. And yet, they carried on 
blindfold, jettisoning other products, like the long wheel base XJ40, to support this 
product which they were told w as a no hoper. They got other people involved, they set up 
another group to look w hy this w asn’t working, did various other things, but I think they  
didn’t know how  to tackle the issues to be honest. It w asn’t a question o f  m alicious 
intent, but they w ere certainly representing things to the City about this product that they 
were being told at the sam e tim e could not be done.
Isn’t £1.6billion an awful lot of money to pay for a brand name?
It’s not just a brand nam e, it’s a brand name with an existing m odel range which actually 
does have som e potential when the econom ies recover, a very strong distribution network 
which is in place, and quite a lot o f  manufacturing capacity which is in place. It may not 
be perfect but it is there, and against a comparison with Lexus which is reputed to have 
spent $4billion or $5billion  on launching the LS400. N ow  Lexus has been a roaring 
success. I don’t know  how  much Infiniti has spent launching the Infiniti range. It’s 
probably rather less than Lexus spent, but it’s still big bucks. So you ’re in a big bucks 
business i f  you want to have a luxury brand. The strategy behind it for Ford was very 
clear. Ford had wanted, for several years it had decided it needed, to be more strongly 
represented in what it saw  as the growth segm ents o f  the autom otive business. In Europe 
it saw the growth segm ents as very small cars like the Peugeot 106, although it w asn’t
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sure it could make money at those, as the MPV [Multi Purpose Vehicle] market, which it 
is now tackling with the joint venture with VW , as utility vehicles as a niche sector which  
it is tackling with the joint venture with Nissan, and luxury cars. Those are the sectors it 
saw as growth sectors. The rest o f  the market growth trends were going to be dull for the 
foreseeable future. It looked at various ways o f  getting into the luxury market, and this 
happened to coincide with the US view  which was that the luxury car business was going  
to continue to evolve in the direction o f  what they termed in the States the functional 
luxury vehicles; that is, the European import type things and it was going to swing away 
from traditional luxury cars, Cadillacs, Lincolns, towards these import type vehicles.
Ford w asn’t convinced that Lincoln was going to be able to bridge that gap properly in 
the States and therefore saw room for an import type brand, and that complemented what 
they saw as an opportunity, and, in fact, a need, in Europe. They had looked at various 
strategies to fill that primarily European need. They’d looked at A lfa Rom eo first o f  all as 
a middle market brand, recognising that Ford in the States has got Ford, Mercury,
Lincoln. In Europe they just had Ford. A lfa Rom eo didn’t work out. They looked at 
various other things. They looked at Saab which was about to work out, but Jaguar came 
along. Saab again w ould have been a middle market brand with a heavy sharing o f  
components, as A lfa Rom eo would have had, with the Ford m odels. Jaguar was seen as a 
further niche up-market but equally interesting in many ways because it had a terrific 
brand name, had a good distribution network, had, it was thought, a reasonably strong 
engineering capability, but which did turn out to be true by the way.
Ford, having looked at the luxury markets, had concluded it didn’t really have the 
capability or the style to be able to develop a true competitor in those markets. It didn’t 
have the market im age to do it credibly either, whereas the Japanese market image was 
marching steadily uphill and it was fairly easy for them to make that transition to the next 
niche up based on the very strong image they’d established for their volum e cars. Ford 
had an eighty year tradition o f  having a blue collar image and couldn’t suddenly change 
that credibly by throwing a luxury car into the equation. They felt it either had to be done 
through joint venture, but couldn’t find a joint venture partner that worked, or in which 
case it had to be done through acquisition. It was felt even at £1.6billion, and they knew  
very well it was expensive, it was justifiable only on the basis that Ford had a vision  
based on a growing luxury car segment, a vision o f  what Ford was going to be able to do 
with the Jaguar brand in time, and it actually came down in the final discussion meeting 
in Dearborn119, the one where the decision was made, that it would only ever generate a 
return if  w e ’re prepared to back our vision. That was not the sort o f  language that Ford 
used, it was very unlikely language for Ford to speak in that way. It was basically Don 
Petersen, the then Chairman, shortly before he got ousted, making the decision to back 
the vision, clearly in the knowledge that it was a long term deal. Even then, that was 
based on a more rosy v iew  o f  the world in the near term than has turned out to be the 
case.
119 Ford World Headquarters was located at Dearborn, Michigan.
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To what extent was it motivated by the fact that Jaguar was supposed to be 
negotiating a deal with General Motors.
That w as certainly part o f  it. The decision w as whether to go for Saab, the deal being the 
one that GM got, but cheaper, or Jaguar, or both. Ford had already agreed the Saab deal. 
Ford had talked to Jaguar in 1988, looking for a basis for co-operation, but Egan was 
frosty. The idea w as to take 15% o f  Jaguar, with agreement. Ford had started to look at 
Jaguar in early 1988, but w as only interested if  it could get Jaguar’s agreement on som e  
kind o f  co-operation. Ford felt it had only a few  days. The decision was em otional, not 
analytical.
You’ve intimated that Egan gave Ford a very frosty reception yet we know he was 
talking to Toyota, for example, and he was certainly talking to General Motors.
Why didn’t he seem so keen on Ford?
He subsequently sw ung around. W hen he had the deal done he was quite supportive o f  it.
I think it w as probably a negotiating position to a certain extent. Perhaps he felt it was too  
early, that he felt that with us com ing in when share price was 247p, after it had been up 
at over 600p or whatever he probably felt at that at that starting price, it w as too early and 
he didn’t want to do any deals at that price. 1 don’t know. That’s speculation on my part. 
A s it subsequently transpired, w e didn’t know this at the tim e, they were a long w ay from 
doing anything with GM  that w as sensible for Jaguar. It w as generally known that they 
were talking about doing a Jaguar o f f  the Senator platform to be manufactured at 
Russelsheim , and it w as not a sensible financial transaction for Jaguar at the time. They 
hadn’t com e to a sensib le product proposition, but they were a m illion m iles away from a 
sensible financial decision , and the discussions had from tim e to tim e been quite 
acrim onious betw een GM  and Jaguar. So I’m not sure i f  the GM deal w ould ever have 
got done anyw ay as it transpired.
How was John Edwards in relation to John Egan?
He was very loyal and Egan trusted him a lot. He w as a great confidant o f  Egan’s, as 
much as anybody probably. H e w as Egan’s m ost trusted lieutenant. John w as also trusted 
by the rest o f  the Jaguar organisation. He w as a very straight guy. Egan, therefore, was 
able to use him as a sounding board into the rest o f  the Jaguar organisation, I think, a lot, 
and Egan didn’t trust any o f  the other people to anything like the sam e extent. John 
[Edwards] knew  what he knew , and he hadn’t seen the rest o f  it, and the transition team 
report that w as done jo in tly  by Ford and Jaguar im m ediately fo llow ing the acquisition, 
done in the space o f  about sixty days from the m iddle o f  January 1990, made him more 
aware o f  the shortcom ings o f  Jaguar’s capabilities That transition team report was done 
very cleverly. It w as done under the chairmanship o f  B ill Hayden, w ho was then not at 
Jaguar. He w as appointed to lead the transition team initially, before it w as known that he 
would be taking over. I w as the first Ford em ployee in Jaguar. I went in straight away as 
a full tim e em p loyee and I knew  that B ill w ould be taking over, but nobody else knew at 
that stage. So B ill led the transition team, and it was done with people from each function 
from Ford and an equivalent person from each function from Jaguar and they worked as a
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team. Each part o f  the report was agreed to by both sides. So, it was a jointly prepared 
report. It was incredibly damning. In the space o f  sixty days an awful lot o f  warts were 
uncovered. John Egan had a very hard tim e accepting that report and was eventually  
persuaded by his people that he had no option. It was factual. He thought it was 
exaggerated, inflated. He couldn’t accept it at all. He was forced to roll over because he 
had no one to fight his battle for him; all the Jaguar people accepted it. Egan’s mistake 
was in staying after 1985/86. Had he left before the launch o f  the XJ40 he w ould have 
been a hero. He did the job  he was charged to do, but he became increasingly arrogant.
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Transcript of the interview with Andrew Lorenz on 7th August 2007 
When did you start to get involved with Jaguar?
When the Jaguar story started I w as a reporter at the Sunday Telegraph, later Deputy City 
Editor, and then I went to the Sunday T im es as Industrial Editor. One o f  the first big 
stories I reported on at the Sunday Tim es w as the Jaguar take-over by Ford. In the run up 
to privatisation I dealt with David B oole, Arnold Bolton (David’s number tw o), Egan, 
and the tw o Edwards’: John Edwards, the Finance Director, and Ken Edwards, the 
Personnel Director. The Personnel Director w as quite important. H e had quite an 
important role in Jaguar because they were still in the process o f  recreating Jaguar as a 
standalone entity, with its own identity, which had been lost when it w as reduced to a 
manufacturing or production operation within BL and it was called som ething like “Large 
Car Manufacturing Plant Number T w o”. Ken had quite an important role so I had quite a 
lot to do with him.
How much did you take on board from Jaguar? How much did you believe that they 
told you?
M y MO [modus operandi] was always to get on with companies on the basis that (a) it 
made life simpler, and (b) actually i f  you got on with companies, but w ere still prepared 
to ask the odd probing question, then you had more chance o f  finding out earlier i f  
anything w as happening than i f  you w ere on the outside. So I listened to them a lot, but I 
also learned to read D avid’s face, and what that effectively meant w as that I m issed  
certain things because he was very busy at tim es and slow  in calling m e back. But I also  
learned to pick up certain things. For exam ple, w e were the first newspaper to spot the 
fact that this decline w as about to happen in 1989, and I remember writing a p iece for the 
Sunday Telegraph saying that life w as going  to get a lot harder for Jaguar. N o w  what I 
didn’t pick up w as the warranty situation. I knew  their quality w asn’t great, but I didn’t 
know it w as as bad as it was. But to be honest I w asn’t focused on the warranty situation,
I was focused more on the basics such as the production side.
Did you have any idea of the extent of the benefit of the Dollar in the early 1980s?
Y es. But you know as w ell as I do that Egan w as such a fantastic salesman. That w as his 
great quality. He told a great story. They didn’t try and conceal the currency benefit at all, 
they just didn’t em phasise it. They didn’t have to, the sales were zoom ing up. They 
w eren’t the only ones, to be fair. The Germans were doing the same. It w as boom  tim e in 
the mid to late 1980s for the European premium car companies selling into the States. In 
those days it was all export. VW  didn’t have a car plant there, M ercedes didn’t etc.
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Was there any instance where you came up with a story and David Boole leaned on 
you not to go with it?
N o. I got on quite w ell w ith David. I know  that everyone called him “D avid B oolesh it” 
and all the rest o f  it, but I just learned to apply a David B oole  discount. So around results 
time David w as there and it w as his job  to put the best possible g loss on things, and I 
recognised that.
But nobody, but nobody, at the time published anything near the truth, did they?
N o they didn’t. But nobody knew  how  much trouble Jaguar were getting into either. It 
w as literally as it w as happening that I got the new s that they were adm itting they needed  
help, they needed investm ent. It w as clear it w as going into reverse purely because o f  the 
weak market conditions in the U S. A fter one press conference at the tim e I asked one  
executive “What are you going  to do about it?”, and this guy told m e “W e’re going to do 
som ething about it, but one person w e ’re not going to do it with is Ford”, w hich told me 
that (1) they were looking for a partner/buyer, and (2) they had Ford banging on the door, 
which nobody knew  at the tim e. There’d been the odd rumour about Ford eyeing Jaguar, 
but that w as it. And literally w e wrote the story on the Sunday about Jaguar wanting to do 
a deal with GM, which happened to be the truth, and on the M onday m orning, or early 
the fo llow ing w eek, there it was: Ford did a dawn raid!120 N obody realised how  desperate 
the situation w as, but there again you  generally don’t anyway, you only find out after the 
event
In your book121 you refer to Egan’s “brilliant marketing effort”. What exactly did 
you mean by “marketing”?
Y es, w ell, I ’ve never understood what marketing is. W ell, he told a great story.
John w as a great salesm an actually. I think he did a fantastic job  o f  sellin g  that story. In 
the early 1980s he understood what they needed to pull them selves out o f  it. In that kind 
o f  business im age is really important. That w as his forte. The trouble w as the other side  
o f  Egan. What he needed w as a strong guy alongside him to handle manufacturing. It 
never happened.
120 Ford used their stockbrokers to purchase 15% o f  Jaguar’s shares by bidding for them directly from 
existing shareholders. Known as a “dawn raid” because it was an event that usually took place early in 
the morning, with great speed, so that the share price in the market had no time to react (ie increase 
beyond the price offered by the raider) before the raider had obtained the required number o f shares.
121 Lorenz, Andrew. A Fighting Chance. The revival andfuture o f  British manufacturing industry. 
(London, 1989).
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Wasn’t David Boole regarded as the true architect of Jaguar’s re-imaging? Indeed, 
a number of people have described him as Egan’s Svengali.
Yes, w ell it was like Alistair Campbell to Tony Blair. I got to know David really w ell. I 
liked him a lot. David literally didn’t understand where all the defects were. It cam e as 
quite as shock to him. In the end 1 found David a really, really interesting, very active  
barometer o f  what happened in Jaguar because the illusion he had helped create had been 
shattered for him. M y personal b e lie f is that Jaguar w as a lost opportunity.
Egan presented h im self as the new  Sir W illiam Lyons, which is why ironically he was so 
ultimately successful. He didn’t want to do the deal with Ford. He really didn’t want to 
sell the company, he believed the government w ould support him. He had a bad tim e 
after he left Jaguar. It ripped the heart out o f  him. H e saw  h im self as being another Sir 
W illiam Lyons. He thought GM w as going to sustain him, that’s w hy he w as so keen on 
GM. That’s why I fucked up with the Ford deal because I w as seeing too much o f  the 
Jaguar side, which i f  you think about it was not too surprising given that I’d got this 
exclusive from Jaguar. 1 remember after one o f  these W aldorf Restaurant m eetings going  
out and seeing David B oole , and Ken G ooding o f  the Financial Tim es cam e up and said 
“H ow are you David?” and D avid, obviously wondering what w as com ing next, said, 
slightly guardedly, “Fine, how  are you?” “Yeah I’m OK, and h ow ’s the Hitler o f  the 
motor industry?” And poor old D avid’s face w as a picture! Egan w as called Sir John Ego 
by a number o f  people. It w as the standard joke. But let’s be realistic about this, John 
Egan was by no means the first or the last egom aniac to run a com pany dow n the tubes.
In business you have to know  your lim itations, and Egan couldn’t possib ly  know his 
limitations, as Egan confessed  to m e afterwards. W hen Hayden cam e in and started 
basically slagging them off, exposing them, w e wrote quite a lot about it. W e didn’t go  
out o f  our w ay to bash John Egan, although w e were pretty disparaging. I got a call from 
David B oole  saying “H e’d like to m eet you because he’s been upset by som e o f  the stu ff 
you ’ve  been writing”. So w e had this discussion. He w as basically asking m e to lay off. I 
said “Look there’s no point in m e flogging a dead horse, so I’m not going  out o f  m y w ay  
to do it, John, but by the sam e token i f  that’s the w ay the new  regim e sees it then I’m 
obviously going to report what they say”, to which he eventually said, plaintively, to me 
“It w asn’t m y fault. I knew  so little about manufacturing”. That’s what he said. “It w asn’t 
m y fault”. But o f  course it w as his fault because he should have recognised that he knew  
nothing about manufacturing, or engineering, or anything else, and got the necessary  
people in. It w as a classic case: the need to ask the question “D o I have the right team?”.
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Transcript of the interview with George Magan on 8th January 2004 
How did you get involved with Jaguar?
B L ’s own advisers, H ill Samuel, had been responsible for the Jaguar float. O f course, 
often in a situation like that you’d have a merchant bank for the parent com pany and one 
for the new ly floated com pany as w ell. That w asn ’t the case here so I w ent to see John 
Egan and had a very good  meeting and that resulted in Jaguar appointing M organ 
Grenfell as its advisors. 1 always got on very w ell with John. It w as very clear that what 
had been floated w as not actually an independent company, it was totally beholden to 
control by BL, including the Board, including all sorts o f  supply contracts, so  he had both 
hands tied behind his back. It was a very d ifficu lt situation. It was som ething o f  an 
upheaval when the Board was changed.
I left Morgan G renfell in the Spring o f  1988 to set up my own investm ent banking 
boutique, Hambros M agan, obviously particularly focusing on corporate advise. John felt 
that he w ould like to continue the relationship with me, to have m e involved , and we both 
felt at that tim e that it w ou ld  best be a jo in t relationship between Hambro M agan and 
Morgan G renfell, although I had the lead role W e were in the Inner Sanctum  with John.
It had becom e clear in 1988 that Jaguar w as in a pretty difficult situation, due to the 
constraints resulting from the BL heritage, the launch o f  the new  car and the investment 
costs o f  that, and the U S Dollar going against Jaguar. In 1988 w e had started the exercise 
looking to see i f  there w as a partner out there w ho would take a m inority stake, and had 
the financial m uscle to be supportive during that difficult phase. It w as pretty clear that 
som e sort o f  external support was going to be necessary. I think that in that final year the 
scale o f  the investm ent w as beginning to look  enormous. Then there w as the downturn in 
the trading. I think the combination o f  the tw o  must have had a deep im pact on the final 
recognition that m aintaining the independence o f  the company w as go in g  to be more 
difficult, but up until that time I w ould say they were very independently-m inded. I think 
the extraneous factors in the last year had a b ig impact. It certainly w asn ’t what w e were 
aim ing for w hen w e  started.
There were d iscu ssions with GM, and I b elieve  a Japanese com pany, and a number o f  
others, but it becam e clear that the tw o m ost likely were GM and Ford. One o f  them had 
$15billion  in Treasury, the other had $12b illion  in Treasury. Both w ere being run by 
motor men. Both com panies were very concerned about the Japanese penetration o f  the 
global luxury market, and both recognised that their own luxury brands, such as Cadillac, 
didn’t travel. What started out as a m inority interest project developed a life o f  its own, 
and developed into a very significant auction. I’d never ever been involved in an auction 
between tw o w orld class com panies. John said afterwards “It’s not a bad price, for 
leather, walnut, and old world charm ”. It w as just as well that Ford w asn ’t able to do any 
due d iligence. John had done a fantastic job . His leadership and charism atic skills in all 
this w as absolutely fundamental.
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Why didn’t they have a Rights Issue? Why did that not happen, because they knew 
they would need a lot of investment?
I’ve no recollection o f  that. It may be because o f  the constraints o f  BL. There was a lot o f  
to-ing and fro-ing over the Golden Share. It m ay be that the company got it wrong. They  
thought the good tim es were going to go  on rolling. I don’t have recollection o f  that 
particular issue. W e must have wrestled with it, and there must have been reasons, good  
or bad, as to w hy it didn’t actually happen. I think John had come to the conclusion that 
he did need an industry partner.
When you came on the scene in 1984 or 198S John Egan was very much into the 
“We have a future as an independent” philosophy. At what point did that change?
I think that must have changed in early 1989 when it really became clear that however  
desirable that course w as going to be they had to have a minority partner o f  real 
substance to provide the muscle and support. In the real world it probably w asn’t going to 
happen. I think, funnily enough, General Motors would have been happier to have done 
that than Ford, but when Ford were starting to say that they wanted to buy the w hole  
company the situation was changed. I can’t remember how that process started. I do 
remember the last Board meeting o f  Jaguar, which lasted 36 hours, although w e used to 
break to go and see either Ford or General Motors. I think that in that last period John 
must have com e to the conclusion that in the real world you can’t be h a lf pregnant; you  
can’t have a Ford or General Motors sitting on a minority stake. You can have your 
autonomy in other w ays. Ford have protected the integrity o f  the marque. They have 
invested hugely in the business. And they created a product which is h ighly acclaim ed. 
But it w asn’t where initially John w as com ing from. It must have been in early 1989 or 
mid 1989 that it really started to be clear that this was going to end up in the hands o f  one  
o f  the big players.
In 1986 they were offered Land Rover. Were you brought in to advise on that?
N ow  that you  say it it rings a bell, but I’d com pletely forgotten it. But I think the answer  
is yes. But I’v e  forgotten what w e did or what happened.
If we go back to the start of your involvement, did you believe that Jaguar did have 
a future as an independent?
I think the answ er is probably yes. I saw  that a lot had been done, and it was obviously  a 
prestigious client to have. I think that what we trying to make sure that they were 
increasingly independent and autonom ous, and not still part o f  the Soviet o f  Leyland. The 
float and the arrangement between the company and BL meant that the board w as  
controlled by BL, the agreements regarding the manufacture o f  various body parts w ere  
tied into BL. M y recollection is that the first thing we were looking at was how  w e made 
it an independent company, how  did w e  finally extract it from BL. Then w e had the 
w hole question o f  the Golden Share, and various other bits and pieces which were
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occupying us at that stage. John h im self w as really “Gung Ho”. You couldn’t be a driving 
force unless you believed you should be independent.
You weren’t long in getting rid of Orr-Ewing and Ray Horrocks, were you?
Horrocks w as very dominant still on the Jaguar Board and was a very strong personality, 
and was still very senior in BL. I suppose that em phasises the point I w as making; that 
the company w asn ’t truly autonomous, and had to finally break free o f  various 
constraints. R eally it shouldn’t have been floated in the way it was, and, interestingly, the 
flotation only had one merchant bank adviser, both for the parent com pany and the 
company being floated. Pretty unusual, or very unusual. I think those issues in those early 
days were the ones that preoccupied us.
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Transcript of the interview with Hamish Orr-Ewing on 14th November 2002 
How did you get involved with Jaguar?
I was known to Ray Horrocks, who w as also an ex-Ford man, but a younger generation.122 
I had made a number o f  com m ents at several CBI conferences at which Ray w as at, 
show ing that (1)1 knew the motor industry extrem ely w ell, (2) 1 had reasonable City 
probity. So, in that sense it looked that, i f  I w as w illing  to do it, I w ould be a good fit as 
Chairman o f  Jaguar. M ore or less out o f  the blue I got a telephone call from Austin Bide, 
who at the tim e w as Chairman o f  Glaxo, and the non-executive Chairman o f  BL, asking  
me for a m eeting. They wanted som eone w ho had in-depth understanding o f  motor 
manufacture, together with a possession which w ould be credible with the City, to 
becom e non-executive Chairman o f  Jaguar w hen it was privatised. 1 perceived it as a job  
in which one w ould be helpful, one would open certain doors which would be unlikely to 
be available to som ebody w ho had never in fact been involved as Chairman o f  a public 
company. I did not know  Ray Horrocks at all w ell. I said “Y es, I’d like to do it”. I did not 
know Egan. I assum ed since he had a good reputation that he would be an effective CEO  
and, since my career w as hands-on m anagem ent rather than a City man who had com e in 
to do som ething, that w e w ould get on w ell, that I w ould not get in his way and run his 
business, and that w e could  do the various things that a good non-executive Chairman 
and an executive CEO need to do together. It w as a role I understood, being a non 
executive director o f  other com panies. This probably was naive and I would probably 
have been much w iser to have said to Austin B ide that I would like notice o f  the question 
and I w ould like the opportunity to fully fam iliarise m y se lf  with Egan and his 
management before I said yes or no.
A lm ost im m ediately, having said yes, 1 found m y se lf  involved in the hurly-burly o f  the 
w hole question o f  Jaguar becom ing a quoted com pany, and I did find that the attitude o f  
BL w as highly proprietorial, and quite a lot o f  people in corporate affairs saw it as their 
show, understandable as it was their subsidiary com pany. I also fairly quickly, having 
met Egan, began to realise I was dealing w ith a man who disliked intensely the w hole BL  
management, not necessarily as people, but he resented the fact that they w ere there at all, 
notwithstanding that they’d given him the job . And I very quickly began to have 
m isgivings as to how  easy he would be to work with. I personally w as not the slightest bit 
ambitious as far as the Jaguar situation w as concerned. I had m y ow n world o f  business.
It w as certainly a nice feather in m y cap, as an additional thing, but it w as not something 
that made any significant difference to m y standard o f  living. M y intention w as to be 
helpful, hopefully  to enjoy it, to m uck in. Y es, certainly to have a substantial say in where 
the com pany w as going, and in the strategy. I felt that Egan, who w as ruthlessly  
ambitious, perceived the thing in a totally different light, perceived m e as being a place­
man o f  BL w ho really w as going to keep Jaguar, although a quoted com pany, as de fa c to  
a subsidiary o f  BL. That was not their intention. However, I thought that with Horrocks’
122 Hamish Orr-Ewing spent nine years working for the Ford Motor Company, the last four years (1959-63) 
as Light Car Planning Manager. In this role he played a major part, under Terence Beckett, in the 
planning and launch of the Ford Cortina in 1962, Ford UK’s most successful model and which, 
according to Wood, contributed half o f Ford UK cars’ profits until the line was discontinued in 1982 
(Wood. Wheels, pi 50). Orr-Ewing then held a similar position at Leyland Motor Corporation, 1963-65, 
before joining Rank Xerox in 1965, becoming executive Chairman o f that company in 1979.
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experience o f  dealing with Jaguar it w ould be an extremely good idea to have him on the 
Board. I therefore asked him to join  the Board. Egan, I’m sure, perceived that as a 
reinforcement o f  his v iew  that he was not go ing  to be allowed to get free from BL. Most 
people are sensitive about their position, their dignity and so on, but Egan w as sensitive  
to a point that w as alm ost pathological. I think he must have spent a very great deal o f  his 
time churning over the anim osities that he felt towards BL because his conversations 
were peppered with unflattering remarks about the individuals, about the com pany, and 
everything else. It m ight have been justified , but it was not said in a justified  and 
analytical sense. So even by the tim e that w e  w ere going through the w h ole  process o f  the 
launch o f  the com pany on the Stock M arket I felt that I was not m aking base with John 
Egan.
The next significant contribution to that relationship was again som ething that w as fairly 
naive on my part. It seem ed to me that i f  Jaguar w as going to be a public com pany it was 
desirable that w e  added to the non executive directors. I said to John Egan that w e should 
have more non executive directors because the company was very short o f  people with 
wider experience. Som ebody who had already been chosen to be a non execu tive director 
was a man called Ken Bond who was the Finance Director o f  Beecham s, and a very 
sound man. He w as not the sort o f  Finance Director that, say, John Barber had been at 
Ford: a power in the land, way outside the finance field. He was more conventional. I 
didn’t feel that w as sufficient, and I said to John Egan that w e should have m ore non 
executives. He did not immediately say no, but it got back to me fairly quickly that he 
was outraged by this and saw the appointment o f  any more non executives as being  
directly intended to undermine his standing. I didn’t see this at the time. It seem ed to me 
at the tim e to be non-controversial, or i f  controversial, then something you w ould discuss. 
I then found out that things were taking place between John Egan and his direct reporting 
line that I w as not being appraised of. T hese w ere substantial issues I w asn ’t being told 
about. Jaguar w as in Coventry, I was fundam entally based in London, and the extent to 
which a non-executive Chairman can contribute depends to a very considerable extent on 
the w illingness o f  the resident CEO in spontaneously providing information, 
spontaneously seek ing to discuss things, and being reasonably w illing to respond to the 
suggestions the Chairman makes, or d iscussion  o f  certain issues. H e did w hatever he 
could to freeze m e out. I know this for a fact. I w as disappointed, and periodically hurt, at 
the cold shoulder I w as getting. To be fair to Egan, he undoubtedly saw  m e as a Trojan 
Horse, put in to  ensure that the w hole th ing remained in the orbit o f  BL. I w as naive in 
my approach to the w hole thing, and I should have known better. Egan w as unnecessarily  
venom ous, for reasons which i f  he had g iven  it more chance he w ould have realised was 
not a cause for concern on his part. The end w as unpleasant.
Ray Horrocks w as in Australia, and there w as a Board meeting at which there w as no 
fairly substantial issue on the agenda. I anticipated that it would be more or less routine. 
When w e sat dow n, Horrocks being aw ay, and, therefore, Egan, having around him a 
majority o f  people on the board, w ithout any prior notice, started in with a prepared 
diatribe which w as that the operating com pany had lost confidence in the Chairman and 
therefore action had to be taken. H e then called  for a vote, and I said “I intend to 
withdraw until y o u ’ve had that vote” . Ted Bond came out o f  the room to w here I was and 
said “What ought w e to do?” I said “D o  whatever your conscience tells you”, and to my 
surprise he voted with the others to rem ove me as Chairman, whereupon I returned. Egan
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made a couple o f  unflattering remarks, and here I fought m y com er. The remarks were 
unnecessary, and they were not even relevant. Then from out o f  the w oodw ork appeared 
the com pany’s lawyers, Coward Chance, w h o had clearly advised, although I think with 
reluctance, because after the meeting the partner concerned came to see m e and said they 
were dism ayed at what had happened, that they  had been acting as they believed  had been 
their duty to their client, but that they had found it very distasteful. They appeared on the 
scene clearly as external witnesses. I asked them  to be explicit as to what they meant by 
saying they had lost confidence in the Chairman, and, o f  course, nobody w ould say. In 
essence it w as a palace revolution. It w asn ’t based on any specific thing, although there 
w as one thing. Then w heeled in were tw o  other senior members o f  m anagement; one the 
present M anaging Director, Beasley, w ho w ere then appointed to the B oard.123 That 
secured for Egan a majority which meant that even when Horrocks cam e back he would 
still have a m ajority to deal with it. There w as a man called David B oole , and it was he 
w ho really built up Egan, and they then proceeded to present me with a statement to 
present to the press. I could either have fought m y comer or challenged it legally. 
H owever, I decided very quickly I w ou ldn’t do that because although em otionally it upset 
me very much, in the bigger picture it d idn’t matter that much, and secondly I was not 
sure I would w in. And never fight battles that you ’re not going to w in. So having 
m odified the press release to some extent 1 agreed to its release. When Ray Horrocks 
cam e back I think he w as disappointed that I hadn’t fought a rearguard action.
M y principal contribution had been to change their merchant bankers because Hill 
Sam uel w as B L ’s. G eorge Magan I knew . H e w as clearly very shrewd. I suggested that 
w e m ove to him , and Egan agreed. What I d idn’t realise was that Egan already had 
contacts with M agan before I came on the scen e. Where I did make a m istake was that I 
arranged with M agan that he come and have dinner with me, and I chatted through the 
w hole Jaguar situation. H ow I was concerned about its long term future. I got Ted Bond 
to com e along to that as well. My thoughts on that were quite sim ply that Jaguar was a 
very small com pany in the motor industry and I could not see that it could generate 
enough cash to maintain the developm ent programme which w ould keep it abreast o f  the 
likes o f  Ford, D aim ler-B enz etc. Therefore, the prospects for the com pany were either to 
grow on its strong share price, which o f  course at the time the share price had increased 
very greatly, or to use the strength o f  the shareprice to acquire things with which Jaguar 
m ight have a natural fit. Land Rover w as one o f  things that I had in mind. Land Rover 
and Jaguar w ere approximately in the sam e scale o f  companies. Com bined it would have 
been possib le to have the same number o f  corporate staffs and thus greatly reduce the 
headcount. It seem ed to me to be a very good  idea. But from the outset I never really 
believed the com pany could remain independent. I always thought that Hill Samuel had 
underplayed things by saying that they cou ld n ’t get the shares underwritten at more than 
165p. I thought it was reasonable for G eorge Magan to go and just look around and make 
a shopping list. A ll this was entirely strategic, entirely provisional. I w ould in all other 
circum stances, had Egan been more friendly, more helpful, had him join  me. But as I felt 
he would have been destructive I decided  to do it on my own. Unquestionably that was a 
fa u x  p a s  for w hich he had every right to  be offended. Magan said to me, just as he was 
leaving, “A t this stage do you want m e to talk to Egan about it or w ould you prefer that 
w e dealt together”. I said “At this stage let’s just get a shopping list, and your thoughts on
123 The other appointee was Kenneth Edwards, the Personnel Director and Company Secretary.
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this, at which point w e’ll bring John in”. M agan immediately told Egan exactly what had 
happened, without telling me he was going to. So, it was a mistake, it should not have 
been done like that, but I personally felt that George Magan behaved very badly. It would 
have been entirely acceptable i f  he’d said h e ’d been thinking about it and couldn’t do it 
without talking to John Egan, and that he thought he ought to do that. I’m sure it incensed 
Egan. He never referred to it directly, but I think it’s that that worked him up to the stage 
o f  doing what I think he was intending to do anyway at a later stage. So that was it. 
Something that I have also learned which I ought to have realised, and frankly it would  
have been very helpful i f  Austin Bide had warned me about it, but I suppose he felt it was 
up to me to find out for m yself, that already Egan had a very close relationship with the 
Prime Minister and saw her regularly, to the extent that really he was able to demand to 
see any Secretary o f  State that he wanted. There’s no doubt that Margaret Thatcher had a 
great antipathy for British Leyland. I am quite sure that she also considered m e to have 
planted there by BL unnecessarily. I think she felt that I had been brought in to keep an 
eye on him, which in fact was true but not in the sense that Egan would have told her. It 
didn’t help that our Prime Minister did not like m e anyway. Chem ically w e didn’t get on, 
and there was a specific thing regarding ICL. Thatcher thought that Rank X erox might 
have taken ICL over, but I was opposed to it, as she had discovered. The tw o things, 
therefore, would have com e together. The Prime Minister would have had no sympathy 
whatsoever for m e w hen she learnt that BL had approached me to take over the 
Chairmanship, and when, as I’m sure he did, John Egan questioned why I should be 
there. Therefore, by the time all this happened I had got strong wind o f  just how  close he 
was to the Prime Minister, and any thought o f  fighting a rearguard action w as highly  
coloured by that knowledge. I wouldn’t have w on anyway.
Did Egan have the backing of the company’s merchant bank, its stockbroker, or any 
of the shareholders, in this?
He certainly had Magan behind him, and M agan was the driving force in the merchant 
bank, so he certainly had them behind him. Magan quite clearly thought, and rightly, that 
the one to back w as Egan, not me, and i f  there w as going to be any problem he was going  
to go straight to Egan and tell him what w as going on. So, without a doubt, Magan had 
advised Egan that i f  he got rid o f  his Chairman it wouldn’t cause any real problem with 
the market. A t Cazenove, Jaguar’s stockbroker, the senior partner at the tim e w as Forbes. 
I’d met him on previous occasions, and w hen this occurred I rang him. He said “Yes, I 
knew it was com ing. Egan rang m e a couple o f  days ago to tell me what he had in mind. 
It’s not the sort o f  thing we would get involved in unless we thought it was going to do 
great dam age to the share price”. H e said “Egan is a very dangerous man”. He asked me 
what I was going to do about, and I said “N othing”. He said “I think you ’re very w ise”. 
The last thing that occurred was at a subsequent meeting at which m ost o f  the Secretaries 
o f  State were present. Norman Tebbitt, w ho I’d met on a number o f  occasions, came over 
to me and said “Thank you very much for not causing a fuss over that. It would have 
been embarrassing for us, for reasons that you can probably understand”. So that is the 
human relations side o f  the story.
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Whilst Egan is not a particularly likeable man, I think he’s paranoid, and I think that he’s 
not a particularly good businessman, and very overrated, he nonetheless did have great 
loyalty within the Jaguar staff. A tough customer, and when he said something would be 
done it happened. After years o f  very woody management, Egan arrives on the scene; 
strong personality, forthright, no nonsense, and did hugely raise their morale. He was a 
very naive man oddly enough. He sincerely believed that Jaguar would be able to remain 
indefinitely an independent company. What prompted him to believe that was that at the 
time the company w as floated the exchange rate with the Dollar was about 1.35 to the 
£ .124 That meant that the flow  o f  cash from the US, the world’s biggest market, after a 
considerable revival o f  the product’s fortunes in the US, again to Egan’s credit because o f  
his ability to promote the company as a new and different business, was arriving in 
bucketloads, and Egan had no real idea o f  how that could change. He was not particularly 
well-informed on the motor industry. He had not been through it in the way, for example, 
that I had before. Ford w as the best business alma m ater anyone could have. There was a 
very, very deep understanding o f  how the industry worked, o f  what counted. People at 
quite junior levels were deeply involved in all the financial parameters which would 
justify a programme. C osts were understood in great depth. They were also discussed 
through a w ide spectrum o f  middle and junior management. The level o f  business 
confidentiality to external companies was high, but internally things that many, many 
businesses kept wrapped up, and therefore were talked about by only a very small 
number, were the subject o f  everyday meetings, discussions etc, and we all learned very 
thoroughly exactly what made the company tick, what its key factors were etc. Egan had 
never been through that sort o f  discipline, and I think he believed, because there was no 
doubt he had a charismatic ability to motivate people, that it would be perfectly possible 
to generate enough cash to develop new products which would not only keep pace with 
people like Daim ler-Benz and BM W , but maybe gradually dominate them. And that was 
not just a sales pitch; that is what he believed. On one occasion I remember Ted Bond, 
Egan, and I were standing together, talking about the whole question o f  the company’s 
future development, and Ted Bond said “W ell, w e have to bear in mind that at some time 
in the not too distant future w e may need a Rights Issue to raise enough funds”. Egan said 
“W e’ll never need a Rights Issue!” Ted, I remember, said “I’ll remind you o f  that one day 
in the future”. O f course, the company was very nearly bankrupt by the time that Ford 
bought it. It was in a financially desperate state. A  great deal o f  the alleged improvement 
in the product w as actually public relations, not reality. It was within months o f  
liquidation. The decision to buy Jaguar was not based on any objective judgements at all. 
There was com petition between Ford and GM. GM was pussy-footing around, and A lex  
Trotman was asked by Poling to secure the deal. I know that Trotman was appalled by 
this.125 He saw it as a total waste o f  money. In 1992 Trotman succeeded Poling as 
Chairman o f  Ford worldwide and came to the conclusion that two things could be done. 
One, Jaguar as an entity could be wiped-out, the name be used for badge engineering, or 
having paid all that m oney, having invested many times more than that sum, be used to 
produce a viable company o f  up-market cars, which Ford essentially didn’t have.
124 The exchange rate during August 1984, the month of Jaguar’s flotation, fluctuated between $1.327 and 
$1.308 to the Pound.
125 Or-Ewing was Trotman’s first boss when the latter joined Ford in the late 1950s, and the two retained a 
good relationship until Trotman’s death in 2005.
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Where did the impetus for flotation come from?
I suspect there is no clear answer to that. M y v iew  is that Egan, having becom e Jaguar’s 
M anaging Director, with the help o f  David B oo le  put the company on the map. It becam e  
highly visib le. A ll sorts o f  stuff was being promoted about the new world o f  quality, new  
approaches to this, that, etc. I think the Prime M inister was most anxious to have 
successful privatisations o f  things which w ere not just electricity com panies. Egan was  
nothing if  not a pusher. He had, I think, the opportunity o f  meeting her, and the genesis o f  
a quoted com pany arose from his desire to do that because it would give him a personal 
platform, and her desire to see something like a m otor manufacturer which had been in 
public control flourish, and become a new  entirely enlightened manufacturing entity. I 
think that w as the background to it. I do not believe it had too much to do with the BL  
side. I don’t think they w ould have done this. I w o n ’t say that they were actively  
reluctant, but they certainly would not have gone the privatisation route unless they had 
had very good reason to do so from external pressure. I think essentially Egan built the 
image. Margaret Thatcher saw him as really som e sort o f  incarnation o f  the British 
version o f  the Am erican dream, and saw her ow n am bitions being realised by it.
And when it started going wrong she dropped it like a hot potato?
That was not surprising. She supported it as long as it w as highly credible and trouble- 
free, and could be held up as an example o f  what free enterprise could achieve once it 
was freed from the shackles o f  nationalisation. It began to need m oney, and therefore the 
only way that could be achieved was to let the Golden Share go by the board and let the 
other interested com panies com e in and take it over. A s soon as the thing started to turn 
sour I’m sure the governm ent didn’t want to know anything about it at all. But that’s 
characteristic.
Who provided the impetus for the appointment of the non-executive Chairman?
Probably a com bination o f  Austin Bide, Ray Horrocks, and David Andrew s.126 There 
were a number o f  people on the board o f  BL who thoroughly disliked Egan. Ray 
Horrocks appointed Egan, it w as not Michael Edwardes. I w ould say that it would have 
been a consensus o f  opinion o f  the non executive and executive directors o f  BL to do 
this. That w as the im pression I w as given. Austin was a cautious man. Why me? I think 
that was unquestionably Ray Horrocks and David Andrews, because they knew enough 
about me to know  that I w as steeped in the industry, but also had m oved out o f  it and 
could therefore be a credible appointment. I think it was a BL rearguard action to say that 
to let Egan loose on a public com pany would have been irresponsible, so w e’ll find a 
Chairman w ho can calm things down. In that I didn’t serve them w ell.
126 David Andrews was BL’s Executive Director responsible for BL’s Truck and Bus operations 
worldwide, and Land Rover.
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Did Egan understand that the Chairman is there to represent the interests of the 
shareholders?
It would absolutely not be part o f  Egan’s temperament. Jaguar w as his property. 
Absolutely. Totally. Shareholders were things that happened as it were. He never had the 
kind o f  conversations that indicated that w e ’ve got to be quite sure that shareholders feel 
comfortable; w e ’ve got to  be careful to reassure the shareholders before w e  do this that 
etc. N ever anything like that. He was an intensely egocentric man.
What did you think of the management team at Jaguar?
By the standards that I w as used to in X erox they were very ordinary people. Jim Randle, 
the engineering director, an extrem ely nice man, was terrified o f  Egan, as they all were. 
He w as a very good conceptual engineer, but not particularly good at getting things done.
I alw ays felt that the spring w as only  half wound out. I couldn’t really m ake any 
com m ents on M ike Beasley. The Finance Director at the time, John Edwards, I would say 
was a small com pany accountant. H e very much fancied him self, but he w as a very 
ordinary sort o f  fellow . David B o o le  I didn’t take to at all because he w as the creator o f  
Egan, and, o f  course, he briefed against me. He really was not a man that 1 w as able to 
relate to at all. He was Egan’s Svengali. I doubt whether Egan w ould have reached the 
position that he did i f  it hadn’t been for David Boole. Egan was in m any w ays quite a 
naive man, and whatever else  B o o le  w as he was not naive, and Egan gave him total 
license to do more or less anything he wanted. The Company Secretary, Kenneth 
Edwards, w as a very ordinary man. I think Garel Rhys at the tim e m ade the comment that 
Jaguar w as a one-m an company w ith no substantial management back-up, which pissed  
them o f f  no end, but he was absolutely right. I think all experiences are worthwhile. It 
didn’t actually do m e any harm because I kept my head down. I d idn’t try to fight it. It 
sim ply w as a nine-day wonder. H ow ever, it was altogether a couple o f  unpleasant years. 
The sort o f  thing that made it so d ifficu lt w as when the Queen M other was visiting  
Jaguar. Egan carefully kept m e from know ing that. Another little exam ple o f  the lack o f  
generosity w as that when Sir W illiam  Lyons died, Egan carefully arranged that all the 
seats in the front o f  the church for the funeral had names on them and left mine off. So 
petty! And it is true that I took the jo b  with the intention o f  being entirely helpful and 
friendly. I w as used to non-executive positions. I was taken aback by the hostility I 
encountered, but one has to see it in the context o f  how Egan w ould have perceived it. He 
saw m e as a plant, and that I invited Horrocks onto the board reinforced that view . He 
wanted to be seen to have sole control.
Did you have any idea of just how bad it was at Jaguar?
N o, not when I joined the Board. I very rapidly discovered that the business was a legacy  
o f  a genius master builder [Lyons], and up to the late 1960s a m otor car was sufficiently  
straightforward that a small com pany dominated by a very industrious and ingenious 
man, backed by som e first class first line reporting, was perfectly capable o f  holding its 
own in the marketplace. D evelopm ent costs were not that high. Jaguar was able to 
generate enough cash during that period to pay for its own developm ent. Lyons knew
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quite w ell that motor manufacturing w as not going to continue on that scale. So he sold it 
to Stokes127, w ho was the worst industrialist that this country had ever had the misfortune 
to experience. Lyons had run the com pany on a shoestring. If you went through its main 
m achining operations for m achining engine cylinder blocks, cylinder heads, gear boxes, 
all heavy bits, this w as being done literally on rigs, adaptations o f  standard m achine tools  
in m ost cases, and many o f  those extrem ely old. There was virtually no purposely  
designed m achine tools to do special jobs. That w as a perfectly sensible w ay o f  going  
about it at that time; it was inexpensive, it w as highly flexible. Where Jaguar ran into 
trouble was when the era o f  electronics appeared and suddenly a new  world opened up: 
engine m anagem ent system s, A B S braking system s etc. These became hugely expensive  
to develop, and required skills which sim ply did not exist in that sort o f  com pany. So, 
what had really happened in Jaguar by the tim e I got there was that they sim ply had not 
addressed that problem. I don’t think Egan had realised how  w oefully lacking they were 
in capacity to build that sort o f  thing. I don ’t think he had the analytical capacity to coldly  
and quietly assess the situation in the com pany w hich he was in. I believe his ego w as  
such as to believe that all that was detail, and that with his ability anything could be 
achieved, which is admirable in som e respects, but not when you’re in a com pany like 
Jaguar which really w as on its knees. Ironically enough, the products built during Egan’s 
era were in m any respects the most unreliable and unsatisfactory throughout the history 
o f  the com pany. That is not what the public w as told, but it was the reality.
The build up o f  the im age o f  Jaguar by David B oo le  as a study o f  rebuilding a com pany’s 
public im age w as absolutely masterly but it had a serious backlash, and it is som ething  
that one could look into because everybody had been told that Jaguar was now  a 
com pletely different business with new  vision  o f  quality control, new  participation by the 
workforce, pride, new  product at the forefront o f  technology etc. That turned out not to be 
the case, and there was som e very serious disillusion, particularly in the U S where the 
new  “big cat” actually turned out to be very unreliable. A s a study in the promotion o f  a 
business w ithout actually altering the product it w as unquestionably a very major 
achievem ent. Whether it was the right w ay to do things I don’t know. But Egan rebuilt 
the image o f  Jaguar that had nothing to do w ith the change o f  the product. It worked, 
there’s no doubt about it. Jaguar w as suddenly heralded as this new sparkling business 
producing different products with an industrial philosophy which was radically altering 
everything. M otoring journalists and politicians all believed it. It is astonishing to m e that 
it was so successful. I’ve not known anyone else  w h o ’s been able to take a company  
which fundam entally had not been changed at all. He did manage to put the company on 
the map in a w ay that I would have thought w as im possible.
127 Sir Donald Stokes, created Baron Stokes in 1969, was Chairman o f the Leyland Motor Corporation from 
1963 to 1968, and Chairman and Managing Director of BL from 1968 to 1975.
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Could they have solved a number of problems through raising funds through a 
rights issue?
Y es, but w hilst they could have had a Rights Issue and raise a substantial am ount, I doubt 
that they had the m anagem ent ability to use the money. I also doubt whether Egan would  
have had the ability to mastermind that. There was an ego problem here. Y o u ’ve got to 
have a strategic plan, worked out in great detail, stick to it, and that requires having a 
staff o f  very high calibre. N one o f  the people at Jaguar that I met had the skill.
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Transcript of the interview with Roger Putnam on 23rd November 2006 
What was your background with Jaguar?
I joined Jaguar in 1982 from Lotus. I’d been at Lotus for sixteen years. John Egan got me 
out o f  Lotus, initially to be Sales and M arketing Director. But then he had N eil Johnson 
im posed on him for that role, so I was told, and I w as asked if  I would still com e because 
even at that tim e N eil had made it a condition o f  his jo in ing that he had a long term  
ambition to go back into the army. I w as quite keen to get out o f  Lotus at the tim e  
because in sixteen years there I’d learned a trem endous amount from Colin Chapm an128; 
an interesting man, but i f  you went for a country w alk with him you’d end up clim bing  
Everest! I w as looking to get back into the mainstream motor industry rather than be with  
a com pany which had to kick-start every morning. I’d been global sales and marketing 
director there for the last eight years. I got headhunted in to do the sales and marketing  
role at Jaguar. I think because o f  N e il’s BL background, Ray Horrocks kinda forced him  
on John, so  John told m e. I’m still a very good friend o f  John’s. N eil w asn’t John’s 
choice, but John had his arm twisted. John wanted som eone w ho would stay the long  
term, not disappear back into the army. Anyway, N eil cam e in and spent an awful lot o f  
time dow n here in London with his army connections. He w as the first Territorial officer  
to take com m and o f  a London regiment. He was very keen to do that. He comm anded the 
Third Battalion The Royal Green Jackets for four years. H e left Jaguar under a cloud. 
John and he fell out. N eil left ju st as the XJ40 was being launched, the m ost important 
event post-privatisation, so  John w asn’t at all pleased. And then, N eil and I were in 
reverse roles for about s ix  m onths; I took his role and he took  m ine. I had a very odd title 
which had m ore to do w ith the fact that they kinda wanted m e in, with status there, 
waiting to  take over. I w as Director, Marketing and UK  Operations. I had global 
marketing because N eil had no marketing experience, but I had from my Lotus days. 
Within tw o  and a half years I’d taken over N eil’s role, and stayed there for another 
twenty.
How was the marketing function at Jaguar organised?
Under BL  Jaguar had lost its entire sales and marketing UK  based operations. It was all 
sucked in to  BL under Trevor Taylor. I was brought in to build up the freestanding sales 
and m arketing function to take Jaguar private again. North A m erica was always totally  
independent because they’d actually survived the BL period as a total entity under 
Graham W hitehead, although M ike D ale was effectively running it. Graham was a kind 
o f  a figurehead at that stage. M ike D ale survived the Ford take-over. The marketing 
structure w as really international rather than global. The U S , after the rigors o f  BL, kinda 
declared U D I and ran very independently. They used to call Brow ns Lane “the fucktory”. 
They hated it. The only person th ey ’d take any instruction from w as John.
128 Colin Chapman. Founder and Chairman, Lotus Cars. The company was founded in 1955, and was listed 
on the London Stock Exchange in 1968. Chapman passed away in December 1982.
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How did the U S forecast sales? From dealers, or from some sort of independent 
analysis?
Both. O f course the dealers ran the US business, rather than the other w ay around. The 
Dealer Council was im m ensely, im m ensely pow erful, and still are. They throw their 
w eight around, and did so very much then. So i f  they were hot the forecasts w ould go up , 
but i f  they turned o f f  the forecasts w ould plum m et down to the ground. N o  one foresaw, I 
don’t think, how  successful the Series III w ould end up to be: the car that really prepared 
Jaguar financially for flotation. The Pound w as very weak at the time. It alm ost reached 
parity in 1984. It meant double incom e com ing in through currency. The Treasury 
worked for John Edwards and did the m ost incredible job  o f  hedging dollar incom e. That 
contributed enorm ously to Jaguar’s profits, 1985 through 1988. O f the £120m illion  peak 
profit that Jaguar made, £80m illion  was currency, and the rest o f  the profit cam e from the 
non-US market. Just after the Ford take-over they separated out the incom e and profit 
streams from the US and m y markets (at that stage the US w as still independent), and 
they could see Jaguar’s performance in the U S w as appalling. Overall w e were breaking 
even. I w as m aking about $200m illion, and the US w as losing $200m illion.
What were the underlying causes?
Currency had gone wrong, and they [Jaguar U S] were spending 17%-18% o f  the margin 
value o f  each car on w hat they called variable marketing, which I’d never heard of, which  
effectively  w as putting m oney in the boot.129 M y first m eeting with B ill Hayden, m y first
129 When Mike Dale was asked about this he responded as follows in an e-mail to the author on 16 May 
2008: “Roger has the number right, but his timing and understanding o f how we used the money are 
wrong. At the time o f the Ford transaction we had already talked the Board into bringing the 1990 
model XJ40 into the US with better equipment and held the price by reducing both the factory and the 
dealer margin (20% down to 18%). This was to offset the introduction o f the Lexus which really 
exposed the XJ40’s high pricing. For approximately 12 months it worked well, but the quality issues 
were really dragging us down and market research showed that approximately 85% o f the luxury buyers 
would not even go into our showrooms because the quality was so public. We had to find an innovative 
way o f getting people back into our cars, which, with Ford’s management, had actually improved 
quality by the 1992 model year to average levels for the industry (J D Power Five Year Report). The 
answer was SuperLease. This was a lease that had a tag on the advertising that said if  you were 
dissatisfied for any reason in the first 30 days you could bring the car back and we would refund all your 
money, including taxes. It also paid for everything except gas and oil for the duration o f the lease. This 
meant we had removed the responsibility o f cost from the customer and was a bold statement about our 
faith in the quality improvement. It worked well and brought us our first move upwards in volume 
(40%) which was vital for the production line to keep the quality improvements going upwards. We 
were the only market that could give this kind o f rapid volume increase and, you could argue, the US 
saved the UK’s arse once again. Leasing had the added advantage that, unlike putting money in the 
trunk, it didn’t advertise our retail price weakness because all the customer saw was the monthly lease 
payment. The snag was the lease required us to guarantee a residual value at the same percentage as our 
competitors in order to achieve a competitive lease payment. This is where Roger’s 17%/l 8% comes 
from, and the improvement in this situation over the next eight years was the major driver o f getting 
Jaguar in the US back into profitability. Volume and warranty costs together were less than 50% o f the 
profit improvement. By 1999 a three year old Jaguar sedan coming off lease was worth over 9,000 
dollars more than the same model in 1992. In the beginning we had to provide that 9,000 dollars in order 
to be competitive on our lease. It was quite biblical really. The factory had to pay for its quality sins 
rather than the customer.”
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presentation, I took him through all m y marketing plans, costs and so on. “OK” he said, 
“where have you hidden the variable marketing costs?” What is variable marketing? O f  
course in luxury selling in Europe the w h ole  basis o f  the sale is getting a premium, not 
actually putting m oney in the boot to get rid o f  the product, to get the supply/dem and  
right. But, o f  course, the Am ericans, and volum e car manufacturers, don’t understand 
that. It’s all about m oving metal at w hatever cost, and hoping you’ve got marginal profits 
at the end o f  it.
What was the impact of the 1987 Stockmarket Crash on Jaguar?
I don’t know. I think the quality hit the U S very hard. Very, very hard. And the US  
dealers were not prepared to go the extra m ile they were in Europe to look after the 
custom ers.130
What were the main problems with the XJ40 in terms of the quality?
Suspension. Electrics. General disappointm ent with the “Tokyo by N ight” display on the 
dashboard. But there were a lot o f  problem s with the suspension for the U S.
I think that i f  the truth were told it w as a com bination o f  design faults, the car w asn’t 
properly engineered, there were som e issues with the rear suspension w hich w eren’t 
resolved until som e tim e later. In the UK  and Europe w e were able to maintain premiums 
with dealers w ho w ent to the final nth degree to make sure customers w ere looked after, 
even when they were having constant problem s.131 Dealers made a fortune. It w as 
probably the m ost profitable franchise in the UK, although not in Europe because the 
volum e w asn’t big enough. It went up to about 15,000 units from 3 ,000  w hen I joined. 
The US dealers were a very fickle bunch. I think w e created a m indset at that time; they  
w eren’t m aking m illions, and they w ere very unhappy. They kicked up very much.
What was the impact of John Egan on the US?
Without any doubt, one o f  John E gan’s greatest achievem ents when he first took over 
was actually getting the US dealers’ confidence restored. He gave M ike D ale the 
confidence to go out and get the dealers to place their support. And John w ould always 
turn som ersaults for the US market because he realised that i f  they did turn against us it 
would be very tough to overcom e. John’s marketing ability w as very high. John left the 
rest o f  the world pretty much to m e.
130 This view is bitterly disputed by Mike Dale, who commented to the author in an e-mail on 9 May 2008: 
“Consider the dealer situation in the US. Enormous commitments had been made by the majority o f 
them in facilities. Why would they not go the ‘extra mile’ to defend their own money? Many of them 
went bankrupt. It was a terrible personal tragedy for them”. See also Appendix footnote 107, page 74.
131 Roger Putnam added in a telephone conversation on 18 July 2007 with the author: “We’d got the XJ40 
absolutely flying away in the UK, and the last thing we wanted to do was to see a big ‘ho-ha’ about the 
quality getting out. We were actually quietly tackling the quality without making a big noise that might 
play when they brought over the US dealers. And the US had this list o f 101 problems - th e  ‘101 
Dalmatians’. There were a mixture o f issues that were specific to the US, and the fact is that we were 
handling it in a much quieter way in the UK so as to not actually rock the boat. The UK market is the 
biggest pushover in the world, not just cars, but anything”.
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What about the UK Dealers?
I inherited som e 300 dealerships under BL, g iving away 15 cars each. If you took the 
demonstrators out, there’d be virtually no cars sold . We started in 1982, and by 1986 it 
was settling down at 100 cars per dealer at full margin. The dealer network had com e  
down to just over 100, so I wasn’t the m ost popular man with the dealer group.1321 
actually reduced H en lys133 down to 3 from 22 outlets. By 1988 w e had 111 dealers selling  
an average 130 cars each. We took the dealer margin down, something I borrowed from  
Lotus. We were g iv ing  them 17.5%, and took that back down to 15%, and put 2.5%  into a 
big pot, and those dealers w ho were prepared to invest took money out o f  this fund. It 
caused all sorts o f  squawks. That was the incentive, the wooden ratchet, to get the dealers 
to invest. And those dealers that didn’t want to invest went. Lookers134, for exam ple, 
w ouldn’t invest so w e parted company, on a friendly basis. And for 10 years the dealers 
made a lot o f  m oney in the UK. Pendragon, for exam ple. Trevor Finn was a huge 
supporter. He built one o f  the first showcase dealerships in Derby. It typified our new  
corporate identity. John generally left me alone to get on with it. He came down to my 
office late one evening and said “I’ve just had George Turnbull135 on the phone. I 
understand you’ve threatened to fire Inchcape. You must let them o f f ’. I said “Sorry, my 
apologises, I haven’t done it yet. Look, we need to get them in shape. There are som e  
very poor players out there, they’re destroying the ability to get others to invest in proper 
showroom s which is the key problem w e have. I’ll reach an agreement with you. I have 
to go down a very long plank and take on some very big other com panies to get them to 
do this stuff. If you ’re happy with that stand on the end o f  the plank then fine, but i f  you 
want to get o f f  let m e know  and I’ll com e back”. And after that I took on C ow ies.136 
C ow ies wanted to buy A ppleyards.137 Unfortunately, C ow ies w as being represented by 
Hambro Magan w ho were also our advisers. So George M agan rang John and said “Your 
man has threatened C ow ies that they can’t buy Appleyards”. In those days manufacturers 
had tremendous pow er as to w ho could represent them. “H e can’t do that, it’s probably 
against Stock Exchange rules”. “N on sense” said John. Again it w as late one evening, 
about seven o ’clock, when John cam e down to my office. H e said “I’ve just had George 
Magan on the phone. What are you doing?” I said “I had Ian Appleyard on the phone 
about an hour ago. He told me that h e’s got a hostile approach from C ow ies. I told him
132 Roger Putnam added in a telephone conversation on 18 July 2007 with the author: “Although Neil 
Johnson was talking to the dealers about rationalisation at the end o f 1981, nothing actually happened 
until I got a grip on it in the middle o f 1982. In fact, not one had been fired between 1981 and the end o f 
1982. We had 302 dealers when I joined, and over the next four/five years we got it down to 120. It cost 
us nothing. I think we had one dealer who half-heartedly threatened to sue, but that didn’t get anywhere. 
They didn’t have the degree o f protection they had in the US, and it was done with great goodwill”.
133 Henlys at the time was a major publicly quoted motor distributor, operating largely in London and the 
south east. Henlys was hailed as having been the “biggest single external influence” in the initial 
development o f what became Jaguar Cars, ordering 500 cars, to be delivered at the rate of 20 per week, 
in 1928 (Whyte. Jaguar. pp44,55).
134 Lookers was a quoted motor distribution group, operating largely in the Manchester/Lancashire area.
135 George Turnbull was Chairman of Inchcape Pic, probably the single largest motor distribution group in 
the UK at that time.
136 Cowie Group was a quoted Sunderland-based motor distribution group with a large car leasing business.
137 Appleyards was a Yorkshire-based quoted motor distribution group. Ian Appleyard, the Chairman, was a 
former Jaguar rally driver, and former son-in-law of Sir William Lyons.
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‘Don’t worry about it, he can’t do anything’”. It got back. Cow ie got hold o f  Magan, said 
‘Get hold o f  Egan’, but in the end C ow ies didn’t get Appleyards.
How big was the marketing organisation in Jaguar at the time?
Tiny, absolutely tiny. Probably tw elve people in the marketing function itself. In the first 
two years o f  Egan a lot o f  the number crunching, market analysis, and so on, w as still 
being done by BL, and then Joe Greenwell, w ho finished up with us as Chairman o f  
Jaguar, came out o f  BL to jo in  us. A guy called Phil Wade took over the market analysis 
side, and Joe Greenwell worked for him, and w e had our own marketing services function 
which was the function which changed the core identity, started all the advertising, dealer 
events on a global basis. It w as a very tight tiny function. It’s even bigger now  even  
though Jaguar’s doing relatively poorly. Under the Ford regime it grew like topsy. It’s 
becom e a m assive bureaucracy.
What about the grey market in Germany in 1985? Weren’t there cars going into 
Germany and out the back door to the States?
I’m afraid German dealers in the luxury sector have alw ays been m assive grey marketers 
if  there’s a shortage. I guess it’s a weakness on the part o f  British manufacturers to look  
at the size o f  the local German market and always plan a much bigger share than they 
could actually achieve. And therefore they always over-supplied the German market to 
meet that share expectation. The easiest way to get rid o f  that share is to actually sell it 
somewhere else, particularly i f  the market’s soft. It’s always been a problem. If  they  
weren’t supplying the States the German dealers were supplying somewhere else. When 
Italy was very hot in the m iddle o f  the 1990s for the S-type, the number o f  S-types that 
were flooding into Italy from Germany was m assive. The reason that BM W  and 
Mercedes own m ost o f  their distribution in Germany is that the German dealers are a law  
unto themselves.
We could never actually get any firm data from the States. The cars were acceptable in 
the States i f  the custom ers imported them them selves. The Am ericans would scream their 
heads o ff  about cars flooding in. W e’d say “G ive us the numbers and w e ’ll get on to it”, 
but we could never find enough vehicles to make a big case, so it went on and on while 
w e were desperately trying to find out who the perpetrators were, and o f  course there’s 
nothing legally you can do to stop them, other than to stop supply, which is what w e did 
in the end. But, o f  course, in terms o f  planning you’re buying inventory which is unique 
to the German product, so you’ve got an eight-month cycle  there before you can even  
stop it, building German cars whether you want to or not.
How much input did the marketing department have into future product planning?
Clive Ennos took over from Jim Randle. C live did more to break down silos in 
engineering than anyone. H e’s dead now , sadly. He was a great addition to Jaguar; one o f  
the few  Ford guys who came in and really made a difference. Jim Randle ran the 
engineering function as a fiefdom . He w as like a jack-in-the box: from time to time h e’d 
pop up, and then the lid would go down again. Clive Ennos did his very best to make sure
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the barriers, the Chinese walls, cam e dow n. Y ou then had heavyweight, co-located, cross­
functional team s, but that didn’t happen until Ford bought the company. The X J220 was 
an absolutely unmitigated disaster138, and it w as C live who actually picked up the pieces 
and had to live with it for about five years, trying to get the remaining cars away. It w as a 
com pletely unauthorised project. Engineering should have been focusing on the F-type, 
but they w ere playing around with the XJ220. There w asn’t quite the process and 
discipline in place to make sure that engineering were doing what they should have been 
doing. The reason that Jaguar didn’t have d iesels for such a long time was that to the 
engineering guys it w asn’t sexy .139
Were there frequent shouting matches between Jim Randle and John Egan?
N o. John didn’t like confrontation. That John got angry, which he could do, certainly.
One o f  John’s problem s w as that he didn’t like confrontation.
What about the potential take-over of Land Rover in 1986/87?
I actually voted for it at the Executive Com m ittee, but it w as Jim Randle and Graham 
W hitehead w ho were against it the most. Jim certainly didn’t want to share engineering. 
He probably knew  that the engineering function at Land R over was better than Jaguar’s. 
John needed convincing about it, and Graham as the spokesm an for 50% o f  the business 
carried a lot o f  w eight. I think Graham genuinely believed , having been set up by M ike 
Dale, that it w ould take too much management tim e. They knew  that they already had 
problems with the XJ40. The interesting thing w as I’d actually been head-hunted by Land 
Rover just as I jo ined  Jaguar. I told John Egan because at that tim e w e were part o f  the 
sam e com pany -  BL. I’d still got som e contacts w ithin Land Rover, so I knew this was 
likely to com e up and tipped John that som ething m ight happen, and he put it to the 
Board [E xecutive Com m ittee], and Randle and W hitehead w ere the tw o w ho were m ost 
vociferous. I w as very much for it because from a distribution point o f  v iew  w e still had a 
lot o f  shared interests w ith Land Rover from the old BL arrangements. It w ould have 
given us critical m ass.
How was John Egan as a boss?
He just let m e get on with it. He w as a great delegator as far as I was concerned, and 
actually he has been very kind to m e since then. He never, ever, interfered, unlike N ick  
Scheele or B ill Hayden. Hayden, actually, in hindsight, did an awful lot to protect Jaguar
138 The XJ220 was built by JaguarSport, a joint venture between Jaguar and Tom Walkinshaw Racing. 
According to Thorley (Jaguar The Complete Works) the initial selling price was £350,000, with a 
deposit o f  £50,000 per car being demanded. Production commenced in 1991. Dymock (The Jaguar 
File. p70) states that a production run o f 220 was undertaken, with a provision to go up to 350 cars. In 
the event, “the 350 ‘firm orders’ evaporated, some in acrimony over deposits, and only 280 XJ220s 
were ever made”. According to Dymock the price achieved was £290,000.
139 When asked in a telephone conversation with the author on 18 July 2007 about the reason why the 
Italian VM diesel engine was not employed by Jaguar, as once announced by Jaguar, Putnam 
commented that that engine was “a ‘dog’. It was very ‘agricultural’, and Jaguar just couldn’t put it in its 
cars”.
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from the Ford culture, and was strong enough to do that. His credibility with Red Poling 
and the senior guys in Dearborn w as such that he carried a lot o f  weight. Scheele was 
seen as a bit o f  a m averick in Ford and didn’t quite have the credibility to protect us, 
although he did his very best. Poling was B ill’s mentor. The Ford system  works on being 
very close to your boss. Y ou could be the w orst manager in the world, but i f  you ’re close  
to your boss you ’re protected. A s the only Ford Chairman not to have been a “Fordy” I 
had the great ability to see  things from a little bit outside o f  the company.
How did you view labour relations and the managerial/worker interface?
I’d com e from a non-union environment. A s soon as I joined Jaguar I w as astonished how  
w e had to, not bow  and scrape, but certainly get c lo se  to the convenors and so on. That 
w as a personal observation. But having said that, the workforce were absolutely brilliant 
-  the number o f  v isitors I took round couldn’t believe how  friendly the workforce was, 
how  keen the workers w ere to talk to outsiders -  not run forklift trucks at them as they 
w ould in Longbridge. I never personally experienced the hostile environment at 
Longbridge, but peop le  used to tell me it was awful. A t Brow ns Lane the relationship 
with the workforce w as absolutely amazing. Generally I think w e achieved a huge 
amount. Bill Hayden cam e in and wooed the workforce by making his famous Gorky 
statement about B row ns Lane, which was actually aim ed more at them than for outside 
consum ption. Bill had never been in a role like that o f  Chairman. He had never been in 
that spot. Ford w as very, very inward focused, so he could make that comment; making it 
to journalists. He hadn’t seen the huge value to a journalist o f  what he’d said. He was 
actually talking to the w orkforce when he said it. And o f  course Trotman made that 
fam ous statement about there being nothing wrong with Brow ns Lane that a bulldozer 
cou ldn’t fix. We w ere actually building the XJ-S and the saloon on the flow line track that 
B ill Lyons had bought second-hand from the Standard M otor Company in the 1950s!
Why wasn’t more Capital Expenditure put into the factory?
John had an absolutely  im possible task. The company w as floated and the government 
pocketed the m oney. Jaguar w as floated with its cashflow , and a half-developed new  
m odel, so our job  w as to m ake m oney and satisfy the City. M ake m oney to pay a 
dividend, find enough m oney to put into a new product. Therefore, capital expenditure 
for new plant, substantial plant, just w asn’t available. And as things got tighter post-1986, 
currency w ent w rong for us. Even though w e were getting the benefit o f  hedging w e were 
alw ays looking at the period after the hedging, what would happen then.
But you had a £75million Design Centre and an outmoded assembly line?
I think you w ould have had to have seen where Engineering resided -  in sheds at the back 
o f  Browns Lane -  to understand that they couldn’t stay there.
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How did you view Jaguar’s relations with the City?
Neither John Egan or John Edwards had been in a public company before. I actually 
came from a tiny public company. Fd actually got som e public company experience.
Both Johns had com e from M assey Ferguson. They’d both been in com panies where 
they’d never really had any financial responsibility. John Egan has told me many times 
“w e did our best” . John has gone on to be very successful with virtually everything he’s 
set his hands to. H e transformed B A A  without a doubt. John went through a very bad 
period after he left Jaguar. He and the Jaguar brand were joined at the hip, and he found it 
very hard to com e to terms with the fact that he w asn’t any longer in charge o f  Jaguar. 
H e’s long past that now . H e did a lot o f  self-analysis. H is conclusion was that w e were 
very vulnerable, w e did our best with what w e had to hand, and w e thought up a totally 
competitive w orldw ide dealer network, which was as good as BM W  or M ercedes at that 
time because o f  the w ay in w hich w e were able to get customer satisfaction ratings, when 
the product itse lf  w as less than good. But w e did have generally an enormous loyalty to 
the product and the brand com ing out o f  a dreadful background like BL.
But had a lot of the problems at Jaguar merely been exacerbated by BL, and 
actually originated in the Bill Lyons days?
They were innate, dating back to B ill L yons’ days. Absolutely! A  highly respected 
journalist said that w hen w e ’d started to launch the XJ40 w e’d follow ed B ill Lyons’ 
original philosophy; producing som ething that looked absolutely fantastic, but actually 
wasn’t. If you go back to the pre-war Jaguars, they promised so much, they looked so 
stunning, but they w eren’t particularly good. But they were cheap. B ill Lyons set out to 
be the cheap B entley, or Lagonda.
How did John Egan react to the problems of the XJ40?
He struggled very, very hard. Randle used to tie him up in knots. Jim used to talk 
gobbledegook engineering. John didn’t know enough about engineering to actually take 
him on, and then for a w h ile  B easley was M D. M ike was M D three tim es in his career. 
The first tim e w as an attempt to put M ike on top o f  Jim to put som e rigour into Jim.
There w as a fam ous article in Car M agazine after the launch o f  the XJ40 saying that the 
wrong man had been knighted instead o f  Randle. Randle’s credibility amongst some o f  
the motoring journalists w as such that John was petrified o f  the com ics.1401 guess as a 
company w e w ere far too focused on the com ics. I guess it com es with the territory. Most 
manufacturers tend to focus far too much on motoring journalists than they do on the 
broadsheet journalists. I think John was petrified Jim ’s credibility would be too great to 
explain Jim leaving. Y et Ford got rid o f  Jim without a whimper. Jim talked a great talk, 
and on paper w as a very fine engineer, but, like so many British engineers, was not 
interested in the long boring slog  o f  long term investment process. Which is why so many 
o f  our manufacturing businesses have been taken over by foreign com panies who are 
prepared to put that long-term, long-cycle investment in to get the com petitive process.
140 Motoring magazines.
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That’s what Ford did; having spent $2.6billion on the company they put in another 
$2billion in the next four years. Browns Lane finished up as being pretty efficient, instead 
o f  a highly labour intensive manufacturing plant, the source o f  the problems. And w e  
were getting N o  1 or N o  2 in J D  Power product quality, which I always believed was a 
combination o f  the incredible passion o f  the workforce for the brand, plus the right tools.
What can you tell me about Ford’s relationship with Jaguar?
I believe that before Henry Ford II died he told the family to buy Jaguar as it was. And 
that was the reason they stayed with it. But the Ford Motor Company is probably the 
most com plex business in the world. I don’t know how you can possibly run businesses 
with such diverse brands as Ford. It lost its brand years and years ago. Brand is a vital 
ingredient for such com panies as Jaguar, Land Rover, V olvo, and even Mazda. Brand is 
what makes them products. I don’t think they’ll get rid o f  V olvo as w ell as Jaguar. It’s 
making a loss at the m oment. I think they’ll hang in with Volvo; it’s a robust business 
with critical m ass. The biggest risk I think is the Ford managers in Dearborn who don’t 
want to try and knuckle dow n and fix Ford’s problems, w ill hang them selves on the coat 
tails o f  V olvo for som e glory or advancement. Once they go out and start interfering then 
God help it. I don’t think Jaguar’s actually saleable. I think it’s so inextricably linked 
with Land Rover they’d have to sell the tw o together, and therefore the current status o f  
Jaguar would eradicate any value in Land Rover. Ford got it right until 1996 when the 
dream faded. I f  you look at the bookends, you’ve got Ferrari probably the m ost passion- 
inspiring brand in the car business and you’ve got BM W  at the other end, which is a high 
volume manufacturer now , but with a brand aura about it. They’re quite different, 
although they’re both in the luxury sector. Their rationale and brand strengths are 
completely different. After Ferrari, Jaguar was the m ost passion-inspiring brand, and I 
think that as a niche manufacturer at around 150,000 cars a year you could maintain a 
viable profitable business, fluctuating with the econom ies, because the brand exists, 
because o f  its exclusivity. BM W  cam e from the volum e sector and then gained its 
premium. Jaguar w as always in the low  volum e premium sector. I always said, before I 
left Jaguar, the brand w ill not go where it doesn’t want to go; w e ’ve managed it there 
over a very long time.
For som ebody to com e in and make the kind o f  statements about fixing Browns Lane 
with a bulldozer or whatever w as just, regardless o f  whether you believed it was true or 
not, seen as a huge insult. Trotman taunted the tw o Johns. He was imm ensely arrogant, 
was quite aggressive. Ford were powerful enough to pull the Golden Share. There is no 
doubt they leaned on M aggie, and Ridley, and that was the beginning o f  the end. I was 
actually in John’s o ffice, just the tw o o f  us, when John got the call from Ridley that 
they’d pulled the G olden Share. I think you’ll find that the potential closure o f  
Dagenham, reduction in Ford investm ent in the UK, were all wrapped up in this. Again, 
having spent four years as Chairman o f  Ford o f  Britain I know the way those things 
work. I am utterly convinced that their behaviour during the hostile takeover was such 
that they had been told by Henry Ford II before he died, although he’d been long gone by 
that stage141, to buy Jaguar as it was. And that was the reason they stayed with it.
141 Henry Ford II died in September 1987.
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But Ford is now rumoured to be looking to sell Jaguar?
I think the current m anagement [in Dearborn] realise that to save Ford they have to get 
rid o f  the side show s. I don’t think Jaguar’s actually saleable. I think it’s so inextricably 
linked with Land Rover they’d have to sell the two together, and therefore the current 
status o f  Jaguar would eradicate any value in Land Rover.142
What was Egan’s Strategy at Jaguar?
It was a “needs must”, frankly. Y es w e did want a second saloon and a replacement for 
the XJ-S which had been around for a long time, 25 years, which was unheard of. The 
XK was essentially a re-bodied XJ-S. That just demonstrated what you could do with 
m id-1970s technology. In fact Mark F ields143 was quoted in the press the other day as 
saying “Jaguar has now  becom e Ford’s Aston Martin follow ing the sale o f  Aston Martin 
which was inevitable”. What he means by that I’m not quite sure. There were two huge 
mistakes that Ford managers made. They grew Jaguar too far, too fast. They saddled it 
with costs as a result. Even the Jaguar Board prior to the acquisition thought about 
closing down Brow ns Lane and concentrating on Castle Bromwich. M ercedes Benz now  
build 600,000 cars in one plant. W hy on earth could they even believe that Jaguar could 
build 150,000 cars in three plants and make m oney? I saw it ahead o f  the time. I said 
“Why are w e doing this?”, but in Ford you get no plaudits for being “I told you so”.
Was Jaguar’s dream of being an independent, powerful, niche player one that 
couldn’t actually be fulfilled?
There had been journalists w h o’d predicted Jaguar’s downfall as an independent long 
before it becam e evident that it w as inevitable. But basically, what Ford hadn’t realised 
was (1) how  antiquated the production m ethods were, and (2) that the product was on its 
last legs; it was just about to fall o f f  into cycle. And, therefore, the huge amounts o f  
money they had to put in at the beginning o f  their ownership were purely to get the 
production process up to som e reasonable level, and replacing the cars. The XJ-S when 
they bought the com pany w as ancient, but it lasted for another seven years.
With General Motors wouldn’t it have ended up being the same as with Ford?
I’d actually brought GM  into Jaguar. In September 1983 at the Paris Show an ex­
colleague at Lotus introduced to Bob Eden for the first time. We were just chatting about 
things in general, how  Jaguar w as doing, and he said “B y the w ay i f  you want a white 
knight just let m e know ”. So I cam e back and reported that to John Egan. Jim Randle was 
actually very pro the GM  relationship. T hey’d very clearly sugared him up. I was
142 On 26 March 2008 the Ford Motor Company announced that it had agreed to sell Jaguar-Land Rover to 
Tata Motors o f India for approx $2.3billion, but upon closing the deal Ford would then contribute up to 
approx $600million to the Jaguar Land Rover pension plans.
143 Mark Fields, Chairman, Ford Motor Company Premier Automotive Group, 2002 to October 2005, and 
afterwards Executive Vice-President, Head of the Ford Americas Group.
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encouraged to keep in contact with GM. I was effectively left to mind the shop w hile the 
executive board w ere dow n there in London to negotiate with Ford. M ike Beasley rang 
me up: “John Egan’s asked m e to ring you up. It’s got to eight pounds”. Bruce Blythe is 
still the Ford fam ily’s adviser. It was his involvem ent that leads m e to believe that the 
Ford fam ily’s instructions were to get Jaguar at all costs.
What part did John Grant play?
He took over from Bruce as the custodian o f  the Blue B ook acquisition bible. What 
happened in short succession  w as that Petersen retired, and Poling took over. Poling had 
been the m ost vocal “do not do this” about the Jaguar purchase, which is why he put Bill 
Hayden into Jaguar. It suited B ill as w ell. B ill was the only corporate V ice President in 
Ford w h o’d never spent tim e in Dearborn. And when w e made the acquisition, Bill was 
about to go and spend his tw ilight years in Dearborn. He didn’t actually want to take on 
Jaguar, but it w as the only route he could see to keep h im self in the UK. O f course he and 
John got along like a badger in a bag. H e called John “Sir John E go”.
Was an independent Jaguar realistic?
I don’t think so. I don’t think Jaguar had anywhere to go. John Egan couldn’t see that at 
the time. H e was running the business on a kind o f  m onthly basis. John had a 
M icawberish v iew  that som ething w ould turn up. And, o f  course, Ford turned up.
What were Jaguar’s lost opportunities?
We had an opportunity w e didn’t take in the Land Rover deal, w e could have expanded 
the range faster, and w e could have built a better production plant instead o f  Whitley. The 
fact was that Ford had to spend another $2billion.
What were the main issues raised by the Ford transition team report?
I don’t know. I w as only interested in the marketing, and whether I was to be there for 
any length o f  tim e. It w as a pretty balanced piece. It w as seen from a manufacturing 
perspective. It didn’t understand that a black art creates a premium. American business, 
in m y v iew , is driven by only tw o dynamics: volum e and price. I f  you get the volume 
right you can get the price right, i f  you can get the price right you can get the volume  
right. It’s self-perpetuating because o f  the size o f  the market, and generally because 
manufacturing is geared to the market.
What are your views on David Boole?
David, like his mentor before him , Hopkins, who had been Lord Stokes’ PR at BL, saw  
his main role as that o f  prom oting John. He believed that a brand like Jaguar had to have 
a figurehead like B ill Lyons. Part o f  Jaguar’s problem now  is that it is seen as a 
featureless com pany that has been absorbed into Land Rover. Land Rover is the dominant 
player. Jaguar needs som ebody as brand champion -  but Ford w ill never do that again
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whilst they ow n it. So, John was what David had made him: Mr Jaguar, inseparable from 
the brand. David w as very aware o f  the beginnings o f  spin; he really w as one o f  the early 
spinners.
John Egan has often said that what he was selling was leather, and old-fashioned 
veneers.
Yes, it w as part o f  the black art. Like a gentlem en’s club, it was the sm ell rather than 
anything substantial. It w as all about touch, feel, passion, something again that Ford 
didn’t understand. And, again, because Am erican business tends to work on very 
measurable dynam ics -  since you can’t measure brand, and you can’t measure passion, 
they can’t exist.
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Transcript of the interview with Nick Scheele on 14th May 2007
Were a lot of the problems that Jaguar had in the 1980s due to the Bill Lyons’ era?
I would say they w ere due to the Leyland days actually because the profitability that 
came out o f  Jaguar in those early Leyland days w as very high. The Pound w as low, and 
Jaguar did use som e o f  the Leyland industry access to dealers to increase sales, 
particularly outside o f  the UK . So they did get profitability, but it w asn’t reinvested in 
Jaguar. I f  you look at Jaguar’s investm ents in the Leyland years there was incredibly little 
in facilities. The only significant investm ent cam e after John Egan took them out o f  BL. 
The big investm ent that John Egan put in was the W hitley engineering centre. Up until 
then engineering had been a relatively m iniscule operation without proper facilities. That 
was true o f  the manufacturing facilities as well; they really hadn’t had much spent on 
them.
What about the assembly line that Bill Lyons bought from Standard back in the 
early 1950s?
That assem bly line w as awful. There were two lines in fact. The X J40s were going down 
two lines, unbelievable really. Side-by-side. But you had different people doing different 
operations, so you really had to be able to track the quality control papers back to which  
line did it. That w as next door to im possible.
The new line you put in cost some £8.5milIion I believe.
That is about right. It w asn’t very expensive. W e did it on the cheap, because w e had to, 
because at that stage w e  w ere still losing over £1 m illion a day. W e did it a year ahead o f  
launching X 300, really because w e just had to get the factory into a better state. One o f  
the problems w as that the facilities were so old. Today i f  you go into Castle Bromwich 
you’ll see that the floor is white, and there are no oil leaks. The floor is w hite because 
that means you ’ll pick up an oil leak before it becom es a problem. The floor in Browns 
Lane w as caked in grim e and grease. So, people respond, I think, to the situation in which 
they’re placed.
Couldn’t that have been sorted?
Y es, it could’ve done, but unfortunately it w asn’t. N obody thought it was important.
Do you think they should have taken over Land Rover in 1986?
They were offered it on a plate. They should have taken it over, but I don’t think they 
could have m anaged it, to be fair. I don’t think there was enough infrastructure in Jaguar. 
There w as too much infrastructure in som e senses, and not enough in others. I think it 
was one o f  the problem s w e had with Ford; w e didn’t really early on put in the right 
infrastructure, and that cost us as w e went on. With hindsight it’s very easy.
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Why do you think the assembly line problem wasn’t tackled earlier? Why didn’t 
Egan tackle it?
John believed that the quality had improved. When he took over and took it private, the 
quality w as appalling. But he then had a quality push and said that it was better. And the 
Series III did get a bit better, but not very much better in reality. But he believed his own 
PR because he w ent out and told everyone that Jaguar quality was now  the best in the 
world etc etc. H e didn’t really see when XJ40 cam e out that the problems were as bad as 
they really were, and the problems were worse in the States i f  you look at the data. The 
data clearly show  that the US car, because generally it w as a higher specification, had a 
significant number o f  incremental problems compared to the European car. But they 
w eren’t acted upon, and they w eren’t acted upon basically because, I think, John didn’t 
want to know. XJ40 nearly brought the com pany to its knees, and should have done 
actually.
John Edwards told me that “we came up with a car that couldn’t be built”.
Yes. There were som e fundamental issues with the car. It had low  voltage electric wiring 
switchgear. And that w iring w as a com m on loom  from end to end. I don’t know o f  
anybody else w h o’s ever done a com plex low  voltage switching and a single loom  
because you drag it through the car, it gets caught, it gets trapped, it gets pinched. You 
then get shorts. Y ou get all the electrical problems that the XJ40 was prone to.
Compound that with som e very fundamental errors: the single wiper was a fundamental 
error, and that gave rise to im m ense custom er complaints. Then there were no passive  
restraints; there w ere no air bags engineered for the car. There were som e big, big issues.
I think the other fundamental problem w as that engineering didn’t talk to manufacturing, 
and v ice  versa. A ll o f  those problem s were self-contained. Engineers didn’t want to know  
about them because they w ere often boring. The XJ220 was the icing on that particular 
cake. And manufacturing couldn’t get the engineers to re-engineer the product for 
assem bly feasibility.
How much do you think was component manufacturers’ problems?
N ot that much. It never is. W e loosely  attribute: w e say a third o f  the problems are 
assem bly, a third are engineering, a third are com ponent manufacture. But the problems 
on the XJ40 w ere very largely engineering in nature. They were in-house. There were 
som e com ponent manufacturing problems, but had that been the only issue that would  
have got sorted out. There were som e problems on the air conditioning. It w asn’t working 
w ell, it didn’t work very w ell. Perhaps it w as poor design, but it was compounded by a 
very, very poor air intake structure, and all around this single wiper. Entirely in our own 
control.
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Roger Putnam told me there were suspension problems as well.
Y es there were. I rem em ber som ebody in Canada telling m e about struts. There was a 
real problem with the struts, and I w as told that they didn’t use them in the winter testing  
that they did. They used another manufacturer’s struts. Apparently they’d known all 
about this in the winter testing that was done in northern Ontario and they’d deliberately 
taken o f f  the struts that cam e with the factory car and put these other struts on because 
they didn’t rust, and the problem w as a rusting problem. I took that back and the then 
ch ief chassis engineer said “N o, no”, and it took five agonising months o f  teeth-pulling to 
get us to say let’s m ove to this other manufacturer, and then the problem went away. And 
everybody in engineering w as saying “N o, no it’s not a problem”. In the northern states 
o f  the US, where it w as salt corrosion, w e were changing struts under warranty.
Bob Dale of Lucas told me that one of the problems that Lucas found, particularly 
with the Series III, was the specification they’d been given for componentry. For 
example, in regard to temperature, nobody told them about the extremes that they’d 
be subject to in the States, and therefore it wasn’t surprising that the electronics 
weren’t up to the job.
I’m not surprised at all. There w as a fuel pump problem with Series III, never recognised  
by Jaguar. What happened w as that in the field, this w as a problem in the M iddle East in 
particular, but also in the southern U S, they came up with their ow n solution, which was 
getting a different pump; a pump that could stand the temperature regim es because the 
cavitations144 w ere caused by temperature extrem es. A bsolutely extraordinary! XJ40 was 
also subject to the sam e kind o f  thing. It had huge problems under extrem es, and not even  
extremes, just in Tokyo sum mer traffic.
I joined Jaguar in January 1992. In M ay o f  that year the J D  Power results came out, and 
on the Manufacturers Initial Q uality Survey there were thirty-six manufacturers and 
Jaguar w as thirty-fifth, kept out o f  last place by that stellar European import called Yugo. 
That is how  bad it w as. The States used to call the XJ40 the 101 Dalmatians; the great big 
vehicle with 101 black spots all over it that had no fixes, no fixes. When you piled  
through what the causal factors were you found that water leaks w as a huge problem, 
paint finish w as another m assive problem, w indshield was a third great problem, and 
electrics w as the fourth. There w ere the four packages o f  problems. But water leaks was 
number one. It w as no surprise. Our ow n water leak test results showed that nearly 90%  
o f  all cars didn’t first tim e g o  through the water test. We knew that, and you could blame 
the water leak group or the weatherseal supplier. But the reality w as that w e had to get 
the door gaps right, w e had to  get the door opening right, and w e had to redesign the 
flanges, and the seal system . N o w  everybody said w e can’t do that, and for whatever 
reason there w as a huge dichotom y between engineering and manufacturing. Bill 
[Hayden] had tried to sort thart out, but eventually what I did was get a guy called Jim 
Portillo over from the States and Jim had responsibility for engineering and 
manufacturing, and purchasing. And out o f  that started a series o f  m eetings, which are 
still going on to this day, w hich got engineering and manufacturing, and purchasing
144 “Cavitations” is the term given to the formation o f bubbles, or a vacuum, in the fuel, resulting in engine 
misfiring, or shuddering.
- 131 -
APPENDIX
together to fix specific problems, out o f  which came a w hole redesign o f  the XJ40, which  
fixed it. It did fix  it, so it w as fixable. The electrical problems had to wait until the X 300  
when w e put in a proper wiring system , with separate units, junction boxes etc.
RISTS were the sole supplier of the wiring loom. Would the single loom have been 
their design or would it have been a Jaguar-imposed design?
I don’t know, 1 w asn ’t there at the tim e, but m y suspicion is that it was a Jaguar-imposed 
design. There w as nobody w ho used a single loom  end-to-end. So, the side lights and the 
tail lights were on the sam e loom . What a nutty system! And you have the high voltage  
system and the low  voltage actuation system . M y suspicion is that Jim Randle had a hand 
in that, but I don’t know  because I never knew Jim Randle, but m y suspicion is that a lot 
o f  that cam e from him. H e had som e strange ideas.
Roger Putnam told me that the biggest problem was that Jim could run rings 
around John Egan so that whenever John Egan ran up an engineering problem Jim 
would just talk his way out of it.
That is what I understand. One o f  the reasons Jim Randle gave for the windshield  
problem w as “ionisation” o f  the w indshield. What a load o f  old codswallop! The reason 
was the single wiper, and the actual wiper m echanism  lifted o ff  the w indow  at higher 
speed. So, did w e ever really so lve it? N o! W e got it a hell o f  a lot better by getting a 
more forceful and better aerodynam ically tuned wiper blade, but it remained a problem  
until w e got rid o f  the single blade. I’d heard that Randle had Egan twisted round his little 
finger because Egan w asn ’t an engineer.
But John Egan wasn’t only not an engineer but he wasn’t a car manufacturing man 
either.
N o, John had no com parisons. One o f  the huge issues that was around at Jaguar was that 
you couldn’t say “W ell, w hat’s your experience o f  this?” because they were independent 
from their world. They thought they were good by comparison with Longbridge. I 
remember som e Jaguar people saying they were as good as M ercedes!
Were Quality Circles still going on when you joined?
They were allegedly going on. But people hadn’t been trained in all the techniques that 
you need to be trained in before Quality Circles have any use because they weren’t 
dealing with data. What they w ere dealing with w as “I think it’s this” or “I think it’s that” 
or “I say, you say” . I w ould have to say that they never kept pace with the m assive 
changes that had happened in the 1980s when, really, western manufacturers started to 
wake up to m odem  quality control m ethodology, and they just hadn’t experienced that. 
The tw o things that Ford brought in were process and process discipline. Ford clearly 
understood these. W e started sending Jaguar people into Ford in the summer/fall o f  1992, 
and cam e back and started doing what process said. It actually worked. Ford don’t follow
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more than 60% o f  process, but Jaguar follow  100% o f  the process. It came around pretty 
quickly.
One of the things you did was to get the headcount down. How difficult was that?
In the event it w asn’t that difficult. When I arrived a lot o f  people thought I’d arrived to 
close the door. W e had a contract com ing up in the Novem ber o f  1992 which meant wage 
negotiations. Everybody knew  w e were losing money; w e ’d had factory floor 
presentations on how  m uch, and it was getting worse. I think 1992 was the low  point in 
terms o f  sales. In 1992 w e  sold  20 ,000  units.145 That was the ultimate low. John Egan had 
got it up to 50 ,000  and then it cam e o ff .146 The unions thought w e were going to ask for a 
wage cut, and there had been talk o f  10%-15%. W e sat around and said “Yes, i f  w e do 
that w e’ll reduce our costs by say 1%”. Internal manual labour was under 10% o f  the cost 
o f  a vehicle. When you ’re losing 35% on sales it’s infinitesimal. So what w e decided to 
do instead o f  doing that w as to go for a w holesale works standards improvement and also 
to say that when w e put in the new  track for the X 300. We knew that would throw up a 
lot o f  labour savings. W e also knew  that com ing up was that w e ’d have to close Radford 
because the new  engine had to go to a m odem  manufacturing facility, and w e had 
Bridgend. It was a nonsense to think w e were going to put it in Radford which would  
never be able to get up to speed. So w e told the unions that instead o f  asking for a wage  
reduction w e ’d g ive them an increase for this year o f  CPI plus ha lf a per cent and next 
year’s CPI plus h a lf a per cent but in return w e wanted to abolish three layers o f  
supervision. W e wanted to go for a team leader concept. We wanted individuals also to 
have within their team leader areas responsibility for quality. For the measurement o f  the 
quality, and the delivery o f  that quality. W e w ould change all the work rules re 
demarcation. W e w ill have to a llow  engineers to work on the line so that they can see the 
problems. Previously that had not been allowed. There was a w hole variety o f  other 
things. The unions nearly bit our hand o f f  to accept. We then implemented every last 
paragraph o f  the agreem ent. It worked for us. It was better sized, but more importantly 
the workforce w as actually working on quality, and the demarcations had gone. So w e  
got rid o f  supervisors: forem en, general foremen. It was just a w hole set o f  change to the 
operation. It had to be brought in by manufacturing management w ho previously had 
been handcuffed by a w age agreement.
145 Jaguar Accounts for 1992, filed at Companies House, show total production o f 20,337 units, and 
wholesales o f 21,797 units, but retail sales in the year (as reported in Automotive News) fell 33% to 
16,489 units.
146 The peak year was 1988 with production of 51,937 units, and wholesales o f 50,603 units, (as can be 
seen in Table 4.3 in the main text).
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John Egan had put in this new supervisory level to manage the production process, 
and since that is one of the things you took out how then was the production process 
managed?
What w e had done in preparation for putting in the single track through 1992 and into 
1993 was to train people. W e did this in conjunction with N Q V s.147 W e wanted to train 
everyone in statistical process control, and in process management. In preparation for 
switching over to the single line everybody working on XJ40 w as going to have a new  
job. We asked everyone to define their job: to write down a process sheet for their job. 
That enabled us to devo lve the process management and the quality management to the 
guys on the line. And that enabled us to take out the supervisory level who weren’t doing 
that anyway: they w ere firefighting most o f  the time. And they were firefighting because 
it w asn’t just the manufacturing process that was out o f  control. We never really knew  
what vehicles w ere com ing dow n the line. The process was wrong. It was fundamentally 
flawed.
It appears that when Bill Hayden took over he got nothing but cooperation.
Yes, but B ill could only  get dow n so far. B ill sorted out som e really basic problems, but 
at the end o f  the day m anagem ent is really only going to sort out the top level, because 
the real issues beyond that can only be sorted out by the guys w ho see them every day. So 
you’ve got to have them  trained to know  what it is that they see, not that it looks wrong, 
but that w e ’ve measured it and its outside tolerance. And it’s a non-repeatable operation. 
And those are the kinds o f  things that w e really had to train the workforce on. The 
workforce w as then given  the pow er to do som ething about things. That w as the big  
change.
Why do you think the Egan management never tackled these problems?
I don’t think people did. It w asn ’t Jaguar alone. H alewood was always a basket case. 
Everybody at Ford had given  up on H alewood, but Jaguar took it over and David Hudson 
went up there. H e had really put in the changes at Jaguar, and he did the same thing at 
H alewood, which w as really involving the workforce. Previously nobody wanted to hear 
what the shopfloor w as saying. That’s how  the auto industry ran, and really w e were 
fundamentally flaw ed because the people w ho knew m ost clearly what the problems were 
were the people w ho confronted the problems every day. And involving them in the 
definition o f  the solution o f  the problems w as not something that cam e naturally to the 
auto industry. It’s not the w ay to go about it. It defines the “them and us”, and locks in 
place a structure that is totally out o f  date because what you want is the know ledge to be 
the guy w ho is putting the thing together.
147 National Vocational Qualifications (NQVs) were introduced in 1986 by the government to develop and 
maintain national standards o f occupational competence.
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What about employee costs?
They had got out o f  control. It was absolutely ludicrous. When w e [Ford] arrived w e had
12,000 on the payroll, and I think that two years later w e were down to 6,000.
Engineering vs Manufacturing. Was that a personality thing, or was it empires?
It was the Jim Randle em pire against the M ike Beasley empire. I’ve heard from lots o f  
people that they w ere ham mer and tongs at each other.
Do you think that Egan was realistic in thinking that he could turn Jaguar into 
another BMW?
I think he genuinely believed  that, but he realised post XJ40 that it couldn’t happen. 
That’s when he started talking to GM. If w e had today’s labour stability, and level o f  
training o f  the workforce back in the early 1980s it probably would have had a chance o f  
succeeding. 1 left the UK  in 1978 for the States, but I’d been in purchasing for Ford o f  
Europe since 1966. M ost o f  m anagem ent’s tim e w as consum ed by problems caused by 
labour issues; w ildcat strikes, ports closing. Every day there w as som ething com ing up, 
which meant that long-term  planning and execution was absolutely at a premium  
certainly in the British m otor industry, and I think in the majority o f  British industry 
throughout that period. N o w  people w ould say that that changed with M aggie, but it 
didn’t really change until M aggie’s second term, 1984 onwards, and didn’t start to bite 
until the late 1980s. So m anagem ent in the 1980s w as consum ed by the drip, drip, drip o f  
unanticipated events. So I don’t think it could have happened. In today’s environment I 
think it would be far m ore likely to be capable o f  happening, but it still needs a long term 
commitment. The b iggest thing, apart from process discipline, that Ford brought to 
Jaguar w as the know ledge that you could plan on long term funds being available. The 
300 programme I took  to the Ford board in April o f  1992, and w e got the funding for it, 
and w e said this is going to be J o b l . N o w  this had never happened in Jaguar before. We 
said that Jobl was going  to be August 1994, and that is what w e were marching for. N ow  
previously Jaguar had gone up and down. Funds were available for this six-month period, 
but w e ’ve got to clam p dow n for the Results, make the Results look better, but it made 
capital expenditure look like a bloody yo-yo! And it really shouldn’t go like that. Once 
you’re on a programme it should go very predictably. And you could plot it. So Ford 
gave Jaguar the ability to take a long-term view . John never had that capability because 
he was really trying to serve too many masters. BM W  had that capability because they 
were fam ily-ow ned, and it w as a very, very stable German econom y, and they were 
taking a growing segm ent o f  the market. I think stability has a lot to do with what you 
can do.
- 135-
APPENDIX
Do you think a big issue for the Jaguar management at the time was the fact that it 
was quoted so they had to look over their shoulders all the time at City
I don’t think it w as a big issue, but it was an issue. Because Jaguar w as quoted they 
decided they had to have a London presence. So they took a long-term lease on a flat near 
Saville Row. N o w  you don’t really want distractions like that.
What about the relationship between Browns Lane and the States?
There w as also total antipathy between Browns Lane and the States. It was total, it was 
almost total warfare. M ike D ale and his predecessor used to com e to Browns Lane once a 
month for the m onthly m eeting, and the dealers used to com e over once a year or 
whatever. And they w ere at total odds with the Brits. Basically I believe that Jaguar 
engineers were engineering cars for trolloping round the Warwickshire countryside, and 
they didn’t design cars w ith any know ledge o f  what the US conditions were like, and we 
suffered m assively as a result. And that suffering was translated into alm ost total warfare 
between the States and Brow ns Lane. It was just crazy, and that w as a huge problem that 
Jaguar had, and there are echoes o f  that still going on today actually. The profit earner 
was always the U S, but that w as alw ays when the Dollar was strong. It w as amazing. In 
1992 w e had no cup holders in the car, w e had no airbags, w e were not making changes 
to the US car. W e w ere m aking them to the rest o f  the world car, so in 1992, the sixth 
year o f  the XJ40, w e ’v e  still got all the original quality problems, and w e ’ve not had a 
single visual enhancem ent o f  the vehicle since launch. And w e didn’t have cup-holders, 
and that was because the tw o sides were at odds. Jim Randle didn’t believe in air bags. 
N obody believed in cup holders. “W hy w ould anybody have a drink in a Jaguar? You  
don’t go to M acDonalds in a Jaguar”. It w as really bizarre. So w e then had lost the US  
market. We also didn’t have a lease company, and 75% o f  luxury cars in the States were 
sold on leases. That w as bizarre as w ell. So it w asn’t just engineering. We were just 
locked into a British v iew  o f  the world.
A lot o f  the U S dealers w ere so lo  dealers, so they didn’t have anything else to push. I 
think it was in large m easure a Jaguar problem. Y es, w e had a quality problem, but not to 
have a lease schem e w as absurd, particularly since the largest leasing company in the 
world was Ford M otor Credit. W ell w e didn’t have that because w e didn’t want the word 
Ford on a Jaguar credit docum ent. That w as true. So w e had to knock a lot o f  heads to get 
a lease programme in. W ho the hell cares, but there was a lot o f  “Ford thy shalt keep thy 
hands o f f  Jaguar, and never let it be sullied”. This for a company that was 35 out o f  36 in 
the J D Power survey. Those were the kind o f  things that were going on. I was in M exico  
when w e took it over and a letter cam e round saying “N o  Ford person shall set foot in 
Jaguar without the consent o f  B ill”. That was Ford management, but B ill was not averse 
to it. So there w as no know ledge transfer. It’s difficult to think back, but that was the case 
when I arrived. For instance w e were still running accounts in the w ay Jaguar had always 
kept them. We didn’t really know what the Series III manufacturing costs were. We were 
still producing Series III up to 1992 for the U S market. It was pretty clear that they were 
horribly expensive. And the XJ-S was fundamentally an early 1950s design, stretched and 
stretched, it had manufacturing inefficiencies com ing out o f  its ears, but w e didn’t know
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their cost. There were no system s integrations -  none o f  that started until 1992. So there 
were no synergies.
There were comments in the papers from John Grant and Bill Hayden in 1991 
about how Ford had already identified £50m in purchasing savings.
It’s not true. It w asn ’t true.
How efficient was the purchasing?
I don’t think it w as very efficient. It did have som e good prices. It got tyres from Pirelli at 
below  full cost. N o w  one o f  the reasons for that w as Pirelli used the Jaguar brand. They 
were exclusive to Jaguar, and they gave very, very good prices. They were hyper- 
com petitive. Purchasing at Jaguar lived in a separate building at Browns Lane to which 
no other m em bers o f  the com pany had access: locked, coded. It was its own little 
fiefdom. Jaguar had lots o f  fiefdom s.
Did Ford make a mistake in buying Jaguar?
Ford bought Jaguar alm ost sight unseen, and what w e bought w as a can o f  worms, with 
no new m odels in the sausage m achine. W e paid too much for it. A  frigging fortune!
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Transcript of the interview with Lord Trotman on 3rd February 2003
Ford were tracking Jaguar for some time. What was your first contact with them?
I was the first Ford man over the wall, literally the first Ford person at Browns Lane. I 
went to see Egan in his lair and break the great new s that w e were interested in Jaguar. 
Petersen had phoned m e and said “W e’ve been talking it over; w e ’re really interested”. 
“W e” meant the States because I was still here at that time. I was Head o f  Ford o f  
Europe. “W hy don’t you go up and see i f  you can see Egan and tell him that w e’d really 
like to make an offer” . So I phoned Egan’s office and said “Could I com e and see you” 
and all that. Naturally he said “What about?” I said “ Well w e don’t want to talk about it 
on the phone, it’s a private matter” and all that. He presumably sm elled a rat. Anyway, I 
got into the car, w ent up there to Browns Lane, walked in, and said “To get to the point 
John”, I’d never m et him  until then, “Ford is interested in acquiring Jaguar”. He said 
“Oh, w ell that’s a non-flyer i f  ever there was one. W e’ve no interest in that. W e’re going 
to stay independent. Elephants don’t sleep w ell with hedgehogs”. I remember that was a 
wonderful metaphor he used. “W e’ll just get crushed. The elephant rolls over in bed and 
crushes the hedgehog. W e’re a small company, you’re a giant. We don’t think it would be 
a good arrangement at all, so  w e ’re really not interested”. I said “Surely w e should 
discuss it?” He w as a little bit tetchy, but not rude. It’s not that w e were laughing and 
joking about it. It w as very serious, and he w as so tetchy. When I got to know him a bit 
later it w as business as usual. John is quite a Yorkshire m an,148 he’s not great on small 
talk or anything. H e’s quite a gruff chap. In any event he was quite gruff, but not really 
unpleasant. He said in no uncertain terms that he w asn’t interested. I said “ W ell, can’t 
w e discuss alternatives to a full take-over. A  partnership or som ething?” It didn’t matter 
how w e approached it John just said “N o, w e ’re not interested”. I don’t recall exactly 
how the m eeting w as arranged, but m aybe I asked him at the tim e “W ell would com e and 
m eet m y boss w hen he com es over from the States?” And w e m et in Grafton Street in 
Mayfair. W e had a London office  there. W e had a nice dining room in the basement 
there, and D on Petersen and I m et John there. John’s was the same speech all over again. 
And so it cam e to nothing.
The Ford M otor C om pany’s v iew  at the tim e was it’s either friendly or it’s not going to 
happen. Since John said it ain’t going to happen w e decided, the Board decided, that 
w e ’re not going in with a hostile. That must have been 1988. Shortly after that, very 
shortly after that, I w as hauled over to Am erica to becom e Head o f  North America. So I 
was out o f  it. M aybe a year later, it must have been within a tw elve month period, the 
Board decided “W e’re tired o f  sitting around here. I f  w e can’t do it friendly w e’re going  
to do it unfriendly”. I w asn’t personally involved in it. I was secondary, sitting in the 
Board m eetings, listening to all the chat and backchat etc. I was involved at that level, but 
I w asn’t over here involved in the negotiations with Jaguar. So I w as only in a limited 
w ay involved in what happened. I w as only sitting listening to the debates and was there 
at the Board m eeting w hen it w as approved that w e make the offer that was finally 
accepted. I w as involved in a Ford 2000 kind o f  a w ay because I went up the ladder to 
becom e President, and, so, I w as involved in Jaguar again. I was going up and down 
looking at the new  m odel developm ent and talking about how  much investment w e ’d put
148 Egan was actually bom in Lancashire, and spent his boyhood in Coventry.
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in and debating should w e admit w e ’d made a mistake and just say “We all make 
m istakes, w e ’ve  made a big one. Screw it, let’s fold it up”. We had those discussions 
quite a bit in the years fo llow ing the acquisition. I hung in. I’m glad I did, as was Wayne 
Booker w ho w as m y executive in charge o f  all international operations, including Europe. 
Wayne w as very strongly in favour o f  hanging in, and between W ayne and I w e several 
tim es persuaded the board “Please, w e ’ve jum ped into it, let’s not give up too quick, let’s 
hang in because w e  think w e can make the thing work”. We did, largely due to Wayne, 
and B ill Hayden, and N ick  Scheele. A good team o f  people.
Going back to 1988 when you first met Egan, did Ford have any idea just how many 
problems Jaguar had?
W ell w e all knew  the jok es about the English drinking warm beer because Lucas makes 
the refrigerators and all that. It w as called “The Prince o f  Darkness” and all those jokes 
about three-position switches: On, Off, and Flicker. So w e knew through a lot o f  
anecdotes, jokes, and, in som e cases, personal experience. You had to have two to make 
sure you had a reasonable chance o f  going anywhere; you had to have two Jaguars 
because one was alw ays in the shop. We knew all that. But it was hostile, so w e never 
really had a good look inside the factory before w e made the acquisition. Som e o f  the 
Ford executives, to m y dism ay, were free with their language with the press, Bill Hayden 
saying it was the worst thing h e’d seen since Gorky. Since w e ’d recently been negotiating 
with the Russians on putting investm ent into Russia w e ’d been to various factories in 
Russia, and i f  you haven’t seen those you haven’t seen anything. So B ill in his usual 
forthright and hard w ay to get his point across makes this statement to one o f  the tabloids 
“It’s the worst thing I’ve  seen since Gorky”. B ill w as the man w ho finally got the British 
trade unions to go to Japan and see what they were doing over there, getting the Brits to 
accept that these guys are form idable competitors. They really do do the things 
everybody says they do. It’s not a myth. They actually do it. They really do produce 
tw ice as many transm issions an hour as w e do and all o f  that and the quality really is a 
damn sight better than ours. A nyw ay, B ill, w ho was the real M essiah on quality and 
productivity and all that, he goes into Jaguar and he was stunned by what he saw.
It was reported, w hich I m ay have said, but I can’t remember saying it, that Trotman said 
“There’s nothing wrong with it that a good bulldozer w ouldn’t fix”. This is just after 
w e ’d agreed to spend a fortune to buy it, so w e w eren’t too popular with som e o f  our 
supervision for som e o f  those statements, or alleged statements. I w asn’t hands-on in the 
sense that B ill w as by a m ile. B ill was an old manufacturing man and was deeply into the 
detail o f  it. He said he had finished body panels stacked on the floor, didn’t even have 
pallets for them. Had the bloody stu ff com ing o f f  the press and the guys just stacked the 
panels up, nestling them  into each other, and sitting on the bloody floor. He said you 
w ouldn’t believe it. And then that gets into hand work to repair the panels, you know, 
sanding and everything to get the scratches off. Material control w as hopeless, quality 
was hopeless, and the discipline o f  the line by Ford’s standards w as appallingly bad. It 
was a big shock to the Ford manufacturing guys who went in. It w as a huge shock just 
how  prim itive it w as. And then the product development was almost non-existent. So we  
were very glum about all o f  that. It was going to cost a lot o f  m oney and a lot o f  effort, 
and a hell o f  a lot o f  team building, and a hell o f  a lot o f  Ford intrusion to get the
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manufacturing standards up, the product developm ent standards. The one thing that sticks 
in my mind is that w e were impressed by, to our surprise, som e o f  the real product 
developm ent talent that w as there, particularly in engine development. We thought 
arrogantly, like all good Ford people do, especially having just put our nose in the tent 
and seen som e o f  the stu ff I’ve  just talked about, w e concluded very quickly and 
arrogantly, w e ’re not going to learn anything from these guys. There’s nothing in it for 
us, it’s all going to be one way. And as it turned out it w asn’t. 1 think there was a lot o f  
talent there in the aesthetics; in the interior trim; in the Englishness bit, which was one o f  
the big attractions. One o f  the reasons for the acquisition was it was unique. It was 
English and w e wanted to retain that, and there w as a lot o f  talent which I would describe 
as British talent that you w ou ldn’t find in M ercedes or BM W . It was the w ay they did the 
seats and the trim and the instrument panels and so forth. That was a valuable presence 
there. And then suspension and handling, ride and handling developm ent w as as I recall 
our guys said “W ell there’s som e talent there w e can use”. And then I specifically  
remember how  im pressed the Ford guys were with the engine technology that w e found 
there. So I don’t want to paint the picture that it w as totally a heap o f  crap and all the 
people were useless. That w asn’t true at all. In engineering product developm ent there 
really were som e very good talent.
And yet that is the area that seems to have had the most criticism.
Yeah, but that, i f  I think back on it, would be primarily underinvestment rather than lack 
o f  talent. The manufacturing bit o f  it w as w ay under-invested. The basic training, the 
discipline, and the confidence that w e just took for granted in any Ford factory at that 
point was light years behind. It w as like Ford had been like in the 1940s or 1930s. It was 
that that w as the b iggest shock.
Who do you blame for the under-investment?
I don’t know w ho to blam e for that. I w ouldn’t blame anybody. John Egan said that one 
o f  the things they’d done, to his great glee, w as to create a lot o f  sizzle without there 
being a lot o f  bacon there. They didn’t have the cash flow , they didn’t have the resources, 
or the borrowing capability to invest a hell o f  a lot. So they were lim ping along and 
keeping the thing going with the sizzle. With talk and the odd little tiny piece o f  product 
excitem ent here and there. I don’t know how  they quite managed to do that. And there’s 
this wonderful tradition o f  Jaguar going back for yonks and they just managed to limp it 
along, but it w as an accident on the w ay to happen.
Did he understand that he was under-investing?
It never occurred to m e that he couldn’t. I f  he didn’t it would be amazing to me that a
chap in that position, in his role, w ouldn’t understand that. He must have had the
benchmark data. H e must have known how  much you have to spend per £100m illion o f  
revenue i f  you ’re running BM W  or any o f  the premium motor companies.
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John Edwards said “Of course, none of us had ever launched a car. None of us had 
ever done it, and we had no concept of the problems that we were going to have with 
the XJ40, and how much it was going to take in terms of investment”
W ell m aybe your v iew  is accurate, but I can honestly say that it had never occurred to me 
that John m ight be deluding him self. I just always assumed “Good for John, he played 
that one beautifully. H e had a weak hand o f  cards, but he played them m arvellously in 
convincing the world that he had a good thing going and he was perfectly comfortable, 
and things were com ing good and that the last thing he needed was for som eone to com e 
along and take him over” . It never occurred to m e that he actually believed all that.
How did you deal with labour relations at the time? What state do you think they 
were in?
The labour relations were bad. A s I recall, there just w asn’t the discipline. There were 
people w ho were doing things that were unthinkable in Ford. Absenteeism  was Hellish. 
Sick leave w as w ay out o f  what w e would consider normal. I know Ford had to go in 
very hard and say “W e’re going to fix  this or the w hole thing’s going to be a 
catastrophe”. “It’s this w ay or no w ay” is what the Ford people essentially had to do; go 
in really hard. I think Scheele and his guys did a very good job in there. I think they 
weeded out a lot o f  people in line supervision and got people to do sim ple things which  
w e think are normal these days; getting people to dress in blue coveralls and all be clean 
and turn up on tim e, and work in team s, and take personal ownership o f  the product and 
all o f  those kind o f  things w e  just think o f  as normal. A ll o f  that stu ff was presumably 
like going back to kindergarten for the Ford guys, but it was “W e’re going to get these 
people to do this s tu ff ’. Before I left Ford, which is four/five years ago, the reports you’d 
get back certainly seem ed to be corroborated by the words o f  the presentations as one 
walked down the production lines. There was a com plete transformation. It was like 
going to a Japanese factory or a really good American factory. People smiled, looked you 
in the eye. Pride, team  work were evident. It was as though the Japanese had been in. It 
was a huge, huge transformation from 1980-89.
How much of that was fear? I’ve heard Bill Hayden’s management style was terror.
Bill w ould subscribe to the concept that fear and greed are the only two motivations that 
matter. I think he w ould have used, and w e would have encouraged him to use it, those o f  
us who felt som e responsibility for the acquisition. And there w as a high level o f  anxiety 
in the years fo llow ing  this acquisition. W e spent a hell o f  a lot o f  shareholders’ money.
On what? In the first couple o f  years there was a high level o f  anxiety. “Oh my God 
w e ’ve got a real dog here!” So, B ill had all the encouragement to just go and fix it. B ill’s 
a very hard manager, and he was in Ford, he was in Dagenham, he w as in all the German 
factories, he w as in Spain. B ill’s a take no prisoners, kick ass and take names kind o f  
disciplinarian, and I think those methods were applied in Jaguar in full measure.
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If we go back to 1989 when Jaguar were talking to GM, Ford had the deal lined up 
with Saab, which nearly went to the wire. What tipped Ford going back and going 
all out for Jaguar?
I remember that w e w ere toying with a lot o f  ideas. We toyed with A lfa  Rom eo. I don’t 
know i f  that’s in the public domain or not. We were on the point o f  signing with A lfa  
Romeo. I w as within an hour o f  it happening, and Craxi149 and A gn elli150 pulled the plug 
on us. It was a really terrific p iece o f  Italian teamwork behind our backs which pulled the 
plug from right under m y feet when I was literally within an hour or something o f  signing 
on behalf o f  the com pany for the acquisition o f  Alfa. So w e thought about it, practically 
everybody you could think o f  to get a name plate, to get a brand above the Ford brand, 
because w e had tested it enough tim es to have convinced ourselves that w e had a ceiling  
in terms o f  price and revenue on the Ford brand. W e could do anything w e liked, we  
could stand on our heads, w e could produce a car that was better than BM W  in every 
detail, but i f  it w as called a Ford you couldn’t price it above a Ford Scorpio. You couldn’t 
sell many because people w ould still say “1 want m y BM W , I want m y Jaguar, I want my 
Merc, or m y A lfa”. So w e  crossed that bridge, but the only way w e were going to get up 
to this lucrative p iece o f  the market place was to get another brand. And w e also debated 
the Lexus approach o f  “D o w e build it ourselves? Brand X ?” W e thought that w e might, 
but that w e probably w ould fail. So w e never crossed that bridge. But w e had a real hot 
spot for Jaguar, and then for reasons that are not in the public domain I know, and can’t 
be, our number one choice o f  all would be BM W , but w e couldn’t bring it about. The 
answer there really w as N o! In six  foot letters! Henry Ford tried it going back to the 
1960s, and in the 1970s. Every decade or so w e had a bash at it and the answer was 
always “There isn ’t any possib ility”. W e alm ost closed on Alfa. W e almost closed on 
Lancia. W e alm ost m erged Ford o f  Europe with Fiat, and one o f  the attractions there was 
Lancia because that w as the brand w e didn’t have, or could have been the brand we 
didn’t have. W e had d iscussions with PSA . I think I met them all. The Fiat one failed 
because Henry Ford and A gnelli couldn’t agree on w ho was going to run the joint. That 
was essentially it. The huge lesson there was before you get a thousand people spending a 
year working their butts o f f  on som ething get the tw o principals first to agree on the 
principles before you do that. So that w as a hard lesson I learned there. We exhausted 
ourselves and then got the tw o top guys saying “W ell that w on ’t work”. We could have 
saved ourselves a hell o f  a lot o f  time. A nyw ay, that didn’t work. A lfa didn’t work 
because w e got double-crossed. The PSA one didn’t work for various reasons. So we got 
onto Jaguar. I think it w as by a process o f  elimination.
Was there a fear back in 1989 that GM was going to beat you to it?
Yeah, oh yeah! I don’t think I know to this day how  much substance there was to the fear, 
whether it w as a rumour, whether they were planting stuff that scared the crap out o f  us, 
that made us overpay which was in a time-honoured tradition in the auto business. I f  you 
know som eone is going to do som ething you may not want to do it yourself but you want
149 Bettino Craxi, Prime Minister o f Italy 1983-87. Infamous for taking bribes, he fled to Tunisia to avoid 
prosecution.
150 Giovanni Agnelli, Head o f (and principal shareholder in) Fiat.
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him to pay the m axim um , so you start being voluble. I’m still not sure i f  GM was really 
interested or i f  they just were trying to get us cranked up.
Egan seemed to hate Ford for some reason.
He did, yeah, for som e reason. I don’t know if  it was personal, or what. Anyway, I was 
up in Birmingham making a speech and I invited John and he was as cordial as anything. 
We talked about the acquisition, w e talked about Gorky and all that, the jokes, hedgehogs 
and elephants and everything. He seem ed to have no hard feelings at all. W e made him  
quite rich.
In regard to Ridley’s announcement about the Golden Share being terminated. Did 
Ford have negotiations with the Government at the time, because if you look at 
Margaret Thatcher’s autobiography she can’t praise Ford highly enough. She was 
really upset that the deal over Rover didn’t go through.
We went to see her. W e let it be known that when the rug was pulled on Rover 
(another rug pulled!) w e  were really m ightily upset. And w e got an invitation to go up 
and see her at D ow ning Street, which was a memorable occasion. I went up with Don 
Petersen. The Foreign Secretary o f  Russia had just seen Ronnie Reagan, and he was on 
his way back to see G orby151, and w as stopping o f f  at Dow ning Street right after she was 
seeing m e and Petersen to brief M aggie on what Ronnie had said and on what he was 
going to say to Gorby. So I w ent there to talk about the bloody auto business and how  
pissed o f f  w e w ere about R over and all that and how  things were going at Dagenham and 
H alewood etc, and she w as talking about ICBM s and what Ronnie should do and all that 
stuff. It was a fascinating thing. She w as excited and she was talking away like a 
machine-gun. W e w ere there at least an hour and w e spent, at most, tw o minutes talking 
about Rover. I4m not exaggerating. She w as saying sorry I suppose. That’s what she was 
doing, being courteous, receiving us, and saying “Sorry, but I’m not going to talk about 
the auto business and all your problem s with the auto business, and I’m not going to be 
specific about that stuff, but I’m going to be cordial”. It was fascinating. It was like being 
right at a seat at the inner table there, listening to that stu ff real time. Then she concluded 
that m eeting with us by saying “Oh, the Russian ! I’ve got to rush o ff  and change”. But 
that was post the R over thing. So w e were upset, very upset, and let her know that.
“W e’re the oldest auto com pany in Britain, w e ’re the first manufacturer in Britain, w e’re 
the biggest em ployer, the b iggest investor the biggest everything, and you treat us like 
crap!” We didn’t quite use those words, but that was the m essage.
Is Ford a good steward of the Jaguar brand?
When w e bought it, the American design team swooped in and thought “Right, w e’ll 
show  these dim British bastards how  to design cars properly. The next new  Jaguar will be 
designed by us” . These guys sw ooped in from the States. It was interesting how  that 
worked out because B ill Ford Senior, w h o’s still on the Board, has always been a Jag buff 
from w ay back, intervened and re-balanced the input into the new  Jaguar. “So, okay, the
151 Mikhail Gorbachev, Head o f State o f the USSR, 1985-91.
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Ford guys can help with all the system s developm ent and engineering system s, quality 
control, and by all m eans put the Ford air-conditioning in, and all those Ford things that 
weren’t going to be seen by the customer, but leave the English guys do it.” Looking 
back I think that w as a good decision, a very unpopular one with som e o f  the heavy  
hitters in the design fraternity. We were going to m ove the first car to Portugal because 
w e couldn’t justify  the investm ent here, but w e did justify it with som e help from HM  
Government. I w ent to see H eseltine over it. He w as by then President o f  the Board o f  
Trade. I said “Too bad for the Brits because w e’re m oving this car to Portugal”, and the 
car stayed here. It w as in the early days o f  the joining o f  the cultures that Bill Ford Senior 
intervened and said “D o n ’t be too heavy-handed with the Detroit influence on Jaguar 
aesthetics. Get the heavy hands off. B e as heavy as you like with engine blocks, 
transmissions and steering, brakes, climate control”. But on the aesthetics his call was 
“That’s what w e bought. A  lot o f  what w e bought was the Britishness o f  the car. Let’s be 
careful w e don’t put too heavy an American hand, or even German”. There were some 
heavy German hands on it as w ell. There was a bit o f  a danger for a w hile that w e were 
going to turn it into a BM W  or M ercedes type o f  vehicle. Big, square, practical, take the 
sex appeal out, let’s have it functional to the Nth degree. It’s still early days. W e’re only 
13 years into it. To m e w e ’re only  in start-up m ode. It’s really early days. Building a big 
auto company is not a five-year proposition. I think ten years is a short time. I think that 
i f  you look back after tw enty years, say in 2010, that would be quite a good time to do a 
full accounting. I’ll bet you m oney w e did a smart thing. Land Rover and Jaguar. Ford is 
going to make these brands sing over the next decade or two. T hey’ll becom e larger all 
over the world.
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Transcript of the telephone interview with Jake Weidinger on 19th May 2008 
When did you first get involved with Jaguar?
M y Dad started selling Jaguars in 1938. This is actually our seventieth year in business. 
When I w as 17 or 18 I used to work in the Summers. It was a very different business, and 
very small. Then when I got out o f  college and the Marine Corps I w ent to work for him  
in 1964 as the fifth em ployee and w e were selling about 50 or 60 Jaguars a year at that 
time, and som e M ercedes and Ferraris. That was the business. I was the Service Manager 
from 1964 to 1979 when I took over the business. In 1981 I was the number one Jaguar 
dealer - 1 sold 101 cars in the US. In 1982 I was the number one dealer - 1 sold 202 cars. 
Thereafter the business exploded. In 1967 w e had six  or seven different Jaguar products -  
that was the last tim e w e had that many. In 1982/83 Jaguar all o f  a sudden started 
becom ing very popular. M ost dealers in those days were a Chrysler dealer or a Cadillac 
dealer and had Jaguar as a sideline. There were a few  people who had MG, Triumph, but 
nobody had any great volum e. There were five or six  distributorships through the 
country. In 1982/83 Jaguar w ere very popular and dealers were scrambling to buy the 
franchise. The franchise picture over the next few  years changed dramatically -there  
were over 150 dealers w h o ’d built facilities. With a popular franchise people were 
making nice m oney, nice return on investment, and it was going pretty good.
I remember when John Egan first came over to the US . There w as a m eeting in Leonia, 
N ew  Jersey. A ll the dealers cam e in. He had everybody going. He and M ike Dale were 
great orators. H e prom ised the dealers that the power steering leaks would stop, and 
everybody got up and cheered him. One dealer got up on the table. It was a source o f  
great jo y  because here w e ’d got this straight guy com ing in and business was going to 
expand. It was very prom ising. In the 1987 m odel year I sold 1,000 new  [Series III] 
Jaguars -  w e w ere the largest dealer in the world at that time. The XJ40 came in May 
1987 for the 1988 m odel year. Our sales were still good for 1988, 1989, 1990. In 1991 I 
was the number one dealer and sold 212 cars.
That’s our history w ith Jaguar. W e w ent from a normal 15 em ployees up to 75 during 
those years. W e had 28 technicians. There were four different buildings w e operated out 
of. We would change transm issions, differentials, engines w hile w e ’d take the ladies up 
to this shopping centre. Three technicians would change differentials (a five hour job) in 
two hours, and then go pick them [the customers] up and bring them back, and not even  
tell them. W e’d say “W e’v e fixed the whine”. W e’d not even tell them what w e ’d done. 
The Series III w as a pretty good car. It had its faults, but it was reliable. It had been out 
for a long, long tim e. It w asn ’t particularly m odem . The dealers started selling a lot o f  
Series Ills. The car w as m anageable. The XJ40 had many, many faults, and what was the 
bad part w as it had faults that couldn’t be repaired. We could replace motors and 
transmissions; w e could fix  leaks; w e could fix different things when they failed. There 
was a high rate o f  failure. Things like when you’re going up a hill at 60mph and the shifts 
w ouldn’t operate effectively . It w ould struggle to get up - it was clearly an engineering 
problem. There w ere quite a few  o f  those. There was something basically wrong with the 
air conditioning/heating system .
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U K  managers of the time have told me there wasn’t much of a problem in the U K . A  
lot of the problem was the fact that the U S model was far more complex because it 
had more bits on it as standard and also that the US dealers didn’t go the extra mile 
that they should have to sort the car out. How do you react to that?
Only an Englishman w ould tell you that! Without the US selling what they sold, and 
without the com m itm ent o f  the US dealers, Jaguar would have had to pack it in a long, 
long tim e ago. W e’d go over there and w e ’d look at the sales results; i f  you’d just look at 
the numbers during that tim e you’ll see that England trailed considerably behind the US. 
The main difference 1 think as far as the customer goes is .. . .a  slight exaggeration, but 
people w ill get in their car in N ew  York and decide to spend ten days on the open road 
and drive to California w ithout checking the oil or air pressure, and they can put thirty or 
forty thousand m iles on the car and all the advancements in those days used to come from 
people in the United States. For exam ple, the air conditioning was always years behind 
with Jaguar because they didn’t deal with it on a different basis, and the amount o f  m iles 
that people put in, and the consum erism  in the United States: it is a different market. I 
don’t think the British over there understood that as w ell as they should. When Bill 
Hayden took over he had us over there -  he’d been there about a month. W e were in a 
meeting with him and he said “You know w e ’re losing $10,000 on every car that w e sell. 
Why should I sell m ore cars?” And he took the volum e down from 25,000 or 30,000 to
10,000 in 1991.152 That is w hy w e only sold 212 o f  them. He recognised that they were so 
badly built in terms o f  quality that he had to stop it.1531 can remember they were looking 
for plant for the X K S and they couldn’t get the trunk to fit properly and they found out 
there were no engineering drawings for them. It was just typical. B ill Hayden was a good  
executive, but he w as a brutal guy -  he had a bad trait o f  publicly chew ing out people in 
front o f  others -  and he w ent in there and changed the operation. He did a lot o f  things, 
but he brought the quality back up in a tremendous way. And w e were dealing with that. 
In 1989 as much as 25%  o f  our sales were replacing people’s 1988 m odels to avoid 
lawsuits. It w as awful. They w ere driving these cars and they w ould com e in and 
complain, and com plain, and com plain, and w e couldn’t fix som e o f  the problems.
152 This statement is something o f an exaggeration. As can be seen in Figure 5.8, and Tables 4.2 and 4.3, in 
the main text o f this thesis, Jaguar sales in the US at this time peaked at 24,464 cars in 1986, and in
1989, the last year o f Jaguar’s independence, US sales had fallen 22% to 18,967 cars, a figure that 
remained largely unchanged at 18,728 cars in 1990. In the following year, US sales nearly halved to 
9,376 cars, but much o f this was due to the economic downturn and the quality issue.
153 Mike Dale was asked about this and he responded as follows in an e-mail to the author on 26 June 
2008: “Bill didn’t stop shipping cars for poor quality, but he did stop shipping them because one model 
went into negative economic profit. In other words, we were losing money on it before it got to the end 
o f the assembly line. It caused considerable stress in the US because it was the lower priced XJ40 and 
was the lead in our advertising. We had to work really hard for a few months shifting cars around the 
country to meet customer demand and avoid the wrath of the Federal Trade Commission”.
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Were these engineering problems, as opposed to production build problems?
There were problem s, for exam ple, with rotors and the braking system . The rotors and 
brakes would squeak and they would becom e warped. We could replace the brake pads 
and w e could replace the rotors, and the vibration when you braked would go away, but 
w e couldn’t replace the spongy brake pedals or redesign the master cylinders on a car.
We couldn’t up the torque on the car’s transmission, and power train, to make the car 
accelerate properly under a load. We could replace windshield wiper motors, fix  oil leaks, 
and wind noise, and replace water pumps, and all the things that w ould fail. Many years 
earlier, in 1974/75 they had an XJ12 that when it got hot, as in the Summer, the car 
would stall when it w as going to make a left-hand turn. If  it was 80 degrees it w ouldn’t 
stall, i f  it w as 90 degrees it would stall on a left hand turn. W e could never fix  that. The 
XJ40 was full o f  that. N o w  w e had all these dealers around here that had put 
$4m illion/$5m illion in a facility that had big sales and needed to take care o f  the 
customer but w eren’t able to. It w as just a m ess. In ’87 when the Series III was there, and 
even when the X J40 cam e along, they built the door by hand and every door was a 
different size, so w hen a custom er came along with wind noise at 40mph w e ’d fix it for 
her. But when the next custom er came along w e ’d fix that, but it w asn’t the same 
problem -  each car w as hand-built. It was constructed by hand. The XJ40 w as an 
advancement but the m easurem ents weren’t correct. The assem bly process w as faulty. 
Every Jaguar that Ford builds today is exactly like the other one -  the specifications and 
tolerances are exact. W e didn’t have that -  the English were the last to install that in 
assembly. The average person in England probably drove six  or seven thousand m iles a 
year at that tim e -  in the U S it w as over eighteen thousand. It’s a different base. I think i f  
you canvass the dealers they’ll tell you all pretty much the same thing. It was a 
nightmare. The car started getting good around 1994/95. The 1995 XJ was a great car, but 
Ford did that. I think that the m anagement knew that it [the XJ40] was not very good.
I spoke to John Egan—
I must tell you that he w as held in great esteem  by the dealers in the United States. He 
made h im self available to the dealers. He wanted to build great cars. He had a sparkle in 
his eye, and a lot o f  charisma, and he was probably the best salesman I’ve ever seen in 
my life. And he w as a great leader. And w e were very grateful for his contribution. He 
kept the thing rolling.
Can I take you further back. You started at a time when Bill Lyons was still around. 
Did you meet him? Did you get to know him at all?
I didn’t get to know  him , but m y dad knew him. I have a few  pictures o f  my father with  
Bill Lyons. Y ou know  the w hole thing after that was a real m ess, you know with the 
changes -  Jaguar-Rover-Triumph, British Leyland and all that. It was so nice when John 
Egan cam e along because he pulled everything together. Thatcher w as Prime Minister 
then and she and Egan thought the same about unions and privatising and all that. It 
worked out very w ell for us. W e used to watch him when he was around on the assembly
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line and speaking to the union people. H e’d got a nasty streak about him. His demeanour 
changed com pletely. He did not like his workforce. He wanted to change it.
You mentioned earlier about the volume taking off in the early 1980s. Why was 
that? Why did Jaguar suddenly become popular in the States?
The Series I and the Series II and III were all pretty good-looking cars. The Series III by 
1980 had more or less been perfected. It worked very w ell. It was a nice size, and it was a 
pretty car, and it w as a com petitive car. It just caught on -  the stars were lined up 
properly. Compared to the XJ40 it was a very good car. It had som e o f  those things that 
would go, but you could deal with that. It handled beautifully. It was a nice little car. It 
would be totally bad by today’s standards because everyone’s gone so far past that, but it 
was the right car.
But by 1979 Jaguar had a pretty bad reputation in the US didn’t it?
It was a reputation that still lingers, although it’s pretty much gone now. It was very 
tough overcom ing it.
Mike Dale was telling me that the research that they did -  that is, Jaguar in the US -  
showed that by 1990 about three-quarters of the luxury buying market wouldn’t 
even go into a Jaguar showroom...
That was alw ays the problem. Our problem was always getting people to com e in. Even 
today w e ’re not on a lot o f  p eop le’s lists. Today, Lexus, BM W , and M ercedes dominate 
in our market. I’m also a Cadillac dealer and Cadillac, which would sell around 200,000  
cars a year in the U S , still isn ’t on a lot o f  people’s lists.
In the late 1908s you had Lexus and Infiniti coming out. How much of the downturn 
in Jaguar sales in the late 1980s was down to these Japanese models coming out, and 
how much was down to the fact that the XJ40 had such a bad reputation by then?
I was one o f  the founding Infiniti dealers. They took market share, there’s no question 
about it. But i f  they hadn’t been there I think the results would have been the same. Let 
me give you an exam ple o f  what happened. In 1959 or 1960 Renault sold hardly anything 
in the US. They changed som ething in the car, the Dauphine, and they sold almost
100.000 cars. About eighteen months later they went out o f  business. They’d sold
100.000 bad cars. In M ay 1987 through to the follow ing May to September I sold  
seventeen hundred bad XJ40s. I must say that Jaguar, to their credit, would pay, pay, pay, 
and pay to repair them. They never said no to the customers. In 1989 rather than have 
people w ho had 1988 Jaguars sue them they would try and get som e m oney from them  
and put them in a new  car. It was aw ful. Jaguar started knocking away at it and in a few  
years the car w as a lot better. Parts were a horror too. In every manufacturer there’s 
always a part that fails and you can’t get them because no one anticipated the failure.
With Jaguar there were som e things you just couldn’t get!
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